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1. Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
To be sustainable in the long run, balance is required.  Law is no exception.  It needs 
to continuously evolve and adapt to society, to regulate not only every situation already 
occurring, but also future unforeseen and unforeseeable circumstances and human behavior.  
The constant evolution of society impacts the law in two ways (often seen complementary 
rather than alternative): the need to introduce new regulations and the development of 
innovative case law.  The legislative bulimia that affects an ever increasing number of 
countries seems to point in the direction of the first method rather than the second way, at 
least in civil law jurisdictions.  The production of new legislation is however often slow and 
sluggish and fails to keep up with a dynamic and ever-changing society. 
Antitrust law seems to be the exception.  The flexibility built in its brief provisions 
delineates its chameleonic traits and makes it a universal, all-encompassing, regulation, 
oblivious to the passing of time.  IP law is instead perceived as more rigid, having sacrificed 
flexibility on the altar of legal certainty.  This is supposed to be what society wants, certainty.  
At the same time, however, people tend not to like strings and snares (lacci e lacciuoli) and want 
rules aligned with their everyday reality.  Rules should keep the game fair and entertaining, not 
end up being purposeless and ineffective burdens. 
A question thus follows, what is the purpose of the law?  The answer to this question 
would require a thesis on its own but for the purposes of this work it will need to be 
answered in a few lines.  Every rule has one (or more) immediate purpose(s) and every 
purpose is different.  However, in a democracy it is (or should be) the people that are 
regulating,1 and it is the interest of the people that the law (every law) is pursuing.  This is 
often forgotten, sometimes considered too distant of an objective from the case to be 
decided.  It is true, not every decision can deal with what is best for the people, but the 
thought needs nonetheless to be always there.  The reason is simple, society evolves, needs 
change, new laws are passed, and conducts in the interest of the few and to the detriment of 
the many change shape and form to slip into the cracks of the legal system.  The law is used 
as a shield not to protect society but to protect against society.  Society itself creates and pays 
for the weapon used to its detriment.   
This is what this work is ultimately about.  Is IP law a weapon for or against the 
people?2  What is the role of competition law in IP-related conducts?  This work aims to 
demonstrate that IP is (rectius, can be) as flexible as antitrust and courts should apply it 
according to its principles, objectives and ratio.  IP and antitrust share a common (direct or 
indirect) objective, enhance long-term consumer welfare.3  They do it in different ways, using 
                                                 
1  The term democracy comes from the Greek δῆμος (dêmos) „people‟ and κράτος 
(kratos) „power‟ or „rule‟, democracy is thus „rule of the people‟. 
2  For the purposes of this work, the terms “people”, “society”, and “consumers” will 
be often used interchangeably. 
3  This work is premised on the so-called theory of complementarity (expression used, 
inter alia, by O. Kolstad, Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights – Outline of an 
Economics-based Approach, in J. Drexl (ed.), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law, Edward Elgar, 2008), on the basis of which antitrust and IP rules complement each 
other converging towards the common objective of enhancing consumer welfare.  Antitrust 
intervention is thus aimed at correcting defects of the IP system that prevent it from reaching its 
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different tools, but their purpose, the ratio of their existence, coincides.  As traditionally 
applied (although this “tradition” is not common to every court, practitioner or scholar, quite 
the opposite), IP has forgotten its (indirect) “pro-consumer” objective,4 while antitrust is 
sometimes oblivious to the relevance of “long-term” effects.5  By looking at how courts and 
scholars have qualified conducts at the intersection between IP, traditionally concerned about 
long-term innovation rather than short-term consumer welfare, and antitrust, traditionally 
viewed as per-se opposing monopolies, this work comes at the conclusion that the ultimate 
objective of IP and antitrust does not fundamentally differ and the two sets of regulations 
complement and strengthen each other.6 
                                                                                                                                                   
objectives.  These principles can be found, e.g., at par. 7 of the European Commission Guidelines on 
the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to technology 
transfer agreements, 2014/C 89/03, 28 March 2014: “[B]oth bodies of law share the same basic objective of 
promoting consumer welfare and an efficient allocation of resources. Innovation constitutes an essential and dynamic 
component of an open and competitive market economy.  Intellectual property rights promote dynamic competition by 
encouraging undertakings to invest in developing new or improved products and processes.  So does competition by putting 
pressure on undertakings to innovate.  Therefore, both intellectual property rights and competition are necessary to 
promote innovation and ensure a competitive exploitation thereof.”  See also the U.S. Department of Justice and 
Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 6 April 
1995, par. 1, “The intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws share the common purpose of promoting innovation 
and enhancing consumer welfare.  The intellectual property laws provide incentives for innovation and its dissemination 
and commercialization by establishing enforceable property rights for the creators of new and useful products, more 
efficient processes, and original works of expression. […]  The antitrust laws promote innovation and consumer welfare 
by prohibiting certain actions that may harm competition with respect to either existing or new ways of serving 
consumers.” 
4  See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502, 1917, pp. 518-
519 (“Such a restriction is invalid because […] to enforce it would be to create a monopoly in the manufacture and use 
of moving picture films wholly outside of the patent in suit and of the patent law as we have interpreted it. […]  A 
restriction which would give to the plaintiff such a potential power for evil over an industry which must be recognized as 
an important element in the amusement life of the nation […] is plainly void because wholly without the scope and 
purpose of our patent laws, and because, if sustained, it would be gravely injurious to that public interest, which we have 
seen is more a favorite of the law than is the promotion of private fortunes.”)  While patents may increase costs to 
society in the short term by restricting competition, they often generate greater and more dynamic 
benefits as a result of innovators striving to be the first to bring a new or improved product to the 
market.  In turn, consumers benefit from having more innovation in the long term and a wide range 
of products at arguably lower (or differentiated) prices.  While static efficiency may increase consumer 
welfare in the short run, dynamic efficiency, including societal gains from innovation, is an even 
greater driver of consumer welfare in the long run.  See N. Economides, W.N. Hebert, Patents and 
Antitrust: Application to Adjacent Markets, 6 Journal on Telecommunication & High Technology 
Law, 2008, p. 457 (“At least in theory, the grant of a patent trades a reduction in allocative and possibly productive 
static efficiency for an increase in innovative activity.  Under the assumption that innovative activity is underprovided 
without patents, some increase in innovative activity will increase dynamic efficiency”). 
5  See T. Curzon Price, M. Walker, Incentives to Innovate v Short-term Price Effects in 
Antitrust Analysis, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2016, pp. 1-3, who repeatedly 
stress the importance of dynamic efficiency in competition policy (“competition policy should be concerned 
with facilitating dynamic efficiency, and not just static efficiency. […]  Our view is that competition policy has 
traditionally under-valued dynamic competition considerations and instead has focused too much on static efficiency. 
[…][A] competition authority needs to facilitate the competitive environment within which innovation can take place”.) 
6  See footnote 3 above.  This position has been recently confirmed by S. Tokic, The 
Role of Consumers in Deterring Settlement Agreements Based on Invalid Patents: The Case of Non-
Practicing Entities, Stanford Tech. Law Review, 2012, p. 2, noting that antitrust law and patent law are 
complementary, as both share the same goal of “promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare”.  As 
said by the U.S. Supreme Court, “patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the ‗scope of the 
patent monopoly‘ – and consequently antitrust law immunity – that is conferred by a patent.” (FTC v. Actavis, 133 
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To study the intersection between IP and antitrust, with a focus on consumer welfare, 
there is no better industry than the pharmaceutical one.  It stands at the crossroads of 
numerous and diverse policy objectives, as well as technical and administrative intricacies and 
social issues: public health and consumer welfare, health and safety regulations and patent 
law, competition and innovation.7   
Aim of this work is to show that IP and antitrust can (and should) be interpreted and 
applied with consumer welfare as their ultimate goal, thus to ensure both continuing 
innovation (by protecting inventors from free-riding) and access to drugs (in terms of limiting 
excessive pricing and eliminating barriers to generic entry). 
1.2. Pharmaceutical Market Dimension (and Significance) 
The importance of the pharmaceutical industry is not merely theoretical.  
Pharmaceuticals represent a major economic sector whose significance keeps on rising.  In 
2008, global pharmaceutical sales amounted to nearly $800 billion.  In 2013, they were already 
close to $1 trillion, which was reached and passed in the course of 2014.  On average, the 
growth rate between 2005 and 2014 has been of 6% per year.8  
Globally, the biggest markets are still the U.S. and Europe, with a joint share of total 
sales above 60% and sales in 2014 amounting to $406 billion and $243 billion respectively.9  
                                                                                                                                                   
S.Ct., 2013, p. 2231)  As clearly stated by T. Curzon Price, M. Walker, Incentives to Innovate v Short-
term Price Effects in Antitrust Analysis, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2016, p. 3, 
“Caring about dynamic efficiency and thinking that this is often under-valued by competition authorities do NOT imply 
that competition authorities should automatically take a non-interventionist stance.  Certainly, in the presence of dynamic 
efficiency concerns, it is important to avoid focusing too much on static harm and on trying to micro-manage or micro-
intervene.  But this is not the same as taking a 'hands-off' approach.  Indeed, […] there are increasingly frequent 
situations in which caring about dynamic efficiency implies greater intervention than would be justified purely on the basis 
of static efficiency concerns.” 
7  “The pharmaceutical industry presents some of the most challenging issues in antitrust law.  Several 
characteristics demonstrate its complexity.  Markets are nuanced.  Multiple regulatory regimes apply.  Generic entry is 
an event with dramatic consequences.  These characteristics have encouraged brand-name drug firms to engage in an array 
of conduct that exploits this complexity to delay generic entry.” (M.A. Carrier, United States.  Pharmaceutical 
Antitrust Law in the United States, in G. Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition and Patent Law 
in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  An International Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, p. 477)  As the European 
Commission notes: “Fair payment mechanisms and sustainable and predictable expenditures are required to 
guarantee access while effective competition among pharmaceutical companies and sufficient rewards for innovation are 
crucial to foster innovation.  Hence issues related to pharmaceutical expenditure require a comprehensive approach 
design” (Commission Staff Working Document, Pharmaceutical Industry: A Strategic Sector For The 
European Economy, SWD(2014) 216 final/2, 1 July 2014, p. 9). 
8  See http://www.imshealth.com/files/web/Corporate/News/Top-
Line%20Market%20Data/2014/World%20figures%202014.pdf, accessed on 6 August 2016.  See also 
http://thomsonreuters.com/en/press-releases/2014/thomson-reuters-annual-pharmaceutical-
factbook-projects-industrys-sales-will-reach-1-trillion-in-2014.html, accessed on 6 August 2016. 
9  See http://www.imshealth.com/files/web/Corporate/News/Top-
Line%20Market%20Data/Global%20Prescription%20Sales%20Information5%20World%20figures%
20by%20Region%202015-2019.pdf, accessed on 6 August 2016; see also EFPIA, The Pharmaceutical 
Industry in Figures, Key Data, 2014, available at: 
http://www.efpia.eu/uploads/Figures_2014_Final.pdf, p. 4, accessed on 6 August 2016.  In the EU, 
public spending on health accounts for over 7% of GDP.  By 2060, public expenditure on acute 
health care and long-term care is expected to rise potentially reaching 9% of GDP (Commission Staff 
Working Document, Pharmaceutical Industry: A Strategic Sector For The European Economy, 
SWD(2014) 216 final/2, 1 July 2014, p. 3). 
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This is probably linked to both the cost of developing new drugs, that U.S. and European 
companies have the resources to bear, and the (consequential) cost of new drugs for 
consumers, too expensive for most of the population of second and third world countries. 
The geographical allocation of (R&D, production and) sales, as well as the importance 
in shaping the legal landscape, confirms it is appropriate to focus on U.S. and EU IP and 
antitrust laws.  Not only these two bodies of laws served and serve as reference for 
governments and authorities all over the world; they also regulate the conducts of some of 
the biggest companies operating worldwide. 
Structurally, the pharmaceutical industry is characterized by a large number of drugs 
and companies.  Markets are however usually very narrow, comprising a limited number of 
interchangeable drugs (often as low as one or two), and profitability varies significantly.  The 
top-10 drugs accounted for almost $90 billion in 201410 and the top-10 companies‟ sales 
reached $360 billion.11  These numbers help painting the picture of an industry in which a 
single “blockbuster drug” is capable of ensuring its patent holder revenues from 5 to 10 
billion every year, and ten companies are in charge of more than 1/3 of total industry sales 
worldwide.  Not only.  The pharmaceutical industry has been identified as one of the top 
performing industry in the U.S., counting on return on revenues and return on assets around 
18%, compared to an average of 4-5% for Fortune 500 companies.12  As recently stated,  
“[t]he U.S. pharmaceutical industry has been topping the list of the most profitable sectors in the 
U.S. economy for almost two decades, never dropping below third place; an accomplishment 
unmatched by any other manufacturing sector.”13 
1.3. Pharmaceutical Industry Structure – The Players 
The biggest players in the industry, those developing and marketing innovative drugs, 
are called “originators”.  They are often large multinational companies investing substantial 
sums into R&D with the objective to discover, develop, manufacture and commercialize new 
drugs.14  Originators‟ products are usually patent protected, allowing them to recoup the 
significant upfront investment in research and development and providing them with a strong 
incentive to take the risk and invest the amounts necessary to continue innovating.15  
On the supply side, the industry is also characterized by the presence of another 
                                                 
10  See http://www.imshealth.com/files/web/Corporate/News/Top-
Line%20Market%20Data/2014/Top_20_Global_Products_2014.pdf, accessed on 6 August 2016. 
11  See http://www.imshealth.com/files/web/Corporate/News/Top-
Line%20Market%20Data/2014/Top_20_Global_Corporations_2014.pdf, accessed on 6 August 2016. 
12  M.O. Adams, Drugs Company Profits In The United States: Are They Excessive? 
Evidence from Public Administration Perspectives, 4(2) Journal of Business & Economics Research, 
2006, p. 85. 
13  M. Boldrin, D.K. Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, pp. 255-257. 
14  “In addition to large originator companies there are numerous SMEs, which typically lack the 
resources required to conduct all necessary steps from basic research to the marketing and distribution of the finished 
product.  SMEs in the pharmaceutical sector, therefore, tend to specialise in innovation in a well-defined and narrow field 
(niche), for example focusing on specific indications or pharmaceutical formulations” (European Commission, 
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working_paper_part1.pdf, 
accessed on 6 August 2016 par. 55). 
15  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, p. 2132. 
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player, the generic company.  Generic companies (or generic manufacturers) manufacture and 
sell drugs that are “bioequivalent” to drugs already in the market, once their patent has 
expired (or is found invalid).  Generic drugs are defined by Directive 2001/83/EC16, Art. 
10(2)(b), as drugs having “the same qualitative and quantitative composition in active substances and the 
same pharmaceutical form as the reference [drug], and whose bioequivalence with the reference [drug] has been 
demonstrated by appropriate bioavailability studies.  The different salts, esters, ethers, isomers, mixtures of 
isomers, complexes or derivatives of an active substance shall be considered to be the same active substance, 
unless they differ significantly in properties with regard to safety and/or efficacy.”17 
In sum, generic drugs contain the same quantity and quality of active substance and 
are in the same pharmaceutical form as the originator (“reference” or “brand-name”) drug, 
but might contain different salts or esters, provided that they do not affect the drug‟s safety 
or efficacy. 
The process to obtain the authorization to market the generic version of a drug is 
usually less burdensome than that provided for the brand-name drug.  Generic companies 
need to file a so-called “abridged” application, which does not require new pre-clinical tests 
and clinical trials, being sufficient to rely on those submitted for the reference product, 
provided that bioequivalence is demonstrated.18 
Generic companies compete between each other and with originators mainly on price 
and efficiency.  Generic products are sold at significantly lower prices (up to 90% lower) than 
brand-name drugs, and generic entry generally leads to a shift of volumes from the originator 
to the generic companies (unless the market moved to a second generation product before 
generic entry). 
1.4. Generic Drug Prices and Generic Substitution 
The importance of generics entry cannot be underestimated.  The entire patent system 
(and the difficult balance it strikes between short-term price competition and long-term 
innovation) is premised on the idea that patent rights are limited in time.  As soon as the 
patent expires, society expects to benefit from competitive prices on the once patented 
product (in this case a drug), close to its marginal cost (notoriously very low in the case of 
drugs).  This is particularly relevant in the pharmaceutical industry, where a decrease in prices 
means increased access to drugs and lower health expenditure for consumers, hospitals, 
insurances and States. 
                                                 
16  Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 
November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use. 
17  In the U.S., the FDA defines generic drugs as “copies of brand-name drugs [which] are the 
same as those brand name drugs in dosage form, safety, strength, route of administration, quality, performance 
characteristics and intended use.” (see FDA, Understanding Generic Drugs, 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/Understand
ingGenericDrugs/, accessed on 6 August 2016) 
18  Art. 10 of Directive 2001/83/EC provides: “the applicant shall not be required to provide 
the results of pre-clinical tests and of clinical trials if he can demonstrate that the medicinal product is a generic of a 
reference medicinal product which is or has been authorised under Article 6 for not less than eight years in a Member 
State or in the Community”.  Regulation in the US does not differ significantly (see Orange Book Preface, 
available at http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/ucm079068.htm, accessed on 6 
August 2016).  A generic drug is considered bioequivalent if it contains the same active pharmaceutical 
ingredient as the originator drug, is the same dosage, strength and form, and exhibits a similar rate and 
extent of absorption. 
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Studies show that the first generic enters the market at approximately 80% of the 
price of the brand-name drug.19  In analyzing drugs that for the first time faced generic 
competition between 2000 and 2007, also the European Commission found that generics 
became available at a price about 25% lower than the originator‟s before patent expiry.20  As 
the number of generics increases, prices to consumers decrease even further.  Two years after 
generic entry, prices have been estimated to be as low as 40% below the price charged by the 
originator before loss of exclusivity.21  Recently, the European Commission found that “price 
drops of up to 90% were observed upon generic entry to the UK market”. 22  In the U.S., the FTC has 
shown a price decrease of 85% on average from pre-entry brand-name drug price.23 
As a result of price competition, as well as policies and regulations favoring drug 
substitution, substantial volume shifts from the originator company to the generic companies 
take place just after generic entry.  It has been estimated that brand-name drugs retain only 
14% of their prescription volume 12 months after generic entry.24  A different study 
concluded that “sales of originator drugs drop as much as 75 percent within weeks following the entry of a 
generic copy into the market.”25  Recently, generic penetration in the U.S. has been calculated in 
80% six month after expiration of the patent and first generic entry.26   
In its sector inquiry, the European Commission has estimated that generic entry in the 
EU happens on average seven months after patent expiry (only four months for the highest 
                                                 
19  See FTC, Authorized Generic Drugs: Short-Term Effects and Long-Term Impacts, 
2011, p. 48, available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/authorized-
generic-drugs-short-term-effects-and-long-term-impact-report-federal-trade-commission/authorized-
generic-drugs-short-term-effects-and-long-term-impact-report-federal-trade-commission.pdf, accessed 
on 6 August 2016. 
20  European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009, par. 
1560. 
21  European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009, par. 
1560.  An analysis by the FDA estimated that the first generic is priced only about 6% lower than the 
brand drug.  Entry of a second generic lowers the price to approximately half the brand-name drug 
price.  Generic drug prices fall to 33% of the brand-name drug price when five generic competitors 
are in the market, and where six or more generics are present, prices fall to a quarter of the brand-
name drug price.  The price drops to 13% of the original price when the generics in the market reach 
15 (FDA, Generic Competition and Drug Prices, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/uc
m129385.htm, accessed on 6 August 2016.  
22  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 3.  See also 
par. 1149 (“[I]n the present case, when generic entry did eventually take place in the UK, following the rejection by the 
Court of Appeal to continue the injunction which had been granted against Apotex at first instance, Servier‘s volumes 
eroded significantly as the average market price dropped by as much as 90%”). 
23  FTC, Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions, 2010, 
p. 8. 
24  M. Aitken, E.R. Berndt, D.M. Cutler, Prescription Drug Spending Trends in the 
United States: Looking Beyond the Turning Point, Health Affairs, 2009, w155. 
25  G. Glover, Prepared Witness Testimony before the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, “Recent Developments Which May Impact Consumer Access to, and Demand for, 
Pharmaceuticals,” 13 June 2001. 
26  IMS, The Use of Medicines in the United States: Review of 2011, 2012, available at: 
https://www.imshealth.com/files/web/IMSH%20Institute/Reports/The%20Use%20of%20Medicin
es%20in%20the%20United%20States%202011/IHII_Medicines_in_U.S_Report_2011.pdf, accessed 
on 6 August 2016. 
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selling drugs)27 and generic penetration rate reaches 30% one year after entry and 45% after 
two years.28  As seen above, if these figures were to be confirmed, this would mark a sharp 
difference between generic penetration in the U.S. and in the EU. 
The use of generics has generated large savings for consumers.  In 2013 alone, the 
Generic Pharmaceutical Association estimated that the U.S. health care system saved $239 
billion thanks to generics.29  In the EU, the Commission estimated that between 2000 and 
2007 generic drugs contributed to save approximately €15 Billion within the European 
Union.30 
In addition to the price decrease, the presence of generic firms in the marketplace is a 
factor stimulating originators to innovate.  With generic entry originators lose most of their 
market share and profits – to maintain their revenue flows, originators are thus incentivized 
to research and develop new, patentable drugs.31  As noted by the European Commission,  
“Originator and generic companies […] agree that generic competition creates and maintains 
incentives for innovation.  Since generic competition limits the period during which originator 
companies can recoup their investments, originator companies are incentivised to constantly search for 
new medicines”.32 
1.5. Tendency and the Future 
Promote innovation and ensure access to necessary drugs to the highest number of 
individuals, while keeping public health spending under control, has characterized the latest 
years‟ development of both regulation and enforcement.  As clearly stated by the European 
Commission: 
“[T]he challenge during the years to come consists in finding a balance between the emergences of new 
and often more costly pharmaceutical therapies and the legitimate expectation of patients to get access 
to innovative and effective medicines, on the one hand, and the need to ensure sustainable public 
healthcare budgets on the other hand. […]  Public authorities face the challenge to accommodate 
different objectives with constrained resources, i.e. striking a balance between guaranteeing patients‘ 
access to state-of-the-art medical treatment and ensuring that incentives are provided for the industry to 
                                                 
27  The delay in generic entry reported by the European Commission is probably due to 
the fact that an explicit exception to patent infringement from conducting the necessary studies and 
trials to enter the market has been introduced in the EU only in 2004 (Art. 10.6 Directive 
2001/83/EC, as amended in 2004, provides: “conducting the necessary studies and trials with a view to the 
application of paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 and the consequential practical requirements shall not be regarded as contrary to 
patent rights or to supplementary protection certificates for medicinal products”). 
28  European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009, par. 
232. 
29  FTC, Concordia Healthcare/Par Pharmaceutical, Docket NOs. C-4553 and C-4554, 
Complaint, 30 October 2015, p. 17. 
30  European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009, par. 
219. 
31  C. Priddis, The Pharmaceutical Sector, Intellectual Property Rights, and Competition 
Law in Europe, in S. Anderman, A. Ezrachi (eds.), Intellectual Property and Competition Law: New 
Frontiers, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 248. 
32  European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009, par. 
92. 
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continue to invest in pharmaceutical R&D.”33 
In the U.S., producers of generic drugs got an easier access to the market in 1984, 
thanks to the introduction of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  In 1996, 22 years later, generics 
reached 43% of the prescription segment in the U.S., more than double what it was before 
the Act.34  
On the enforcement side, since the mid-1970‟s, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) dedicated a division within the Bureau of Competition to investigate potential antitrust 
violations in the health care sector.  The Health Care Division consists of approximately 
thirty-five officials who work exclusively on health care and pharmaceutical antitrust matters.  
In a recent speech, Bill Baer, Assistant Attorney General for the U.S. Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division, reiterated the importance of the pharmaceutical industry in everybody‟s 
everyday life.35  A similar position was expressed by Edith Ramirez, chairwoman of the FTC: 
“Protecting American consumers from anticompetitive conduct by pharmaceutical companies continues 
to be one of the Commission‘s most important responsibilities.  The Commission is committed to 
enforcing the antitrust laws in pharmaceutical markets to promote competition and prevent conduct 
that is likely to harm consumer welfare.”36 
At the European level, the importance of the pharmaceutical industry is long 
recognized and has been expressed with emphasis by the at-the-time Commissioner for 
Competition, Neelie Kroes, in opening the inquiry into this sector.37  In her speech, she 
noted:  
“I chose the pharmaceuticals sector to be the focus of the Commission‘s next sector inquiry because in 
my term as Competition Commissioner I have focused on solving competition problems that make a 
difference to the lives of individuals.  Few things make more of a difference than this.  The 
pharmaceuticals sector is vital to the health of Europe‘s citizens.  As well as being a vital sector of the 
economy, medicines are a major expense.  Medicines cost us all a lot of money– we spend around 200 
billion euros each year on pharmaceuticals; that‘s around 400 euros for every man, woman and child 
in the 27 Member States of the European Union.”38 
                                                 
33  Commission Staff Working Document, Pharmaceutical Industry: A Strategic Sector 
For The European Economy, SWD(2014) 216 final/2, 1 July 2014, pp. 7-9. 
34  M. Boldrin, D.K. Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, pp. 241-242. 
35  “The rising cost of health care affects Americans every time they pay their health insurance premium, 
visit a doctor, receive hospital care, and fill a prescription.  Because health care is fundamental to our lives, we share an 
interest in maintaining and fostering competitive markets that will keep prices in check, improve quality and spur 
innovation.” (B. Baer, Workshop on Examining Health Care Competition Opening Remarks, 25 
February 2015, p. 1, available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518886/download, accessed on 6 
August 2016) 
36  E. Ramirez, Oversight of the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, speech before the 
U.S. Senate, 9 March 2016, available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/934563/160309enforcementantitru
stlawstest.pdf, accessed on 6 August 2016. 
37  The European Commission launched its pharmaceutical sector inquiry in January 
2008, following signals of declining innovation regarding new chemical agents and delayed market 
entry of generic medicines.  It covered the period 2000-2007 and investigated a sample of 219 drugs. 
38  N. Kroes, Commission launches sector inquiry into pharmaceuticals, 16 January 2008, 
available at europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-08-18_en.htm?locale=en, accessed on 6 August 
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In a recent document, the European Commission reiterated the importance of a well-
functioning pharmaceutical market emphasizing that the demographic transition the EU is 
undergoing, with the number of EU residents aged 65 and over expected to increase from 92 
million in 2013 to 148 million in 2060, is one of the major challenges for the financial 
sustainability of the health care systems.39  In its recent conclusions on strengthening the 
balance in the pharmaceutical systems in the European Union and its Member States, the 
Council of the European Union invited the European Commission to “[c]ontinue and where 
possible intensify […] the monitoring, methods development and investigation […] of potential cases of market 
abuse, excessive pricing as well as other market restrictions specifically relevant to the pharmaceutical 
companies operating within the EU, such in accordance with Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on 
Functioning of the European Union.”40 
Not only the U.S. and the EU are taking steps to address potential issues in the 
pharmaceutical market, the need to find the right balance between intellectual property and 
competition policy in this sector is at the center of attention also at the UN level.  To tackle 
this issue, in May 2014 the UN Development Programme published a guidebook for low- and 
middle-income countries on how to use competition law to promote access to drugs.41 
1.6. Cost and Time of Developing a Drug 
One of the most important things to keep in mind to ensure the correct balancing of 
short term price competition and long term innovation in the pharmaceutical sector is that 
pharmaceutical R&D is extremely expensive.  The research and development involved in the 
creation of a new drug is usually significant, both in terms of time and cost, while the 
marginal cost of production (and of „copying‟) is typically low.42  This is the main reason why 
patents are so important in the pharmaceutical industry,43 and why regulators and antitrust 
                                                                                                                                                   
2016.  The importance of a competitive pharmaceutical market has been recently emphasized by the 
European Commissioner for Competition Margrethe Vestager, who noted that “there can be times when 
prices get so high that they just can‘t be justified. After all, people rely on these medicines for their health, even their 
lives.” (M. Vestager, Protecting consumers from exploitation, 21 November 2016, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/protecting-consumers-
exploitation_en, accessed on 11 December 2016) 
39  This is due to the fact that “health-related spending generally increases with the age of a person 
and the prevalence of chronic diseases like diabetes or dementia will rise with an ageing population” (Commission 
Staff Working Document, Pharmaceutical Industry: A Strategic Sector For The European Economy, 
SWD(2014) 216 final/2, 1 July 2014, p. 3). 
40  Council conclusions on strengthening the balance in the pharmaceutical systems in 
the European Union and its Member States (2016/C 269/06), 23 July 2016, par. 48, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016XG0723(03), accessed on 
11 December 2016. 
41  The in-depth report is available at: 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/hiv-aids/using-competition-law-to-
promote-access-to-medicine.html, accessed on 6 August 2016. 
42  Generic drugs are much easier and cheaper to develop than brand-name ones.  The 
involved R&D is minimal, as is the risk of unsuccessful attempts.  The same goes for the time and 
cost of obtaining the marketing authorization, since generic manufacturers can usually rely on the 
results of the clinical test conducted by the originator (provided they demonstrate bioequivalence). 
43  “The pharmaceutical industry is a textbook example of a science based sector characterised by high 
R&D costs, uncertainty and spill overs, for which patent protection assures appropriable, thus providing incentives for 
innovation” (L. Magazinni, F. Pammolli, M. Riccaboni, M.A. Rossi, Patent Disclosure and R&D 
Competition in Pharmaceuticals, 18 Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 2009, p. 467). 
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enforcement agencies should be careful in their activity, not only to avoid diminishing the 
incentives to invest, but also to actively promote investments in more advanced and 
affordable drugs.  As Professor Merges points out: 
“[T]here is one consistent finding across all the empirical literature on patents, one canonical truth 
that has been repeatedly established and confirmed beyond a peradventure of doubt: the 
pharmaceutical industry needs patents to survive. […]  If there is one industry where the conventional 
―incentive theory‖ of patents is actually true, it is the pharmaceutical industry.  As a result, it is 
equally well understood that eliminating or weakening patent protection in this industry would 
significantly reduce the volume of R&D and consequently the supply of new drugs”.44 
The importance of patent protection is emphasized also by Professors Boldrin and 
Levine, who identified the pharmaceutical industry as “the poster-child of every intellectual monopoly 
supporter.  It is the vivid example that, without the sheltering patents provide inventors with, the outpouring of 
new wonder drugs we have grown accustomed to would have not materialized, our life expectancies would be a 
lot shorter, and millions of people would have died of the diseases Big Pharma has instead managed to cure”.45 
The patent system balances the interest of the inventor to recoup the investments 
necessary to bring a new drug to the market, with the broader interest of society to have 
access to new and improved cures at affordable prices.  Without a patent system, generic 
manufacturers would “free-ride” on the originator‟s R&D expense,46 investments in the 
development of new drugs would not guarantee adequate returns, and investors would put 
their money in more lucrative activities.  The result would be suboptimal level of new drugs 
creation to the detriment of society.47  
Although originators are very cautious in disclosing data regarding the cost of 
developing a new active principle,48 it has been estimated that the costs of bringing a 
“breakthrough” invention, often called New Molecular Entity (NME), to the market have 
increased substantially over the years.  While in 1975 development costs have been estimated 
in $149 million (in year 2000 prices), in 2000 development costs had increased to more than 
                                                 
44  R.P. Merges, Justifying Intellectual Property, Harvard University Press, 2011, p. 289. 
45  M. Boldrin, D.K. Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, p. 242. 
46  “Given the clear disparity between the high cost and risk of innovation in the pharmaceutical sector 
and the low cost and risk of imitation, it is self-evident that exclusivity and thus protection from imitation is needed if 
there is to be innovation” (EFPIA, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceuticals, 2008, p. 15, available at: 
http://www.efpia.eu/uploads/Modules/Documents/efpia-ipr_annex-20080616.pdf, accessed on 6 
August 2016).  See also Council Directive 2004/48/EC of 29 April, 2004 on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, OJ L 195/16–25, Recital 3 (“[W]ithout effective means of enforcing intellectual 
property rights, innovation and creativity are discouraged and investment diminished.”) 
47  See C. Bohannan, H.J. Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, 51 
Boston College Law Review, 2010, p. 922 (“[M]arket failure is the starting point for IP laws, and it is market 
failure that gives rise to the need for legal entitlements.”). 
48  As reported by Professor Abbott, “[t]he cost of researching and developing originator 
pharmaceutical products is deliberately shrouded in mystery.  The originator pharmaceutical industry has aggressively 
resisted providing data regarding its R&D costs.  This resistance traces back as early as 1950s U.S. Senate 
investigations into pharmaceutical pricing in the United States, has manifested itself in litigation in countries as diverse 
as South Africa and India, and continues to this day as reflected in Gilead‘s refusal to provide R&D data to the U.S. 
Senate in response to request from the Finance Committee.” (F.M. Abbott, Excessive Pharmaceutical Prices 
and Competition Law: Doctrinal Development to Protect Public Health, 6(3) UC Irvine Law Review, 
forthcoming Spring 2017, p. 20, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2719095, accessed on 6 August 2016) 
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$800 million.49  From 2010 to 2015, the cost of bringing a new active ingredient from 
discovery to launch has been estimated as still on the rise, from $1.2 billion in 2010 to $1.6 
billion in 2016.50  As noted, “[w]ith R&D costs of such magnitude, it seems impossible to even dream of 
a pharmaceutical industry that could properly function and innovate in the absence of a very strong patent 
protection.”51   
Costs take into consideration also the R&D costs of failed attempts, which in the 
pharmaceutical industry are substantial.  The success rate for the development of a new drug 
is very low – typically less than 1% of the molecules discovered in pre-clinical tests enter the 
clinical trial stage,52 and only 16% of those survive the process of human clinical trials and 
gain drug approval.53  
The development of a new drug is not only expensive, it is also time-consuming.  As 
explained by the European Commission in the final report of its Pharmaceutical Sector 
                                                 
49  J.A. DiMasi, R.W. Hansen, H.G. Grabowski, The Price of Innovation: New 
Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. Health Econ., 2003; C.P. Adams, V. van Brantner, 
Estimating The Cost Of New Drug Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 Health Affairs, 2006; 
C.P. Adams, V. van Brantner, Spending on new drug development, 19 Health Economics, 2010.  Cost 
includes R&D, formulation and testing, animal studies, human clinical trials, failed attempts, 
opportunity cost of capital, and authorization procedure. 
50  Deloitte, Measuring the return from Pharmaceutical innovation, 2015, available at 
http://www2.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/life-sciences-and-healthcare/articles/measuring-return-
from-pharmaceutical-innovation.html, accessed on 6 August 2016.  Different results have been 
reached in 2014 by the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, summarized at 
http://csdd.tufts.edu/files/uploads/Tufts_CSDD_briefing_on_RD_cost_study_-
_Nov_18,_2014..pdf, accessed on 6 August 2016.  Tufts estimated that the cost per new prescription 
drug approval (inclusive of failures and capital costs) in 2013 was $2.558 billion.  The cost was $1.395 
billion out-of-pocket (i.e. not capitalized).  These figures have been heavily criticized inter alia by 
Doctors without Borders that observed that new drugs can be developed for $50 million, or up to 
$186 million taking failures into account, and Tufts‟s figures were “nowhere near what the industry 
claims is the cost” (Rohi Malpani, R&D Cost Estimates: MSF Response to Tufts CSDD Study on 
Cost to Develop a New Drug, 18 November 2014, available at 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/rd-cost-estimates-msf-response-tufts-csdd-study-cost-
develop-new-drug, accessed on 6 August 2016. 
51  M. Boldrin, D.K. Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, p. 244. 
52  H. Grabowski, Patents, innovation and access to new pharmaceuticals, 5 Journal of 
International Economic Law, 2002, p. 851. 
53  J.A. DiMasi and others, Trends in Risks Associated with New Drug Development: 
Success Rates for Investigational Drugs, 87 Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics, 2010, 272.  In the 
words of R. Jacob, Judge of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, “the nature of the investment is 
risky.  Most research leads nowhere.  The few winners must pay for all the losers.  And in recent years the number of 
really important drugs coming forward seems to be diminishing.  It is in the nature of investors – human that they are - 
that the higher the risk the more reward is needed to persuade them to put their money up.” (R. Jacob (Rt. Hon. Sir), 
Patents and Pharmaceuticals, paper given on 29th November at the Presentation of the Directorate-
General of Competition‟s Preliminary Report of the Pharma-Sector Inquiry, 27 September  2011, par. 
6, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/jacob.pdf, accessed 
on 6 August 2016).  As Professor Korah explains, “most attempts to find a cure for particular problems by the 
pharmaceutical companies do not work.  Of those that do, many never get far through their safety trials. So a small loss 
is made on most drugs. A few almost get to the market, but then some side effect appears and those cost the inventor a 
great deal. Only a few drugs are successful and the company must make a large profit on these to make up for the losses 
on the other, or R&D will not be worthwhile” (V. Korah, Merck v. Primecrown – The Exhaustion of 
Patents by Sale in a Member State where a Monopoly Profit Could not be Earned, 4 ECLR, 1997, 
273). 
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Inquiry, the life cycle of a medicine starts with the so-called “basic research”, where the 
molecular targets of a disease are identified and promising molecules, which interact with the 
targets, are determined.  This phase is usually 6 month to 2-3 years long and includes, in its 
last part, the application for patent protection.  The development phase follows and is usually 
divided into two stages: the pre-clinical tests, consisting of laboratory and animal tests, and 
the clinical trials, comprising three distinct clinical phases (so-called Phase I, II and III) 
directed towards progressively larger groups of patients, in which the efficacy of the drug is 
investigated.  The most significant costs are concentrated in Phase III which alone accounts 
on average for 60% of the total R&D budget.  The basic research and pre-clinical phase 
combined account only for 8% of the total expenditure, while the remaining 32% goes into 
Phase I and Phase II (12% and 20% respectively).54 
Once all phases have been completed, and delivered consistent results in terms of 
safety and efficacy, the company applies for a marketing authorization to launch the drug on 
the market.  From discovery of a new chemical compound, and correlated patent application, 
to the final market approval and product launch, the process has been estimated to last on 
average 12 to 13 years,55 during a big part of which patent protection is running.   
Originators apply for patent protection early in the research phase, several years 
before product launch.  While a patent lasts twenty years, due to the lengthy gap between 
discovery and approval of a new drug, the effective monopoly protection is estimated to last 
only 10 to 12 years – plus 3 to 5 years of extension.  The European Commission estimated 
that in 2007 the effective protection period from the date of launch of the pharmaceutical 
product to the first generic launch was approximately 14 years.  In 2000 the figure stood at 
10.5 years.56   
The need for patent protection in the pharmaceutical industry is obviously not 
disputed by this work, quite the contrary.  The development of a new drug, or its 
improvement, is immensely beneficial to society and should be incentivized.  The cost and 
time needed and the risks involved in developing a new drug make it very important that 
successful inventors (and investors) recoup all expenses and foregone investment 
opportunities, and are rewarded for their results.  The patent system is extremely beneficial to 
pharmaceutical R&D, and R&D is in turn indispensable to the discovery of new drugs, the 
cure of diseases, and ultimately the benefit of society.  As originators are profit-driven 
companies, it is the profits they make on new drugs that incentivize new investments in R&D 
and in turn translates into the creation of new, more beneficial, drugs. As eloquently stated by 
Abraham Lincoln almost 160 years ago,  
“Next came the Patent laws. […] Before then, any man might instantly use what another had 
invented; so that the inventor had no special advantage from his own invention.  The patent system 
changed this; secured to the inventor, for a limited time, the exclusive use of his invention; and thereby 
                                                 
54  European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009, pp. 
50-63, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/staff_working_paper_part1.pdf, 
accessed on 6 August 2016. 
55  EFPIA, The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures, Key Data, 2014, available at: 
http://www.efpia.eu/uploads/Figures_2014_Final.pdf, accessed on 6 August 2016, p. 6. 
56  European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009, par. 
164. 
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added the fuel of interest to the fire of genius, in the discovery and production of new and useful 
things.”57 
1.7. Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
We saw that the cost and time necessary to develop new drugs are significant.  The 
capital necessary to be able to sustain research, development and marketing of new drugs, 
including failed attempts, influence the composition of the market, characterized by the 
presence of a relatively small group of very big companies,58 whose blockbuster drugs ensure 
them massive profits.59  The industry is indeed operating on a “blockbuster drug” business 
model.60  As noted by the European Commission, “some blockbusters account for a very large share of 
total turnover of the companies concerned (up to 55%).  On average the most important blockbusters […] 
generate 19% of the total global turnover of the originator companies concerned.”61 
A blockbuster drug is defined as a drug that “achieves annual revenues of over US$1 billion 
at a global level”62.  Blockbuster drugs are often very innovative products that treat pathology 
not previously curable or represent a leap forward in terms of reduced side effects, overall 
effectiveness, or new pharmaceutical action.  Innovative products comprise new active 
ingredients, often called NME (new molecular entities).  NMEs are the substance for which 
pre-clinical test and clinical trials must be conducted, and which are given an International 
Non-proprietary Name (INN), which will define that active ingredient globally.  Recent years 
have seen a sharp decline in the number of approvals of NMEs.  The Commission reported 
that between 1994 and 1999 an average of 40 NMEs were launched every year.  The number 
dropped to 27 per year between 2000 and 2007.63 
This decrease in the number of NMEs is not necessarily problematic since follow-on 
and incremental innovation, i.e. further development of known substances, is as valuable and 
important, and may result in decisive improvements to the drug‟s effectiveness.64  In the 
                                                 
57  A. Lincoln, Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions, 1858, available at 
http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/discoveries.htm, accessed on 6 August 2016. 
58  As we saw supra, the top-ten companies accounted in 2014 for more than 1/3 of total 
worldwide sales. 
59  See supra.  The Commission explains: “the revenues from these products are often the backbone 
of many originator companies” (European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 
2009, par. 26). 
60  L.E. Battaglia, Drug Reformulation Regulatory Gaming: Enforcement and 
Innovation Implications, 7 European Competition Journal, 2011, p. 381. 
61  European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009, par. 
67. 
62  European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009, p. 
6. 
63  European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009, p. 
33. 
64  “[P]harmaceutical innovation is almost invariably incremental in nature, with most therapeutic 
advances building upon what has gone before.  Systems that seek only to reward ―breakthrough‖ innovations therefore 
risk undervaluing the great majority of innovations, which although incremental may represent real improvements in 
efficacy and/or reductions in side effects.” (Lundbeck, Pharmaceutical Pricing and Market Access, 2014, 
available at https://www.lundbeck.com/global/CSR/positions/pricing-and-market-access, accessed 
on 6 August 2016)  See also Glaxosmithkline, GSK Public policy positions. Incremental Innovation, 
April 2014, available at https://www.gsk.com/media/280854/incremental-innovation-policy.pdf, 
accessed on 6 August 2016 (“most pharmaceutical R&D is incremental – indeed, incremental innovation is the 
key to most major advances in the treatment and prevention of disease.”).  On the nature of innovation in the 
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words of Sir Isaac Newton, it could be said that modern pharmaceutical research is “standing 
on the shoulders of giants”.65 
The structure of the industry and the reliance on blockbuster drugs may however lead 
originators to put all their efforts into protecting revenues flowing from their most successful 
products, rather than seriously improving them (or replacing them with a radically different, 
more effective, drug) to the benefit of consumers.  Second generation products of 
questionable value are developed as a way to extend or strengthen patent protection on 
blockbuster drugs, with the sole purpose of keeping generics and competing originators out 
of the market. 
1.8. Marketing and Promotional Activities 
In an ideal world, companies would invest in R&D (and every other activity necessary 
to bring new drugs to the market), obtain patent protection and marketing authorization, 
market their drugs and, thanks to the success of their most innovative cures, make sufficient 
profits to fund new R&D projects.  Unfortunately the picture‟s colors are much less bright 
and defined.  In addition to the cumulative innovation conundrum discussed above, an 
interesting aspect of the pharmaceutical industry is the role of marketing initiatives. 
Although the pharmaceutical industry is one of the sectors with the highest ratio of 
R&D investments to net sales, having spent 14.4% of net sales on research and trials in 
2012,66 pharmaceutical companies spend more on marketing and sales than on R&D.67  The 
Commission estimated that European originator companies spent on average 23% of their 
global turnover in the period 2000-2007 on marketing and promotional activities (and 17% 
                                                                                                                                                   
pharmaceutical sector, see C.M. Correa, Ownership of knowledge. The role of patents in 
pharmaceutical R&D, 82 Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 2004, p. 785 (“Innovation in 
pharmaceuticals relies increasingly on the knowledge gleaned from preceding innovations and on generally available 
techniques […].  Innovation in this sector follows, therefore, an essentially ―cumulative‖ model of innovation, as opposed 
to the ―discrete‖ model, where the prospects of variations and improvements of inventions are substantially bounded”). 
65  Letter from Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (5 February 1676) (“What Descartes did 
was a good step.  You have added much several ways, and especially in taking the colours of thin plates into philosophical 
consideration.  If I have seen a little further it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants”).  As explained by Prof 
Shapiro, “The essence of science is cumulative investigation combined with hypothesis testing.  The notion of ―cumulative 
innovation,‖ each discovery building on many previous findings, is central to the scientific method.  Indeed, no respectable 
scientist would fail to recognize and acknowledge the crucial role played by his or her predecessors in establishing a 
foundation from which progress could be made.  […][M]ost basic and applied researchers are effectively standing on top 
of a huge pyramid, not just on one set of shoulders.  Of course, a pyramid can rise to far greater heights than could any 
one person, especially if the foundation is strong and broad.  But what happens if in order to scale the pyramid and place 
a new block on the top, a researcher must gain the permission of each person who previously placed a block in the 
pyramid, perhaps paying a royalty or tax to gain such permission?  Would this system of intellectual property rights slow 
down the construction of the pyramid or limit its height?” (C. Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross 
Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in A.B. Jaffe, J. Lerner, S. Stern, Innovation Policy and 
the Economy, MIT Press, 2001, pp. 119-120). 
66  EFPIA, The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures, Key Data, 2014, available at: 
http://www.efpia.eu/uploads/Figures_2014_Final.pdf, accessed on 6 August 2016, p. 10. 
67  Drugs sold on prescription cannot be advertised directly to consumers in the EEA.  
Originators can however advertise them to doctors through the so-called detailing, i.e. visits by 
medical sales representatives (European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, 
par. 2140). 
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on R&D).68 
Looking at the 2015 annual report of Novartis,69 the ratio between R&D and 
Marketing and Sales expenses, around 0.7 to 1, is in line with the European Commission‟s 
findings.70 
Expenses in marketing and sales might be of concern not only because they might be 
a way to disguise payments to doctors to favor certain drugs in their prescriptions,71 but also 
because they might be used by originators to persuade doctors, pharmacists, hospitals, and 
therefore consumers (patients, whose decisions are heavily influenced by doctors and 
pharmacists), to prefer their drug, notwithstanding the existence of more effective, or as 
effective and cheaper, alternatives (e.g., generics). 
The information asymmetry existing in the pharmaceutical industry makes consumers 
(and even doctors) particularly vulnerable to aggressive marketing and sales tactics, and over-
investment in marketing, as opposed to R&D, should not be in any way incentivized.  The 
same reasoning applies to legal expenses.72 
                                                 
68  European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009, 
paras. 72 and 74.  In addition, at paras. 76-77, the Commission reports that “the number of employees in 
marketing and sales departments is twice the number of those working in R&D.  In some companies, this ratio can 
reach even one employee in R&D to three in marketing.”  See also S.O. Schweitzer, Pharmaceutical 
Economics and Policy, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 82 (“While the R&D expenses varied between 
11% and 15% of annual sales for [originators], marketing and promotional expenses ranged from 21% to 40% of 
annual sales.”). 
69  Available at https://www.novartis.com/investors/financial-data/annual-results, 
accessed on 6 August 2016. 
70  These numbers seem even too generous.  Professors Boldrin and Levine found that 
“the top 30 firms spend about twice as much in promotion and advertising as they do in R&D; and the top 30 are 
where private R&D expenditure is carried out, in the industry.” (M. Boldrin, D.K. Levine, Against Intellectual 
Monopoly, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 255-257, who continues, “no more than 1/3 – more 
likely 1/4 – of new drug approvals are considered by the FDA to have therapeutic benefit over existing treatments, 
implying that, under the most generous hypotheses, only 25-30% of the total R&D expenditure goes toward new drugs.  
The rest […] goes toward the so called ―me-too‖ drugs”).  Me-too drugs, are those “structurally similar to – and 
that largely duplicate the action of – already patented medicines” (European Commission, Pharmaceutical 
Sector Inquiry, Preliminary Report, 28 November 2008, par 212, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/index.html, accessed on 6 August 
2016).  In other words, me-too products are usually based on new active substances – thus NMEs – 
but are launched on the market only after an innovative product was disclosed to the public.  Me-too 
products do not usually entail a genuine therapeutic progress and provide little added value in 
comparison to the rival‟s successful drug, ultimately representing an emulation exercise (for which 
marketing expenses are much more important than R&D)(C.M. Correa, Ownership of knowledge. 
The role of patents in pharmaceutical R&D, 82 Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 2004, p. 
785). 
71  In 2011, the Fair Trade Commission of the Republic of Korea imposed corrective 
orders and fines against six drug manufacturers for offering economic incentives to doctors, clinics 
and hospitals to increase the prescription of their drugs.  Such incentives included seminars, 
conferences, golf outings, lectures and consultancy fees.  Similarly, in September 2014, the National 
Development and Reform Commission of China fined GlaxoSmithKline $490 million for having 
bribed hospitals and doctors. (UNCTAD Secretariat (note by), The Role of Competition in the 
Pharmaceutical Sector and its Benefits for Consumers, UN Conference on Trade and Development, 
27 April 2015, paras. 58-59).   
72  “[Pharmaceutical] Companies today have found that the return on investment for legal tactics is a 
lot higher than the return on investment for R&D,‖ says Sharon Levine, the associate executive director of the HMO 
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1.9. The Conducts 
It is clear from the above that pharmaceutical research and development is costly, 
risky and lengthy but, when it leads to the discovery of new or better cures, is beneficial to 
consumers and should be incentivized. 
Unfortunately, an increase in investments in research does not equal more or better 
drugs nor an increase in profits.  R&D costs nearly doubled in the past 20 years without a 
corresponding increase in the discovery of NMEs (rather, regulatory authorities around the 
world observed a decrease in the rate of new drug submissions), many key blockbuster drugs 
are falling off the cliff of loss of exclusivity and revolutionary and wildly successful drugs are 
becoming rarer and rarer. 
To face the increased competition from new entrants and generics, and the slow-
down of breakthrough discoveries, originators started to be more concerned about ensuring 
that their old goose (blockbuster drug) keeps on laying golden eggs than to breed new ones.  
Pharmaceutical companies have thus a strong incentive to concentrate their investments in 
protecting product exclusivity for as long as possible, instead of trying to innovate.  To do 
this, originators employ various techniques that extend the profitability of their commercially 
successful drugs and restrict or delay generic market entry, to the detriment of consumers.  
Patent protection thus becomes an end in itself.73 
A slowdown in the transition from the protected status of a proprietary medicine to 
the status of generic products, manufactured and distributed in open competition, does not 
simply decrease static efficiency, i.e. consumers‟ short-run well-being in terms of lower prices 
and increased access to drugs.  Rather, it might be the reason – and simultaneously the 
consequence – of a progressive decline in innovation, as it extends the duration of a 
monopoly rent situation, thus reducing the pressure to innovate.74  
To better understand the value (and cost) of delaying generic entry, noteworthy is a 
statement made by the CEO of Cephalon, a large U.S. biopharmaceutical company, in 
relation to a pay for delay settlement with 4 generic companies: “We were able to get six more 
years of patent protection. That‘s $4 billion in sales that no one expected.”75 
                                                                                                                                                   
Kaiser Permanente. ―Consumers today are paying an inordinate premium under the guise of the creating the stream of 
innovation in the future. But it‘s actually funding lawyers.‖” (M. Boldrin, D.K. Levine, Against Intellectual 
Monopoly, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 263). 
73  “To confront generics upon expiry of the compound patent, originators often put in place strategies to 
create and enforce a comprehensive set of additional patents protecting other aspects of the product (production process, 
forms, formulations etc.).” (European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 
1127). 
74  As discussed, not only generic competition helps patients to have access to affordable 
healthcare and public health systems to remain economically sustainable, it also stimulates 
pharmaceutical companies to continue investing in research and develop innovative treatments, as 
they cannot rely forever on their blockbuster products. 
75  FTC v. Cephalon, Inc. No. 08-cv-2141: Complaint for injunctive relief, 13 February 
2008, p. 4, available at http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/061-0182/cephalon-inc, 
accessed on 6 August 2016.  The FTC settled its suit against Cephalon in May 2015 for injunctive 
relief and $1.2 billion.  On 4 August 2016, Cephalon reached a $125 million settlement agreement to 
end a 48-U.S. States investigation.  Cephalon allegedly defrauded the Patent and Trademark office to 
secure an additional patent and then concluded pay for delay agreements that delayed generic entry for 
nearly six years. 
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The pharmaceutical industry has been a central focus in the debate over the 
appropriate balance between patents and antitrust.  The general perception is that there is an 
inherent tension between the two, one granting the right to exclude and the other 
condemning exclusionary practices.  Their interaction, however, often seen as problematic, is 
instead beneficial when long-term consumer welfare is put back in its rightful central position.  
The complementarity between the two bodies of laws, and the ability they have to strengthen 
each other, has been highlighted on both sides of the Atlantic.  In Europe, Mario Monti, at 
the time Commissioner for Competition, famously referred to innovation as the bride and 
competition as the groom: 
“It is of course a longstanding topic of debate in economic and legal circles how to marry the 
innovation bride and the competition groom.  In the past some have argued that such a marriage will 
unavoidably lead to divorce because of conflicting aims of IPR law and competition law.  But I think 
that by now most will agree that for a dynamic and prosperous society we need both innovation and 
competition.  Contrary to what some might think, competition is a necessary stimulus for innovation.  
IPR law and competition law have a complementary role to play in promoting innovation to the 
benefit of consumers.  I therefore firmly belief in this marriage and, like in all good marriages, the real 
question is how to achieve a good balance between both policies.”76 
In the U.S., Professor Hovenkamp underlined the coincidence between the two 
regulations‟ objectives and the central role played by antitrust in promoting innovation: 
“Antitrust policy and the IP laws are both concerned with practices that restrain competition 
unnecessarily by reducing the size of the public domain beyond that which the Constitution 
contemplates or as Congress intended for them to be expanded.  In fact, antitrust has a dual role as 
promoter of competition in IP-intensive markets.  It regulates both restraints on competition and 
restraints on innovation.”77 
The patent system and competition law are interacting components of the market, 
into which they must both be active and coordinate to limit consumer welfare losses.  There 
is no reason why antitrust should be deferential to IP, and the instrumental use of the patent 
system can and should be addressed by competition law.78  At the same time, competition 
                                                 
76  M. Monti, The New EU Policy on Technology Transfer Agreements, Paris, 16 
January 2004, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-04-19_en.htm?locale=en, 
accessed on 6 August 2016. 
77  H.J. Hovenkamp, Innovation and the Domain of Competition Policy, 60 Alabama 
Law Review, 2008, p. 106. 
78  In the EU, the Commission and the EU Courts have shown little deference towards 
IP rights.  The special responsibility incumbent upon dominant firms not to impair competition has 
resulted in the Commission aggressively enforcing competition rules under Article 102 TFEU, 
including in those areas of intersection between competition rules and IPR.  In the U.S., antitrust 
enforcement agencies and courts have traditionally applied the principle of symmetry under which 
antitrust rules are applied to IPRs exactly the same way as to other property rights.  The U.S. system 
however evolved in recent years “towards a more interventionist approach, possibly under the influence of some 
distinguished scholars who have started to challenge the idea of IP rights‘ untouchability and parity with other property 
rights.  First, it has been argued, IPRs are probabilistic in nature, i.e. they contain a strong element of uncertainty; many 
rest on shaky grounds, are issued after a limited examination process and would not stand scrutiny if litigated.  Second, 
IPRs cannot be treated like other property rights since the former may in some circumstances confer market power, 
sometimes even extraordinary market power.  Accordingly, strong antitrust enforcement is needed in presence of strong 
IPRs.” (M. Todino, Antitrust Rules and Intellectual Property Rights in the EU and the US, 1(2) Italian 
Antitrust Review, 2014, pp. 28-29).  The US Supreme Court ruling in Actavis confirmed the departure 
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enforcement should not be concerned only about prices, but also about innovation, and aim 
at striking the right balance between short-term and long-term consumer welfare.79 
Patent law is the starting point.  (One of) The rationale of the patent system is exactly 
the renounce to some short-term price competition in exchange for long-term innovation.  
Society agrees to potentially paying higher prices for a defined period of time in exchange for 
the introduction of new or improved products.  The balance between price competition and 
innovation has thus been struck by society in adopting patent law. 
Patent law has however to be interpreted and applied.  It is the interpretation and 
application of patent law, or better the conducts originators claim to be within their patent 
rights, that this work is investigating.  While potentially within the letter of patent law, most 
of the conducts scrutinized by antitrust agencies around the globe are not within the purpose, 
the ratio, of patent law (rectius, they are contrary to its ratio) and are therefore forbidden by 
patent law itself, in addition to be antitrust violations.  The role of antitrust is however 
decisive when it comes to deterring these conducts.  As much as IP law is premised on a 
market failure, antitrust intervention in the IP world is premised on a failure of the IP system 
to detect and deter conducts contrary to its purpose.  Patent law is (ab)used to achieve 
objectives that are diametrically opposed to those pursued by patent law itself, and upset the 
balance between short-term competition and long-term innovation on which patent law is 
premised.80 
The European Commission‟s pharmaceutical sector inquiry identified a “toolbox” of 
unlawful practices ascribed to originators to delay or block the entry of generic drugs.  The 
final report made reference to (i) patenting strategies of originators; (ii) patent settlements and 
other agreements between originator and generic companies; (iii) promotional activities; (iv) 
strategic launching of second generation and follow-on products; and (v) aggressive patent 
litigation, opposition procedures and appeals before patent offices and interventions before 
marketing authorities and pricing reimbursement authorities.81 
These practices take advantage of patent laws and healthcare regulation thereby 
disrupting the necessary balance between incentives to innovate and access to affordable 
                                                                                                                                                   
from the traditional symmetry principle and recognized that IPRs may deserve special antitrust 
attention due to their features and strength. 
79  T. Curzon Price, M. Walker, Incentives to Innovate v Short-term Price Effects in 
Antitrust Analysis, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2016, p. 5: [T]here is a trade-off, 
and it is unlikely to be socially optimal to maximise rewards from innovation. […]  ‗Maximising innovation‘ is very 
unlikely to equate to the 'highest possible rewards for innovation' because of the rent-protecting behaviour that will 
thereby be induced.  Competition authorities therefore need to be aware that protecting dynamic incentives may incentivise 
dynamically inefficient rent-seeking behaviour.”  See also p. 8: “the goal of competition policy should [not] be simply to 
maximise innovation.  There is no economic theory that says that maximising innovation maximises social welfare.  It 
may lead to over-rapid redundancy of past innovations.  Furthermore, maximising the rents flowing from innovation is 
likely to incentivise wasteful activity to protect those rents”. 
80  In the words of the former European Competition Commissioner Joaquin Almunia: 
“Companies should spend their time innovating and competing on the merits of the products they offer – not misusing 
their intellectual property rights to hold up competitors to the detriment of innovation and consumer choice.” (J. 
Almunia, Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Motorola Mobility on potential 
misuse of mobile phone standard-essential patents, IP/13/406, 6 May 2013, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-406_en.htm, accessed on 6 August 2016). 
81  European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009, par. 
24. 
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drugs.  Indeed, an element to be always kept in mind when it comes to the pharmaceutical 
industry is that the society‟s interest in this field is not limited to competition and innovation, 
but includes also public health, product safety and access to drugs.  
In recent years, the pharmaceutical industry has been a central element in the agenda 
of several antitrust authorities around the world.  This renewed interest may be motivated, on 
one side, by the protection of public health and public finances (made critical by the 
prolonged period of economic crisis), and, on the other side, by the explosion of allegedly 
anticompetitive practices, maybe motivated by the expiration of patent protection of a large 
number of blockbuster drugs in a narrow time frame, the so-called “patent cliff”,82 coupled 
with a decrease in the number of NMEs discovered. 
 
2. Patent Regulation 
As anticipated, the starting point is patent law.  This chapter analyzes the patent 
system, focusing on the legal instruments put in place to ensure proportionality of patent 
rights.  This introduction on patent regulation has the purpose of providing all the necessary 
background to determine the objective of patent law and how to best reach it. 
Patents for pharmaceuticals can be of three kinds: product, process, and medical use.83   
Product patents are those protecting the chemical compound.  They include patents 
on the active ingredient as well as on salts, esters, enantiomers, combinations and other 
derivatives of a known active ingredient. Generally speaking, compound patents have to 
clearly state at least one medical use for the compound.  The first compound patent for a new 
active substance is usually very broad, potentially covering several alternative compounds 
depending on the displacement of the specific chemical groups in the molecular structure.84 
Process patents “protect the way in which a technical result is obtained, and not the result as 
such”85.  As it can be inferred from Article 64(2) EPC,86 the resulting product is protected by 
the process patent only in so far as it has been realized using that process.  In the case of 
pharmaceuticals, due to the fact that there are indefinite chemical reactions and processes 
through which the drug can be manufactured, a process patent is normally considered much 
weaker than a product patent and usually cannot by itself keep generics out of the market.  
                                                 
82  European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009, par. 
165. 
83  A. Kur., T. Dreier, European Intellectual Property Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 
Edward Elgar, 2013, p. 109. 
84  C.M. Correa, Efforts to Raise the Bar in Patent Examination Need to Be Supported, 
43(7) International Review of Intellectual Property, 2012, p. 749.  See also B. Domeij, Patent Claim 
Scope: Initial and Follow-on Pharmaceutical Inventions in Europe, 23(7) European Intellectual 
Property Review, 2001, p. 326.  The EPO considers the so-called Markush type claim (a chemical 
formula grouping hundreds or even thousands of alternative compounds) acceptable and compliant 
with the principle of unity of the invention when all alternatives indicated have common properties 
and share a common structure (EPO, Guidelines for Examination, Markush grouping, November 
2015, available at: http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/guidelines/e/f_v_5.htm, 
accessed on 6 August 2016). 
85  A. Kur., T. Dreier, European Intellectual Property Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 
Edward Elgar, 2013, p. 109. 
86   “If the subject matter of the European patent is a process, the protection conferred by the 
patent shall extend to the products directly obtained by such process”. 
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Indeed, generic manufacturers can enter the market as long as they employ a different (and 
non-protected) process. 
Finally, medical use patents refer to the patentability of the therapeutic/medical use of 
a previously known, and potentially patented, substance.87 
2.1. International Patent Law 
The patent regulation is very fragmented and several layers of legislation exist.  The 
first layer is represented by the international regulations, in particular the Paris Convention88 
and the TRIPS agreement. 
The most important provision of the Paris Convention for the purposes of this work 
is Article 5A.  In particular, Article 5A(2) authorizes the use of compulsory licensing to 
prevent “abuses” which might result from the exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by 
the patent (of which failure to work is mentioned as an example).89  This provision is 
interesting not only for its wording, which brings into the patent regulation the concept of 
abuse,90 but also for its genesis.  It seems that British proponents of the “abuse” language, 
introduced in 1925 by The Hague Convention, suggested it be understood as a reflection of 
the then-existing British law on the abuse of monopoly rights.91  This provision of the Paris 
Convention is evidence of the fact that the anti-monopolistic rationale is not an antitrust 
exclusive and is inherently present in the patent system as well. 
In the past decades, the enforcement of patents has been further globalized, mainly 
through the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (so-called, 
TRIPS agreement).  The TRIPS agreement, which entered into force on 1 January 1995, 
contains provisions reaching broadly into substantive and procedural aspects of intellectual 
                                                 
87  Article 54(5) of the European Patent Convention establishes “patentability of any 
substance or composition […] for any specific use […], provided that such use is not comprised in the state of the art.”  
A famous example of second medical use for medicinal products having multiple therapeutic effects is 
Viagra, originally developed to cure angina pectoris (A. Kur., T. Dreier, European Intellectual 
Property Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Edward Elgar, 2013, p. 110). 
88  The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property was concluded in 
1883 and revised periodically thereafter.  This Convention has been for over a hundred years the 
foundational instrument for discussions on international standards in patent regulation and remains to 
this day relevant in international intellectual property policy. 
89  Article 5A(2) states: “Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures 
providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the exclusive 
rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work”.  Article 5A(3) expresses a bias favoring 
compulsory licensing over patent forfeiture or revocation: “Forfeiture of the patent shall not be provided for 
except in cases where the grant of compulsory licenses would not have been sufficient to prevent the said abuses.  No 
proceedings for the forfeiture or revocation of a patent may be instituted before the expiration of two years from the grant 
of the first compulsory license”. 
90  The Paris Convention does not limit the national legislature‟s freedom to determine 
what use or conduct by right holders shall constitute an “abuse”. 
91  U.K. Patent and Designs Act of 1907, par. 27, as revised by U.K. Patent and Designs 
Act of 1919 (9 & 10 Geo. V., c. 80), cited in S.P. Ladas, Patents, Trademarks, and Related Rights. 
National and International Protection, Harvard University Press, 1975, p. 278.  See also R.M. Hilty, 
Legal Remedies Against Abuse, Misuse, and Other Forms of Inappropriate Conduct of IP Right 
Holders, in R.M. Hilty, K.-C. Liu (eds.), Compulsory Licensing, Springer, 2015, p. 385 (“the Paris 
Convention historically responded to far-reaching provisions in national legislations which were related in particular to a 
―patent abuse‖ in terms of non-working of the invention. Such conduct of the patent holder quite often led to the forfeiture 
of the patent in question (e.g., Austria and Belgium, both laws from the 1850s).”   
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property law.92  As to the relation between the TRIPS agreement and the Paris Convention, 
Article 2 TRIPS establishes that the latter, and in particular its Art. 5, continues to apply.93 
On the purpose of IP, Article 7 TRIPS, in line with the premises of this work, 
establishes that the protection and enforcement of IPRs “should contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and 
to a balance of rights and obligations.” 
Article 8(2), in line with Article 5 of the Paris Convention, recognizes the power of 
the WTO Member States to take appropriate measures to prevent the “abuse of intellectual 
property rights” by right holders.94  The TRIPS agreement thus offers a legal basis to justify, 
from an international law perspective, a restriction of patent rights in case of abusive behavior 
to the detriment of innovation and consumer welfare.95 
With respect to access to drugs, the TRIPS agreement was clarified by the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health of 14 November 2001.  The Doha 
                                                 
92  As far as general rules on patent go, Article 27 requires the signatory States, i.e. all 
members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), to make sure patents are “available for any inventions, 
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are 
capable of industrial application.”  Note 5 of the agreement further specifies that “[f]or the purposes of [Art. 
27], the terms ―inventive step‖ and ―capable of industrial application‖ may be deemed by a Member to be synonymous 
with the terms ―non-obvious‖ and ―useful‖ respectively”.  According to Article 28, patents confer general rights 
to exclude third parties from, in case the subject matter of the patent is a product, manufacturing, 
using, marketing, or importing for such purposes the product; in case the patent concerns a process, 
third parties are precluded from using the process, and using, selling or importing the product 
obtained directly by that process.  Patents grants also positive rights to their holders.  Patent owners 
can assign, or transfer by succession, the patent and conclude licensing agreements. 
93  Article 2 TRIPS establishes that: “In respect of Parts II, III and IV of this Agreement, 
Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris Convention (1967).  Nothing in Parts 
I to IV of this Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations that Members may have to each other under the Paris 
Convention, the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention and the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of 
Integrated Circuits.” 
94  Article 40 states that “Members agree that some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to 
intellectual property rights which restrain competition may have adverse effects on trade and may impede the transfer and 
dissemination of technology” and nothing prevents States from “specifying in their legislation licensing practices or 
conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on 
competition in the relevant market.”  In turn, Article 48 TRIPS allows Member States (but does not oblige 
them) to “order a party at whose request measures were taken and who has abused enforcement procedures to provide to 
a party wrongfully enjoined or restrained adequate compensation for the injury suffered because of such abuse”.  Article 
67 requires developed countries to assist developing and least-developed countries in the preparation 
of laws and regulations on the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as on 
the prevention of their abuse.  With respect to patent protection of pharmaceutical products in 
developing countries, although Article 41 of the TRIPS agreement requires the members of the WTO 
to “ensure that enforcement procedures […] are available under their law so as to permit effective action against any act 
of infringement of intellectual property rights”, WTO members granted these countries a transition period, 
recently extended to 2033. (WTO members agree to extend drug patent exemption for poorest 
members, 6 November 2015, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/trip_06nov15_e.htm, accessed on 6 August 2016.) 
95  See Article 30 TRIPS (“Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred 
by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do 
not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third 
parties.”) 
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Declaration is the result of demands by developing countries, increasingly concerned over the 
prohibitive cost of essential patented drugs.96  The aim of the Doha declaration was to strike a 
balance between the protection of IP and the protection of public health and the way to 
achieve it has been to limit IP rights in order to favor access to drugs.97  
2.2. United States 
Having introduced the patent rules at the international level, it is now appropriate to 
briefly consider regulations at the regional/national level, in particular those at the U.S. and 
EU level. 
To ensure the correct balancing between stimulating innovation by protecting 
inventors and limiting secondary innovation and price competition by granting undeserved 
and/or overly broad patents, the patent system is premised on the review of the inventor‟s 
application by the patent office to determine whether the claimed invention respect the 
standard of patentability (and thus justifies the social cost of granting a patent).98  To be 
patentable, an invention must meet all the statutory requirements for patentability.99 
                                                 
96  In response to such demands, the Doha declaration embraces a doctrine of 
“flexibility”.  This way, WTO members can be compliant with the TRIPS agreement, but at the same 
time guarantee respect of public health and improve access to drugs, by counting on flexibilities such 
as parallel imports, compulsory license and exceptions to patent rights.  The declaration states that 
WTO members “recognize the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many developing and least-developed 
countries” and “recognize that intellectual property protection is important for the development of new medicines [and] 
the concerns about its effects on prices”.  The Declaration, at paragraph 4, clarifies that: “the TRIPS Agreement 
does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, […] the 
Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members‘ right to protect 
public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.  In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO 
members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose.”  As 
noted by Professor Petit, “This shift in legal policy entitled developing countries to issue compulsory licenses. The 
FCL doctrine was turned into practice in Africa, Asia and India, where compulsory licenses were issued over anti-
retroviral drugs useful for the treatment of HIV/AIDS” (N. Petit, "Stealth Licensing" - Or Antitrust Law and 
Trade Regulation Squeezing Patent Rights, Revue du Droit des Industries de Réseau, 2014, p. 7-8). 
97  Within the flexibilities at the States disposal to ensure the protection of public health 
and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all, competition law (whose importance is 
recognized inter alia by Article 31(k) TRIPS on compulsory license) and IP law (whose limitations are 
permitted under Article 30 TRIPS) are the focus of this work.  Countries like India, which has taken 
advantage of the flexibilities provided for by the TRIPS agreement, enjoy up to 41 times cheaper 
drugs than countries not making use of those flexibilities (C.M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, 
the WTO and Developing Countries: The TRIPS Agreement and Policy Options, Zed Books, 2002, 
35). 
98  As explained by the Federal Circuit, the government-granted monopoly “is not a 
disbursement of governmental largesse and thus not a ‗gift‘; rather, the government grant of a property right, namely the 
right to exclude for a limited time, is conditioned on the creation and public disclosure of a new and useful invention” 
(Xechem Int‟l, Inc. v. Univ. Of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d, Fed. Cir., 2004, p. 1331). 
See also In re „318 Patent Infringement Litigation, 583 F.3d, Fed. Cir., 2007, 1324, where it can be 
read, a “patent is not a hunting license; it is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion”. 
99  One of the requirements, enablement (Section 112 of the Patent Act), relates more 
directly to the invention description and claims than to the patent subject matter.  Enablement serves 
the purpose of enabling third parties to make and use the invention, once the patent is expired, and to 
let the public know the outer limits of the patent (thus encouraging innovation).  Enablement ensures 
that the scope of the patent is proportional to the inventor‟s disclosure – a patent can claim only as 
much as it teaches.  The description has to be sufficiently clear and complete (i) that those skilled in 
the art will be able to make, use, and understand the invention, and (ii) “to enable others to discern the 
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The first requirement of patentability is utility, i.e., as indicated by Section 101 of the 
Patent Act, the invention has to be “useful”.  This requirement is potentially extremely 
important to avoid patents being granted before a new technology has been adequately 
described or understood.  In this sense, its aim is to optimize the timing of the award and 
prevent rent seeking.100 
                                                                                                                                                   
boundaries beyond which experimentation and invention are undertaken at the risk of infringement.” (Eli Lilly and 
Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs., 630 F. 2d, 3rd.Cir., 1980, p. 120).  Professor Merges describes the 
characteristics of a patent application as follows: “A patent application has two main parts.  The first is a 
specification of the invention, which is written like a brief science or engineering article describing the problem the inventor 
faced and the steps she took to solve it.  It also provides a precise characterization of the ―best mode‖ of solving the 
problem.  The second part of the patent application is a set of claims, which usually encompass more than the material set 
out in the specification.  Claims define what the inventor considers to be the scope of her invention, the technological 
territory she claims is hers to control by suing for infringement. […][A] patent‘s specification need not point out precisely 
how to make every device that would fall within its claims.  Disclosure of an inventive concept or principle, whose precise 
contours are defined by the claims, is enough.” (R.P. Merges, R.R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of 
Patent Scope, 90 Columbia Law Review, 1990, pp. 844, 846)  Another requirement is that the subject 
matter needs to be patentable.  The U.S. Patent Act, Section 101, provides: “Whoever invents or discovers 
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”  Justice Breyer explains 
clearly the rationale of the limits to the patentable subject matter: “[T]he reason for the exclusion is that 
sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than ―promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,‖ the 
constitutional objective of patent and copyright protection. U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 8.  The problem arises from the 
fact that patents do not only encourage research by providing monetary incentives for invention.  Sometimes their presence 
can discourage research by impeding the free exchange of information, for example by forcing researchers to avoid the use 
of potentially patented ideas, by leading them to conduct costly and time-consuming searches of existing or pending 
patents, by requiring complex licensing arrangements, and by raising the costs of using the patented information, 
sometimes prohibitively so.  Patent law seeks to avoid the dangers of overprotection just as surely as it seeks to avoid the 
diminished incentive to invent that underprotection can threaten. One way in which patent law seeks to sail between these 
opposing and risky shoals is through rules that bring certain types of invention and discovery within the scope of 
patentability while excluding others.” (Laboratory Corp. Of America Holdings V. Metabolite Laboratories, 
Inc., 548 U. S. (2006), Breyer J. dissenting) 
100  See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 1966 (“Until the process claim has been reduced to 
production of a product shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of that monopoly are not capable of precise delineation.  
It may engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area. Such a patent may confer power to block off whole 
areas of scientific development, without compensating benefit to the public.  The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the 
Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with 
substantial utility.  Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this point – where specific benefit exists in 
currently available form – there is insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a 
broad field.”)  Utility weeds out patents with no practical application, used only to game the system to 
the benefit of rent-seekers and to the detriment of consumers.  “Investment and effort are therefore directed 
toward the socially useful goal of developing the technology, rather than simply racing to the patent office.” (R.P. 
Merges, The Trouble with Trolls Innovation Rent-Seeking and Patent Law, 24(4) Berkeley 
Technology Law Journal, 2009, pp. 1588-1590)  The utility requirement has however been interpreted 
quite broadly and does not often entail a stringent verification.  The pharmaceutical industry might be 
the exception and the practical use of the chemical compound should be stated by the applicant and is 
carefully scrutinized by the office.  “Only if an invention has absolutely no ―practical utility‖ will a patent be 
denied. The only exception is inventions pertaining to pharmaceuticals, where some cases question whether laboratory 
promise is enough to establish utility in treating human patients.” (R.P. Merges, P.S. Menell, M.A. Lemley, 
Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age, Aspen Publishers, 2012, p. 129).  See also R.P. 
Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards Economic Perspectives, 76(4) California Law 
Review, 1988, pp. 811-812 (“The second requirement ―utility,‖ has devolved over the years into a rather minimal 
obstacle to obtaining a patent.  Today, a patent will not be withheld even though the invention works only in an 
experimental setting, and has no proven use in the field or factory ([…] In chemical patent cases, however, the courts 
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Second, the invention has to be novel.  This is also called the first-to-invent 
requirement and refers to the need for the invention to be the first of its kind, not previously 
known, used, patented, or described in a printed publication.101  The novelty requirement 
ensures that information in the public domain remains public and can be used freely by 
consumers, competing companies and inventors (standing on the shoulders of the public 
domain giant).  If the information is already in the public domain, society has no interest in, 
nor benefit from, granting a patent.102 
The third requirement is non-obviousness.  The invention has to be a nontrivial step 
forward in what is already known, i.e. it has to entail a degree of skill and ingenuity.  The grant 
of a patent is thus excluded under Section 103 of the Patent Act when “the differences between the 
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have 
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said 
subject matter pertains.”103  As emphasized by Professor Merges,  
“The statutory nonobviousness test serves a gatekeeping function; it seeks to reward inventions that, 
viewed prospectively, have a low probability of success. […]  The standard insists that only the results 
from uncertain research should be rewarded with a patent.  Research which overcomes uncertainty is 
precisely the sort society values, and hence rewards with a patent.  […][T]he job of nonobviousness is 
to encourage invention while not over-rewarding it.”104 
Exactly as the novelty requirement, also non-obviousness aims at limiting the 
publicly-available information sacrificed in the name of innovation.  Countless inventors draw 
from the stock of publicly-available resources and price competition depends on it.105  A 
                                                                                                                                                   
have consistently held that a chemical compound claimed in a patent application must have some known, practical use. 
[…]).”) 
101  Section 102 of the Patent Act.  “Lack of novelty may bar the claimed invention from being 
patentable either because it was made before; it was sold more than a year before a patent application was filed; or it was 
otherwise subject to prior use or knowledge” (R.P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards 
Economic Perspectives, 76(4) California Law Review, 1988, p. 811). 
102  “[Jefferson] viewed a grant of patent rights in an idea already disclosed to the public as akin to an 
ex post facto law, obstruct[ing] others in the use of what they possessed before. […] Sections 102(a) and (b) operate in 
tandem to exclude from consideration for patent protection knowledge that is already available to the public.  They 
express a congressional determination that the creation of a monopoly in such information would not only serve no socially 
useful purpose, but would in fact injure the public by removing existing knowledge from public use.” (Bonito Boats, 
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 1989).  See also Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas 
City, 383 U.S. 1, 1966, (“The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed 
by the stated constitutional purpose. […]  Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove 
existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.”) 
103  “The nonobviousness requirement extends the field of unpatentable material beyond that which is 
known to the public under Section 102, to include that which could readily be deduced from publicly available material 
by a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent field of endeavor.  See Graham, 383 U.S., at 15.” (Bonito Boats, Inc. 
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 1989)  As explained by the Supreme Court in Grahams v. 
John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 1966, “the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differences between the 
prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. 
Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined.”  To verify whether 
an invention is non-obvious, courts have to presume that the reasonably skilled inventor knows 
everything (public) in the prior art.  Although not realistic, this presumption ensures objectiveness, 
administrative efficiency and reduces the risk of conflicting decisions. 
104  R.P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 Berkeley Technology 
Law Journal, 1992, pp. 2-3. 
105  “―Obvious‖ patents harm consumers by creating exclusive rights in things that would otherwise sell 
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patent should be granted only when a person of ordinary skill in the art would have excluded 
reasonable chance of success for the experiment leading to the invention.106  Non-
obviousness must be defined narrowly because patent law does not leave room for 
independent invention – a patent can be infringed unknowingly.107 
The difference between novelty and nonobviousness is that to verify the first it is 
necessary to look back, asking whether something in the prior art anticipates all of the 
elements of a patent claim; to verify the second it is necessary to look into the future and 
consider whether a person skilled in the art would be likely to have come up with the same 
invention on his own.108  As highlighted by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
“Taken together, the novelty and nonobviousness requirements express a congressional determination 
that the purposes behind the Patent Clause are best served by free competition and exploitation of 
either that which is already available to the public or that which may be readily discerned from 
publicly available material.”109 
Ensuring the correct application of the novelty and non-obviousness requirements is 
potentially a solution (or at least a serious complicating factor) to several of the abusive 
practices analyzed below.  An originator would not be able to obtain patents on a chemical 
component of the drug, a changed form or an altered salt, for the sole purpose of extending 
exclusivity and preventing generic substitution.110  Two potentially abusive practices that 
would be made difficult, harmless, or in some cases impossible, by the strict interpretation of 
                                                                                                                                                   
competitively.  The deadweight loss of obvious patents is high.  As the previous discussion suggests, it tends to be higher in 
markets that are already noncompetitive to begin with, because marginal consumers in those markets have more 
consumers‘ surplus to lose. Many pharmaceutical extension patents very likely fall into this category.” (H.J. 
Hovenkamp, Consumer Welfare in Competition and Intellectual Property Law, 9 Competition Policy 
International, 2014, pp. 60-61) 
106  To determine nonobviousness, the case law recognized the importance of objective 
factors such as “the commercial success of the invention (which I have criticized), the failure of competitors to make the 
invention (which I have suggested ought to be the major objective factor), a long-felt need in the industry for an invention, 
and recognition in the industry of a notable achievement.” (R.P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of 
Patentability, 7 Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 1992, p. 35).  The Supreme Court clarified in 
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 1989, that “[e]ven if a particular 
combination of elements is ―novel‖ in the literal sense of the term, it will not qualify for federal patent protection if its 
contours are so traced by the existing technology in the field that the ―improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic, 
not that of the inventor.‖ Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 248, 267 (1851).” 
107  “If we are going to be in the business of condemning innocent discoverers for patent infringement then 
we must make sure that patents are granted only for things that are sufficiently nonobvious that there won‘t be a large 
number of innocent discovers.  Otherwise we create monopoly rights in pedestrian changes.” (H.J. Hovenkamp, 
Institutional Advantage in Competition and Innovation Policy, University of Iowa Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 13-43, 2013, p. 4) 
108  “Determining nonobvious subject matter requires going beyond what the prior art actually contains in 
order to assess whether someone of ―ordinary‖ skill and who is acquainted with the prior art in that field would be likely 
to come up with the invention independently.  In the patent granting process nonobviousness queries typically involve 
situations where there are multiple pieces of prior art but no single piece fully anticipates a particular patent claim; or 
where the invention is anticipated in a different market, or ―field of endeavor,‖ but not in the one where the patent is 
sought.” (H.J. Hovenkamp, Consumer Welfare in Competition and Intellectual Property Law, 9 
Competition Policy International 53, 2014, pp. 63-64) 
109  Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 1989. 
110  The so-called evergreening, a strategy consisting in patenting the metabolite of a drug 
when its patent is close to expiration to prevent generic substitution, was ended in the U.S. by 
deeming the metabolite “inherent” in the original drug and thus not novel.  See Schering Corp. v 
Geneva, Inc., 339 F.3d, Fed. Cir., 2003, p. 1373. 
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the novelty and non-obviousness requirements are the creation of patent clusters111 and 
product hopping. 
2.3. European Union 
The most notable difference between the U.S. and EU patent laws is the absence, at 
least for now, of a unitary patent protection system in the European Union.  When the Treaty 
of Rome was first drafted in 1957 no provision was set forth to unify intellectual property law 
and IP rights protection.  The Treaty of Lisbon introduced an extremely important 
innovation in this respect with Article 118 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU).  This Article grants the European Parliament and the Council the power to 
“establish measures for the creation of European intellectual property rights to provide uniform protection of 
intellectual property rights throughout the Union and for the setting up of centralised Union-wide 
authorisation, coordination and supervision arrangements.”  The European Parliament acted on this 
power and a Unitary patent, valid and enforceable in the entire EU, is close to becoming a 
reality. 
Despite the patent system not being completely harmonized within the EU, it is a fair 
assumption for the purposes of this work to consider the patent systems of the EU Member 
States roughly aligned.  Indeed, the TRIPS agreement and the European Patent Convention 
(EPC) helped in the process of bringing Member States‟ IP legislations closer together and 
most national provisions have substantially identical wording.  Given the harmonizing effect 
of the EPC, this work will focus on its provisions and on the most recent evolutions that 
interested the protection of patents at the EU level. 
On 5 October 1973, in Munich, several western European nations entered into a 
treaty (the EPC) establishing, as Article 1 states, a “system of law, common to the Contracting States, 
for the grant of patents for invention”.  The EPC is an international treaty binding on all EU 
Member States as well as some other European countries (such as Switzerland, Liechtenstein, 
Monaco, Turkey, Norway, Macedonia, San Marino, Albania, and Serbia), establishing a 
common system of law for the grant of patents.  The EPC created the European Patent 
Office (EPO), in charge of the examination of patent applications in accordance with the 
substantive principles established by the Convention.  Although commonly referred to as 
“European” patents, the patents granted under the European Patent Convention have a 
hybrid character: they are granted under common rules by the EPO, a central, European, 
authority but, once granted, they instantly transmogrify into a bundle of national patents, 
governed by the national law of each of the Member States for which they are granted.112  
Therefore, a European patent has the same effect and confers the same rights, subject to the 
                                                 
111  See I. Lianos, R.C. Dreyfuss, New Challenges in the Intersection of Intellectual 
Property Rights with Competition Law, 4 CLES Working Paper Series, 2013, p. 16 (“The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the court that hears all patent appeals, at one time set the level of 
nonobviousness very low.  As a result, patent thickets developed and it became increasingly difficult to determine freedom 
to operate.”) 
112  Article 2(2) EPC states: “The European patent shall, in each of the Contracting States for which 
it is granted, have the effect of and be subject to the same conditions as a national patent granted by that State”.  See 
also Article 64 EPC which establishes that the patents granted by the EPO confer on its holder, “in 
each Contracting State in respect of which it is granted, the same rights as would be conferred by a national patent 
granted in that State” (Article 64 EPC).  Patent protection lasts 20 years from the date of filing of the 
application (Article 63 EPC). 
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same conditions, as a national patent and must be enforced or challenged before national 
courts.113 
Not differently from the U.S. system (and from most of the legal systems around the 
world), Article 52 EPC establishes three main requirements for an invention to be 
patentable.114 
The invention needs to be new, i.e. not part of the “state of the art”, which includes 
everything made available to the public before the filing of the patent application.115  An 
invention will thus be new only when it is objectively different from any other known 
technical solutions, with no geographic or other delimitation.116 
Second, the invention has to involve an inventive step.  This can be considered the 
alter ego of the non-obviousness requirement in the U.S., i.e. the invention needs to be not 
obvious to a person skilled in the art.117  As explained by the European Commission, to 
determine whether this requirement is respected, “the EPO follows the ―problem-solution approach‖, 
consisting of three stages of analysis. First, the closest prior art is determined. (The closest prior art is the 
combination of already known features which constitutes the most promising starting point for development 
leading to the claimed invention.)  Then the objective technical problem to be solved is established, based on the 
difference between the claimed invention and the closest prior art.  Finally, the EPO considers whether the 
claimed invention, starting from the closest prior art and the objective technical problem, would have been 
obvious to a skilled person.”118 
Finally, the invention has to be susceptible of industrial application, i.e. it can be made 
or used in any kind of industry.119  The term “industry” has to be interpreted broadly and 
includes any physical activity of “technical character, i.e. an activity which belongs to the useful or 
practical arts as distinct from the aesthetic arts”.120 
                                                 
113  Article 64(3) provides: “Any infringement of a European patent shall be dealt with by national 
law.”  After the European patent has been granted, it needs to be validated in each Member State for 
which it was requested.  The patent needs to be translated in case it is not in one of the official 
languages of the Member State.  The success of the EPC is probably due to its hybrid nature.  While 
its introduction allowed inventors to overcome the costs and problems connected with multiple 
national applications, Member States maintain their sovereignty on “national” patents granted 
thereunder. 
114  According to Article 52 of the EPC, “European patents shall be granted for any inventions, in 
all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial application.” 
115  “An invention shall be considered to be new if it does not form part of the state of the art.  The state 
of the art shall be held to comprise everything made available to the public by means of a written or oral description, by 
use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of the European patent application” (Article 54 EPC). 
116  Not every element of the invention needs to be never heard of – it is sufficient that at 
least one essential technical feature cannot be found in the prior art.  In the pharmaceutical field, the 
novelty requirement tends to be relative easy to fulfil.  As Professor Domeij explains: “[d]ue to the 
precision with which a substance can be defined structurally in chemistry, the novelty requirement in connection with 
product patents tends to become an assessment of the identity of two substances: if there is the slightest difference, the 
novelty requirement is satisfied.” (B. Domeij, Pharmaceutical Patents in Europe, Kluwer and Nordstedts 
Juridik, 2000, p. 92) 
117  “An invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, having regard to the state of the 
art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art” (Article 56 EPC). 
118  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 67. 
119  “An invention shall be considered as susceptible of industrial application if it can be made or used in 
any kind of industry, including agriculture” (Article 57 EPC). 
120  EPO, Guidelines for Examination, part G, Ch., III, 3.1. 
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Noteworthy is the fact that, in its final report on the pharmaceutical sector inquiry, 
the European Commission reported critics on the thoroughness of the EPO process.  
“Generic companies suggested that in particular in such situations of relatively minor modifications to already 
patented products, the EPO should examine the patent application very closely before granting it.  At present, 
it was felt by many respondents that the novelty and the inventive step requirements for such patent applications 
were at times too easily considered as being met, partly because the EPO sometimes overlooked prior art and 
partly because the EPO sometimes accepted, as part of their ―problem-and-solution approach‖ to inventive 
step, claims from applicants regarding non-existent or obvious problems.”121 
An additional requirement for a valid patent application is the unity of the invention.  
Article 82 EPC states that a European patent application “shall relate to one invention only or to a 
group of inventions so linked as to form a single general inventive concept”.  The applicant can overcome 
an objection of lack of unity raised by the EPO by simply filing one or more divisional 
applications for each separate inventive concept.122  A divisional application can be filed also 
                                                 
121  European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009, par. 
1316. 
122  Divisional applications ensure that the patentee pays the appropriate patenting fee for 
each invention, make the research for prior art easier, and divide stronger from contestable claims.  
Divisional applications are regulated by Article 76 EPC that provides: “A European divisional application 
shall be filed directly with the European Patent Office in accordance with the Implementing Regulations.”  The crucial 
substantive requirement is that the divisional application is “filed only in respect of subject-matter which does 
not extend beyond the content of the earlier application as filed; in so far as this requirement is complied with, the 
divisional application shall be deemed to have been filed on the date of filing of the earlier application and shall enjoy any 
right of priority.”  Although a violation of the EPC may be corrected by way of amendments, allowing 
the applicant to radically amend its request and maintain the original priority date, Article 123(2) and 
(3) EPC establishes that “the European patent application or European patent may not be amended in such a way 
that it contains subject-matter which extends beyond the content of the application as filed.  The European patent may 
not be amended in such a way as to extend the protection it confers.”  An alarming, and increasingly frequent, 
practice in the area of divisional applications is the so-called double patenting, i.e. the filing of 
divisional application(s) whose subject matter is literally or substantially identical to the parent 
application or patent.  If granted, the same invention would thus be protected by two patents.  Such a 
practice is used as a precautionary measure against final rejection or revocation.  At present, while 
double patenting is generally recognized as a problematic aspect of the system, there is no specific 
legal basis in the EPC for its prohibition.  The recently updated EPC Guidelines, however, provide 
that: “The EPC does not deal explicitly with the case of co-pending European applications of the same effective date 
filed by the same applicant.  However, it is an accepted principle in most patent systems that two patents cannot be 
granted to the same applicant for one invention.  The Enlarged Board of Appeal has accepted obiter dictum that the 
principle of the prohibition on double patenting is based on the notion that an applicant has no legitimate interest in 
proceedings leading to the grant of a second patent for the same subject-matter if he already possesses one granted patent 
for that subject-matter (see G 1/05, and G 1/06).  It is permissible to allow an applicant to proceed with two 
applications having the same description which do not claim the same subject-matter (see also T 2461/10).  The 
applicant may, for example, be interested in obtaining a first quicker protection for a preferred embodiment and pursue 
the general teaching in a divisional application (see G 2/10).  However, in the rare case in which there are two or more 
European applications from the same applicant definitively designating the same State or States (by confirming the 
designation through payment of the relevant designation fee) and the claims of those applications have the same filing or 
priority date and relate to the same invention, the applicant should be told that he must either amend one or more of the 
applications in such a manner that the subject-matter of the claims of the applications is not identical, or choose which 
one of those applications he wishes to proceed to grant.  If he does not do so, once one of the applications is granted, the 
other(s) will be refused under Art. 97(2) in conjunction with Art. 125. If the claims of those applications are merely 
partially overlapping, no objection should be raised (see T 877/06).” (Guidelines for Examination in the 
European Patent Office, G, IV, 5.4 Double patenting, November 2015)  The scope for a double 
patenting objections is however rather limited.  The EPO jurisprudence has progressively restricted 
the interpretation of “same invention” to the point that objections of double patenting are upheld 
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voluntarily by the applicant.  On the procedural side, a divisional patent can be filed with the 
EPO for as long as the “earlier” European patent application is still pending.123  This, and the 
lack of an explicit prohibition in Article 76 EPC, led the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the 
EPO to deem sequences of divisional applications (i.e. a divisional application of a divisional 
application) acceptable.124  This means that as long as there is a pending patent application 
(even if it is a divisional of a divisional) it is possible to file an additional divisional 
application.  Applicants can thus continuously file divisional applications throughout the 
entire patent term.125 
Although divisional applications are not unique to the pharmaceutical industry, the 
subject matter of a new drug is often particularly suitable to be divided into several patent 
applications.  This characteristic of the pharmaceutical subject matter leads to the frequent 
use (and occasional abuse) of voluntary divisional applications by originators.  The strategic 
use of this tool to the detriment of consumer welfare will be analyzed below. 
As a final remark on the EPO procedure, the validity of a European patent can be 
challenged in an opposition and appeal procedure before the EPO without any presumption 
regarding its status.  An EPO decision is retro-actively effective in all States where the 
opposed patent has been validated. 
2.3.1. SPC 
Specific to the pharmaceutical industry is another regulatory instrument created to 
recoup a portion of the time elapsed between the filing of the patent application for a new 
drug and the grant of the marketing authorization.  It is the so-called Supplementary 
Protection Certificates (SPC).126  The SPC compensates companies for the period of patent 
exclusivity they could not (potentially) profit from due to the time necessary to obtain the 
                                                                                                                                                   
only when there is no practical difference between the claims of two applications.  Applications 
broader or narrower in scope as well as partially overlapping are considered acceptable. 
123  Article 36 of the Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of 
European Patents states: “The applicant may file a divisional application relating to any pending earlier European 
patent application.” 
124  See case G-1/06, Sequences of divisionals/SEIKO, 28 June 2007.  See also 
Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, A, IV, 1.1.2 Sequences of divisional 
applications, November 2015 (“A divisional application can also be an earlier application in the sense of Art. 
76(1) for the purposes of one or more further divisional applications.  The characterising feature of a sequence of 
divisional applications each divided out from its predecessor is that each member of the sequence claims as date of filing 
the date of the root application in which the subject-matter divided out in sequences of divisional applications was first 
disclosed (G 1/05, G 1/06).  In a sequence of divisional applications, a first-generation divisional application is a 
divisional application based on an application which is not itself a divisional application, i.e. the root application.  A 
second-generation divisional application is a divisional application based on a first-generation divisional application; and 
so on.”) 
125  G. Ghidini, G. Cavani, P.F. Pisera‟, Italy – Abuse of Patent Rights and Abuse of 
Dominant Position: The Pfizer Case, in G. Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition and Patent 
Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  An International Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, p. 259, footnote 30, 
note that “the ‗cascading‘ fragmentation of an original patent through a succession of divisional applications, one based 
on the other, has the substantial effect of disorienting one‘s competitors and augmenting their uncertainty in relation to the 
scope of the patent right.‖ 
126  In the U.S., it is the Hatch-Waxman Act that, to compensate for the time that lapsed 
during the FDA regulatory process, grants originators the possibility to extend their exclusivity beyond 
the standard 20-year patent term for a period of up to five years, and an additional six-month of 
“paediatric exclusivity” if the manufacturer conducts certain paediatric studies. 
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authorization to market the drug.  The SPC has been introduced by Council Regulation 
1768/92127 in response to the perceived insufficiency, for the amortization of investments, of 
the period of market exclusivity left after the marketing authorization is obtained.  Recitals 2 
and 3 of the Regulation explain its purpose:  
“[M]edicinal products, especially those that are the result of long, costly research will not continue to 
be developed in the Community and in Europe unless they are covered by favourable rules that provide 
for sufficient protection to encourage such research […][A]t the moment the period that elapses 
between the filing of an application for a patent for a new medicinal product and authorization to 
place the medicinal product on the market makes the period of effective protection under the patent 
insufficient to cover the investment put into the research.” 
The application must be lodged with the competent patent office of the Member State 
that granted the basic patent.128  According to Article 3 of Regulation 469/2009, for the grant 
of the certificate, the drug shall be protected by a basic patent in force in a Member State at 
the time of the application and a valid marketing authorization has been granted to place that 
product on the market.  The application needs to be lodged within six months of the date on 
which the marketing authorization in that particular Member State was granted. 
The SPC confers the same rights as conferred by the basic patent and extends the 
term of the basic patent for a period equal to the time between the date on which the 
application for the basic patent was lodged and the date of the first authorization to place the 
product on the market in the Community, reduced by five years.129  However, the SPC cannot 
be granted for a period exceeding five years and the combined patent and SPC exclusivity 
cannot exceed 15 years from the first marketing authorization.  It is evident that if the basic 
patent is revoked or limited, the certificate will consequently become invalid. 
As we will see in greater details below, the SPC regulation has been at the center of 
attention in one of the most important cases of abuse of dominance in the pharmaceutical 
sector, the European Commission decision (and the following EU Courts judgments) in 
AstraZeneca.  In this case, the submission of false or inaccurate statements, capable of 
effectively misleading public authorities, has been deemed in violation of competition law.  
The SPC had a role also in the Italian Pfizer case, in which the Italian Competition Authority 
sanctioned a non-misleading request of an SPC because it was deemed part of a complex 
strategy aimed at delaying generic entry. 
2.3.2. Pediatric Extension 
In addition to the SPC, the originator may obtain also a so-called “pediatric 
extension”.  Regulation 1901/2006 requires that a pediatric investigation plan is established 
and results are submitted to the European Medicines Agency to obtain the marketing 
authorization, unless the EMA decides to waive this requirement either independently or 
                                                 
127  The SPC is now regulated by Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for 
medicinal products, OJ 2009, L152. 
128  Article 9 of Regulation 469/2009. 
129  Article 13 of Regulation 469/2009.  To avoid disparities and obstacles to the 
common market, the SPC is calculated on the basis of the first marketing authorization and will thus 
have equal expiration date in every Member State. 
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upon request from the applicant.130  As compensation for conducting the pediatric studies, 
the patent holder which obtained an SPC is entitled to an automatic 6-month extension of the 
exclusivity period. 
This extension was introduced to incentivize the pediatric research since a relevant 
number of drugs used on children were not studied nor authorized for that purpose.  As 
analyzed below in discussing Pfizer, given its purpose, the regulation on the pediatric 
extension may be considered abused where, for drugs that will not be used in the treatment of 
children, the originator, instead of asking for a waiver, conducts the pediatric investigation 
with no other purpose than to obtain the extension. 
2.3.3. Unitary Patent and Unified Patent Court 
Although not yet in force, it is worth mentioning the most recent (successful, at least 
for now) attempt at a unitary patent for the whole (or almost whole) EU.  The proposal to 
create an EU patent system, under which a central granting authority (the EPO) would grant 
EU-wide patent rights, is long-standing.  As of 2009,131 the interest in creating a European 
patent with unitary effect has strengthen and in 2012, in the context of the so-called 
“enhanced cooperation” procedure (under which a group of Member States can proceed 
without the others),132 the relevant regulations laying the foundation for a unitary patent 
protection were adopted.133  In addition, in February 2013, 25 European Countries (excluding 
Croatia, Poland, and Spain) reached an agreement on the creation of a Unified Patent Court 
(UPC), which will have exclusive jurisdiction for the enforcement of European patents with 
unitary effect and supplementary protection certificates issued for a product covered by such 
patents.  Therefore, e.g., a single injunction will be obtainable through the Unified Patent 
Court for all States having ratified the UPC Agreement.  The UPC will also have non-
exclusive competence over non-unitary European patents in participating states, which will 
become exclusive after an extendable seven year transition period (if the patentee has not 
opted out by notifying the Registry of the Court). 
                                                 
130  Typical reason for a waiver is the fact that the disease the drug cures only occurs in 
the adult population. 
131  Noteworthy is the fact that the final report of the European Commission 
pharmaceutical sector inquiry specifically recommended the creation of an EU patent and unified 
patent court to limit the risk of conflicting judgments and the obstacles to the Common Market 
created by national patents, as well as national patent systems.  As pointed out by G. Muscolo, Abuse 
of Litigation, Abuse of Patent and Abuse of Dominance: Where Do We Stand?, in G. Muscolo, G. 
Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  An International 
Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, p. 119, the Commission‟s report “confirms the lack of consistency in EU case law 
and the consequent uncertainty in the pharmaceutical patent situation derived from the absence of a unified patent 
judiciary.  The creation of a Unified Patent and of a Unified Patent Court has finally filled the gap; moreover, a branch 
of the Court of First Instance, dealing with cases on pharmaceutical and bio-technologic patents, has been recently 
established in London.” 
132  Croatia, Italy, and Spain did not participate at the beginning, but in September 2015 
Italy joined the Unitary Patent and became the 26th member of the enhanced cooperation. 
133  Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent 
protection (Article 15 expressly states that the Regulation “shall be without prejudice to the application of 
competition law and the law relating to unfair competition”) and Council Regulation (EU) No 1260/2012 of 17 
December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent 
protection with regard to the applicable translation requirement. 
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The two regulations entered into force on 20 January 2013 but will apply only after 
the entry into force of the UPC Agreement.  As to the UPC Agreement, it will enter into 
force the first day of the fourth month after it has been ratified by 13 participating States, 
including the three most patent intensive Member States (Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom).  Eleven states have ratified the UPC Agreement so far, namely Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and 
Finland.134 
Under Article 3(2) of Regulation 1257/2012: “[a] European patent with unitary effect shall 
have a unitary character.  It shall provide uniform protection and shall have equal effect in all the participating 
Member States.  It may only be limited, transferred or revoked, or lapse, in respect of all the participating 
Member States.  It may be licensed in respect of the whole or part of the territories of the participating Member 
States.”135  The European patent with unitary effect will be granted by the EPO under the 
rules and procedures laid down by the European Patent Convention (EPC).  Regulation 
1257/2012 defines the conditions and the scope of the unitary effect, while the EPC 
establishes the relevant criteria under which the patent is granted.  Therefore, nothing 
substantially changes in the pre-grant phase.136  After the grant of a European patent, the 
patentee has the opportunity, within one month from the publication in the European Patent 
Bulletin, to file a request for unitary effect and, if the formal requirements are met, benefit 
from such uniform protection and equal effect in all participating States. 
As to the enforcement system, the UPC will be divided into a Court of First Instance 
(CFI) and a Court of Appeal.  The UPC-CFI will be one court with several divisions.  The 
central division will be seated in Paris (with local (or regional) divisions in individual member 
                                                 
134  The list is constantly updated at this address 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/agreements-
conventions/agreement/?aid=2013001, accessed on 11 December 2016.  In addition, the legislation 
enabling Italy‟s ratification and implementation of the UPC Agreement came into force on 25 
November 2016.  The Law also provides for the implementation of the UPC agreement in three ways: 
(i) excluding UPC disputes from the competence of national IP specialized courts; (ii) amending 
Article 66 of the Industrial Property Code to introduce provisions on indirect patent infringement 
(currently acknowledged only by the case law); (iii) authorizing the required budgetary changes for 
Italy‟s participation in the new UPC system (Italy‟s local division of the UPC in Milan should be be 
ready to function by June 2017). 
135  Article 7 of Regulation 1257/2012 provides that: “[a] European patent with unitary effect 
as an object of property shall be treated in its entirety and in all the participating Member States as a national patent of 
the participating Member State in which that patent has unitary effect and in which, according to the European Patent 
Register: (a) the applicant had his residence or principal place of business on the date of filing of the application for the 
European patent; or (b) where point (a) does not apply, the applicant had a place of business on the date of filing of the 
application for the European patent.  2. Where two or more persons are entered in the European Patent Register as 
joint applicants, point (a) of paragraph 1 shall apply to the joint applicant indicated first.  Where this is not possible, 
point (a) of paragraph 1 shall apply to the next joint applicant indicated in the order of entry.  Where point (a) of 
paragraph 1 does not apply to any of the joint applicants, point (b) of paragraph 1 shall apply accordingly.  3. Where no 
applicant had his residence, principal place of business or place of business in a participating Member State in which that 
patent has unitary effect for the purposes of paragraphs 1 or 2, the European patent with unitary effect as an object of 
property shall be treated in its entirety and in all the participating Member States as a national patent of the State where 
the European Patent Organisation has its headquarters in accordance with Article 6(1) of the EPC.” 
136  The application can be filed in any language and prosecuted in English, French or 
German.  Before the grant, the EPO requires the patent specification to be translated into English, 
where the EPO prosecution was in French or German, or into any other official language of an EU 
member state, where the EPO prosecution was in English. 
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states),137 with sections in London and Munich dealing with cases concerning specific patent 
classifications.138  The UPC Court of Appeal will be located in Luxembourg and will hear all 
appeals.  All the panels of both Courts (of three and five judges respectively) will have a 
multinational composition and operate under the Rules of Procedure of the UPC.  The 
decisions of the UPC-CFI and of the UPC Court of Appeal will be immediately enforceable 
in any contracting State.   
 
3. Objective of IP and Scope of the Patent 
After this brief introduction on patent law, it is now time to determine its rationale.  
Often laws are considered a given and interpretation and enforcement take the letter of the 
law as the starting (and sometimes ending) point.  The risk with this approach is that a law 
created to accomplish a specific result might be (ab)used to achieve unforeseen and often 
undesirable consequences, sometimes diametrically opposed to those behind the same 
existence of the law. 
Patent law, as any other law, has been created for a reason, to pursue a specific 
objective.  A conduct that, by using the means provided by patent law, aims at achieving 
patent law‟s objective should not be the object of criticism by antitrust authorities.  In 
deciding whether to adopt a patent law, and how to structure it, regulators balance the 
different interests coming into play (on one hand, the need to encourage innovation; on the 
other hand, the avoidance of monopolies), and this balancing should not be questioned by 
antitrust authorities.139  To the contrary, when the conduct, although formally compliant with 
                                                 
137  Actions for revocation must be brought in the Central Division.  The same applies to 
actions for non-infringement.  In this case, however, if a corresponding action for infringement is 
brought within three months, the Central Division must stay the non-infringement proceeding.  
Actions for infringement shall in general be brought before the Local (or Regional) Division (1) where 
the infringement has occurred or is threatened, or (2) where the defendant (or one of the defendants) 
has his residence or place of business.  In cases where the defendants are not EU-based or the country 
under (1) or (2) does not participate in a Local or Regional Division (as is the case for Luxembourg 
and Malta), the case can again be brought in the Central Division.  In the event the defendant present 
a counterclaim for revocation, the Local or Regional Division hearing the infringement action can (i) 
proceed with the infringement and revocation proceedings together; (ii) proceed with the infringement 
proceedings and send the counterclaim for revocation to the Central Division (so-called 
“bifurcation”); (iii) send the counterclaim to the Central Division and stay the infringement 
proceedings until a decision on the revocation.  If the parties agree, it is also possible for the 
infringement action and revocation counterclaim to be both heard by the Central Division. 
138  London: patents in the IPC (International Patent Classification) classifications A and 
C (chemistry, pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and also human necessities, including medical devices); 
Munich: IPC classification F (mechanical engineering).  Other matters, i.e. classifications B, D, E, G 
and H, including electronics, software and physics, will be heard in Paris.  After the British 
referendum to exit the EU (Brexit), the issue of whether the UK will remain part of the UPC system 
has been widely discussed and a final position is yet to be expressed.  While it is likely that the UK will 
remain part of the UPC system (though Brexit will probably delay the implementation of the Unitary 
patent), certain steps to address the participation of a non-Member State will need to be taken. 
139  “The tradeoff between static welfare loss from short-run supra-competitive pricing and dynamic 
efficiency gains from more abundant innovation over time is said to be implicitly struck by Congress when it set the length 
and breadth of patent rights.” (T. Cheng, Putting Innovation Incentives Back in the Patent-Antitrust 
Interface, 11(5) Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, 2013, p. 390).  See also 
A. Chowdhury; A. Gaigl, The Economics of Competition Law and of Pharmaceutical Patents, in G. 
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the letter of the law, goes against the principles and objectives of patent law, not only antitrust 
has a role to play, but the same patent law will be central in sanctioning its abuse and ensuring 
that its purpose is not frustrated.  Indeed, to determine whether a right has been abused it is 
necessary to determine whether it has been used in a way contrary to the objective for which 
it was granted.  The notion of abuse is symbiotically linked to the very objectives that the law 
sets for the patent.  
The patent holder‟s conduct should thus always be tested against the objective of IP 
law in general, and of patent law in particular, to determine whether it is in line or in conflict 
with it.  When a conduct involving the use of a patent conflicts with the reason why the 
patent was granted, it may be abusive both under patent law and antitrust law.140  As briefly 
expressed by the former European Commissioner for Competition, Joaquin Almunia: 
“a healthy system for the protection of intellectual property creates incentives for researchers and 
inventors granting them exclusive rights – within certain limits – for the commercial exploitation of 
their findings.  But the system can be abused, which can be particularly harmful for the economy.  
This is why we want to prevent the trend we can observe in certain industries toward the strategic use 
of patents as a means to block competition”.141 
As said, the abuse of a patent may be understood as the use of patent rights to hinder 
the achievement of the objective for which the rights were granted.  To determine what an 
abuse is, it is therefore necessary to determine the objective pursued by patent law in granting 
exclusive rights.  The same conduct may also restrain third parties from competing with the 
patentee, which strengthen the harmfulness of the conduct and may lead to the intervention 
of antitrust authorities. 
The basis for the introduction of patent law in the United States is article I, § 8, cl. 8, 
of the U.S. Constitution, which gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”  Patent rights thus stem from a specific constitutional provision 
which authorizes Congress to grant exclusive rights, for limited times, “[t]o promote the Progress 
of Science”.  What is clear from this clause is that the power granted to Congress is limited and 
conditioned by a specific aim, the promotion of advances in science and the useful arts.142  As 
                                                                                                                                                   
Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  An 
International Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, p. 11 (“First, it is important to acknowledge that patents indeed do 
account for (at least, to some extent) the trade-off between static and dynamic welfare through the consideration of 
parameters such as the patent length/term (or, maximum patent duration) and the scope/breadth of the patent (i.e., the 
extent to which substitute products will be considered to be infringing on the patent).  As such, an optimal patent design, 
specified by the length and breadth of a patent, is one that aims to strike the balance between providing sufficient 
monopoly profits to recoup the investment cost of the innovation and reducing the welfare loss due to the monopoly.”) 
140  This work is premised on the idea that creator‟s rights are not absolute and society 
can, under certain circumstance, be worse off by the granting and use of a patent (even when the 
patent was the reason the invention was disclosed in the first place).  On this idea, see W. Gordon, A 
Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual 
Property, 102 Yale Law Journal, 1993, p. 1533. 
141  J. Almunia, Antitrust enforcement: Challenges old and new, 8 June 2012, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-428_en.htm, accessed on 6 August 2016. 
142  See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 1966.  See also United 
States v. Singer Mfg., 374 U.S., 1963, p. 199 (“There is a public interest here which the parties have subordinated 
to their private ends-the public interest in granting patent monopolies only when the progress of the useful arts and of 
science will be furthered because as the consideration for its grant the public is given a novel and useful invention”).  
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clearly expressed by the Supreme Court: 
“The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries.  
Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.  The grant of an exclusive 
right to an invention was the creation of society – at odds with the inherent free nature of disclosed 
ideas – and was not to be freely given.  Only inventions and discoveries which furthered human 
knowledge, and were new and useful, justified the special inducement of a limited private monopoly.  
[Thomas] Jefferson [author of the 1793 Patent Act] did not believe in granting patents for 
small details, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices.  His writings evidence his insistence upon a 
high level of patentability.”143  
The exclusivity right on the invention granted by the patent is thus not an end in 
itself.144  The purpose of a patent is not to exclude others.  That is a means to achieve the 
purpose of promoting total welfare.145  A patent is the price society agrees to pay as a 
consideration for a useful, novel and non-obvious invention, to incentivize the inventor to 
                                                 
143  Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S., 1966, p. 9 (Patents reduce 
competition by creating temporary monopolies to reward inventors who invent “things which are worth to 
the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent.”).  It is noteworthy that Jefferson had an instinctive 
aversion to monopolies.  Initially he argued against the need for limited monopoly to incite 
“ingenuity”, since “the benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to that of their general 
suppression,” (V Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 47, Ford ed., 1895).  His position changed when in a 
letter to Madison in August 1789 he stated that he would have welcome a provision to this effect: 
“Art. 9. Monopolies may be allowed to persons for their own productions in literature & their own inventions in the 
arts, for a term […] but for no longer term & no other purpose.”  Jefferson believed that the exclusive right on 
the invention is not a natural right, but it is granted for the benefit of society.  His view that the public 
interest is inherent in patent law is shared by the Supreme Court.  See also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S., 1980, p. 315 (“The […] provisions of patent law have been cast […] to fulfill the constitutional and 
statutory goal of promoting ‗the Progress of Science and the useful Arts‘ with all that means for social and economic 
benefits envisioned by Jefferson.‘”), and Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S., 1989, p. 
146 (“the Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of 
monopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the ‗Progress of Science and useful Arts.”) 
144  As Professor Lemley clearly puts it, IP “intervenes in the market to interfere with the freedom 
of others to do what they want in hopes of achieving the end of encouraging creativity.  If we take that purpose out of the 
equation, we are left with a belief system that says the government should restrict your speech and freedom of action in 
favor of mine, not because doing so will improve the world, but simply because I spoke first.  But why do we think there 
is some entitlement to be the only one allowed to say a particular thing, or to make a particular product, simply because I 
did so first?  Why not give the right instead to the last person to do so, or the person with the longest last name, or with 
the longest eyelashes?  Most often, the answer turns out to be a utilitarian one—because we believe that doing so 
privileges creativity and therefore encourages someone to strive to be first.  But that is an empirical prediction, not one we 
can simply assume to be true.” (M.A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA Law Review, 
2015, pp. 1339-1340) 
145  “The patent system recognizes the exclusionary power of the patentee not as an end in itself but as a 
means to an end – in short, that of promoting greater overall welfare by stimulating technological innovation and its 
dissemination.  A clear confirmation of this is the obligation imposed by many legislations on the patent holder to 
implement the invention to an extent that is not disproportionate to  the needs of the country (in Italy, see Art. 70 of 
Industrial Property Code, IPC), except in the case where non-implementation is due to causes beyond the control of the 
owner.  This principle finds a precedent in the first international Convention on industrial property, the Paris Union 
Convention of 1883: Art. 5 is clearly and precisely aimed at avoiding the emulative practice, for mere exclusionary 
purposes, of patent applications.” (G. Ghidini, G. Cavani, P.F. Pisera‟, Italy – Abuse of Patent Rights and 
Abuse of Dominant Position: The Pfizer Case, in G. Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition and 
Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  An International Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, p. 261, 
footnote 37) 
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make the productive effort.146  In short, “a patent, is at once the equivalent given by the public for 
benefits bestowed by the genius and meditations and skill of individuals, and the incentive to further efforts for 
the same important objects”.147 
Looking at the EU, the European Commission recently confirmed that granting to 
the patentee the exclusive right to use an invention with a view to manufacturing industrial 
products and putting them into circulation for the first time is aimed at rewarding “the creative 
effort of the inventor”.148 
As a creation of society and an exception to the inherent free nature of disclosed 
ideas,149 the scope of patent rules needs to be interpreted narrowly,150 to avoid society being 
overcharged.151  This might happen in two cases: first, the patent grant is too broad, keeping 
                                                 
146  Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S., 1974, p. 480.  See also, for an EU 
perspective, A. Leonard, Abuse of Rights in Belgian and French Patent Law – A Case Law Analysis, 
Jipitec, 2016, p. 46 (“Connections with the ―right-function‖ criterion of abuse can be established considering the goals 
of patent law.  Patents represent incentive to innovate, encompassing the promotion of the development of products and 
services for consumers.) 
147  Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S., 1932, pp. 127-128. 
148  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 1120, citing 
Court of Justice, 15/74, Centrafarm BV and Others v Sterling Drug, 31 October 1974, par. 9.  In the 
FAQ on the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, p. 5, the European Commission expressly states: “Patents 
are essential for protecting intellectual property rights of inventors so that they can make a profit on their innovation and 
will continue to invest and work in the field.”  At the international level, as seen above, Article 7 TRIPS 
states that: “[t]he protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the promotion of 
technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and 
users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations.” 
149  “Patents and copyrights are legal monopolies, as this term has been used since at least the sixteenth 
century.  That is, they are statutory grants that restrain people from doing things that they would otherwise be free to do 
under the common law.  Because patents and copyrights give their owners power over the exercise of the common law 
rights of others, their exclusionary power must not only be grounded in a recognized legal rule, but also be bounded by 
law.  Thus, determining the scope of IP rights and the limitations on their exercise involves more than balancing economic 
interests, and ultimately relies on the general principles of the rule of law.” (Katz A., Intellectual Property, 
Antitrust, and the Rule of Law: Between Private Power and State Power, 17 Theoretical Inquiries in 
Law, 2016, pp. 635-636) 
150  See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S., 1980, p. 315 (“Given the complexity and 
legislative nature of this delicate task, we must be careful to extend patent protection no further than Congress has 
provided.  In particular, were there an absence of legislative direction, the courts should leave to Congress the decisions 
whether and how far to extend the patent privilege into areas where the common understanding has been that patents are 
not available”).  See also Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S., 1972, p. 531 (“in light of this 
Nation‘s historical antipathy to monopoly […][w]e would require a clear and certain signal from Congress before 
approving the position of a litigant who […] argues that the beachhead of privilege is wider, and the area of public use 
narrower, than courts had previously thought”). 
151  “Empirical evidence indicates that whatever the total social cost of a patent, it is not, on average, 
zero” (R.P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 High Technology Law Journal, 
1992, p. 30).  A balance has to be found between over-protection and under protection of inventions.  
Under-protection may discourage R&D and investment in innovation.  Over-protection may 
discourage follow-on innovation and harm competition and consumer welfare.  Indeed, granting 
inventors the right to exclude limits the diffusion of ideas and prevents people (both consumers that 
cannot pay the supracompetitive price, if that is the case, and other inventors, that have the same idea, 
or a dependent idea) from fully benefiting from them.  Although one might think that the dependent 
invention would not exist without the first, this does not take into consideration that patent holders 
have the right to sue also those that developed the same invention independently, without even 
knowing it was patented.  Therefore, the price society is “paying” to grant a patent has to be 
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out of the public domain too big of a portion or being used to achieve results that exceed the 
need to promote further innovation, or too long, extending the exclusivity beyond the patent 
term; second, the invention might not be of a sufficient value to justify a patent grant as 
consideration.152  Overcompensating the patentees disrupts the incentive system and results in 
inefficiency, reduced innovation and competition, and unjustifiably high prices. 
Both the value of the invention and the balancing exercise between the scope of the 
patent and the consideration paid by society has to be determined in an objective way.  The 
minimum value of an invention to be worth a patent simply coincides with the patentability 
requirements.  If those requirements are met, society considers the invention valuable and 
worth paying for with the grand of exclusive rights.  For this reason the patent office, as a 
representative of society in concluding the social contract with the inventor,153 should 
carefully review the invention154 and verify that it meets all the patentability requirements.155  
                                                                                                                                                   
outbalanced by the benefit in terms of creation and dissemination of new works.  When patentees are 
overcompensated, the incentive system is disrupted and the result is inefficiency and reduced output. 
152  Judge Kozinski, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc in White v. Samsung 
Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 9th Cir., 1993, noted: “Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as 
underprotecting it.  Culture is impossible without a rich public domain.  Nothing today, likely nothing since we tamed 
fire, is genuinely new.  Culture, like science and technology, grows by accretion, each new creator building on the works of 
those who came before.  Overprotection stifles the very creative forces it‘s supposed to nurture. […]  Intellectual property 
rights aren‘t free.  They‘re imposed at the expense of future creators and of the public at large. […]  This is why 
intellectual property law is full of careful balances between what‘s set aside for the owner and what‘s left in the public 
domain for the rest of us […] All of these diminish an intellectual property owner‘s rights.  All let the public use 
something created by someone else.  But all are necessary to maintain a free environment in which creative genius can 
flourish.” 
153  A patent does not derive from natural law, but from an act of State, which grants the 
patentee an exclusivity right on the invention.  The patent system can be viewed as a contract between 
the inventor and society (see, e.g., Century Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse, 191 F. 350, 8th Cir., 1911, and 
Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Floral Innovations, Inc., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140345, 2012 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 
2012) “A patent is, therefore, appropriately viewed as a contract between the patentee and the public.”) under which 
a patent is a consideration for the disclosure and the enabling of the innovation by the inventor (See 
A. Musso, Del Diritto di Brevetto per Invenzioni Industriali, in Commentario del Codice Civile 
Scialoja-Branca, Zanichelli, 2012, pp. 541-543; V. Falce, Sulle Fondazioni Filosofiche delle Moderne 
Dottrine Economiche dell‟innovazione, Rivista di Diritto Industriale, 2004, p. 125).  Society renounces 
to the free exploitation of the invention, granting an exclusive right (limited in time) to the inventor; 
the inventor creates and discloses its invention, new and useful to society, in the pursuit of an increase 
in consumer welfare.  This incentive rationale has at its core the societal benefits of the invention. 
154  The concern that, due to budget constraints and record numbers of new applications, 
patent offices cannot reliably and efficiently render complex patentability judgments is widespread.  
See, e.g., C.S. Hemphill, B.N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies, 2011, p. 6 (“The lightness of review ex ante might be a rational response given the 
substantial cost entailed in reviewing each patent. Such ―rational ignorance‖ is costeffective provided that most patents 
have little economic importance, and the set of important patents cannot be identified early, but can be identified later.”).  
See also F. Jenny, Anticompetitive Abuses of Patent Systems and the Role of Competition 
Authorities, Concurrences, 2013, p. 31 (“possibly because they are overworked or possibly because patent 
examiners are rewarded for patents granted, some patent offices have granted weak patents, i.e. patents which do not meet 
the criteria of ―utility‖ ―novelty‖ or ―non-obviousness‖ and would be invalidated if challenged, but the court proceedings 
to establish the invalidity of such patents is long and costly”).  
155  “It makes sense to view the Patent Office‘s job not as an assessment of the possible value of the 
invention in action, but instead as an evaluation of the significance of the inventor‘s contribution to technical knowledge.  
[…][T]he role of the Patent Office is to police the ―contract‖ between society and the inventor. […]  The Patent Office is 
then in a sense acting to insure the adequacy of the inventor‘s contribution-guaranteeing that the inventor is providing 
sufficient consideration for the contract.  The Patent Office thus acts as society‘s agent in negotiating a disclosure 
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If this does not happen, not only society (over)pays for something that it does not want, but 
it risks missing the opportunity to get something it does want (another invention blocked by 
the undeserved patent). 
Allowing inventors to harvest the benefits deriving from their work by granting them 
exclusivity for a limited period of time must be in the interest of society in general, i.e. lead to 
the creation of a valuable innovation that would not have been developed without the 
granting of a patent.156 
The balancing exercise between rewarding inventors and promoting competition and 
access to innovation informs the grant of the patent as much as the scope of the patent once 
it is granted.  Specifically, the scope of the patent must coincide with its purpose.  The only 
conducts falling within the scope of the patent‟s exclusivity rights are conducts that are in line 
with the purpose of the patent, i.e. the enhancement of long-term consumer welfare157 by 
incentivizing innovation.158  Patent regulation should thus be interpreted in line with its 
ultimate aim, increase consumer welfare.159 
                                                                                                                                                   
agreement with an inventor.  And nonobviousness is the standard society has given the Patent Office in evaluating which 
―deals‖ it considers worth making.” (R.P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 High 
Technology Law Journal, 1992, pp. 68-69 (although the author is describing the disclosure theory, the 
same principles are applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the position taken by this work)) 
156  See S.C. Gilfillan, The Root of Patents, or Squaring Patents by their Roots, 31 Journal 
of the Patent Office Society, 1949, p. 611 (“A patent is helpful and proper when it rewards sufficiently useful 
creative work which might not have been done without that prospective reward.  And conversely a patent is unneccessary, 
and wrongly gives away the people‘s freedom, to a merely lucky, adventitious monopolist, when it gives him the ownership 
of an invention that would have been made without a patent reward, nearly as soon, either by him or by someone else 
somewhere in the world.  This principle has always been the basis for granting patents for inventions won by genius or 
luck, and denying them for inventions that could have been made by anyone skilled in the art, or inventions that follow 
logically from already known principles.”) 
157  According to some authors, whose opinion is shared by this work, maximizing 
consumer welfare is the high road to total welfare maximization.  See J. Farrell, M.L. Katz, The 
Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust, 2(2) Competition Policy International; and S. Martin, 
The Goals of Antitrust and Competition Policy, CIBER Working Papers, July 2007. 
158  “From a utilitarian point of view, the objective of intellectual property protection is to secure long-term 
public interest by providing exclusive rights to right holders for a limited duration of time to incentivize certain desirable 
behaviour.” (M. Lorenz, P. Chrocziel , et al. (eds), Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Kluwer, 
2016, p. 8).  At pp. 3-6, the authors list four theories, or points of view, that have been developed over 
time to justify the granting of a patent: the natural rights theory, the reward theory, the utilitarian-
based incentive theory, and the disclosure theory.  As it can be inferred from this work, while 
recognizing the importance and relevance of all of these theories, this author takes a position that, 
with the necessary caveats, is most in line with the utilitarian-based incentive theory. 
159  As Professor Anderman explains it: “The contribution of IPRs to ―consumer welfare,‖ by 
stimulating innovative efficiencies […] cannot be measured solely by the benefits of first inventor incentives, it must also 
take into account the potential consumer harms caused by practices such as ―blocking‖ patents, unwarranted higher 
prices and the enforcement of unused patented inventions which are used to prevent follow on and cumulative innovation.” 
(S. Anderman, The “Accommodation” of EU Competition Law with Intellectual Property Law, p. 6, 
available at http://www.agcm.it/component/joomdoc/eventi/Anderman.pdf/download.html, 
accessed on 6 August 2016).  See also See, e.g., M. Franzosi, The New Unified European Patent Court 
and a New Patent Law: When a KU is Not a KU, in G. Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition 
and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  An International Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, p. 182 (“It 
seems to me the patent system has to be conceived and administered as a tool to promote, not only (a) the progress of 
science and useful arts, but also (b) the best allocation of the market and at the end (c) the welfare of society.  At least 
three, and not one, are the goals of the system.  And the solutions, in the day by day judicial practice, should be 
influenced by the vision of these three goals.”) 
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“Consumer interests should be just as central to intellectual property law as they are to antitrust.  Just 
as in antitrust, consumers have the correct set of incentives.  They tend to profit from a well-
functioning patent system, furthering innovation that expands output and increases quality and 
variety, while reducing costs.  More generally, consumers profit from economic growth, and innovation 
is growth‘s largest driver.”160 
Patent rights are not absolute,161 the exclusive right to exploit an invention does not 
exist in rerum natura and it is thus created and granted by a public authority, with a precise 
social function.  Limits and exceptions to patents are thus inherent to the rights themselves 
and arise directly from the same reason the rights were granted. 
“A patent right cannot be viewed as a title giving (almost) complete freedom of action but rather as 
temporary permit to exploit monopoly rights under fair and reasonable conditions, in other words, as 
a duty-bearing privilege.”162  
The same position has been taken by the U.S. Supreme Court when it affirmed that a 
patent is a privilege because it is conditioned by a public purpose.163  The right to exclude is 
thus granted for, and as long as it is, fostering innovation and long-term consumer welfare.  
As Professor Hovenkamp explains: 
“The constitutional mandate to Congress to create intellectual property regimes in order to ―promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts‖ is expressly tied to creating incentives to innovate.  Indeed, 
the IP Clause is the only place where the Constitution expressly links the scope of a property right to 
the incentive to develop it.  An optimal IP policy creates just enough incentive to cause creative people 
to innovate at the optimal level, but not so much as to restrain excessively others who want to build on 
                                                 
160  H.J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination, 76(3) Ohio 
State Law Journal, 2015, p. 485. 
161  “The Court‘s decision in Actavis reaffirmed the conclusions of circuit courts that a patent does not 
confer upon the patent holder an ―absolute and unfettered right to use its intellectual property as it wishes,‖ Microsoft, 
253 F.3d at 63, and ―[i]ntellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws,‖ In re Indep. 
Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000).” (State of New York v. Actavis, No. 14-
4624, 2d Cir., 2015, p. 52)  In its judgment in Scarlet Extended (C-70/10, 24 November 2011, par. 
43), the Court of Justice of the EU expressly stated that “The protection of the right to intellectual property is 
indeed enshrined in Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‗the Charter‘). There 
is, however, nothing whatsoever in the wording of that provision or in the Court‘s case-law to suggest that that right is 
inviolable and must for that reason be absolutely protected.” 
162  G. Van Overwalle, Fair Use: A Workable Concept in European Patent Law?, in R.M. 
Hilty, K.-C. Liu (eds.), Compulsory Licensing: Practical Experiences and Ways Forward, Springer, 
2014, pp. 425-426.  The author cites in particular P. Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 
Dartmouth, 1996, pp. 220-223, where it can be read: “If the purpose in creating the privilege [i.e. the patent] 
is to fulfil some approved goal then it should also follow that the [patent] holder is subject to duties not to exercise the 
[patent rights] in a way that defeats the purpose for which the [patent] was granted. […]  Holders of intellectual 
property privileges are subject to those duties that maximize the probability that the purpose for which the privilege was 
first created is achieved. […]  The grant of these monopolies would be tied to the idea of duty.  Duty-bearing privileges 
would form the heart of an instrumentalism of intellectual property”.  See also A. Musso, Del Diritto di Brevetto 
per Invenzioni Industriali, in Commentario del Codice Civile Scialoja-Branca, Zanichelli, 2012, pp. 
541-545. 
163  Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S., 
1971, p. 313.  “It is a mistake […] to conceive of a patent as but another form of private property. The patent is a 
privilege conditioned by a public purpose.” (Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S., 1945, pp. 380-84, Justice 
Douglas dissenting) 
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their work.”164 
The mentioned balancing between returns to the patent holder (increasing its 
incentive to create socially valuable invention) and the public losses from patent exclusion is 
reflected in the scope and duration of a patent.  The balancing as regards duration has been 
legislatively addressed by establishing a limited duration of exclusivity ending 20 years from 
the date on which the application for the patent was filed.  The patent‟s scope, instead, is 
being constantly defined by courts, within the limits of the law, in every decision involving 
directly (e.g., when deciding questions of patent infringement) or indirectly (e.g., in antitrust 
cases) a patent.  
As emphasized, inter alia, by Professor Hovenkamp, the scope of the patent rights 
should be tailored to the objective to achieve which the patent was granted.  The patent rights 
should thus encompass as much as necessary to spur consumer welfare-enhancing 
innovation, but nothing more.  Too narrow patents would not provide incentive enough to 
innovate, while overly broad patents would discourage much useful research and 
competition.165 
To conclude and recap, patent rights are neither unlimited nor unconditioned.  If the 
patent holder‟s behavior does not fall within the perimeter of the patent, as interpreted on the 
basis of the purpose for which it was granted, it cannot be considered within its rights.  If the 
                                                 
164  H.J. Hovenkamp, Innovation and the Domain of Competition Policy, 60 Alabama 
Law Review, 2008, p. 107. 
165  “This raises the issue of how much patent protection is necessary to spur innovation.  For example, if 
the duration of patents were too limited, inventors might not be able to charge a supracompetitive price long enough to 
recoup their research costs and earn a sufficient profit to make their efforts worthwhile.  Similarly, if the bundle of 
exclusionary rights were somehow inadequate, the value of patents would decrease and diminish the rewards to inventors. 
In short, weak patent protection reduces the incentive to research and innovate.  While it is easy to see how insufficient 
rewards may hurt innovation, less obvious is the fact that overly strong patent protection also hurts innovation.  
Innovation is a cumulative process in which today‘s inventors build on the ideas of yesterday‘s creators.” (C.R. Leslie, 
Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation Policy, 34(4) The Journal of Corporation 
Law, 2009, p. 1261).  Prof. Anderman clarifies: “a wide patent grant runs the risk that the social and economic 
costs of IP protection will exceed the innovative value of the grant by foreclosing too many avenues to future improvements 
by later innovators.” (S. Anderman, Overplaying the innovation card: The stronger intellectual property 
rights and competition law, in P. Drahos, G. Ghidini, H. Ullrich (eds.), Kritika: Essays on Intellectual 
Property, 2015, p. 24).  See also R.P. Merges, R.R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 Columbia Law Review, 1990, pp. 874, 877, 916 (“The real problem is not controlling overfishing, 
but preventing underfishing after exclusive rights have been granted.  The only way to find out what works and what does 
not is to let a variety of minds try.  If a property right on a basic invention covers a host of potential improvements, the 
property right holder can be expected to develop the basic invention and some of the improvements.  But we would expect 
a single rightholder to underdevelop – or even ignore totally – many of the potential improvements encompassed by their 
broad property right.  […][W]e have little faith in the imagination and willingness of a ―prospect‖ holder to develop that 
prospect as energetically or creatively as she would when engaged in competition.  We are also skeptical about her ability 
to orchestrate development.  Given the way humans and organizations think and behave, we believe we are much better 
off with considerable rivalry in invention than with too little. […]  When a broad patent is granted […] its scope 
diminishes incentives for others to stay in the invention game, compared with a patent whose claims are trimmed more 
closely to the inventor‘s actual results.  This would not be undesirable if the evidence indicated that control of subsequent 
developments by one party made subsequent inventive effort more effective. But the evidence, we think, points the other 
way.”).  Another explanation has been provided by Professor Hovenkamp: “[a]s patent protection is 
greater, measured by either duration or breadth, the incentive to obtain patents increases but the dissemination of 
knowledge decreases. Economic growth depends both on sufficient incentives to innovate plus the effective dissemination of 
innovation through the economy” (H.J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination, 
76(3) Ohio State Law Journal, 2015, p. 508). 
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patent holder uses its patent right to achieve results that exceed or run counter to the purpose 
of the patent (which is, as we saw, the enhancement of long-term consumer welfare by 
incentivizing investments in innovation)166 and can thus lead to limitations to the patent right 
and, as discussed in further details below, even be considered abusive either under patent law 
or antitrust law. 
With regards to the limitation of patent rights to what is necessary to ensure and 
realize the purpose of the patent, the U.S. Supreme Court expressed an opinion that perfectly 
summarizes the position taken by this work in the eBay case.167  This case recognized the 
threat to innovation of overreaching patent protection and provided a considered approach 
to limiting patent rights and maintaining incentives to innovate.  In its concurring opinion, 
Justice Kennedy, joined by three judges, warned lower courts about the use of patents “not as 
a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.  [A]n injunction, 
and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge 
exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.  When the patented invention is 
but a small component of the product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed 
simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the 
infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest. […]  The equitable discretion over 
injunctions, granted by the Patent Act, is well suited to allow courts to adapt to the rapid technological and 
legal developments in the patent system.”  
The Supreme Court thus limited the extent of the patent rights by limiting the scope 
of the remedies for its violation,168 in case the patent is not used “as a basis for producing and 
selling goods” and the remedy “[does] not serve the public interest”.  In particular, the Supreme 
Court directed trial courts to abandon the automatic injunction rule and instead rely on a 
flexible test, based on the traditional principles of fairness, to determine whether an 
injunction can be granted or the patent right should be limited to legal damages.169-170  As 
                                                 
166  Noteworthy is the fact that conducts that exceed the perimeter of the patent often 
run counter its purpose (and vice versa).  This is clearly explained by the fact that a patent-related 
conduct that is not within the perimeter of the patent can‟t but represent the appropriation of part of 
the public domain or of the public welfare that was not part of the original deal and is thus contrary to 
the enhancement of both short- and long-term consumer welfare. 
167  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC , 547 U.S. 388, 2006. 
168  The limitation of the right to get an injunction has effects that do not substantially 
differ from the grant of a compulsory license.  “[T]he court‘s denial is equivalent to the grant of a compulsory 
license under the patent.  A compulsory license is also among the range of remedies that may result from the assertion of a 
successful patent-related antitrust claim.  Accordingly, after eBay, patent infringers may be expected to argue against 
permanent injunctions using the same or similar arguments that previously may have served as the basis for Sherman 
Act § 2 claims.” (H.J. Hovenkamp, M.D. Janis, M.A. Lemley, C.R. Leslie, M.A. Carrier, IP and 
Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law, Aspen, 2014, p. 2-
50).  See also I. Lianos, R.C. Dreyfuss, New Challenges in the Intersection of Intellectual Property 
Rights with Competition Law, CLEAS Working Paper Series, 2013, p. 29 (“Refusing to grant injunctions 
(and instead requiring the payment of royalties) is, in some ways, the functional equivalent of compulsory licensing.  
Knowing that an injunction will not be awarded, patentees will be more likely to negotiate deals on their own rather than 
have the court calculate royalties.”) 
169  The Supreme Court held that: “According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff 
seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief.  A plaintiff must 
demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury;[(In Paice v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d I 293, 
Fed. Cir., 2007, the Federal Circuit upheld the denial of injunctive relief by the district court, based on 
the rejection of Paice‟s arguments regarding irreparable harm.  The district court concluded that “the 
absence of an injunction would not adversely affect Paice‘s ability to license its technology, and would not adversely affect 
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clearly explained by Professor Peritz: 
“eBay‘s distinction between property rights and property remedies should be understood as harboring a 
patent policy to promote competition, an equitable doctrine that allows infringers to compete against 
the owners with the patent in suit unless extraordinary circumstances warrant an injunction.”171 
This limitation is perfectly in line with the discussed provision in the U.S. Constitution 
on the basis of which the exception to the inherent free nature of disclosed ideas has been 
introduced “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”.  Exclusive rights are thus granted 
by society to inventors for a purpose, and charging exorbitant fees falls outside of that 
                                                                                                                                                   
Paice‘s reputation or market share (because Paice was not manufacturing goods under the patent).  In addition, Paice 
had offered a license to Toyota.” (H.J. Hovenkamp, M.D. Janis, M.A. Lemley, C.R. Leslie, M.A. Carrier, IP 
and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law, Aspen, 2014, 
p. 2-49).)] (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that 
injury;[(“An ongoing royalty payment or damage award will typically be more than adequate to compensate the patentee.  
This is best demonstrated by the fact that so many patentees routinely accept a running royalty for all users of a 
standard.” (R.P. Merges, J.M. Kuhn, An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented Standards, 97 California Law 
Review, 2009, p. 28))] (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in 
equity is warranted;[(In Verizon Services Corp. v. Vonage Holding Corp., 503 F.3d I 295, Fed. Cir., 
2007, the Federal Circuit noted that in balancing the harms, an important factor is whether the 
infringer would have the time to implement an alternative solution.)] and (4) that the public interest would 
not be disserved by a permanent injunction.[(The Court thus explicitly refers to the need to strike a balance 
between the interests of the patentee, the infringer and the public, the latter being the ultimate 
purpose of patent law)]” 
170  In this author‟s opinion, also the district court‟s position in eBay, which the Supreme 
Court rejected as “expansive” since “traditional equitable principles do not permit such broad classifications”, in 
reality falls within the four-factor test coined by the Supreme Court.  As summarized by the Supreme 
Court, the District Court “concluded that a ―plaintiff‘s willingness to license its patents‖ and ―its lack of commercial 
activity in practicing the patents‖ would be sufficient to establish that the patent holder would not suffer irreparable harm 
if an injunction did not issue”.  The Supreme Court criticized the district court‟s decision because it did 
not take into account the reasonable preference by some patent holders to “license their patents, rather 
than undertake efforts to secure the financing necessary to bring their works to market”.  This critic, although 
correct, should not lead to reject the district court reasoning tout court.  The district court‟s reference to 
the “lack of commercial activity in practicing the patents” should be understood as encompassing both the 
marketing of the patented product and the licensing of the patent (which is a commercial activity as 
much as product sales).  Lacking both, and in case the plaintiff is willing to license its patents, an 
injunction should not be issued.  None of the factors identified by the Supreme Court as necessary for 
an injunctive relief to be granted can be considered present.  In particular, it would be quite difficult to 
demonstrate that the patent holder would suffer an irreparable injury that monetary damages are 
inadequate to compensate when (i) it has a patent, (ii) it is not practicing it (either commercializing a 
product or licensing it), but (iii) it is willing to license it.  While the first two elements would not be 
sufficient, under U.S. law (the reasoning would be much different under most European patent laws, 
which provides for a compulsory license in case of patent non-use), to deny a motion for injunctive 
relief (in line with the right not to use the patent as enshrined in Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern 
Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 1908, “which rejected the contention that a court of equity has no jurisdiction to grant 
injunctive relief to a patent holder who has unreasonably declined to use the patent.”  The right not to use the 
patent is, in this author‟s opinion, contrary to the public interest (the fundamental purpose of the 
patent system) and the Supreme Court could have taken this occasion to definitively reject it, at least 
with regards to the possibility to be granted an injunctions (since, as the Supreme Court noted in eBay, 
“the creation of a right is distinct from the provision of remedies for violations of that right”).  The willingness to 
license its patents, however, should tip the balance in favor of the infringer and lead to the conclusion 
that an injunction would not serve the public interest. 
171  R. Peritz, The Competition Question Unasked in Actavis: What Is the Scope of the 
Patent Right to Exclude?, 28 Antitrust, 2013, p. 48. 
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purpose and therefore of the perimeter of the patent. 
Having analyzed a way to limit patent rights to what is necessary to ensure and realize 
the purpose of the patent, we can now consider the other measures applicable under patent 
law and antitrust law to patent holders using their patent rights to achieve results that exceed 
or run counter to the purpose of the patent.  Both IP and antitrust are indeed indispensable 
instruments ex post grant to (re)balance patent rights and make sure that the general aims of 
patent protection are not lost in an enforcement of patent rights that undermine, instead of 
enhancing, consumer welfare. 
 
4. Patent Misuse 
Starting from patent law, the doctrines analyzed by this and the following chapters are 
the American doctrine of patent misuse and the European abuse of rights doctrine.  The 
principles behind these two doctrines are not only in large part coincident, but they are also 
common to antitrust law.  This was noted recently by the Italian Council of State in its 
judgment confirming the Italian Competition Authority decision fining Pfizer (on which, see 
below chapter 11.2).   
With respect to patent misuse, the doctrine originated in the U.S. and its purpose is to 
“prevent a patentee from using the patent to obtain market benefit beyond that which inheres in the statutory 
patent right.”172  Patent misuse is an equitable defense available for defendants in patent 
infringement cases.  The doctrine finds its origins in the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, 
“whereby a court of equity will not lend its support to enforcement of a patent that has been misused.”173  
Patent misuse was born and raised by judicial practice174 to restrain patentees from adopting 
conducts that, while formally adhering to the letter of the law, unduly attempt to expand 
exclusive rights beyond the invention.175  An alleged infringer may assert misuse where the 
                                                 
172  Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d, Fed. Cir., 1992, p. 704. 
173  B. Braun Med, Inc. v. Abbot Labs., 124 F.3d, Fed. Cir., 1997, p. 1427.  Judges invoke 
equity to guide the case to an outcome that is fair and just to all the parties involved as well as to the 
public at large.  See also U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat‟l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S., 1957, pp. 465-66 (“It is now, 
of course, familiar law that the courts will not aid a patent owner who has misused his patents to recover any of their 
emoluments accruing during the period of misuse or thereafter until the effects of such misuse have been dissipated, or 
‗purged‘ as the conventional saying goes. […] The rule is an extension of the equitable doctrine of ―unclean hands‖ to the 
patent field.”)  See also Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 1942 (“[i]t is a principle of 
general application that courts, and especially courts of equity, may appropriately withhold their aid where the plaintiff is 
using the right asserted contrary to the public interest.”) 
174  Congress upheld the judicial creation of patent misuse, while restraining its 
application.  35 U.S.C. Section 271(d), as amended in 1988, sets forth the conducts which may not 
provide the basis for finding misuse, including refusal to license. 
175  The successful assertion of patent misuse “requires that the alleged infringer show that the 
patentee has impermissibly broadened the ‗physical or temporal scope‘ of the patent grant with anti-competitive effect”. 
(Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel. Co., 133 F.3d 860, Fed. Cir., 1997, p. 869).  “A patent is, therefore, 
appropriately viewed as a contract between the patentee and the public.  Patent misuse occurs when the scope of an 
otherwise valid patent monopoly extends beyond the prescribed boundaries of the patentee‘s control” (Syndicate Sales, 
Inc. v. Floral Innovations, Inc., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140345, 2012 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 2012).  Misuse 
therefore delineates the limit beyond which the patent grant becomes “more embarrassment than advantage 
to society.” (Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (13 August 1813), available at 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html, accessed on 6 August 2016).  
As explained by Professor Lim, “misuse serves as an insurance policy against unanticipated roughish behavior from 
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patentee attempts to enforce its patent in a manner foreclosing “competition, future innovation, or 
access to public domain”.176  As explained by Professor Lim, 
“[T]he entire basis for misuse is directed toward the goal of ensuring that patentees obtain a right 
commensurate, and not more than, the services they render.  […][M]isuse imposes a duty on patentees 
to conduct themselves so that they further (or at least refrain from contravening) the patent and 
antitrust policies embodied in the grant of patent rights.  And where the equities favor neither party, 
the law is clear that the balance should be struck in favor of a broader rather than a narrow use of 
that technology, or in other words, the policy of public use should outweigh the monopolistic privilege of 
a patentee.”177 
As a result of the misuse, the patent is unenforceable until the effects of the misuse 
have been purged.178  Purging means for the patentee to show that it abandoned the 
misconduct and “the baleful effects of the misuse have been fully dissipated”.179   
Infringers asserting misuse need not to prove market power180 or show evidence of an 
                                                                                                                                                   
patentees.  A number of interviewees, notably judges, observed that they had no problems with the inherent vagueness of 
misuse.  Interviewees opined that vague formulations are to be expected when dealing with equity.  Doctrines meant to 
cover situations not defined in advance had no way but to be vague.  The ingenuity of patentees to devise ways of abusing 
their patent rights is matched only by the potential malleability of patent misuse.‘” (D. Lim, Patent Misuse and 
Antitrust Law: Empirical, Doctrinal and Policy Perspectives, Edward Elgar, 2013, p. 160).  As stated 
by Marshall Leaffer, “[o]f course equitable doctrines, like patent misuse, are messy by their very nature.  However, 
they do allow for a needed flexibility for judicial determination.” (M. Leaffer, Patent Misuse and Innovation, 10 
Journal High Tech. Law, 2010, p. 157).  On the vagueness of patent misuse, Professor Merges notes 
that, “[n]ot only is [it] a notoriously difficult standard for an antitrust plaintiff to meet, it is also a standard that is very 
difficult to apply.  Thus it is ironic indeed that advocates of greater certainty in the law of patent misuse would propose a 
unified rule of reason approach when this is arguably one of the least certain legal rules ever propounded”. (R.P. 
Merges, Reflections on Current Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse, 70 Journal of the Patent & 
Trademark Office Society, 1988, p. 794) 
176  C. Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 Iowa Law Review, 2011, p. 478.  
Referring to the Supreme Court‟s eBay decision, as providing an important rationale for rethinking 
misuse, Professor Hovenkamp notes that “[t]he courts have a legitimate role in policing conduct that is not 
expressly authorized by the Patent Act and that serves to restrain innovation, sequesters the public domain, imposes 
competitive harm disproportionate to innovation effects, or that involves improprieties in the patent procurement process.” 
(H.J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System. A Reexamination, 76(3) Ohio State Law Journal, 
2015, p. 564) 
177  D. Lim, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Law: Empirical, Doctrinal and Policy 
Perspectives, Edward Elgar, 2013, p. 170.  At p. 162, Professor Lim indicates that one approach to 
determine misuse “is to require the defendant to show cognizable harm either to the competitive process or to incentives to 
innovation under the general analysis that animates patent law cases.” The burden should then “shift to the patent 
owner to demonstrate a business justification for having insisted on […] a strategic use of the patent grant exceeding its 
scope and contrary to patent policy.” (M. Leaffer, Patent Misuse and Innovation, 10 Journal of High 
Technology Law, 2010, p. 159) 
178  Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S., 1942, p. 492. 
179  See U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat‟l Gypsum Co., 352 U.S., 1957, pp. 594-95.  See also 
Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 541, S.D.N.Y., 1969, p. 560 (“What conduct constitutes a ―purge‖ 
depends upon the nature and extent of the misuse.  Where the misuse […] consists of extensive and aggravated 
misconduct over a period of several years, which has substantially rigidified the price structure of an entire market and 
suppressed competition over a wide area, affirmative action may be essential effectively to dispel the consequences of the 
unlawful conduct.”) 
180  “A finding of market power is not required under traditional patent misuse doctrine, but it is 
required for establishing an antitrust violation.  Thus, a finding of patent misuse does not necessarily mean that the 
patent holder has committed an antitrust violation” (R. Feldman, Rethinking Patent Law, Harvard University 
Press, 2012, p. 139). 
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antitrust injury181 but if successful will not be awarded damages, let alone treble damages as in 
antitrust cases.  Misuse may result only in the unenforceability of the patent. 
These differences, in conjunction with the fact that misuse is an affirmative defense 
and antitrust is a cause of action, justify the existence of the doctrine.182  Other than that, the 
differences between the conducts condemned as misuse of patents (or, as we will see, abuse 
of rights)183 and the anticompetitive conducts violating antitrust are not significatnt.184  This 
does not entail, as many seem to argue, a limitation of the reach of patent misuse.  It is 
antitrust that should reappropriate its position of ultimate watchdog of consumer welfare and 
                                                 
181  An antitrust plaintiff needs to show that the patentee has caused injury “of the type the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes the defendants‘ acts unlawful.” (Cargill, 
Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado., Inc., 479 U.S., 1986, p. 109) 
182  Patent misuse can thus be a useful response to practices in conflict with the purpose 
of the patent system, but falling outside the reach of antitrust.  See Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. 
Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, N.D. Ill., 2003, p. 1047 “When the advance of science […] enables a 
form of patent misuse that is new but is well within the conceptual heartland of the doctrine, the boundaries of the 
doctrine can expand modestly to encompass it. […] It would be inappropriate to confine patent misuse, as is sometimes 
suggested, to practices that violate antitrust law, for in that event the doctrine would be superfluous”.  See also, D.L. 
Burk, M.A. Lemley, Biotechnology‟s Uncertainty Principle, 54 Case Western Reserve Law Review, 
2004, p. 741 (“The patent misuse doctrine can play a powerful role in deterring anticompetitive efforts to extend patent 
rights beyond the scope a rational pharmaceutical patent policy would give”).  Professor Thomas Cotter explains: 
the “reasons to have a misuse doctrine in addition to antitrust law, if the substantive content of the two is the same”: 
“(1) to permit someone who does not have antitrust standing or cannot prove antitrust injury to challenge the conduct at 
issue, or (2) to create an additional penalty (such as unenforceability of the IPR) in addition to the antitrust sanction” 
(T.F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 Houston Law Review, 2007, p. 935). 
183  See C. Osti, What Is in a Name: The Concept of Abuse in Sui Generis Abuse, in G. 
Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  An 
International Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, p. 99 (“Now, if you consider just these two elements [of the abuse of 
rights], i.e., the distortion of the rule‘s function (such theory in fact deriving from a conspicuous creation of the French 
droit administratif, i.e., the theory of détournement de pouvoir) and the gross unbalance between the interest satisfied and 
the one oppressed by the abusive conduct, it is not hard to see how basically all of the above [antitrust] cases [of abuse] 
would fall in either category, if not in both.‖) 
184  Judge Posner in particular argued that patent misuse principles should be completely 
aligned with antitrust principles.  “The [misuse] doctrine arose before there was any significant body of federal 
antitrust law, and reached maturity long before that law (a product very largely of free interpretation of unclear statutory 
language) attained its present broad scope.  Since the antitrust laws as currently interpreted reach every practice that could 
impair competition substantially, it is not easy to define a separate role for a doctrine also designed to prevent an 
anticompetitive practice – the abuse of a patent monopoly.  […][T]here is increasing convergence of patent-misuse 
analysis with standard antitrust analysis.  See, e.g., Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374, 1378-82 
(Ct.Cl.1971); Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 366 F.Supp. 220, 227-32 (E.D.Pa.1973), aff‘d, 
510 F.2d 334 (3d Cir.1975); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F.Supp. 983, 997-98 (D.Conn.1978) (the lengthy 
subsequent history of this case is irrelevant). One still finds plenty of statements in judicial opinions that less evidence of 
anticompetitive effect is required in a misuse case than in an antitrust case. See, e.g., Transitron Electronic Corp. v. 
Hughes Aircraft Co., 487 F.Supp. 885, 892-93 (D.Mass.1980), aff‘d, 649 F.2d 871 (1st Cir.1981). But apart 
from the conventional applications of the doctrine we have found no cases where standards different from those of antitrust 
law were actually applied to yield different results. […]  If misuse claims are not tested by conventional antitrust 
principles, by what principles shall they be tested?  Our law is not rich in alternative concepts of monopolistic abuse; and 
it is rather late in the day to try to develop one without in the process subjecting the rights of patent holders to debilitating 
uncertainty. Cf. Hensley Equipment Co. v. Esco Corp., 383 F.2d 252, 261-62 n. 19, amended, 386 F.2d 442 (5th 
Cir.1967).” (USM Corp. v SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F2d 505, 7th Cir., 1982).  See also Linzer 
Prods. Corp. v. Chandra Sekar, 499 F. Supp. 2d 540, S.D.N.Y., 2007, p. 552 (“Patent misuse, which 
developed long before the advent of antitrust law, has largely merged with antitrust law.  ‗Misuse is closely intertwined 
with antitrust law, and most findings of misuse are conditioned on conduct that would also violate the antitrust laws‘ 
(Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis & Mark A. Lemley, IP and Antitrust § 3.1 (2002 & 2007 Supp.)”). 
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intervene when this is frustrated by the (dominant) patentees‟ anticompetitive conducts 
contrary to the purpose of the patent system.  Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp observed 
this shortcoming of current antitrust enforcement in noting that: 
“[Misuse] has additional concerns that antitrust does not capture, or at least that it does not capture 
very effectively.  One of these concerns is with protection of the public domain, even if nonmonopolistic.  
Another is with practices that restrain rather than promote innovation.  Of course, one might say that 
―foreclosure‖ of the public domain is an antitrust concern.  Further, antitrust is also concerned as 
much with dynamic as with static competition, and thus innovation is always important to its 
analysis.  While both of these things are true, antitrust takes a much more cautious and restrictive 
approach to these problems than IP policy does”.185 
The misuse doctrine, although not completely disappeared, is playing a very minor 
role in patent-related litigation in the U.S. and was featured in only 20 appellate level cases 
between 1991 and 2012.186  The decline in the reference to patent misuse is a lost opportunity 
to find in patent law itself the solution “to make the system more consistent with its underlying 
goals.”187 
This is one of the principles on which this work is premised.  Patent law can cure 
itself by turning to its roots, its rationale, the objective it pursues.188  The doctrines of patent 
misuse and abuse of rights define the scope of the patent in line with the patent law‟s very 
own purpose, promoting innovation.189  These doctrines go beyond the letter of the law to 
find and protect its raison d‘être.  The opportunity however is not lost forever and courts are 
continuously presented with the possibility to take an important stand in (what this author 
thinks is) the right direction (the eBay decision being the perfect example). 
 
5. Abuse of Rights 
The general doctrine of abuse of rights, as that of patent misuse, is the main weapon 
to strike down harmful conducts by patentees using their statutory rights in a manner that is 
contrary to their purpose.  As anticipated, the application of patent misuse has been limited to 
                                                 
185  P.E. Areeda, H.J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: an Analysis of Antitrust Principles and 
Their Application, Aspen, 2004, par. 178 (as cited in D. Lim, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Law: 
Empirical, Doctrinal and Policy Perspectives, Edward Elgar, 2013, p. 27). 
186  D. Lim, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Law: Empirical, Doctrinal and Policy 
Perspectives, Edward Elgar, 2013, pp. 28-29 (“To give some context to this figure, it is useful to consider another 
equitable defense-inequitable conduct. Inequitable conduct featured in about 300 appellate level cases in the same period. 
(Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the ―Plague‖: Reforming the Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1329, 1333 (2009) (―The Federal Circuit has issued over 600 cases since 1983 that mention 
‗inequitable conduct.‘ Over 300 of those cases substantively address, and contain a ruling on, an issue of inequitable 
conduct‖ [citations omitted]). […]  “Since the facts that give rise to inequitable conduct also give rise to misuse, it is 
surprising that misuse is not alleged every time an allegation of inequitable conduct is raised.”) 
187  H.J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System. A Reexamination, 76(3) Ohio 
State Law Journal, 2015, p. 561. 
188  Indeed, the doctrine of patent misuse captures all of the anti-competitive (and, as we 
saw, anti-innovation) practices that increase the scope of the patent. 
189  “A patentee, as the beneficiary of a public policy ―to promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts‖, does not have the right to use the special privilege of a patent monopoly to secure rights not granted by the patent 
and that are contrary to public policy” (Windsurfing International, Inc. v. Fred Ostermann GmbH, 613 F. 
Supp., S.D.N.Y., 1985, p. 952). 
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the United States while in Europe the so-called abuse of rights doctrine found application.  
Exactly as patent misuse, the abuse of rights doctrine is essentially a jurisprudential 
construction (in some country then codified, expressly or implicitly by the legislator) where 
judges found themselves empty-handed when faced with conducts permitted by the law but 
contrary to its purpose.190  At the outset, it is noteworthy that the abuse of rights doctrine is 
applicable to every field of the law,191 and is not therefore confined to patent law (one of the 
fields in which it had the most success is undoubtedly tax law).  The patentee‟s abuse of its 
rights may be split into two broad categories: 
a) abuse with antitrust relevance, in which the patentee holds a dominant position in the 
relevant market for the patented product, and the abuse qualifies as an abuse of 
dominance; 
b) abuse without antitrust relevance, in which the patent does not grant its holder 
significant market power (e.g. due to the presence of substitutes), and therefore the 
abuse can be dealt with only by referring to other provisions or to the general 
principles of patent law. 
The abuse of rights doctrine does not have a widespread application, however, mainly 
due to the existence (and wide application) of rules protecting consumers, as well as rules 
punishing unfair competition, often sufficient to address patent abuses that do not fall within 
the realm of EU antitrust (which has already a much wider reach than in the U.S.).  The 
relevance of the abuse of rights doctrine is however not limited to its potential application, it 
is also useful to determine the boundaries of antitrust.  Indeed, conducts constituting an 
abuse not only are not covered by the patent rights but run counter to the very purpose of the 
patent system which, as seen and will be discussed in further details below, converge with the 
antitrust purpose in the protection and enhancement of (long-term) consumer welfare. 
A (patent) right can be considered abused when, notwithstanding its formal adherence 
                                                 
190  Interestingly enough, Article 7 of the preliminary project for the Italian Civil Code of 
1942 provided that “nobody can exercise its right in a way inconsistent with the purpose for which the right was 
granted”.  This provision was taken out in the final version of the Code due to concerns on the 
excessive powers that such a general clause left to judges (see Italian Supreme Court, 18 September 
2009, n. 20106). 
191  A. Lenaerts, The relationship between the principles of fraus omnia corrumpit and of 
the prohibition of abuse of rights in the case law of the European Court of Justice, 25 Common 
Market Law Review, 2011, pp. 1703-1718.  See, e.g., G. Ghidini, G. Cavani, P.F. Pisera‟, Italy – Abuse 
of Patent Rights and Abuse of Dominant Position: The Pfizer Case, in G. Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, 
(eds.) Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  An International Perspective, 
Kluwer, 2016, p. 259 (“The Italian courts have […] expressly enforced the abuse of rights relating to tax, corporate, 
civil and civil-procedural matters, identifying – on the basis of the ruling given by the European Court of Justice in 
Halifax (Court of Justice, 21 Feb. 2006, Case C-255/2002, Halifax plc et al. c. Commissioners of Customs & 
Excise, ECR 2006, I-1655.) – its characteristic features, such as in particular: (i) the entitlement to a subjective right; 
(ii) the possibility that such right may be actually exercised according to an undefined set of procedures; (iii) the fact that 
such an exercise is carried out in compliance with the laws governing it; (iv) the occurrence of an unjustified disproportion 
between the benefit achieved by the holder of the right and the sacrifice to which the counterpart is subject.”)  See also C. 
Osti, What Is in a Name: The Concept of Abuse in Sui Generis Abuse, in G. Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, 
(eds.) Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  An International Perspective, 
Kluwer, 2016, p. 100 (“It is a rather well known fact that the European courts have made ample use of the theory of 
abuse of rights in such distant areas as tax law, civil procedure, freedom of establishment and free circulation of people 
and services, and even State Aid law.”) 
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to the conditions laid down by the law,192 the patentee‟s conduct does not achieve the 
purpose of the law, and the patentee‟s intention is to obtain an improper and undeserved 
advantage (with a corresponding unjustified and unproportioned sacrifice by the other party 
which, in the case of patents, is society as a whole).193  As clearly explained by Professors 
Ghidini and Cavani, “the use of subjective rights intended to achieve purposes to the detriment of third 
parties for purposes other than those for which they were conferred is to be considered contra ius.”194  
Advocate General Maduro explained in Halifax that: 
“there is a Community law principle of interpretation prohibiting the abuse of Community provisions 
[…].  According to that principle, the provisions […] must be interpreted as not conferring the rights 
that might appear to be available by virtue of their literal meaning, when two objective elements are 
found to be present.  First, that the aims and results pursued by the legal provisions formally giving 
rise to the […] advantage invoked would be frustrated if that right were conferred.  Second, that the 
right invoked derives from economic activities for which there is objectively no other explanation than 
the creation of the right claimed.”195 
Maduro‟s interpretation, upheld by the Court of Justice in its final decision,196 focuses 
                                                 
192  As observed by Leonard, “[t]he principle rejects a rigid adherence to the letter of the law in the 
evaluation of an individual exercise of rights.  In light of the creativity of right holders and their ability to circumvent 
rules, the principle of AoR proves to be a necessary complement to the principle of formal legality.” (A. Leonard, 
Abuse of Rights in Belgian and French Patent Law – A Case Law Analysis, Jipitec, 2016, p. 32). 
193  “[A] finding of an abuse requires, first, a combination of objective circumstances in which, despite 
formal observance of the conditions laid down by the Community rules, the purpose of those rules has not been achieved. 
It requires, second, a subjective element consisting in the intention to obtain an advantage from the Community rules by 
creating artificially the conditions laid down for obtaining it.” (Court of Justice, C-110/99, Emsland-Stärke, 
2000, par. 5153)  See also Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, C-200/02, Man Lavette Chen, 18 
May 2004, paras. 114-115 (“For it to be possible to speak of an abuse of law, there must […] also be an underlying 
‗combination of objective circumstances‘ in which ‗despite formal observance of the conditions laid down by the 
Community rules, the purpose of those rules has not been achieved‘. […]  In other words, it must be ascertained whether 
the person concerned, by invoking the Community provision which grants the right in question, is betraying its spirit and 
scope.  The test is therefore, essentially, whether or not there has been a distortion of the purposes and objectives of the 
Community provision which grants the right in question.”)  To be able to leverage the patent right in order to 
obtain an undue advantage it is usually necessary to be in a position of market power.  This means that 
the abuse of patent rights is often interconnected with (and absorbed by) the abuse of dominance.  
Indeed, some of the most relevant cases in which an abuse of IP rights has been found, both in the 
U.S. and in the EU, are related to undertakings in a dominant position. 
194  G. Ghidini, G. Cavani, P.F. Pisera‟, Italy – Abuse of Patent Rights and Abuse of 
Dominant Position: The Pfizer Case, in G. Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition and Patent 
Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  An International Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, p. 259. 
195  Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, C-255/02, Halifax, 7 April 2005, par. 
91. 
196  See Court of Justice, C-255/02, Halifax, 7 April 2005, paras. 68-69, 74-75 (“according to 
settled case-law, Community law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends (see, in particular Case C-367/96 
Kefalas and Others [1998] ECR I-2843, paragraph 20; Case C-373/97 Diamantis [2000] ECR I-1705, 
paragraph 33; and Case C-32/03 Fini H [2005] ECR I-1599, paragraph 32).  The application of Community 
legislation cannot be extended to cover abusive practices by economic operators, that is to say transactions carried out not 
in the context of normal commercial operations, but solely for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining advantages provided for 
by Community law (see, to that effect, Case 125/76 Cremer [1977] ECR 1593, paragraph 21; Case C-8/92 
General Milk Products [1993] ECR I-779, paragraph 21; and Emsland-Stärke, paragraph 51). […]  In view of 
the foregoing considerations, it would appear that […] an abusive practice can be found to exist only if, first, the 
[conduct] concerned, notwithstanding formal application of the conditions laid down by the relevant provisions […], 
result in the accrual of a […] advantage the grant of which would be contrary to the purpose of those provisions.  Second, 
it must also be apparent from a number of objective factors that the essential aim of the [conduct] concerned is to obtain 
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more on the objective nature of the abuse of rights than on the subjective intention of the 
patentee.197  The test to determine an abuse has thus two prongs: (i) the purpose and results 
pursued by the legal provision whose application has been distorted would be frustrated if the 
right was conferred; (ii) the right invoked derives from activities which have no other 
explanation than the creation of the undue right.  This is however not necessarily in contrast 
with the interpretation given by the Court of Justice in Emsland.  The subjective element of 
the patentee‟s intention to obtain an undeserved advantage should indeed be objectivized to 
the criteria of “no other explanation” for the patentee‟s conduct other than an intention 
contrary to the purpose of the law.  This is indeed the position taken by Advocate General 
Maduro who explains: 
“What appears to be a decisive factor in affirming the existence of an abuse is the teleological scope of 
the Community rules invoked, which must be defined in order to establish whether the right claimed 
is, in effect, conferred by such provisions, to the extent to which it does not manifestly fall outside their 
scope. […]  When the Court takes the view that an abuse exists whenever the activity at issue cannot 
possibly have any other purpose or justification than to trigger the application of Community law 
provisions in a manner contrary to their purpose, that is tantamount, in my view, to adopting an 
objective criterion for the assessment of the abuse.  It is true that those objective elements will reveal 
that the person or persons engaged in that activity had, most likely, the intention of abusing 
Community law.  But it is not that intention that is decisive for the assessment of the abuse.  It is 
instead the activity itself, objectively considered.  […] What matters is not the actual state of mind 
[…], but the fact that the activity, objectively speaking, has no other explanation but to [abuse the 
law].”198 
Civil law in several of the EU Member States has crafted a coherent doctrine of abuse 
of rights, which applies in general to every kind of rights, including patents.  Central principle 
of such a doctrine is that there will be an abuse whenever the exercise of a right goes against 
the (social) purpose that animated the legislator in granting that right.199  According to this 
principle (the so-called right-function principle), the legislator confers rights upon individuals 
to realize specific social aims.  A patent right is thus the means to achieve the (social) end.  
The enforcement and exercise of patent rights by the patent holder must respect and further 
these ends.  In case it does not, and rights are instead exercised to achieve objectives that are 
contrary to the ends for which they were granted, an abuse takes place.200 
                                                                                                                                                   
[the] advantage. As the Advocate General observed in point 89 of his Opinion, the prohibition of abuse is not relevant 
where the economic activity carried out may have some explanation other than the mere attainment of [the] advantages.” 
197  As explained by Maduro, “what is referred to in Emsland as the subjective element of the abuse 
does not affect the interpretative nature of the Community law notion of abuse.  In Emsland the Court linked that 
subjective element to the finding that the situation giving rise to the application of a certain Community rule was purely 
artificial.  In my view, that finding of artificiality should not be based on an assessment of the subjective intentions of 
those claiming the Community right.  The artificial nature of certain events or transactions must certainly be determined 
on the basis of a set of objective circumstances verified in each individual case.  This is, furthermore, in line with the 
Court‘s reference, again in Emsland, to the ‗sole purpose‘ of an activity or behaviour as a central element supporting the 
conclusion that there has been an abuse of Community law.” (Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, 
C-255/02, Halifax, 7 April 2005, par. 70). 
198  Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, C-255/02, Halifax, 7 April 2005, par. 
70. 
199  P. Van Ommeslaghe, Abus de droit, fraude aux droits des tiers et fraude à la loi note 
sous Cass., 10 sept. 1971, R.C.J.B., 1976, pp. 303 et seq. 
200  See, in general, S. Herman, Classical social theories and the doctrine of „abuse of 
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Whenever an abuse of rights takes place, the sanction is often not the forfeiture of the 
right but its unenforceability in the manner considered improper by the judge.  The abuse of 
patent rights (exactly as patent misuse) is thus a shield more than a sword and has the 
objective of re-establishing the victim in the state it would have been had the abuse never 
occurred. 
 
6. Marketing Authorization 
Before moving to antitrust, and to the intersection between patent law and antitrust 
law, it seems appropriate to briefly discuss about a regulation specific to the pharmaceutical 
sector, the marketing authorization.  The importance of this regulation is two-fold, on one 
side it is obviously an element to take into consideration when assessing the patentees‟ 
conducts in the pharmaceutical sector, on the other side patentees may abuse patent law as 
much as the regulation governing marketing authorization, with not very dissimilar results.  
 Entry into pharmaceutical markets is heavily regulated, to protect consumers 
from the risks of harm to their health, and both consumers and States from excessive prices 
and ineffective products.  Pharmaceutical products must thus meet strict regulatory 
requirements as a condition to access the market.  Agencies such as the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA) require that all new drugs 
undergo specific laboratory, animal and human testing in controlled clinical trials, to provide 
evidence of safety and efficacy. 
Clinical trials typically take 4 to 6 years, and regulatory review adds an additional 1 to 2 
years.  This leads to a more limited duration in time of patent protection – the effective 
monopoly protection is estimated to last about 10 to 12 years – plus a 3 to 5 year extension. 
6.1. United States 
In the United States, the relevant regulation is the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.201  The Act provides for two different procedures for originators 
and generics to facilitate the latter‟s entry and thus competition from lower priced generic 
drugs, while maintaining incentives for originators to invest in developing new drugs. 
An originator company seeking to market a new drug must file a New Drug 
Application (“NDA”) with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), demonstrating 
the safety and efficacy of the drug, which inevitably requires “a long, comprehensive, and costly 
                                                                                                                                                   
rights‟, 37 Louisiana Law Review, 1977.  An additional or alternative element that may lead to a 
finding of abuse is the disproportion between the harm caused to the other party and the utility 
brought to the right holder by the use of the right.  “This prong was inspired by a famous case of the French 
Court of Appeals of Colmar, which Josserand himself considers as a first inroad in the theory of abuse of rights: a case 
where the court found for limiting the property right of an owner who intended to build a false chimney on his house roof 
essentially for the purpose of blocking his neighbour‘s view.  Such action having been considered devoid of a ‗serious and 
legitimate interest‘.” (C. Osti, What Is in a Name: The Concept of Abuse in Sui Generis Abuse, in G. 
Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  An 
International Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, p. 99) 
201  The Act has been amended by the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984 (the Hatch-Waxman Act) and the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, 
and Modernization Act of 2003, 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(b)(2), 355(j) and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e). 
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testing process.”202  NDA-based drugs are referred to as “brand-name drugs”.   
The FDA requires also originators to identify the patents covering the drug and 
publishes a list of the approved drugs and their related patents on the so-called “Orange 
Book”, a publicly available database of the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic 
Equivalence Evaluations.  The Orange Book is a comprehensive database containing 
indications on the drug‟s patent protection, which encompasses every patent in which at least 
one claim cover the drug‟s active ingredient, formulation, or medical use. 
The marketing authorization of generic drugs is less burdensome.  Generic drugs are 
defined as “copies of brand-name drugs […] in dosage form, safety, strength, route of administration, 
quality, performance characteristics and intended use.”203  As seen in the introductory chapter, market 
entry of generics leads to significant savings both for consumers and States.  In the words of 
the then President Ronald Reagan, the Hatch-Waxman Act was introduced in the U.S. 
specifically to enable “the Federal Government, the largest single consumer of drugs, […] to purchase 
generic drugs at significantly lower cost.”204  The Supreme Court recently confirmed that the Hatch-
Waxman Act‟s purpose was to “speed the introduction of low-cost generic drugs to market, thereby 
furthering drug competition.”205  Before the Act, generics had to repeat the tests already performed 
by originators.206  Due to the cost and time required, generic entry was often delayed and not 
cost-effective, resulting in a de facto extension of the patent monopoly.  Congress therefore 
sought to increase the availability of generic substitutes following the loss of exclusivity and 
reduce both healthcare costs and the individual expenditure on pharmaceuticals.  To promote 
price competition, the Act established a swifter regulatory approval process for generic 
products, the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).  A generic manufacturer who 
wishes to market a generic version of a brand-name drug may seek FDA approval by filing an 
ANDA.  The ANDA allows the generic manufacturer to avoid having to conduct detailed 
studies to demonstrate efficacy and safety of the drug, granting it the possibility to 
“piggyback” on the originator‟s studies submitted in connection with the already-approved 
                                                 
202  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct., 2013, p. 2228. 
203  FDA, Understanding Generic Drugs, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/%20ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/Unders
tandingGenericDrugs/, accessed on 6 August 2016. 
204  R. Reagan, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 
1984, p. 1362. 
205  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct., 2013, p. 2228.  The Act aimed at balancing the 
interests of originators, thus encourage innovation, and of generic manufacturers and the public 
(short-term), thus promote price competition between brand-name and generic drugs.  To promote 
innovation, the new law introduced the possibility for originators to apply for an extension of the 
patent term to make up for the time lost in the marketing authorization process.  To promote 
competition, the Act introduced a less burdensome and time-consuming process to authorize 
marketing of generics.  In the words of David Balto, former Policy Director of the Bureau of 
Competition of the FTC, “the added protections and exclusivity term for innovator firms have accompanied a 
tremendous increase both in the investment in, and the success of, pharmaceutical innovation.  […][At the same time], 
[t]he industry also has seen an increase in the percentage of brand-name drugs that have a generic competitor on the 
market.  Today, nearly 100% of the top-selling drugs with expired patents have generic versions available, versus only 
thirty-six percent in 1983.” (D. Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust Risks, 55 Food 
and Drug Law Journal, 2000, pp. 324-325) 
206  At the time of the introduction of the Hatch–Waxman Act in 1984, generic firms had 
to undertake lengthy and expensive trials to demonstrate safety and effectiveness.  Approval by the 
U.S. FDA took years, and because the required tests constituted infringement, generic manufacturer 
could not begin the process before the expiration of the patent. 
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brand-name drug‟s NDA.  The only requirement for the generic manufacturer is to 
demonstrate bioequivalence.207  The generic applicant must demonstrate that its proposed 
drug is bioequivalent to the brand-name drug, i.e. that the rate and extent of absorption of the 
active ingredient is the same.208  In other words, two drugs are bioequivalent if they deliver 
the same amount of the same active ingredient into a patient‟s bloodstream over the same 
amount of time. 
When a brand-name drug is covered by one or more patents listed in the Orange 
Book, before entering the market a generic must provide one of four certifications for each 
patent listed in the Orange Book.209  Three out of the four possible certifications – no listed 
patent on the drug, any relevant patent has expired, and a promise to wait until any still-in-
force patent expires – do not result in periods of exclusivity.  The fourth, instead, results in a 
180-day exclusivity period.  A company that intends to market a generic version of a drug 
prior to expiration of the patents covering it must make a „paragraph IV certification‟, 
certifying that the originator‟s patents are “invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or 
sale of the [generic] drug.”210 
In almost all cases, a Paragraph IV certification provokes patent infringement 
litigation by the originator because the certification is an act of constructive infringement.211  
By certifying in the ANDA application that a patent is „„invalid or will not be infringed”, the 
generic manufacturer infringes the patent without having to actually produce and market the 
drug. 
If a company makes a paragraph IV certification, it must notify the patent holder of 
the filing of its ANDA.  If the patent holder initiates a patent infringement suit against the 
company within 45 days of receiving such notice, the FDA must stay the ANDA application 
for a 30-month period, while the parties litigate patent validity and infringement in court.  If 
the court decides the matter within that period, the FDA follows that determination; if 30 
months pass with no decision, the FDA may decide to go forward and give approval to 
                                                 
207  21 U.S.C. Sec. 355(j). 
208  21 U.S.C. Sec. 355(j)(8)(B)(i). 
209  21 U.S.C. Sec. 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). 
210  21 U.S.C. Sec. 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).  See C.S. Hemphill, M.A. Lemley, Earning 
Exclusivity Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 Antitrust Law Journal, 2011, p. 
952 (“This pattern—launch, challenge, sue—is frequent for major drugs, and it has become the norm for the top-selling 
drugs.  Litigation raises the expense of a Paragraph IV challenge to $10 million or more.”)  See also C.S. 
Hemphill, B.N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in 
Pharmaceuticals, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 399, 2012, pp. 13-14 (“The 
likelihood that an ANDA includes a patent challenge increases sharply with drug sales.  While generic entrants 
challenge patents for just 29 percent of drugs in the bottom quintile of sales, they do so for 96 percent of drugs in the top 
quintile (p-value < .01).  The likelihood that a drug will be challenged ―early,‖ within five years of launch, is also 
increasing with sales.  With the exception of the bottom quintile of sales (where the profitability of early generic entry and 
thus patent challenges would be lowest) effective market life is stable over the sales distribution. By contrast, nominal 
patent term increases sharply with sales, with the top sales quintile having almost four years more patent term than the 
bottom (p-value < .01). […]  For drugs that are challenged, the mean decrement to nominal patent term resulting from 
challenges is 6.4 years (median = 6.2 years).  The drugs that were challenged had aggregate sales of over $81 billion in 
the year prior to challenge. Given the large difference between brand and generic prices, the static welfare gains to 
consumers as a result of these challenges is likely large.”) 
211  35 U.S.C. Sec. 271(e)(2)(A). 
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market the generic product.212  As Professor Hovenkamp et al. pointed out,  
“In effect, the FDA acts as though the patent were conclusively presumed valid unless the Federal 
Circuit instructs it otherwise.  The effect of this rather remarkable rule is to delay drug price 
competition for several years even where a patent is clearly invalid, by granting what is akin to an 
automatic preliminary injunction whenever a pharmaceutical patent owner files suit against a generic 
manufacturer.”213 
                                                 
212  21 U.S.C. Sec. 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I). 
213  H.J. Hovenkamp, M.D. Janis, M.A. Lemley, C.R. Leslie, M.A. Carrier, IP and 
Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law, Aspen, 2014, p. 
15-68.  See also p. 15-25 (“[U]ntil 2004 the Hatch-Waxman provisions created the potential for a pioneer to 
invoke multiple 30-month stays by successively listing new patent information in the Orange Book relevant to a given 
drug product.  The prospect of multiple 30-month stays presented an opportunity for ―evergreening,‖ a form of 
anticompetitive behavior that does not exist in ordinary patent infringement litigation.  Regulatory and legislative changes 
effective in 2004 deal effectively with the problem of multiple 30-month stays, both by giving a generic ANDA applicant 
sued for patent infringement the right to assert a counterclaim challenging the listing of information in the Orange Book 
and by limiting patentees to a single 30-month stay for any given drug, regardless of the number of patents listed as 
covering that drug.”)  The concern highlighted by Professor Hovenkamp directly relates to the so-called 
“patent linkage”, introduced in the U.S. by the Hatch-Waxman Act as a compromise between the 
interest of originators to obtain early adjudication of their patent rights, and the interest of generic 
manufacturers for an early and safe (from liability) entry.  Patent linkage consists in the practice of 
linking the grant of the marketing authorization (the pricing and reimbursement status or any 
regulatory approval) of a generic drug to the status of the patent(s) covering the originator's drug.  
Patent linkage thus prevents marketing approval of a generic before adjudication of the brand-name 
drug's patent(s).  The patents covering the brand-name drug are normally listed in a government 
registry (the Orange book in the U.S.) to provide notice to potential generics manufacturers.  
Whenever submitting an application for the marketing of a generic drug, generics manufacturers must 
notify the originator to allow it the opportunity to seek enforcement of its patent rights.  If a patent 
infringement lawsuit is filed, the health agency refrains from approving the generics drug for a 
reasonable period of time to allow for resolution of the dispute.  Patent linkage exists in Canada (as 
well as, e.g., in China, Singapore and South Korea), but it is rare in Europe (as well as, e.g., in India and 
Japan).  In these latter countries, the marketing approval of generics does not require a verification of 
the status of the patent on the brand-name drug.  One of few exceptions in the EU is Italy, where a 
patent linkage system has been (re)introduced by Article 11 of Law 8 November 2012, n. 189.  The 
possibility to get rid of patent linkage in Italy has been recently discussed (and rejected) by the Senate, 
following a position paper of 12 November 2015 by the generic manufacturers' association 
Assogenerici (available at 
https://www.senato.it/application/xmanager/projects/leg17/attachments/documento_evento_proce
dura_commissione/files/000/003/259/2015_11_12_-_Assogenerici_-_Position_paper.pdf, accessed 
on 6 August 2016), and several statements by the Italian Antitrust Authority, but it may be discussed 
again as part of a wider reform of the rules on pharmaceutical products in September 2016.  The 
provision of patent linkage in Italy runs counter EU law.  The European Commission indicated that 
“[u]nder EU law, it is not allowed to link marketing authorisation to the patent status of the originator reference 
product.  Article 81 of the Regulation [2004/726/EC] and Article 126 of the Directive [2001/83/EC] provide 
that authorisation to market a medicinal product shall not be refused, suspended or revoked except on the grounds set out 
in the Regulation and the Directive.  Since the status of a patent (application) is not included in the grounds set out in 
the Regulation and in the Directive, it cannot be used as an argument for refusing, suspending or revoking [marketing 
authorization]." (European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009, 
par. 336)  Patent linkage often leads to delays in market entry of generic drugs, increasing cost and 
time necessary to obtain the marketing authorization.  Patent linkage provides originators with an 
additional opportunity to game the system and create barriers to generic entry, particularly by 
aggravating the effect of patent clusters (as new patents are listed as covering the brand-name drug).  
As it has been noted, “the linkage regime provides a highly flexible tool in the hands of sophisticated pharmaceutical 
firms.  The number and array of patent types, the speed of patent listing, the automatic injunction, and the low relevance 
54 
 
The first successful ANDA filer obtains a 180-day exclusivity period during which 
other generic challengers are not permitted to market their drug.214  The purpose of this 
provision was to create an incentive for generic manufacturers to challenge patents that may 
be invalid, not infringed, or unenforceable, or invent around them, and accordingly get 
generic drugs on the market as early as possible for consumers to enjoy lower drug prices.215 
The 180-day exclusivity period has however been exploited to delay generic entry 
instead of speeding it up.  The Hatch-Waxman Act has been interpreted to grant 180 days of 
generic exclusivity to the first generic company to file for FDA approval, regardless of 
whether or not it succeeds in invalidating the patent or finding a way to avoid infringement.  
The originator can therefore “pay-off” the first generic “entrant” to convince it not to market 
its drug, without having to worry about any other generic manufacturer for at least 180 days.  
Even worse, generic exclusivity begins on the first day of commercialization of the drug and 
can thus be stipulated in the settlement.  This may thus ultimately lead to the foreclosure of 
the market for as long as the period of generic exclusivity has not expired.  As Professor 
Hovenkamp et al. clearly illustrate: 
“most grants of 180-day exclusivity today come not from successful challenges to patents but from 
generic companies that obtain entry rights through settlements, often settlements with cash payments 
attached.  The 180-day exclusivity period offers the potential for collusive settlement arrangements 
between pioneers and generics.  A pioneer could initiate a patent infringement suit against a first 
generic ANDA filer and settle the litigation with an exclusion payment to the generic, under which 
the generic would delay commercialization of the generic product, thus postponing the commencement of 
the 180-day exclusivity period and locking other generics out of the market. Until 2004, such an 
agreement could keep out other generics indefinitely, because until the first generic actually entered the 
market no others would have the right to do so. Congress changed the law effective in 2004 to provide 
that the first generic to file an ANDA is entitled to only 180days of generic exclusivity and forfeits 
that exclusivity if it fails to enter the market within a reasonable time.  This new provision reduces, 
but certainly does not eliminate, the gains from anticompetitive settlements.  Agreements  that exclude 
generic competitors since that time can still delay generic entry, either directly (if the first ANDA filer 
                                                                                                                                                   
requirement for listing combined with low evidentiary requirements for new and follow-on drug development enable 
pharmaceutical firms to rapidly identify attractive drug targets for legal protection both during and after regulatory 
approval” (cfr. R. Bouchard, R. Hawkins, R. Clark, R. Hagtvedt, J. Sawani, Empirical Analysis of Drug 
Approval-Drug Patenting Linkage for High Value Pharmaceuticals, 8(2) Northwestern Journal of 
Technology and Intellectual Property, 2010, p. 226). 
214  21 U.S.C. Sec. 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(IV).  Under Sec. 355(j)(5)(D), the 180 days of 
exclusivity may be forfeited by a failure to market by a specified date, a failure to obtain tentative FDA 
approval, withdrawal of the ANDA, amendment of the ANDA to non-Paragraph IV status, 
commission of an antitrust violation, or expiration of the patent. 
215  Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Ltd., 527 F.3d, Fed. Cir., 2008, p. 1283; 
Teva Pharm. Indus. v. Crawford, 410 F.3d, D.C. Cir., 2005, pp. 53–54; Sandoz, Inc. v. FDA, 439 F. 
Supp. 2d, D.D.C., 2006, pp. 33–34.  The 180-day exclusivity period is extremely valuable for generic 
manufacturers.  The vast majority of their potential profits materialize during such exclusivity period.  
These profits come at the expense of consumers that, during the exclusivity period, have to pay higher 
prices, very close to those they were paying before the entry of the first generic.  As it has been 
pointed out, “[t]he FDA has estimated an average price discount of just 6 percent when there is only one generic 
manufacturer competing with the brand-name firm.  In the case of Zocor, the difference in retail prices between the brand-
name drug and the exclusive generic was about 10 percent.  The entry of additional competitors reduces the price sharply, 
and the more generic competitors, the lower the price.” (C.S. Hemphill, M.A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity 
Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 Antitrust Law Journal, 2011, p. 954) 
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agrees to an entry date and therefore can still obtain its generic exclusivity) or because the FDA 
approval process takes time, so that other generics will not be able to enter as quickly.”216 
During the exclusivity period, the generic manufacturer has to face competition not 
only from the brand-name drug, but potentially also from a generic version of the drug 
produced by the originator, known as authorized generic (“AG”).  Indeed, the originator is 
permitted to market a generic version of its brand-name drug during the first filer‟s exclusivity 
period under its NDA.  Once an ANDA filer enters the market, an authorized generic may 
become an attractive choice as a means of recouping some of the revenue the originator 
would otherwise lose to the generic.  Competition between the first generic entrant and an 
authorized generic often drives down both retail and wholesale generic drug prices.217  The 
entry of an authorized generic thus has an impact on the first generic entrant both in terms of 
sales and margins. 
6.2. European Union 
Also at the EU level rules on market access of pharmaceutical products are common 
across States.218  Drugs may only be placed on the market after they have obtained a 
                                                 
216  H.J. Hovenkamp, M.D. Janis, M.A. Lemley, C.R. Leslie, M.A. Carrier, IP and 
Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law, Aspen, 2014, pp. 
15-29 – 15-30.  The first-filer generic must enter the market within the later of (i) 75 days after FDA 
approval; and (ii) 75 days after an appellate court decision finding invalidity or non-infringement of 
the originator‟s patent (21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i))(it is thus not sufficient a later filer obtains a 
declaration of invalidity by a district court), otherwise it forfeits its exclusivity and the exclusivity 
passes to the next generic in line.  If there is no generic in line, the exclusivity is forfeited and any 
generic can enter.  Professors Hemphill and Lemley notes how “[t]he resulting delay from this process—file 
the ANDA, conduct the district court suit, win the appeal, wait until just before the end of seventy-five days, then wait 
another 180 days—can easily stretch to several years.” (C.S. Hemphill, M.A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity 
Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 Antitrust Law Journal, 2011, p. 964)  As 
noted by Professor Carrier, however, “appellate court decisions typically are not issued until years after a lawsuit 
challenging settlement is filed.  For example, appellate rulings have come 6, 8, 11, and 13 years after settlement.  As a 
result, the forfeiture provisions do not typically apply.” (M.A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100(7) Iowa Law 
Review, 2014, p. 15)  In addition, Professors Hemphill and Lemley highlight an additional profile of 
complexity involved in the entry of later filers.  Indeed, the analysis above “presumes that there is a patent 
lawsuit between the brandname firm and the later filer.  Often, that cannot be taken for granted because the brand-name 
firm declines to sue the later filer, even if it sued the first filer.  Without a suit, the later filer is bottled up behind the first 
filer, unable to secure FDA approval.  In response, some generic firms file declaratory judgment suits in an effort to 
trigger (eventually) the first filer‘s use-it-or-lose-it obligation.  A declaratory judgment action, however, is a chancy thing, 
because there is often a dispute about whether the generic firm has standing to bring its suit.  That complication makes 
this route an even more time-consuming, costly, and uncertain affair.” (C.S. Hemphill, M.A. Lemley, Earning 
Exclusivity Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 Antitrust Law Journal, 2011, p. 
964) 
217  FTC, Authorized Generic Drugs: Short-Term Effects and Long-Term Impact, 2011, 
pp. 41-48, available at https://www.ftc.gov/reports/authorized-generic-drugs-short-term-effects-
long-term-impact-report-federal-trade-commission, accessed on 6 August 2016. 
218  Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 
November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use (OJ L 311, 
28.11.2001, p. 67-128), as amended, and Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 31 March 2004 laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and 
supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a European 
Medicines Agency (OJ L 136, 30.4.2004).  The Directive harmonizes national procedures and 
requirements for the authorisation, while the Regulation establishes the centralised procedure to 
obtain a marketing authorization with validity for the entire EEA. 
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marketing authorization, which ensures quality, efficacy and safety of medicinal product.219  
For new drugs, detailed results of pharmaceutical (physiochemical, biological or 
microbiological) tests, pre-clinical (toxicological and pharmacological) tests and clinical trials 
must be submitted with the application for a marketing authorization.  
A centralized marketing authorization procedure led by the European Medicines 
Agency (EMA), in charge of the scientific evaluation, is available for new drugs.  The 
procedure takes at least 210 days (although it is possible to conduct an accelerated assessment 
in 150 days),220 and the marketing authorization is granted by the European Commission for 
the entire EEA.  In the alternative, it is possible to obtain the recognition in other Member 
States of the authorization issued on a national basis.221  Since Directive 2001/83/EC 
harmonized the substantive requirements to obtain a marketing authorization, this procedure 
relies on the mutual recognition of national authorizations.  Pursuant to Article 28 of 
Directive 2001/83/EC, companies can submit parallel national applications based on the 
decentralized procedure, which substantially coincides with the recognition procedure but 
applies to drugs which have not yet been granted a national marketing authorization at the 
time of application.  The application is simultaneously submitted to several Member States, 
one of which is selected as Reference Member State and coordinates the procedure 
As in the U.S., the marketing authorization for generics is easier and quicker to obtain.  
Generics are defined as products with the same qualitative and quantitative composition in 
active substances and the same pharmaceutical form as the brand-name drug, and whose 
bioequivalence has been demonstrated by appropriate bioavailability studies.222  Differences in 
salts, esters, ethers, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes or derivatives of an active 
substance shall be considered to be the same active substance, unless they differ significantly 
in properties with regard to safety and efficacy.  In such cases, additional information 
providing proof of safety and efficacy must be supplied by the applicant.  If these conditions 
are met, the competent authority can rely on the proof of safety and efficacy submitted in the 
marketing authorization application for the brand-name drug (the “reference product”) and a 
generic applicant is thus exempted from having to provide the results of pre-clinical tests and 
clinical trials.  This is the so-called abridged application.223  Using the brand-name‟s dossier in 
                                                 
219  Directive 2001/83/EC provides that: “no medicinal product for human use may be placed on 
a market in the EEA unless a marketing authorisation has been issued for it”. 
220  The Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP) within the EMA 
prepares an opinion on whether the application should be granted or not and send it to the European 
Commission. 
221  As explained by the European Commission, “[t]he Member State that has already 
authorised the product (known as the Reference Member State (―RMS‖)) submits an evaluation of the product to other 
Member State/s (known as Concerned Member States (―CMS‖)) which are asked to mutually recognise the 
[marketing authorization] of the RMS.  The CMS will then issue a [marketing authorization] permitting the 
marketing of the product in their territory.” (European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 
2014, par. 72) 
222  Article 10 of Directive 2001/83/EC. 
223  The generic manufacturer has to demonstrate that its drug has (i) the same qualitative 
and quantitative composition in active substances and (ii) the same pharmaceutical form as the 
reference drug and (iii) to show bioequivalence with it, by conducting bioavailability studies.  
According to the so-called “Bolar provision”, introduced in 2004, conducting the necessary studies 
and trials with a view to obtaining a generic marketing authorization “shall not be regarded as contrary to 
patent rights or to supplementary protection certificates for medicinal products” (Article 10(6) of Directive 
2001/83/EC). 
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an abridged application for marketing authorization saves generic manufacturers time and 
money.224  Once a generic has obtained a marketing authorization it can enter the market, 
provided that other national legal requirements, such as obtaining price approval and 
reimbursement status, have been satisfied.225 
Since 2005, a generic entrant can benefit from the abridged procedure also if the 
reference product is not on the market anymore or the marketing authorization has been 
withdrawn.  The inability to prevent generic entry by withdrawing the marketing authorization 
or discontinuing the product makes it more important for originators to switch patients to 
second generation (patent-protected) drugs before the patent on the first generation product 
expires.  (Almost) Every prescription for the old drug not switched at the time of generic 
entry will, due to the rules on generic substitution, automatically be fulfilled with the cheapest 
available generic.  
 
7. Generic Substitution 
The last piece of regulation to take into consideration to assess conducts by 
pharmaceutical companies relates to generic substitution.  This regulation is relevant for this 
work because originators‟ abusive conducts are often immediately aimed at disrupting the 
functioning of generic substitution.  This is achieved either by blocking generic entry tout court 
or by switching patients to second generation (patent-protected) products that cannot be 
substituted for the generic version of the first generation brand-name drug.  When assessing a 
conduct, the rules on substitution should thus always be kept in mind. 
Rules on generic substitution may apply to doctors (in the form of guidelines 
recommending the prescription of generics when available) or pharmacists (in the form of 
mandatory generic substitution if the patient does not specifically need the more expensive 
brand-name drug, and thus the prescription specifies “non-substitutable”).  Through 
prescription guidelines and pharmacy substitution, governments promote the use of generics 
(medically equivalent to brand-name drugs). 
Drug substitution laws are designed to address the price disconnect between 
prescribing doctors, who choose the drug but do not pay for it, and insurers, consumers and 
States, who do not choose, but pay for the prescribed drug.  The purpose of generic 
                                                 
224  Generic manufacturers are allowed to apply for a marketing authorization when the 
originator‟s product is still protected by exclusive rights.  However, an abridged application can be 
submitted only upon expiry of the originator‟s eight-year period of data exclusivity on pharmacological 
and toxicological tests, as well as clinical studies, collected and submitted to the relevant authorities to 
demonstrate safety and efficacy of the brand-name drug (Directive 2004/27/EC and Regulation 
2004/726/EC).  In addition to data exclusivity, marketing exclusivity grants the originator two more 
years of protection from generic competitors, during which the drug, even if approved for marketing, 
cannot enter the market.  Marketing exclusivity can be extended by one additional year, thus bringing 
the total to 11 years, if the originator, during the eight years of data exclusivity, obtains marketing 
authorization for one or more new therapeutic indications with significant clinical benefit.  Data 
exclusivity and marketing exclusivity apply to both patent law and SPC protection. 
225  “In principle, a generic company can decide to launch its generic product without waiting for the 
originator‘s relevant patents to expire or attempting to invalidate them.  It is in these cases that one generally speaks of 
launch ‗at risk‘ as the generic may still be prevented from entering the market or may subsequently have to be withdrawn 
pursuant to a court order/injunction, if it infringes a valid patent.”(European Commission, AT.39612, 
Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 75) 
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substitution is thus to cancel out certain prescribing habits of physicians, which have little 
incentive to consider price when deciding which drug to prescribe, by shifting drug selection, 
between brand-name and their corresponding generics, from doctors to pharmacists and 
patients, who have greater financial incentives to choose the most cost-effective solution.   
In addition, doctors are subject to incessant drug promotion, including detailing (sales 
calls and visits to doctors‟ offices), direct mailings, free drug samples, sponsored continuing 
medical education programs and media advertising.226  In many countries, doctors do not 
have a thorough knowledge of medicines and get most of their knowledge (or at least 
updates) from pharmaceutical companies‟ visits and material.227  Drug promotion tends to 
determine a brand-name recall in doctors and potentially distrust against generics, which 
result in the diffusion of prescriptions of brand-name drugs, instead of using their 
International Nonproprietary Names (INN).  Generic substitution tries to counter also this 
effect.  
In the U.S., all 50 States and the District of Columbia have drug substitution laws to 
encourage generic competition.228  Although the specific provisions may vary, drug 
substitution laws either permit or require pharmacists to fulfill the prescription with a 
therapeutically equivalent,229 lower-cost generic drug in place of the brand-name drug, absent 
express direction otherwise from the physician (i.e. when the prescription is marked 
“dispense-as- written”).  
Within the EU, the regulation on drug substitution is national.  For example, in 
France pharmacists have the right to substitute brand-name drugs with their generic 
                                                 
226  S.O. Schweitzer, Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy, Oxford University Press, 
2006, p. 87. 
227  As noted by the President of the French Competition Authority, “the general reluctance 
toward generic is partly the side effect of the poor knowledge of the pharmacopoeia by many players within the health 
system, most notably by doctors themselves, who are also largely unaware of the legal framework applicable to the market 
entry and distribution of pharmaceuticals.  Only a small minority of doctors in France write their prescriptions using the 
INN for drugs.  The social affairs committee of the National Assembly noted in 2011 that pharmacology is hardly 
taught either in medical school or during continuing professional education.  Hence doctors are highly receptive to the 
information brought to them by so-called ‗medical visitors‘ who represent the pharmaceutical companies‘ interests.” (B. 
Lasserre, France – Raising Artificial Barriers against Generic Entry: The French Experience, in in G. 
Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  An 
International Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, pp. 193-194) 
228  M.A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The Missing 
Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 Florida Law Review, 2010, p. 1017. 
229  Most States adopt the FDA‟s definition of therapeutically equivalent and allow 
generic substitution only if the FDA designates the generic as “AB-rated” in the Orange Book.  To be 
AB-rated, a generic must not only be bioequivalent (i.e. it exhibits a similar rate and extent of 
absorption) but therapeutically equivalent to the brand-name drug, meaning it must have the same 
active ingredient, dosage, form, strength, and route of administration.  As the court summarized in 
Abbot Labs: “[t]herefore an approved generic drug that is not AB-rated against a currently available branded drug, 
because, for example, the drugs have different formulations or dosages, may not be substituted for the branded drug and 
may only be sold, if at all, as a separately branded, rather than generic, drug” (Abbott Labs. v. Teva 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., 432 F.Supp.2d, 2006, p. 415).  Due to the narrowness of this criteria, 
originators can game the system by changing the form of the brand-name drug to avoid generic-
substitution.  See also the Orange Book Preface, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/ucm079068.htm, accessed on 6 August 
2016. 
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equivalent, provided it is on the generic list230 (which is rather narrow in France compared to 
other countries like the UK or Germany).231  However, substitution can be prevented by 
doctors if they indicate “non-substitutable” on the prescription. 
 
8. Antitrust 
8.1. United States 
To better understand the intersection between IP and antitrust, and the principles 
expressed by courts and agencies, a brief introduction on the relevant provisions of antitrust 
law is opportune. 
As a general note, antitrust provisions tend to be vague.  In the U.S., this has been 
linked to the fact that “Congress apparently did not want to get involved in articulating a specific definition 
of competition or in determining which practices might promote or undermine it.  Rather it enacted a few 
general principles derived from the common law, and left it largely to the courts to determine what practices 
violate them.”232  The principles underlying the adoption of the antitrust law are thus very 
similar to those governing patent misuse and abuse of rights: general principles and a 
delegation to the courts for the case-by-case enactment. 
The fundamental provisions of the U.S. antitrust laws for our purposes are Section 1 
                                                 
230  “A statute law of 1998 and ensuing decrees introduced in France a right for pharmacists, when 
delivering prescription medicines, to substitute a generic for the [brand-name drug].  In order to encourage pharmacists 
to carry out this substitution, they were granted a legal guarantee that they would make the same margin rate for the sale 
of any medicine within a group of generics, i.e., that they would earn as much by selling a generic as they would the 
corresponding originator medicine, although the price of the latter is generally higher than that of the former.  In the same 
vein, a statute law of 2003 ruled that, when doctors write their prescriptions using the International Nonproprietary 
Names (INN) for pharmaceutical substances rather than the brand-name, pharmacists may only deliver the originator 
medicine insofar as its final cost for the State Healthcare system does not exceed that of the most expensive generic.  Only 
if the prescribing doctor expressly indicates that the prescribed, brand-name medicine is ‗not substitutable‘ is the 
pharmacist barred from substituting a generic for its originator. […][F]or a pharmacist to be able to substitute a generic 
for an original medicine, the former must be listed in the repertoire of generics kept by health authorities.” (B. Lasserre, 
France – Raising Artificial Barriers against Generic Entry: The French Experience, in in G. Muscolo, 
G. Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  An International 
Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, pp. 189-190) 
231  “Paracetamol or aspirin-based medicines, for example are not included in the generics list, even if 
these drugs are frequently used by consumers.  There are many manufacturers of paracetamol or aspirin that can be 
bought without prescription, but because consumers are not aware of the generic versions, they tend to buy the branded 
version.  One of the paracetamol brands is the fifth most reimbursed drug by the public health insurance system in 
France, so this subject is an important one in terms of the financing of the public health system.” (OECD 
Competition Committee, Summary Record of the Discussion on Competition and Generic 
Pharmaceuticals, DAF/COMP/M(2014)2/ANN3/FINAL, 6 November 2014, p. 5, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/M(2014)2
/ANN3/FINAL&doclanguage=en, accessed on 6 August 2016)  See also B. Lasserre, France – 
Raising Artificial Barriers against Generic Entry: The French Experience, in in G. Muscolo, G. 
Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  An International 
Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, pp. 187-188 (“the market share of generic drugs in France does not exceed a quarter 
(by volume) of the total quantity of reimbursable drugs, whereas this proportion reaches about two-thirds in Germany 
and in the United Kingdom and three-quarters in the USA – despite the fact that, since the mid 1990s, a public policy 
in favour of generic medicines has been consistently and actively pursued, with the aim of controlling health expenditure.”) 
232  C. Bohannan, H.J. Hovenkamp, Creation without Restraint: Promoting Liberty and 
Rivalry in Innovation, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 43. 
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and Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act.   
Section 1 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 1) prohibits “[e]very contract, combination 
[…] or conspiracy, in restraint of trade […]”.  This provision has been interpreted as prohibiting 
“virtually any practice that has the effect of reducing output and raising price – or those activities that are 
‗anticompetitive‘ under the ordinary definitions of neoclassical economics.”233  
Section 2 of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. Sec. 2) prohibits monopolization, or 
attempted monopolization.  The offense of monopolization has two elements: “(1) the 
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that 
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or 
historic accident.”234  The court has thus to determine whether the firm possesses monopoly 
power and acquired, enlarged or maintained its monopoly power through exclusionary 
conduct.  In Aspen Skiing, the Supreme Court clarified that a conduct may be exclusionary 
when it “(1) tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does not further competition on the 
merits or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way.”235  To be condemned for monopolization, the 
conduct of a firm having market power must have anticompetitive effect, and no 
procompetitive justification236 that outweighs the anticompetitive harm.237  Focus is thus on 
the effects of the conduct, while evidence of the intent behind it is only relevant to interpret 
facts and predict the likely consequences of the monopolist‟s conduct.238  To show attempted 
monopolization, instead, the plaintiff must prove: “(1) that the defendant has engaged in predatory or 
anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving 
monopoly power.”239  Attempted monopolization, contrary to monopolization, requires a specific 
finding of intent.240 
To conclude, Section 5 of the FTC Act allows the FTC to intervene when it has 
reason to believe that an “unfair method of competition” is likely to cause competitive harm.  
Section 5 enables the FTC to address conducts covered by the letter and the spirit of both 
Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  Due to its open formulation, Section 5 of the 
FTC Act is potentially able to reach more broadly than the Sherman Act and address most if 
not all of the patentees‟ abusive conducts discussed in this work, even before they produce 
                                                 
233  H.J. Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 Florida 
Law Review, 2010, p. 874. 
234  United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S., 1966, pp. 570-571. 
235  Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S., 1985, pp. 595-596. 
236  A procompetitive justification consists in “a nonpretextual claim that its conduct is indeed a 
form of competition on the merits because it involves, for example, greater efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal” 
(United States v Microsoft, 253 F.3d, D.C. Cir., 2001, p. 59).  See also LePage‟s v 3M, 324 F.3d, p. 152 
(“[A] monopolist will be found to violate § 2 of the Sherman Act if it engages in exclusionary or predatory conduct 
without a valid business justification.”). 
237  It is thus necessary to determine whether a conduct preventing actual or potential 
rivals from competing, or impairing their opportunities to do so effectively, does not benefit 
consumers at all, or is unnecessarily restrictive for the consumer benefits that it produces. 
238  See, e.g., Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238, 38 S.Ct. 242, 62 
L.Ed. 683, 1918.  Evidence that the conduct is “not related to any apparent efficiency” may constitute proof 
of specific intent to monopolize. (Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S., 1995, 
p. 608) 
239  Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 1993, p. 456. 
240  See, e.g., Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d, 2d Cir., 1990, 
p. 180. 
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any competitive harm.241 
8.2. European Union 
Contrary to patent law,242 a common EU antitrust law exists, is applicable in every 
Member State and is enforced by a central authority, the European Commission, as well as by 
national competition authorities.   
EU antitrust law stands on two main provisions (for our purposes), Article 101 and 
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
Article 101 prohibits all agreements between undertakings and concerted practices 
“which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market”.243  The main objective of this norm 
                                                 
241  In FTC v. Brown Shoe Co. Inc., the Supreme Court allowed the FTC to apply 
Section 5 so as to “arrest trade restraints in their incipiency”, without the need to show competitive harm.  
The Supreme Court held that Section 5 reaches “practices which conflict with the basic policies” underlying 
antitrust law, as well as incipient violations (FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S., 1966, p. 321-322).  See 
also FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S., 1986, p. 454 (stating that Section 5 covers “not 
only practices that violate the Sherman Act and the other antitrust laws but also practices that the Commission 
determines are against public policy for other reasons”); FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S., 1972, p. 
244 (noting that FTC must “consider […] public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed 
in the spirit of the antitrust laws”).  See W.E. Kovacic, M. Winerman, Competition Policy and the 
Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 Antitrust Law Journal, 2010, pp. 
930-931 (“Congress intended Section 5 to be a mechanism for upgrading the U.S. system of competition law by 
permitting the FTC to reach behavior not necessarily proscribed by the other U.S. competition statutes, including the 
1890 Sherman Act and the Clayton Act.”)  Contra, see R.A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission: A 
Retrospective, 72 Antitrust Law Journal, 2005, p. 766, that rejects the idea that the FTC Act‟s 
prohibitions are broader than those of the Sherman Act, but expresses the view that “the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts have been interpreted so broadly that they no longer contain gaps that a broad interpretation of Section 5 of 
the FTC Act might be needed to fill.”  Posner‟s position is criticized by Professors Hemphill and Lemley 
who explain: “We have no doubt that antitrust at one time was skewed toward over-enforcement, but today if there is 
any bias it is in the opposite direction.  The Supreme Court in the last two decades decided seventeen antitrust cases in a 
row in favor of defendants.  Only once in the last eighteen years has an antitrust plaintiff won in the Supreme Court.  
[…][T]o suggest that as they are currently interpreted the Sherman and Clayton Act cover everything that might possibly 
be anticompetitive flies in the face of the realities of modern antitrust.  Nonequivalence, in short, has its uses.  That is 
particularly true if the prospect of treble damages leads courts to constrict the scope of liability in private plaintiff cases.  
Even if it is appropriate for courts to limit liability to compensate for the heightened false-positive risk created by treble 
damages, it does not follow that the FTC must adhere to the same path.  The FTC seeks injunctive relief, not treble 
damages.  That difference reduces concerns about false positives and overdeterrence.  Put another way, the FTC‘s optimal 
scope of liability may well be broader than the courts‘.  Nonequivalence allows the FTC to take advantage of that 
difference, while the Sherman Act applies a harsher penalty to a narrower class of activity.” (C.S. Hemphill, M.A. 
Lemley, Earning Exclusivity Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 Antitrust Law 
Journal, 2011, pp. 974-975) 
242  As seen, although there is no EU patent law (yet), legislations are largely harmonized, 
thanks to international treaties, EU regulations and directives, and the few differences are (for our 
purposes) mostly formal rather than substantial. 
243  The requirement that the agreement may affect trade between Member States is the 
jurisdictional threshold for the application of EU antitrust law (the same limit is provided for by 
Article 102 TFEU).  To fulfil this requirement, it is sufficient the probability to influence, directly or 
indirectly, actually or potentially, the trade between Member States.  This includes agreements limited 
to a single Member State, or relating to trade outside of the EU, if they have the potential to restrict 
imports or exports of otherwise affect the European internal market.  Agreements explicitly 
prohibited by Article 101(1) include those which “(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any 
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is to ensure that each undertaking determines its business conduct independently.  Article 101 
is applicable only in case of agreements or concerted practices within the meaning of antitrust 
law.  To be in an agreement, the undertakings must have expressed their joint intention to 
conduct themselves on the market in a specific way.244  An agreement can be considered 
concluded where “there is a concurrence of wills on the very principle of a restriction of competition”.245  
The concept of concerted practice, instead, refers to “a form of coordination between undertakings 
which, without being taken to the stage where an agreement properly so called has been concluded, knowingly 
substitutes for the risks of competition practical cooperation between them”.246  The second element 
necessary for Article 101 to be applicable is the anticompetitive object247 or effect.248-249  Also 
                                                                                                                                                   
other trading conditions; (b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; (c) share markets 
or sources of supply; (d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing 
them at a competitive disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of 
such contracts.”  Agreements caught by Article 101(1) TFEU shall not be prohibited if they satisfy the 
four cumulative conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU: “[(i)] the agreement must contribute to improving the 
production or distribution of products or contribute to promoting technical or economic progress, that is to say, lead to 
efficiency gains; [(ii)] the restrictions must be indispensable to the attainment of those objectives, that is to say, the 
efficiency gains; [(iii)] consumers must receive a fair share of the resulting benefits, that is to say, the efficiency gains, 
including qualitative efficiency gains, attained by the indispensable restrictions must be sufficiently passed on to consumers 
so that they are at least compensated for the restrictive effects of the agreement […]; and [(iv)] the agreement must not 
afford the parties the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.” 
(European Commission, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, 2011/C 11/01, 14 
January 2011, par. 49) 
244  General Court, T-7/89, Hercules Chemicals v Commission, 17 December 1991, par. 
256; General Court, T-9/99, HFB and Others v Commission, 20 March 2002, par. 199. 
245  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 1105.  In 
the case at stake, the Commission took the position that: “The agreements that are subject to this Decision 
clearly constitute agreements in the sense of Article 101(1) of the Treaty and they contain a concurrence of wills with 
respect to the future commercial behaviour of the generic undertaking in question. As the analysis of each of the 
agreements will show, the obligations which the generic undertaking accepted in each of the agreements restricted their 
ability to enter the market and thereby their autonomy of decision-making, and eliminated or substantially reduced 
commercial uncertainty for [the originator] with respect to the future competitive behaviour of the generic undertaking 
for the duration of the agreement in question.” (see par. 1108) 
246  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 1105. 
247  “Restrictions ―by object‖ are those which, ―by their very nature‖, can be regarded as being injurious 
to the proper functioning of normal competition.  In order for an agreement to be regarded as having an anti-competitive 
object, it is sufficient that it has the potential to have a negative impact on competition.  In other words, the agreement 
must simply be capable in an individual case, having regard to the specific legal and economic context, of resulting in the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market. […][T]he anti-competitive object of an 
agreement may be deduced not only from the content of its clauses but also from the intention of the parties as it arises 
from the ―genesis‖ of the agreement and/or manifests itself in the ―circumstances in which it was implemented‖ and in 
the ―conduct‖ of the companies concerned. […][T]he fact that an agreement may also have had other, entirely legitimate 
objectives does not bar the possibility of finding a restriction by object.” (European Commission, AT.39612, 
Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, paras. 1110-1111, 1113-1114, and references thereof) See also 
General Court, T-472/13, Lundbeck v Commission, 8 September 2016, paras. 339-341 (“certain types of 
coordination between undertakings reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition for the examination of their effects to 
be considered unnecessary […] That case-law arises from the fact that certain forms of coordination between undertakings 
can be regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition […] 
Consequently, it is established that certain collusive behaviour, such as that leading to horizontal price-fixing by cartels 
or consisting in the exclusion of some competitors from the market, may be considered so likely to have negative effects, in 
particular on the price, quantity or quality of the goods and services, that it may be considered redundant, for the 
purposes of applying Article 101(1) TFEU, to prove that they have actual effects on the market.  Experience shows 
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the effect on potential competition from new entrant, in our case generics, is relevant in 
determining the effects of the agreement.250  As regards the intention of the parties to the 
agreement, the case law recognizes its importance in establishing the existence of a restriction 
by object.251  Finally, with regards to the applicability of Article 101 to agreements concerning 
IP rights, the European Commission has recently noted that “[t]here are various […] examples of 
cases in which the Courts of the European Union considered that agreements concerning intellectual or 
industrial property rights are subject to Union competition law and may infringe Article 101(1) of the 
Treaty.”252  The General Court further explained that, “[a]lthough the rights recognized under the 
industrial property legislation of a Member State are not affected by Article 101 TFEU, the circumstances in 
which they are exercised may nevertheless fall within the scope of the prohibitions laid down in that article.  
This may be the case whenever the exercise of such a right appears to be the object, the means or the 
consequence of an agreement”.253 
                                                                                                                                                   
that such behaviour leads to falls in production and price increases, resulting in poor allocation of resources to the 
detriment, in particular, of consumers”). 
248  “For an agreement to have restrictive effects on competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) it 
must have, or be likely to have, an appreciable adverse impact on at least one of the parameters of competition on the 
market, such as price, output, product quality, product variety or innovation.  Agreements can have such effects by 
appreciably reducing competition between the parties to the agreement or between any one of them and third parties.  This 
means that the agreement must reduce the parties‘ decision-making independence, either due to obligations contained in 
the agreement which regulate the market conduct of at least one of the parties or by influencing the market conduct of at 
least one of the parties by causing a change in its incentives.” (European Commission, Guidelines on the 
applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-
operation agreements, 2011/C 11/01, 14 January 2011, par. 27).  “The assessment of whether a horizontal 
co-operation agreement has restrictive effects on competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) must be made in 
comparison to the actual legal and economic context in which competition would occur in the absence of the agreement 
with all of its alleged restrictions (that is to say, in the absence of the agreement as it stands (if already implemented) or 
as envisaged (if not yet implemented) at the time of assessment).  Hence, in order to prove actual or potential restrictive 
effects on competition, it is necessary to take into account competition between the parties and competition from third 
parties, in particular actual or potential competition that would have existed in the absence of the agreement.” (par. 29). 
249  To determine the impact of the agreement on competition it is necessary to take into 
consideration not only “existing competition between undertakings already present on the relevant market but also 
[…] potential competition, in order to ascertain whether, in the light of the structure of the market and the economic and 
legal context within which it functions, there are real concrete possibilities for the undertakings concerned to compete 
among themselves or for a new competitor to penetrate the relevant market and compete with the undertakings already 
established” (General Court, T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94, European Night Services 
and Others v Commission, 15 September 1998, par. 137). 
250  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, paras. 1163, 
1165.  The Commission continues at paras. 1169 and 1181: “In any event as amply shown by the number of 
oppositions, revocation actions and counterclaims of invalidity either launched or envisaged by the generics in this case, the 
validity of a patent may be challenged. In addition, the burden to prove infringement rests with the patent holder. There is 
no presumption that a particular product is manufactured with a particular process that infringes a given patent. In the 
Commission‘s view, nothing prevents the possibility that an invoked patent is found invalid or not infringed and thus 
incapable of blocking a generic product. […] The absence of a marketing authorisation does not suggest that the product 
was not capable of reaching the market, as long as the generic was pursuing its efforts to obtain regulatory approval and 
such attempts did not run into objectively insurmountable problems.” 
251  General Court, T-472/13, Lundbeck v Commission, 8 September 2016, par. 523. 
252  “[C]rucial aspect in demonstrating potential competition is the ability to enter a market.  The 
perception of the incumbent […] and of other [potential entrants] will also be taken into account.  [T]he Court of 
Justice considers that in the pharmaceutical sector potential competition on the compound can and is likely to exist 
already well before the expiry of a basic, compound, patent, even if process or other patents may still be in force.” 
(European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 1120) 
253  General Court, T-472/13, Lundbeck v Commission, 8 September 2016, par. 486. 
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The second relevant provision is Article 102 TFEU, which forbids “any abuse by one or 
more undertakings of a dominant position […] in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.”254  
Article 102 TFEU is the provision dealing with unilateral abusive conducts in EU antitrust 
law as much as Section 2 of the Sherman Act does so in U.S. antitrust law.  As Professor 
Arezzo argued, “they are both meant to prohibit unilateral conduct which influences a certain market, and 
have the effect of impairing trade between member States [and in] both cases the conduct becomes relevant 
when a certain degree of economic power is involved”.255 
To assess whether a conduct falls under Article 102 TFEU, it is necessary to 
determine whether the conduct constitutes an abuse and whether it has been undertaken by a 
firm in a dominant position.256  Starting with the concept of abuse, Article 102 TFEU 
imposes on an undertaking in a dominant position, irrespective of how it achieved such 
position, a “special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the 
common market”.257  This is one of the main differences with the U.S. system, which takes a 
different view of the role of antitrust.  In the U.S., preference is to tolerate questionable 
                                                 
254  Within the practices expressly forbidden, Article 102 lists: “(a) directly or indirectly 
imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; (b) limiting production, markets or technical 
development to the prejudice of consumers; (c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; (d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance 
by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the subject of such contracts.”  The categories of abuses condemned under EU antitrust law 
are broader than those illicit under U.S. law.  While in the U.S. only exclusionary practices fall under 
the reach of antitrust, in the EU also exploitative abuses are forbidden.  Exclusionary abuses are, 
directly or indirectly, attempts to exclude from the market competitors or undertakings active on a 
related (upstream or downstream) market and “cause consumers harm through their impact on competition” 
(Court of Justice, C-209/10, Post Danmark, 27 March 2012, par. 20).  Exploitative abuses are 
conducts essentially directed at customers or suppliers “whereby the dominant undertaking takes advantage of 
its market power to exploit its trading partners (consumers)” (A. Jones, B. Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, 
Cases, and Materials, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 367) and extract supracompetitive gains.  The 
main difference between exclusionary and exploitative abuses is that, in the first case customers and 
consumer are harmed indirectly, by harming the competitive process, in the second case the harm is 
direct.  This work agrees with the European Commission cautious approach (sometimes even too 
cautious) in addressing exploitative abuses, and takes the view that relying exclusively on the market to 
get rid of exploitative practices is ill-advised.  The non-interventionist approach does not take into 
consideration the fact that certain markets are unable to self-correct (due to, e.g., non-transitory 
barriers) and, even when they are, self-correction may take so long that consumers are significantly 
affected by the abuse. 
255  E. Arezzo, Intellectual Property Rights at the Crossroad between Monopolization and 
Abuse of Dominant Position: American and European Approaches Compared, 24(3) John Marshall 
Journal of Computer & Information Law, 2006, p. 455. 
256  Only abuses that may affect trade between Member States are prohibited by Article 
102 TFEU.  Abuses can be considered to affect trade when they have an impact on the competitive 
structure in more than one Member State.  It is sufficient that the abuse “may affect trade”, i.e. it is 
probable that the conduct affects (in any way, not necessary reducing it) the patterns of trade, based 
on an objective assessment (taking nonetheless any subjective element into consideration).  The effect 
on trade has to be appreciable, or better, not insignificant, and this is assessed primarily by referring to 
the position of the undertaking on the market for the product concerned. 
257  Court of Justice, 322/81, Michelin v Commission, 9 November 1983, par. 57.  See 
also Court of Justice, C-209/10, Post Danmark, 27 March 2012, par. 23.  A dominant undertaking is 
thus barred from conducts that, notwithstanding the fact that they are aimed at protecting its own 
commercial interests, have the purpose of strengthening its dominant position or abuse it (European 
Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2762). 
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conducts (Type II errors) rather than prohibit innocuous (and potentially beneficial) ones 
(Type I errors).  Premise of the U.S. approach is that markets, and thus Type II errors, are 
self-correcting (in the long-run) and the government should thus limit its intervention to 
avoid imposing duties on competitors and costumers that may undercut their incentives to 
invest and invent.  EU antitrust takes a different position in this regard, often linked to ordo-
liberalism.258  In the EU, dominant firms are under a positive obligation to refrain from any 
form of competition other than performance competition.  In other words, dominant 
undertakings have an obligation to behave as if they did not have market power.  The 
difference between the U.S. and the EU approaches can thus be summarized in their faith in 
the market‟s ability to self-correct.  At the EU level, faith in self-correction is limited, risk of 
Type I errors is perceived as manageable, and the cost of Type II errors is deemed substantial.  
For this reason, the “special responsibility” shifts the burden of enforcement to firms, which 
are deemed to be better placed to assess the compatibility of their conduct with the 
enhancement of consumer welfare.  The U.S. approach (at the Supreme Court level at least) is 
diametrically opposed and is premised on avoiding, as much as possible, to restrict the firms‟ 
commercial freedom.  The burden is thus on the agencies to show, in exceptional 
circumstances, that the firm‟s conduct is exclusionary and in breach of antitrust law.259 
To determine whether a conduct can be considered abusive, the European 
Commission refers to the same principle as Section 2 of the Sherman Act, competition on the 
merits.260  The behavior of a dominant undertaking is thus legitimate as long as it is 
                                                 
258  While preferring a market economy to central planning, ordo-liberalism is much less 
confident in the market‟s ability to self-correct, especially in terms of avoiding the concentration of 
economic power in private hands, which is considered the main threat to economic freedom.  Ordo-
liberalism takes the position that economic players should not be coerced into their choices and the 
only acceptable form of competition should be competition on the merits. 
259  As eloquently summarized by Professor Fox, “A significant portion of U.S. and EU law 
on abuse of dominance and monopolization corresponds. In particular, monopolistic conduct prohibited by section 2 of the 
Sherman Act is likely to constitute an abuse of dominance under TFEU Article 102, although not vice versa. […]  
The Competition Directorate in Europe faces a highest court that applies the Treaties' values of openness and access, 
often engages in formal legalistic analysis, and sometimes applies rules of fairness.  Accordingly, the Court's 
pronouncements tend to proscribe more than the Competition Directorate's guidance would.  The U.S. agencies face a 
highest court that tends to apply values of trust in the market and deep respect for the business judgment of even 
dominant firms, expecting thereby to maximize innovation, efficiency, and a notion of freedom.  The Supreme Court's 
holdings proscribe less conduct than most current U.S. agency officials deem anticompetitive.  Thus we see more 
administrative-level convergence and more judicial-level divergence.”  From this, it follows that, “the EU perspective 
on abuse of dominance at the Court of Justice level stresses the process of competition, seeking to enable all market actors 
to compete on their merits, particularly efficient and potentially efficient competitors.  The U.S. law of monopolization at 
the Supreme Court level stresses the costs of antitrust intervention, tending toward per se legality in a number of 
situations and otherwise imposing considerable burdens on plaintiffs to show how the particular conduct will increase 
market power and harm consumers and that the finding of a violation would not com- promise low prices and incentives 
to innovate.” (E.M. Fox, Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance: Why Europe is Different, 59(1) 
The Antitrust Bulletin, Spring 2014, pp. 150-151, and p. 143).  See also P. Larouche, M.P. Schinkel, 
Continental Drift in the Treatment of Dominant Firms: Article 102 TFEU in contrast to Section 2 
Sherman Act, TILEC Discussion Paper DP 2013-020, May 2013, p. 7 (“Eleanor Fox suggests that, beyond 
the rhetoric, the difference between US and EU law relates to the grey zone of conduct which is not clearly output-
limiting but nevertheless would injure the competitive process.  US antitrust law does not thread into that grey zone, for 
fear of error, which would lead to prohibiting pro-competitive conduct.  Under EU competition law, in contrast, 
authorities do not hesitate to prosecute conduct falling into that grey zone, despite the error risk.”) 
260  “[A]n undertaking in a dominant position has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to 
impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market […].  An undertaking in a dominant position cannot 
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“performance-based”, pursuing the undertaking‟s legitimate commercial interests, to the 
benefit of consumers.261  The European Commission defines competition on the merits as 
“competition on product quality, strength of the patented technologies and similar.”262  As explained by the 
Court of Justice: 
“The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a 
dominant position which is such to influence the structure of a market where, as a result of the very 
presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened and which, through 
recourse to methods different from those which condition normal competition in products or services on 
the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the 
degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition.”263 
The illegality of a conduct under Article 102 TFEU is unrelated to its compliance or 
non-compliance with other legal rules.  Indeed, in the majority of cases, abuses of dominant 
positions consist of conducts otherwise (formally) lawful under branches of law other than 
antitrust.264 
As far as intent goes, although not necessary for the purposes of identifying an abuse 
of dominant position, it constitutes a relevant factor in the Commission‟s analysis265 to 
                                                                                                                                                   
have recourse to means other than those within the scope of competition on the merits (Irish Sugar v Commission, cited at 
paragraph 54 above, paragraph 111).” (General Court, T-203/01, Michelin, 30 September 2003, par. 97) 
261  See C. Osti, What Is in a Name: The Concept of Abuse in Sui Generis Abuse, in G. 
Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  An 
International Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, p. 96 (“Often the Court couples [competition on the merits] with 
the one of ‗competition based on performance‘, a clear reference to the German theory of Leistungswettbewerb (literally, 
performance competition)(See, e.g., Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v. European Commission and 
others[2010] ECR I-9555, paras  174-177)  Such theory was developed with reference to unfair competition law (a 
not insignificant detail, as we shall see), in order to distinguish ‗fair‘ from ‗unfair‘ competitive conduct.  Conduct (or 
competition) based on performance was considered such as to allow a firm to prevail on a competitor (possibly, even to 
eliminate it from the market) as a result of a choice made by the customer, who considered that the products or services 
offered by such competitor would be superior in quality, or in price, etc.  Contrast this with conduct based on 
‗impediment‘, where, e.g., the competitor would be falsely denigrated, or boycotted, or its products or brand slavishly 
imitated, its merits appropriated, etc. (H.C. Nipperdey, Wettbewerb und Existenzvernichtung. Eine Grundfrage des 
Wettbewerbsrechts (Heymann, Berlin, 1930), see in particular, 19)”) 
262  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2766. 
263  Court of Justice, 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche, 13 February 1979, par. 91.  See also 
Court of Justice, 322/81, Michelin, 9 November 1983, par. 70 (“Article [102] covers practices which are 
likely to affect the structure of a market where, as a direct result of the presence of the undertaking in question, 
competition has already been weakened and which, through recourse to methods different from those governing normal 
competition in products or services based on traders‘ performance, have the effect of hindering the maintenance or 
development of the level of competition still existing on the market.”) and Court of Justice, C-27/76, United 
Brands, 14 February 1978, par. 249 (“It is advisable therefore to ascertain whether the dominant undertaking has 
made use of the opportunities arising out of its dominant position in such a way as to reap trading benefits which it 
would not have reaped if there had been normal and sufficiently effective competition.”)  More recently, see Court of 
Justice, C-209/10, Post Danmark, 27 March 2012, paras. 22-24 (“Competition on the merits may, by 
definition, lead to the departure from the market or the marginalisation of competitors that are less efficient and so less 
attractive to consumers from the point of view of, among other things, price, choice, quality or innovation.  […] Article 
[102 TFEU] applies, in particular, to the conduct of a dominant undertaking that, through recourse to methods 
different from those governing normal competition on the basis of the performance of commercial operators, has the effect, 
to the detriment of consumers, of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition existing in the market or the 
growth of that competition”). 
264  Court of Justice, C-457/10 P, AstraZeneca, 6 December 2012, par. 132. 
265  General Court, T-321/05, AstraZeneca v Commission, 1 July 2010, par. 359 (“although 
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determine whether a conduct has an abusive nature.  In its Guidance paper on Article 102 
TFEU,266 the European Commission lists among the factors generally relevant to assess 
whether the allegedly abusive conduct is likely to lead to anti-competitive foreclosure, “internal 
documents which contain direct evidence of a strategy to exclude competitors, such as a detailed plan to engage 
in certain conduct in order to exclude a competitor, to prevent entry or to pre-empt the emergence of a market 
[…] Such direct evidence may be helpful in interpreting the dominant undertaking‘s conduct.”267  Evidence 
of an exclusionary strategy can thus support the finding of an abuse, but it cannot serve as a 
conclusive factor.  Intent is an important element to cross check the conduct, and verify 
whether it represents competition on the merits, but elements to “objectify” the conduct need 
to be present as well.268 
As to the effects of the conduct, the Court of Justice explicitly stated: “although the 
                                                                                                                                                   
proof of the deliberate nature of conduct liable to deceive the public authorities is not necessary for the purposes of 
identifying an abuse of a dominant position, intention none the less also constitutes a relevant factor which may, should 
the case arise, be taken into consideration by the Commission.  The fact, relied upon by the applicants, that the concept of 
abuse of a dominant position is an objective concept and implies no intention to cause harm […] does not lead to the 
conclusion that the intention to resort to practices falling outside the scope of competition on the merits is in all events 
irrelevant, since that intention can still be taken into account to support the conclusion that the undertaking concerned 
abused a dominant position, even if that conclusion should primarily be based on an objective finding that the abusive 
conduct actually took place.”) 
266  Communication from the Commission – Guidance on the Commission‟s 
enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings, 2009/C 45/02, 24 February 2009, par. 20. 
267  In the specific case of creation of patent clusters, the purpose for which the 
application was filed is a relevant element for identifying whether the patent strategy can be construed 
as competition on the merits or not.  “[B]oth patent clusters and divisionals seemingly serve to prevent or delay 
generic entry.  While this, during the period of exclusivity, is generally in line with the underlying objectives of patent 
systems, it may in certain cases only be aimed at excluding competition and not at safeguarding a viable commercial 
development of own innovation covered by the clusters. (During the public consultation the EPO has rightly pointed out 
that the purpose for which an application has been filed is not relevant to the decision-making process within the 
European patent system and that this should remain so.  The EPO would have neither a mandate nor the resources to 
analyse such intentions.  It goes however, without saying that the description of the underlying intentions is relevant to 
understand how companies use existing legislative framework for their purposes.  The intention can also be taken into 
account in competition law assessments.)” (European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, Final 
Report, 8 July 2009, par. 523) 
268  The finding of an anticompetitive intent will often be objective as well, inferred from 
the objective characteristics of the undertaking, its conduct and effect, the market structure, and the 
absence of (credible) pro-competitive reason for the adoption of an exclusionary (or exploitative) 
behavior (on this last point, see M.A. Carrier, N.L. Levidow, A.S. Kesselheim, Using Antitrust Law to 
Challenge Turing‟s Daraprim Price Increase, 31 Berkeley Technology Law Journal, forthcoming 2016, 
p. 11, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2724604, accessed on 6 
August 2016, “The Court found that the monopolist was guilty of anticompetitive conduct because it was willing to 
forego ticket sales and sacrifice profits to harm its smaller competitor. ([Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands 
Skiing Corp., 472 U.S., 1995,] at 608)  As applied by commentators, this profit-sacrifice test offers a defendant-
friendly approach that only punishes activity that has no justifiable reason other than harming competitors. (E.g., A. 
Douglas Melamed, Exclusive Dealing Agreements and Other Exclusionary Conduct—Are There Unifying 
Principles?, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 375, 392 (2006) (―anticompetitive intent‖ of firm willing to sacrifice profits can 
be ―unambiguously inferred‖); Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The ―No 
Economic Sense‖ Test, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 413, 415 (2006) (the test‘s application ―could not be simpler if . . . 
the conduct cannot possibly confer an economic benefit on the defendant other than by eliminating competition‖); Steve 
Shadowen et al., Anticompetitive Product Changes in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 75-76 
(2009) (profit sacrifice leads to natural inference that actor ―was aware of and motivated solely to achieve that 
reduction‖).)”) 
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practice of an undertaking in a dominant position cannot be characterised as abusive in the absence of any 
anti-competitive effect on the market, such an effect does not necessarily have to be concrete, and it is sufficient 
to demonstrate that there is a potential anti-competitive effect”.269  Although not excluding the necessity 
to demonstrate anticompetitive effects, the Court only requires the Commission to 
demonstrate that the conduct concerned is capable of having anticompetitive effects.270  The 
analysis of anticompetitiveness of the conduct is ex ante, on the basis of the situation at the 
time when the conduct was undertaken.271 
Exactly as in the U.S., also in the EU the dominant undertaking whose conduct is 
under scrutiny can provide justification for its conduct by demonstrating either that the 
conduct was objectively necessary, or that the exclusionary effect might be counterbalanced, 
or outweighed, by “advantages in terms of efficiency that also benefit consumers”272 
8.3. Market Definition in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
As seen, to be held liable for monopolization or abuse of dominance, the investigated 
firm has to possess a certain degree of market power.  The first element to take into 
consideration in establishing market power is the definition of the market in which the firm is 
active.273  The topic is of particular relevance for this work due to the fact that market 
definition is specific to each industry and often, in the pharmaceutical industry in particular, 
defining a broader or narrower market is what distinguishes dominance (or even monopoly) 
from effective competition. 
The main purpose of market definition is to identify products regarded as 
substitutable by consumers, by reason of their characteristics, prices and intended use, and 
                                                 
269  Court of Justice, C-457/10 P, AstraZeneca, 6 December 2012, par. 112.  See also 
Court of Justice, C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera, 17 February 2011, par. 64. 
270  This does not mean that the European Commission is free to assert potential effects 
in any case.  As explained by Advocate General Mazak, “[i]t must […] be demonstrated that it is plausible 
that the practice harms or will harm competition.  Abstract, purely hypothetical or remote assertions or theories of harm, 
which are not linked to the specificities of the case at hand, will thus not suffice.” (Opinion of Advocate General 
Mazak, C-457/10 P, AstraZeneca, par. 63). 
271  Court of Justice, C-457/10 P, AstraZeneca, 6 December 2012, par. 110.  As explained 
by the European Commission, “[t]he assessment thus not only looks at what existed at the time of the acquisition 
but also takes into account what could reasonably be expected” (European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril 
(Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2812). 
272  Court of Justice, C-209/10, Post Danmark, 27 March 2012, paras. 41-42 (“[I]t is for the 
dominant undertaking to show that the efficiency gains likely to result from the conduct under consideration counteract 
any likely negative effects on competition and consumer welfare in the affected markets, that those gains have been, or are 
likely to be, brought about as a result of that conduct, that such conduct is necessary for the achievement of those gains in 
efficiency and that it does not eliminate effective competition, by removing all or most existing sources of actual or 
potential competition.”) 
273  Both in the U.S. and in the EU, market definition has a product and a geographic 
element.  The European Commission has invariably found pharmaceutical markets to be national in 
scope due to a number of factors: “different price and reimbursement rules […], differences between national rules 
on incentives for cheaper generic […], as well as different brand and packing strategies […], different distribution and 
certain, however in the present case minor, differences in prescribing habits of doctors”. (European Commission, 
AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2547)  Although drugs and pharmaceutical 
companies are substantially identical throughout the EU, the pharmaceuticals markets remain 
fragmented along national borders.  This is true both looking at the largely national (though 
harmonized) patenting regimes as well as at the pricing and reimbursement levels. 
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thus the competitive constraints faced by the undertaking.274  Product market definition relies 
primarily on demand-side substitutability, i.e. on the identification of the products customers 
see as substitutes for that of the company under scrutiny.275  To measure demand-side 
substitutability, reference is usually made to the SSNIP (Small but Significant Nontransitory 
Increase in Price) test.276  If a 5 to 10% increase in price would lead a significant portion of 
customers switching to the lower-priced product, the products can be considered in 
competition between each other.  The presence of the other product in the market acts as a 
constraint on the ability of the manufacturer of the first product to profitably raise prices, 
since a price increase would cause consumers to stop buying its product and switch to its 
competitor‟s.  If this is the case, both products should be included in the same relevant 
market.277  In the specific case of pharmaceuticals, when drugs “can be broadly used for the same 
purpose but differ in terms of price, quality, consumer preferences or other significant attributes, the products 
are considered to be differentiated”.278  In addition, the market functioning needs to be taken into 
account in defining the relevant market.  Most of the prescription drugs are indeed covered 
by either public or private health insurance, which provides financial protection to consumers 
and makes their demand inelastic.  Insensitivity to increases in prices creates incentives for 
originators to charge much higher prices than they would on the sole basis of patent 
exclusivity.  Another factor contributing to the general inelasticity of demand (and thus to a 
rather narrow market definition, often coinciding with the single drug on which the patent 
                                                 
274  According to settled case law, “it is necessary first to define the products which, although not 
capable of being substituted for other products, are sufficiently interchangeable with its products, not only in terms of the 
objective characteristics of those products, by virtue of which they are particularly suitable for satisfying constant needs, but 
also in terms of the competitive conditions and the structure of supply and demand on the market” (General Court, T-
83/91, Tetra Pak, 6 October 1994, par. 63).  See also General Court, T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke v 
Commission, 12 June 1997, par. 81.  In this regards, the European Commission noted, “[h]owever, 
functional interchangeability and similarity in characteristics are insufficient to determine whether two products are 
demand substitutes, because the responsiveness of customers to changes in price is also determined by how customers value 
different characteristics.  It must be recalled that the relevant market is not determined on the basis that certain products 
competed against each other in a broad sense but on the basis of whether such products were sufficiently substitutable to 
significantly constrain each other‘s market power, in particular as regards pricing.  Moreover, a properly defined market 
does not need to include all functionally interchangeable products, as such interchangeability between products normally 
only defines the outer boundaries of a product market but may not be a decisive criterion. […]  A relevant market in 
competition cases should only include those products that are capable of significantly constraining an undertaking‘s 
behaviour and of preventing it from behaving independently of an effective competitive pressure.”  (European 
Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2417) 
275  The Court of Justice stated that: “It is settled case law that, for the purposes of applying Article 
[102] of the Treaty, the market for the product or service in question comprises all the products or services which in view 
of their characteristics are particularly suited to satisfy constant needs and are only to a limited extent interchangeable 
with other products or services”. (C-7/97, Oscar Bronner, 26 November 1998, par. 33)  See also 
Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition 
law, 97/C 372/03, paras. 13 ff. 
276  The SSNIP test measures the elasticity of demand, i.e. the way the market responds to 
changes in price.  If a small but significant increase in price triggers a significant reduction in demand, 
demand for the product is said to be elastic. 
277  The type of evidence relevant to assess whether two products are demand substitutes 
includes: “evidence of substitution in the recent past”. When available, “this sort of information will normally be 
fundamental for market definition. If there have been changes in relative prices in the past (all else being equal), the 
reactions in terms of quantities demanded will be determinant in establishing substitutability.” (Commission Notice 
on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community competition law, 97/C 372/03, 
par. 38) 
278  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2417. 
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grants a monopoly) is the fact that the choice of which (prescribed) drug to buy is not taken 
by the ultimate consumer (the patient, who lacks the necessary medical expertise to determine 
the appropriate treatment) or the insurer/State (either, or both, potentially sensitive to 
increases in prices) but by doctors, who may not know, or care about, the price of the 
prescribed drug and generally have no incentive to take drug prices into account.279  The 
doctors‟ experience in prescribing a specific drug with good results and their knowledge of 
drugs, heavily influenced by originators through literature, seminars and continuing medical 
education programs, as well as marketing efforts (including samples, mailing, detailing), plays 
a role in narrowing down the number of drugs that each doctor is ready to prescribe to his 
patients, and therefore the drugs actually competing in the relevant market.  Once the doctor 
has become familiar with the brand-name drug, due to brand loyalty, risk aversion or else he 
will be likely to keep on prescribing it by name, even following patent expiration and generics 
entry (of which the doctor might not even be aware).280  This well-known phenomenon is 
often referred to as “doctors‟ inertia”.281 
To define the relevant product market in the pharmaceutical sector, the European 
Commission has strongly relied in its merger control practice on the Anatomical Therapeutic 
Chemical Classification (“ATC”), devised by the European Pharmaceutical Marketing 
Research Association.  The third level of the ATC classification, referred to as ATC3, which 
groups medicines that have the same therapeutic indication(s) (i.e. the same intended medical 
use), has been generally taken as a starting point for the selection of candidate products.  
However, under specific circumstances, the Commission found it more appropriate to look 
also at ATC4 or the molecule level.282  To define the relevant market in each specific case, the 
                                                 
279  “Physician agency for patients in deciding whether/which drugs to prescribe tends to make demand 
more inelastic, because physicians are unaware of drug prices, and such price-insensitivity is rational if the patient-
principals are also price-insensitive due to insurance.  Given the high margin of price over marginal cost for originator 
drugs, originator manufacturers invest heavily in promotion to physicians.  This promotion focuses solely on brand and 
clinical benefits of the drug, not the price, and the same is true of direct-to-consumer advertising in the US.  The fact that 
promotion is often more important than price in determining market shares, because consumer demand is price-insensitive 
due to insurance, is important for antitrust approaches to market definition that relay on price elasticity.” (P.M. 
Danzon, Competition and Antitrust Issues in the Pharmaceutical Industry, on file with the author, p. 
11)  The U.S. FTC explained: “[t]he basic problem is that the forces of competition do not work well in a market 
where the consumer who pays does not choose, and the physician who chooses does not pay.  Patients have little influence 
in determining which products they will buy and what prices they must pay for prescription”. (FTC, Bureau of 
Consumer Protection, Drug Product Selection, January 1979, pp. 2-3, available at 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015008517792, accessed on 6 August 2016) 
280  D.A. Lundin, Moral Hazard in Physician Prescription Behavior, 19(5) Journal of 
Health Economics, 2000, p. 639 ff. 
281  The General Court referred to “the specific features of the markets for pharmaceutical products, 
which are characterised by ‗inertia‘ on the part of prescribing doctors” (General Court, T-321/05, AstraZeneca v 
Commission, 1 July 2010, par. 278).  In the Servier case, the European Commission notes: “In the case of 
perindopril, decreases in the prices of other medicines that may have well been intended for the same use did not negatively 
affect the sales of perindopril.  The reasons for this are the doctors‘ general disregard towards prices and the price rigidities 
induced by regulatory frameworks.  Prices still mattered, sometimes because of incentives being gradually built in for 
doctors to prescribe cheaper medicines and sometimes because of payments by patients, however, not to a sufficient extent.  
Perindopril was virtually immune to changes in relative prices.  There were also no other means to adequately replace 
competition in prices. Once the continued-use patients were known to dominate the patient base, and the doctors‘ inertia 
was established, other forms of competition, such as promotional efforts, could have, at best, a limited impact on the 
existing sales of perindopril.” (European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 
2544) 
282  European Commission, COMP/M.5661, Abbott/Solvay Pharmaceuticals, 2 
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Commission thus uses the ATC level as a starting point but takes also into account “the case-
specific evidence relating to the relative strength of the intra-class constraints faced by [the drug][…].  As a 
matter of principle, if constraints from other products are gauged insufficient, those other products cannot belong 
to the same relevant market.”283 
When the patentee‟s conduct is aimed at blocking or delaying generic entry, the 
competitive constrain coming from generics is central in the relevant product market 
definition.  The fact that “the generic constraint outweighs by an order of magnitude all other potential 
constraints [would] naturally [lead] to the finding of a narrow market comprising only the medicine in 
question.”284 
8.4. Market Power 
As anticipated, market definition aims at determining whether the undertaking holds a 
position of market power, relevant for the application of antitrust rules to unilateral conducts.  
At the EU level, dominance (threshold for the application of Article 102 TFEU) has been 
defined as “a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective 
competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers.”285 
                                                                                                                                                   
November 2010, paras. 8-9.  The General Court recognized that taking into account the ATC level is 
only a preliminary step in the Commission‟s analysis (General Court, T-321/05, AstraZeneca, 1 July 
2010, paras. 154-155). 
283  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, footnote 3215.  
In the recent Servier case, the Commission noted: “certain functional similarities are not sufficient to establish 
that […] other medicines represented sufficiently close substitutes to constrain [the originator‟s] behavior. […][F]or 
any new patient, only an initially unknown subset of available medicines will be compatible.  As soon as it is discovered 
that a given medicine alone, or in combination, adequately treats the patient‘s condition without side effects, the doctor is 
unlikely to risk provoking side-effects by deciding to switch this patient to another treatment.  A doctor would be unlikely 
to risk her patient‘s well- being for a few euros of savings in the monthly treatment cost. […]  The health risks related to 
switching of successfully treated patients will generally lead to a relatively low propensity to switch for so-called continued-
use patients.  For first time patients, […][t]he doctors are surely aware of the broad choice of therapies, but they 
naturally tend to prescribe new patients with the medicines which have shown to be good for their previous patients.  This 
well-known phenomenon is often referred to as ―the doctors‘ inertia‖.  The degree of substitutability of a given molecule 
with other molecules will therefore depend, among other things, on the degree of doctors‘ inertia and on the relative 
proportion of continued-use patients out of all patients treated with a given medicine. […]  The combination of the 
aforementioned factors, the ex ante uncertain effects of treatments and the doctors‘ personal experience, effectively 
[restrict] the substitutability between available therapies.” (European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril 
(Servier), 9 July 2014, paras. 1230-1235) 
284  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 1240. 
285  Court of Justice, C-27/76, United Brands, 14 February 1978, par. 65.  See also 
Communication from the Commission – Guidance on the Commission‟s enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 82 to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, 2009/C 45/02, 24 
February 2009, par. 8.  As noted by Professor Ullrich, “All in all, it has to be determined whether a firm‘s 
conduct is sufficiently controlled by competition or needs to be controlled by law.” (H. Ullrich, Mandatory Licensing 
Under Patent Law and Competition Law: Different Concerns, Complementary Roles, in R.M. Hilty, 
K.-C. Liu (eds.), Compulsory Licensing: Practical Experiences and Ways Forward, Springer, 2014, p. 
361)  See also E. Arezzo, Intellectual Property Rights at the Crossroad between Monopolization and 
Abuse of Dominant Position: American and European Approaches Compared, 24(3) John Marshall 
Journal of Computer and Information Law, 2006, pp. 490-491.  The European Commission further 
explained that “[s]uch a position does not preclude some competition but enables the undertaking which profits from it, 
if not to determine, at least to have an appreciable influence on the conditions under which competition will develop, and 
in any case to act largely in disregard of it so long as such conduct does not operate to its detriment.  The notion of 
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In the U.S., the Supreme Court defined monopoly power (threshold for the 
application of Section 2 of the Sherman Act) as “the power to control prices or exclude 
competition.”286  DOJ and FTC explained that: “[m]arket power is the ability profitably to maintain 
prices above, or output below, competitive levels for a significant period of time.”287  
Market power can be proven directly by demonstrating that the originator has the 
ability to “maintain the price of [the brand-name drug] at supracompetitive levels without losing 
substantial sales”,288 or indirectly, by referring to the originator‟s market share.  While not 
definitive in itself to assert dominance, market share represents a useful first indication of the 
market structure and of the undertakings‟ relative position.  In the European Commission‟s 
practice, “market shares of more than 50% constitute very large market shares and are in themselves, and 
save in exceptional circumstances, evidence of the existence of a dominant position, and that market shares of 
between 70% and 80% are a clear indication of the existence of a dominant position.”289  Market shares 
are used as a proxy also in the U.S.290  As far as percentages go, in the U.S. as well courts have 
not drawn a bright-line for determining the market share sufficient to infer monopoly power.  
Reference is usually made to Judge Hand‟s decision in Alcoa where he suggested 90% as the 
threshold for certain dominance, doubtful above 60% and certainly excluded below 33%.291  
Several U.S. courts found 75% to be sufficient.292 
In some cases the product market can be defined so narrowly that it coincides with 
the patented product.  Being a “one-product” market, a finding of dominance is rather 
obvious.  Once the market is narrowly defined, the conclusion that a (strong) patent confers 
significant market power to its holder tends to follow inevitably.  In such a situation, the 
assessment of dominance is pre-determined by the definition of the relevant market and mere 
ownership of a patent may be sufficient to confer dominance.  This is however an exception 
(although quite common in the pharmaceutical industry) and holding a patent does not 
necessarily confer market power in the antitrust sense.293  Patent holders have to compete on 
                                                                                                                                                   
independence which is the special feature of dominance is related to the level of competitive constraints facing the 
undertaking in question.  Such power may involve the ability to eliminate or seriously weaken existing competition or to 
create barriers to entry for potential competitors.” (European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 
July 2014, par. 2552) 
286  United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 76 S.Ct. 994, 1956, p. 
391. 
287  U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for 
the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 6 April 1995, par. 2.2.  See also In Ball Memorial Hospital, Inc. 
v. Mutual Hospital Insurance, Inc., 784 F.2d, 7th Cir., 1986, p. 1335, market power was defined as “the 
ability to cut back the market‘s total output and so raise price”. 
288  In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, D. Mass., 2013.  
See also In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., 94 F.Supp.3d, D.Conn., 2015. 
289  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2561. 
290  See Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d, 2d Cir. 2004, p. 500 
(monopoly power can be “inferred from a firm‘s large percentage share of the relevant market”).   
291  United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 2d Cir., 1945. 
292  H.J. Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice, 
West, 2016, p. 357. 
293  In the EU this principle has been recognized long ago.  See Court of Justice, C-
241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP (“Magill”), 6 April 1995, par. 46 (“So far as dominant position is 
concerned, it is to be remembered at the outset that mere ownership of an intellectual property right cannot confer such a 
position.”).  See also Court of Justice, C-457/10 P, AstraZeneca, 6 December 2012, par. 186 (“although 
the mere possession of intellectual property rights cannot be considered to confer such a position, their possession is none 
the less capable, in certain circumstances, of creating a dominant position, in particular by enabling an undertaking to 
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the market with providers of products or technology that (do not imitate but) can substitute 
their patented ones (competition by innovation).294  The degree of market power granted by a 
patent is thus inversely proportioned to the number of existing substitutes for the product.  
In a one-product market, the number of (succesful) substitutes is the lowest possible (zero; 
this is the case when no other cure exists to treat a certain disease) and the market power is at 
the highest level (monopoly, protected from imitation by the patent).  Increasing the number 
of substitutes decreases the degree of market power.295  Therefore, as explained by Professor 
Ghidini, 
“[i]n a correct systemic perspective, patents‘ institutional mission is to grant inventors a micro-
monopoly (i.e., on the given specific technological solution they developed), not a macro-monopoly (on 
the industrial sector or niche to which that solution belongs).  This assumption is backed by the 
indisputable principle that patents cannot prevent competitors from developing and marketing (and 
indeed patenting, if novel and inventive) any different competitive solution aimed at the same function: 
even if the first patented solution had happened to be, at the date of filing, the first and only to satisfy 
that specific function/usefulness.”296 
On the relevance of IP rights in assessing market dominance, patents are not the only 
to consider.  Synergies between trademarks and patents, particularly in the pharmaceutical 
industry, should not be underestimated.  As noted by Professor Ghidini, the commercial 
success and appeal of a trademark is “enhanced by the exclusive presence of the product on the market 
for 20 years.  Now the appeal acquired by such a trademark can prolong the ‗monopolistic‘ effect of the patent, 
or rather the owner‘s dominant position beyond the patent‘s expiration (save for cases of vulgarization).  
                                                                                                                                                   
prevent effective competition on the market”).  In the U.S. the presumption of market power was recently 
rejected by the Supreme Court in Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S., 2006, pp. 42-
43.  See also Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F.Supp.2d, N.D.Ill., 2003, p. 995 (“patent 
confers a monopoly in the sense of a right to exclude others from selling the patented product.  But if there are close 
substitutes for the patented product, the patent ―monopoly‖ is not a monopoly in a sense relevant to antitrust law”).  
Before, see U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the 
Licensing of Intellectual Property, 6 April 1995, par. 2.2. (“The Agencies will not presume that a patent, 
copyright, or trade secret necessarily confers market power upon its owner.  Although the intellectual property right confers 
the power to exclude with respect to the specific product, process, or work in question, there will often be sufficient actual 
or potential close substitutes for such product, process, or work to prevent the exercise of market power.”) 
294  See J. Drexl, The Relationship between the Legal Exclusivity and Economic Market 
Power: Links and Limits, in I. Govaere, H. Ullrich (eds.), Intellectual Property, Market Power and the 
Public Interest, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2008, p. 16: “[I]ntellectual property rights only prevent competitors from 
imitating the subject matter of protection (―competition by imitation‖).  They do not exclude competitors from offering 
better products (―competition by substitution‖).  Hence, legal exclusivity by itself does not lead to an economic monopoly. 
[…][H]owever, exclusivity may well produce such effects in specific cases, for instance as a consequence of the market 
circumstances”. 
295  Although not necessarily decisive, patent rights have a very important role to play in 
determining market power and should always be part of the assessment.  The General Court stated 
that “[w]hen granted by a public authority, an intellectual property right is normally assumed to be valid and an 
undertaking‘s ownership of that right is assumed to be lawful. The mere possession by an undertaking of an exclusive 
right normally results in keeping competitors away, since public regulations require them to respect that exclusive right.” 
(General Court, T-321/05, AstraZeneca, 1 July 2010, par. 362)  The European Commission added, 
“[t]he notion of barriers to entry does not require that barriers are absolute in order to include them in the assessment of 
dominance. The analysis of barriers to entry includes factors affecting timely and sufficient entry.” (European 
Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2571) 
296  G. Ghidini, The Bride and the Groom. On the Intersection between Intellectual 
Property and Antitrust Law, in G. Caggiano, G. Muscolo, M. Tavassi (eds.), Competition Law and 
Intellectual Property: a European Perspective, Kluwer, 2012, pp. 37-38. 
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Opening the market to competitors does not prevent consumers, attached to the trademark which has 
accompanied the product for 20 years, from preferring to remain loyal to the latter, and thus from being locked-
in even after the patent expires.”297  The appeal acquired by a trademark on a blockbuster drug is 
further strengthen by the doctors‟ inertia discussed above.  Without (generics and) rules on 
generic substitution, the risk of a monopoly of indefinite duration on the drug (and, if no 
alternative is found, on the cure) would be a real possibility. 
Factors taken into account to establish dominance in the pharmaceutical industry are 
obviously market shares, but also barriers to entry in terms of R&D and regulatory cost, drug 
patent protection (number and type of patents, covering the compound, process, salts, 
crystalline form, etc., their strength and scope)298 and the existence of other IP rights (such as 
a trademarks),299 product differentiation and lack of effective substitutes for the patented 
drug, drug price above competitive level, lock-in effects (switching time, cost, and risk 
involved), doctors‟ inertia, price disconnect, and inelasticity of demand.300 
 
9. Antitrust and IP: Friends or Foes? 
Contrary to the analysis conducted with respect to patent law, the objective of 
antitrust law is not analyzed as a baseline to define its abuse.  This chapter is focused on 
demonstrating that the objective of antitrust301 does not clash with that of IP (and thus, to 
                                                 
297  G. Ghidini, The Bride and the Groom. On the Intersection between Intellectual 
Property and Antitrust Law, in G. Caggiano, G. Muscolo, M. Tavassi (eds.), Competition Law and 
Intellectual Property: a European Perspective, Kluwer, 2012, pp. 41-42. 
298  See e.g. Court of Justice, C-457/10, AstraZeneca, 6 December 2012, par. 187 (“Losec, 
as the first PPI to be introduced on the market, enjoyed particularly strong patent protection, on the basis of which AZ 
brought a series of legal actions which enabled it to impose significant constraints on its competitors and to dictate to a 
large extent market-entry terms to them.”) 
299  The European Commission notes: “Indeed, an OECD report cites some evidence to the effect 
that, generally speaking, ‗intellectual property rights, in the form of patents and trademarks are relatively more important 
in the pharmaceutical industry than in other sectors‘ and refers, in this connection, to ‗one survey of several industries 
which ranks the pharmaceutical industry the highest in its reliance on patent protection‘.  Similar rights derived from 
pharmaceutical law also effectively result in barriers to entry into the pharmaceutical sector. In particular, until the expiry 
of data exclusivity applications for market authorisation need to rely on costly and lengthy preclinical and clinical trials.  
In addition, one study of pharmaceutical firms‘ decisions to launch new pharmaceutical products in a large number of 
OECD countries identifies national market authorisation and price approval rules and bodies as barriers to entry.  
Such rules, many of which remain national, entail costs and often long delays before a pharmaceutical product can be 
actually marketed” (European Commission, COMP/A.37507/F3, AstraZeneca, 15 June 2005, par. 518). 
300  The Commission listed almost all of these factors in European Commission, 
AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2405 (“(a) active product differentiation, (b) perindopril being 
an experience good, (c) presence of the lock-in effects with respect to the bulk of perindopril prescriptions, (d) presence of 
loyal prescribers, (e) general price insensitivity observed with respect to both the prescribers and the patients, and (f) the 
regulatory frameworks that shielded Servier‘s perindopril from price constraints from other molecules.  Cumulatively all 
those elements enabled Servier to operate on the market for perindopril in a largely unconstrained manner.”) 
301  As clearly put by the U.S. Seventh Circuit, “[i]f no consumer interest can be discerned even 
remotely in a suit brought by a competitor—if […] a victory […] can confer no benefit, certain or probable, present or 
future, on consumers—a court is entitled to question whether a violation of antitrust law is being charged.” (Brunswick 
Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d, 7th Cir., 1984, pp. 266–67)  Even the three dissenting judges 
in Actavis acknowledged that “the point of antitrust law is to encourage competitive markets to promote consumer 
welfare.” (FTC v. Actavis, Inc. 133 S.Ct., 2013, par. 2238)  See also Court of Justice, C-52/09, 
TeliaSonera Sverige, 17 February 2011, par. 22 (“The function of [competition] rules is […] to prevent 
competition from being distorted to the detriment of the public interest, individual undertakings and consumers, thereby 
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realize one, the other does not need to be at least partially sacrificed).  As this work aims to 
show, the objectives coincide on the maximization of consumer welfare in the long run, by 
promoting competition on the merits and innovation.302  What differs between the two 
disciplines are the means to achieve the common objective – IP and Antitrust are thus 
convergent in objectives and complementary in means.303 
                                                                                                                                                   
ensuring the well-being of the European Union”). 
302  “The ultimate goal of the competition rules is simple: to ensure that consumers benefit from new and 
improved products and lower prices.” (M. Monti, Competition and Information Technologies, Brussels, 18 
September 2000, p. 2, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-00-
315_en.htm?locale=en, accessed on 6 August 2016)  See also I. Lianos, Competition law, intellectual 
property rights and dynamic analysis: towards a new institutional “equilibrium?, Concurrences, 2013, 
par. 8 (“Although there is some disagreement over the adequate methodologies to be followed for the incorporation of 
innovation and ―dynamic competition‖ in competition law analysis, most competition scholars would agree that 
competition law should not only focus on static welfare effects and that it should also take a more dynamic approach.”); 
and J. Drexl, Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Edward Elgar, 2008, 
p. 4 (“[w]hereas in the past intellectual property and competition where mostly considered as contradictory concepts, it is 
today widely admitted that both fields of law, […] are meant to promote complementary goals, namely innovation based 
on dynamic concepts of competition”).  In the U.S.; see C.R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component 
Parts of Innovation Policy, 34(4) The Journal of Corporation Law, 2009, p. 1267 (“Like patent policy, 
antitrust law attempts to strike the proper balance between under and over-enforcement.  Overly aggressive antitrust 
enforcement could chill innovation.  In addition to affirmatively trying to encourage innovation, antitrust policy avoids 
pursuing competition in a manner that unnecessarily stifles innovation.”); and T. Cheng, Putting Innovation 
Incentives Back in the Patent-Antitrust Interface, 11(5) Northwestern Journal of Technology and 
Intellectual Property, 2013, p. 390 (“Consumer welfare is enhanced when consumers are able to obtain the same 
good at a lower price or obtain a higher-quality good at the same price.  Consumer welfare is also improved when 
consumer choice is widened.  In economic parlance, antitrust is principally concerned with static efficiency – the allocation 
of goods and services over the short run.  Dynamic efficiency, which refers to the ability of a market or an economy to 
produce innovation, is also important to antitrust. […]  Like patent law, antitrust is concerned with dynamic efficiency.  
This concern is motivated by the fact that in the long run, the greatest enhancement to consumer welfare comes not from 
lower prices obtained from static competition, but from the emergence of new technology and new products.”)  In the 
economic literature, see L. Battaglia, P. Larouche, and M. Negrinotti, Does Europe have an 
Innovation Policy? The Case of EU Economic Law, Discussion Paper No. 8481, Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, July 2011, p. 22 (“[G]eneric competition is viewed as being an essential source of 
pressure to drive originators back to competition in innovation post-patent lapse. […][A]ctions which interfere with the 
standard model of upfront patent protection for novel medicines followed by vigorous competition by generics post-patent 
lapse to drive prices down, will be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism.”); and C. Shapiro, Antitrust, 
Innovation, and Intellectual Property. Testimony Before the Antitrust Modernization Commission, 8 
November 2005. Available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/amcinnovation.pdf, accessed 
on 6 August 2016. 
303  See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 897 F.2d, Fed. Cir., 1990, p. 
1576 (“[T]he aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws may seem, at first glance, wholly at odds.  However, the 
two bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and competition.”) 
and Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d, Fed. Cir., 1999, p. 1362 (“The patent and antitrust laws are 
complementary, the patent system serving to encourage invention and the bringing of new products to market by adjusting 
investment-based risk, and the antitrust laws serving to foster industrial competition.”).  See also U.S. Department 
of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights. 
Promoting Innovation and Competition, April 2007, pp. 1-2 (“Over the past several decades, antitrust 
enforcers and the courts have come to recognize that intellectual property laws and antitrust laws share the same 
fundamental goals of enhancing consumer welfare and promoting innovation. […]  Modern understanding of these two 
disciplines is that intellectual property and antitrust laws work in tandem to bring new and better technologies, products, 
and services to consumers at lower prices. […][A]ntitrust and intellectual property are properly perceived as 
complementary bodies of law that work together to bring innovation to consumers: antitrust laws protect robust 
competition in the marketplace, while intellectual property laws protect the ability to earn a return on the investments 
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“At the highest level of analysis IPR and competition law are complementary because they both aim 
at promoting consumer welfare.  The objective of IPR laws is to promote technical progress to the 
ultimate benefit of the consumers.  This is done by striking the right balance between over- and under-
protection of innovators‘ efforts.  The aim is not to promote the individual innovator‘s welfare.  The 
property right provided by IPR laws is awarded to try to ensure a sufficient reward for the innovator 
to elicit its creative or inventive effort while not delaying follow-on innovation or leading to unnecessary 
long periods of high prices for the consumers. […]  Competition policy aims at promoting consumer 
welfare by protecting competition as the driving force of efficient markets, providing the best quality 
products at the lowest prices.  The relevant question is therefore not one of conflict but of 
complementarity and possibly adjustment in the individual case. To what extent should competition 
policy intervene and try to improve the balance produced by IPR law […]  There is […] agreement 
that competition policy has to play its normal role where IPR rights are used to produce an anti-
competitive effect beyond the exploitation of the IPR rights. […]  There is also general agreement that 
in such cases competition policy must take account of specific IPR characteristics in order to properly 
protect dynamic efficiency.”304 
The European Commission guidelines on the application of Article 101 to technology 
transfer agreements seem to be inspired by this same principle of complementarity.   
“The fact that intellectual property laws grant exclusive rights of exploitation does not imply that 
intellectual property rights are immune from competition law intervention. […]  Nor does it imply 
that there is an inherent conflict between intellectual property rights and the Union competition rules.  
Indeed, both bodies of law share the same basic objective of promoting consumer welfare and an 
efficient allocation of resources.  Innovation constitutes an essential and dynamic component of an open 
and competitive market economy.  Intellectual property rights promote dynamic competition by 
encouraging undertakings to invest in developing new or improved products and processes.  So does 
competition by putting pressure on undertakings to innovate.  Therefore, both intellectual property 
rights and competition are necessary to promote innovation and ensure a competitive exploitation 
                                                                                                                                                   
necessary to innovate. Both spur competition among rivals to be the first to enter the marketplace with a desirable 
technology, product, or service.”); and H.J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System. A Reexamination, 
76(3) Ohio State Law Journal, 2015, p. 471 (“Both antitrust policy and patent policy are properly concerned with 
economic welfare, although the concerns are articulated more clearly in antitrust than in patent law.  At the atmospheric 
level, antitrust focuses on the short run, including such things as immediate pricing and output, while patent law is 
concerned with long run issues relating to innovation.  But upon inspection this dichotomy quickly breaks down.  In fact, 
antitrust policy has always been concerned with performance over both the short and long runs and often considers effects 
on innovation.”) 
304  European Commission evaluation report on the transfer of technology block 
exemption regulation N° 240/96, Technology transfer agreements under article 81, /* 
COM/2001/0786 final */, paras. 29-34.  See also the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 6 April 1995, par. 1 (an 
update of the antitrust guidelines is currently under discussion, but this provision was not subject to 
any revision, see https://www.ftc.gov/reports/antitrust-guidelines-licensing-intellectual-property-
proposed-update-1995-guidelines-issued, accessed on 19 August 2016)(“The intellectual property laws and 
the antitrust laws share the common purpose of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare.  The intellectual 
property laws provide incentives for innovation and its dissemination and commercialization by establishing enforceable 
property rights for the creators of new and useful products, more efficient processes, and original works of expression.  In 
the absence of intellectual property rights, imitators could more rapidly exploit the efforts of innovators and investors 
without compensation.  Rapid imitation would reduce the commercial value of innovation and erode incentives to invest, 
ultimately to the detriment of consumers.  The antitrust laws promote innovation and consumer welfare by prohibiting 
certain actions that may harm competition with respect to either existing or new ways of serving consumers.”) 
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thereof.”305  
From this it follows that competition authorities can and should intervene only when 
the conduct of a patentee is likely to deter consumer welfare (i.e. when the patent-related 
conduct is also contrary to the purpose patent law aims to achieve).  Antitrust and patent laws 
thus complement and strengthen each other in the pursuit of the same objective.  In the 
words of Professor Leslie,  
“Antitrust and patents are not merely complementary in that they pursue the goal of innovation; 
instead, they affirmatively depend on each other. Both are necessary; neither is sufficient. They are 
components of an overall innovation policy that maximizes both static and dynamic competition.”306 
Scenarios in which IP and antitrust are allegedly in tension are those in which the 
patentee‟s conduct leads to less rather than more innovation, to the detriment of consumer 
welfare.  In these cases, however, the conduct contrasts with the very aim of patent law as 
much as it does with antitrust.307  In such cases, a limit to the rights alleged by the patentee is 
warranted to rectify, to the benefit of consumers, the imbalance that would otherwise 
result.308  Antitrust complements patent law when IP rights are exercised to the detriment of 
consumer welfare.  This is the position recently taken by the European Commission in the 
words of its Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager: 
“Without effective competition rules, there would be higher risks that today‘s innovators might stifle 
those of tomorrow, or that consumers might not benefit from fair access to those innovations.  Our 
                                                 
305  European Commission, Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union to technology transfer agreements, 2014/C 89/03, 28 March 
2014, par. 7. 
306  C.R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation Policy, 
34(4) The Journal of Corporation Law, 2009, p. 1260. 
307  “As far as the patent-antitrust interface is concerned, the two paramount considerations for antitrust 
are the consumer harm resulting from restrictive patent exploitation practices and foreclosure of innovation opportunities 
by a dominant patentee against rival technology developers.” (T. Cheng, Putting Innovation Incentives Back in 
the Patent-Antitrust Interface, 11(5) Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, 
2013, p. 391) 
308  “Defendants also argue that antitrust law is not a vehicle for enforcing the ―spirit‖ of drug laws. 
Defs. Br. at 46. But the Supreme Court has made clear that ―[a]ntitrust analysis must always be attuned to the 
particular structure and circumstances of the industry at issue.‖ Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411.  Leading antitrust 
authorities have encouraged courts to acknowledge market defects, such as a price disconnect and the exclusivity of 
patents, in their antitrust analysis.  And in other Hatch-Waxman contexts, this court has recognized that efforts to 
manipulate aspects of the Hatch-Waxman incentive structure to exclude competition could state an antitrust claim.  See, 
e.g., Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 2010) […]  
Therefore, we conclude that the district court appropriately considered the unique market characteristics of the 
pharmaceutical industry in concluding that antitrust law ―requires [Defendants] to allow generic competitors a fair 
opportunity to compete using state substitution laws.” (State of New York v. Actavis, No. 14-4624, 2d Cir., 
2015, pp. 46-47)  Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S., 1912, p. 49 (“Rights conferred by 
patents are indeed very definite and extensive, but they do not give any more than other rights a universal license against 
positive prohibitions.  The Sherman law is a limitation of rights -- rights which may be pushed to evil consequences, and 
therefore restrained.”)  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S., 2013, par. II.A ([R]ather than measure the length or 
amount of a restriction solely against the length of the patent‘s term or its earning potential, as the Court of Appeals 
apparently did here, this Court answered the antitrust question by considering traditional antitrust factors such as likely 
anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues, market power, and potentially offsetting legal considerations present in the 
circumstances, such as here those related to patents. See Part II–B, infra. Whether a particular restraint lies ―beyond the 
limits of the patent monopoly‖ is a conclusion that flows from that analysis and not, as The Chief Justice suggests, its 
starting point.”) 
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task in this regard is to find the right balance between the interests of distributors, artists, inventors 
and creators and the interests of consumers. […] Competition policy should therefore work hand in 
hand with intellectual property policy to achieve common goals. […][They] must work hand in glove 
in order to promote economic growth while ensuring consumers gain access to a wide range of 
innovative and creative goods and services at reasonable prices.”309 
This is the so-called dialectical interplay between the two disciplines “that works to 
eliminate situations which would obstruct both innovation and competitive dynamics” – as noted by 
Professor Ghidini – “Through such dialectical exchange, each discipline, by fulfilling its function, can also 
indirectly serve the aims of the other.”310  In the words of the former European Commissioner for 
Competition, Joaquim Almunia, 
“When addressing the role of competition policy in supporting innovation, one must deal with the 
seeming conflict between competition and the protection of intellectual property rights.  In fact there is 
no such conflict. IPR policy and antitrust are complementary.  Antitrust enforcement does not 
question the use of IPR but it must fight the abuse of IPR.”311 
In light of the above, the optimal level of intervention of antitrust authorities in case 
of patent-related conducts should be based on the maximization of consumer welfare from 
an innovation and competition perspective.  To achieve this, competition law should aim at 
finding a balance between free competition and the provision of sufficient incentive for 
research and development.  This balancing exercise should be carried out by determining 
whether the patent right has been exercised to pursue an aim falling outside of the essential 
function and purpose of patent law, the only potentially justifying encroachments on 
competition law.312  In this analysis, the behavior of the patentee is an important indicator, 
thus intent can and should be taken into account in determining whether a patent-related 
conduct may be abusive.  The conclusion reached so far is adequately summarized by the 
words of Professor Leslie: IP and antitrust “are interdependent”. 
                                                 
309  M. Vestager, Intellectual Property and Competition, 11 September 2015, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/intellectual-property-and-
competition_en, accessed on 6 August 2016. 
310  G. Ghidini, The Bride and the Groom. On the Intersection between Intellectual 
Property and Antitrust Law, in G. Caggiano, G. Muscolo, M. Tavassi (eds.), Competition Law and 
Intellectual Property: a European Perspective, Kluwer, 2012, pp. 28-29. 
311  J. Almunia, Competition Policy in Times of Restructuring, 22 June 2012, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-487_en.htm, accessed on 6 August 2016.  See also 
J. Almunia, Intellectual Property and Competition Policy, 9 December 2013, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-1042_en.htm, accessed on 6 August 2016 (“In 
their different ways, both the patent system and the system that enforces competition law in the EU pursue common goals.  
A well-functioning IPR system can in fact promote competition by encouraging firms to invest in innovation.  And both 
competition policy and the intellectual-property protection system do contribute to create the right framework for 
innovators.  As a competition authority, we intervene only when the IP rights are abused or used as a cover-up for anti-
competitive practices – which is clearly the exception, not the rule.”) 
312  “The Commission regards dynamic competition in R&D as an important mechanism of economic 
growth.  This mechanism requires that the market power needed to attract innovation is restricted in time and in scope as 
foreseen in the applicable legislative framework.  These restrictions are necessary in order to keep incentives for the 
undertaking enjoying temporary market power to further develop through genuine innovation and avoid being overtaken 
by competitors.  Prohibition of the abuse of a dominant position is only aimed at the attempts of circumventing the 
existing restrictions of market power that originate from the mechanism of dynamic competition and not at its exercise in 
terms of collecting the economic rents during the legitimate period of legal protection.” (European Commission, 
AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2578) 
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“On the one hand, antitrust law needs patent law to maximize innovation. Unrestricted competition 
creates insufficient incentives for innovation.  Competitive markets without any protection for 
intellectual property would be less likely to see profit-maximizing firms investing in research that could 
easily be copied and used by competitors without restriction.  Patent law also needs antitrust law in 
order to maximize innovation.  In the same way that overly strong patent rights can reduce 
innovation, misconduct by patentees in procuring, enforcing, and using their patents can also be 
anticompetitive in a manner that stifles innovation.  Yet the patent system is not designed to truly 
punish—let alone deter—patent abuses. Antitrust law is better equipped to punish and deter patent 
misconduct that may prove to reduce innovation.”313 
To reach the IP and antitrust‟s common objective of enhancing consumer welfare, 
their enforcement needs to be coordinated so as to make sure that their means are not 
frustrated or weakened.  To improve their interaction, antitrust enforcement should 
internalize IP values, such as the promotion of incentives to innovate.  In the IP field, a 
rebirth (or resurrection) of the often forgotten doctrines of patent misuse and abuse of rights 
may help bring the patent‟s purpose back at the center of attention and with it the 
enhancement of consumer welfare.314 
 
10. Abuses: Introduction 
In this and the following chapters we put the theory into practice.  We saw in the 
introduction that IP is often more concerned about dynamic efficiency and antitrust about 
static efficiency.  However, not only both regulations leave room to (or even explicitly pursue, 
or would be able to pursue) competition and innovation respectively, but dynamic and static 
efficiency are not necessarily at odds, and measures that foster one will often improve the 
other as well.315 
Abusive behavior in the pharmaceutical industry has taken several different forms and 
have been scrutinized by authorities all over the world.  It does not come as a surprise that 
most of the relevant cases concern unilateral practices by companies having a strong position 
                                                 
313  C.R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation Policy, 
34(4) The Journal of Corporation Law, 2009, p. 1269. 
314  As noted by Professor Lianos, “[t]hese recommendations insist on the importance of trans-
disciplinary links between IP and competition law and confirm the thesis that intellectual property and competition law 
have become or are in the process of becoming a ―unified field.‖” (I. Lianos, Competition law, intellectual 
property rights and dynamic analysis: towards a new institutional “equilibrium?, Concurrences, 2013, 
par. 12, citing W.K. Tom, J.A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres 
to Unified Field, 66 Antitrust Law Journal, 1997) 
315  “What really matters in such cases is that markets remain contestable in terms of firms having both 
the ability and the incentive to innovate.  […][T]he vast majority of abuse of dominance cases in Europe relate to 
exclusionary abuses.  By definition, these have adverse effects on dynamic efficiency.  Cartels are another area where there 
is not a trade-off.  Cartels are generally set up in relatively tight oligopolies.  By ensuring that all the firms in the cartel 
have a stake in the status quo, they are likely to undermine incentives to innovate” (T. Curzon Price, M. Walker, 
Incentives to Innovate v Short-term Price Effects in Antitrust Analysis, Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice, 2016, pp. 6-7, who continues, “[s]ome mergers can harm both static and 
dynamic efficiency.  For instance, mergers where a large incumbent buys a small recent entrant might reduce static 
efficiency but might also be aimed at removing the dynamic threat offered by the new entrant […].  More directly, mergers 
involving firms that compete in innovation may have both static and dynamic adverse effects. For example, pre-merger, 
firms may have incentives to try to enter each other's markets with innovations, while post-merger, cannibalisation of 
revenue streams might dampen such innovative efforts.”) 
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in their relevant market.  These conducts fit under the so-called “product lifecycle 
management”, strategies aimed at delaying, preventing, foreclosing, or rendering ineffective 
generic competition (by increasing the uncertainty, the cost or the hurdles faced by generic 
companies), and thus extend the period of exclusivity as much as possible.   
The conducts scrutinized include filing multiple patents on variants of the same drug 
(patent clusters or thickets), starting baseless litigation to delay or prevent generic entry (sham 
litigation), withdrawing the first-generation drug from the market to switch patients to a new, 
patent-protected, version (product hopping), denigrating generics, providing misleading 
information to the patent office, and paying generics to stay out of the market (pay for delay 
patent settlements).  Excessive pricing, an exploitative abuse, prohibited in the EU (and at the 
Member States level) but not in the U.S., will be analyzed as well. 
 
11. Patent Clusters and Acquisition of Competing Patents 
The first abuse analyzed directly relates to the functioning of the patent system and 
patent‟s quality.316  In light of the indulgent approach of most patent offices in verifying the 
respect of the patentability requirements, originators often file a multitude of patent 
applications (including divisional),317 on manufacturing process, reformulations, dosage 
                                                 
316  The idea that too many patents with insignificant value are awarded is more than a 
century old.  Already in the late 1800s, David Brewer, Supreme Court Justice, suggested that patents 
were far too many, many of which with no value. (D.J. Brewer, The Patent System, 3 Yale Law 
Journal, 1894, p. 151)  More recently, see OECD, Policy Roundtable on Competition, Patents and 
Innovation, DAF/COMP(2007)40, 8 January 2008, pp. 21-23 (“In recent years, a number of commentators 
have expressed concern that too many patents are being issued, their scope is becoming too broad, they are too easy to 
obtain, and the legal rights attached to them have become too powerful.  Some observers believe that these developments 
have changed patents from being innovation facilitators to being innovation retardants. […][T]he easier it is to obtain 
patents and the broader they are, the more of them will tend to be issued and the more comprehensive they will be (up to a 
saturation point).  That, in turn, can lead to five types of costs.  First, static inefficiencies increase because more patents 
and greater patent breadth make monopolisation and its attendant deadweight losses more likely.  Second, dynamic 
inefficiencies increase because it will become more difficult for others to invent without infringing someone else‘s patent.  
Third, a greater number of broader patents will encourage socially wasteful rent-seeking behaviour, such as patent 
trolling.  Fourth, enforcement costs will be higher since there will be more to enforce.  Finally, it is possible that overbroad 
patent rights and easier patentability will lead to inefficient overinvestment in R&D.  Some believe that when patents 
are awarded too easily, or are allowed to protect very broad claims, a vicious cycle arises that deters innovation.  This 
happens because the body of issued patents eventually covers so much substantive territory that companies are forced to 
recognise a substantial likelihood that their innovations will lead to accusations of infringement by other companies.  To 
reduce their risk, businesses amass larger and larger patent portfolios in a kind of IP arms race in which patents are 
collected mainly for use as bargaining chips in the event of an infringement problem.  But of course the act of building up 
those portfolios adds to that problem.  With so many patents already granted and more being issued all the time, it 
becomes harder and harder to know who is likely to sue, to feel confident about one‘s chances of successfully fending off an 
infringement suit, and to negotiate and pay for the licenses deemed to be necessary. […]  Consider the comments of an 
executive from Texas Instruments: ‗TI has something like 8000 patents in the United States that are active patents, 
and for us to know what‘s in that portfolio, we think, is just a mind-boggling, budget-busting exercise to try to figure that 
out with any degree of accuracy at all.‘  If a company with the resources of Texas Instruments cannot afford to know even 
what it has in its own patent portfolio, one can imagine how hard it could be for small potential entrants to determine 
their risks of triggering a patent infringement lawsuit.”) 
317  While divisional applications have the same priority and expiration date as the parent 
patent, and thus cannot add any extra-time to the patent protection, strategic use of divisionals can 
create uncertainty as to the final extent of the patent, which in turn might cause delays to generic 
entry.  Divisionals may be also used by originators to extend the overall time of patent examination (a 
81 
 
regimes, new uses, as well as salts, metabolites, polymorphic forms, particles, solvates and 
hydrates, to protect the drug from generics and expand the reach of exclusivity of the patent 
on the main active ingredient.318  In other words, the originator319 “stockpiles” patent 
protection by obtaining separate patents relating to the same drug320 with the aim of creating 
several layers of defense.321  This is often referred to as a patent cluster or patent thicket.  As 
                                                                                                                                                   
sequence of divisional applications might allow an invalid submission to survive several years of 
examination) thus prolonging the period of legal uncertainty for generic companies.  The effect is 
further exacerbated by the divisionals‟ independence (which leave them unaffected by the successful 
challenge of a parent application) and the possibility to use sequences of intertwined divisionals.   
318  This phenomenon is widespread in the pharmaceutical industry.  As noted by C.S. 
Hemphill, B.N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, Journal of Empirical Legal 
Studies, 2011, p. 11, “Drugs approved between 1985 and 1987, have an average of 1.9 patents per drug. In the 
final (2000 to 2002) cohort, the mean slightly more than doubles to 3.9 patents per drug.  The median increases from 
1.5 to 2.5 patents per drug. […]  In other words, the top twenty-five percent of patent portfolios, among drug approvals 
in the first several years of the Act, had two or more patents per drug, while the top portfolios fifteen years later were 
more than double that size.”  Professors Boldrin and Levine indicate that: “[t]he National Institutes of Health 
Care Management reveals that over the period 1989-2000, 54% of FDA-approved drug applications involved drugs 
that contained active ingredients already in the market.  Hence, the novelty was in dosage form, route of administration, 
or combination with other ingredients.  Of the new drug approvals, 35% were products with new active ingredients, but 
only a portion of these drugs were judged to have sufficient clinical improvements over existing treatments to be granted 
priority status.  In fact, only 238 out of 1035 drugs approved by the FDA contained new active ingredients and were 
given priority ratings on the base of their clinical performances.  In other words, about 77% percent of what the FDA 
approves is ―redundant‖ from the strictly medical point of view.” (M. Boldrin, D.K. Levine, Against Intellectual 
Monopoly, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 260-261) 
319  Not only incumbent firms protecting their profits are often less likely to innovate (see 
K. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources to Invention, in NBER, The Rate and 
Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton University Press, 1962), but they also have an incentive to 
block their (potential) competitors from innovating.  This is usually achieved by creating barriers to 
entry, including by obtaining or acquiring blocking patents, able to extend and strengthen protection 
from the same thing IP is supposed to incentivize, innovation. 
320  Patents in a cluster concern innovations that the originator has no intention of 
developing further or making use of, other than for reserving the domain and eliminating potential 
competition.  This strategy is called “defensive patenting” and consists in inventions “which the applying 
company considers to have little or no prospect of being developed and/or commercialised and/or which, once granted, the 
company holds primarily to protect itself against actual or potential competition.” (European Commission, 
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009, par. 1118) 
321  The validity of these patents is usually doubtful.  As noted by the European 
Commission, “the final outcome in 60 % of opposition and appeal procedures against originator company‘s patents 
examined in this report was a revocation of the disputed patent. In addition to this, the scope of the patents was reduced 
in another 15%.  These procedures almost exclusively concerned secondary patents.  Furthermore in 55 % of the patent 
litigation cases between originator and generic companies that involved a question of the disputed patent‘s validity and 
that reached a final judgement, the patents were annulled (43 of 78 cases).” (European Commission, 
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009, par. 501)  The numbers vary, although they 
are not far from EU levels, in the U.S.  The success rate of generic manufacturers‟ challenges to 
originators‟ patents has been demonstrated by the FTC in 2002 to be at more than 70% (FTC, 
Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study, July 2002, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study, accessed on 6 
August 2016).  Professors Lemley and Shapiro found in 2005 that 50% of all litigated patents are 
declared invalid. (M.A. Lemley, C. Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 2005, p. 76)  Similar results are cited by Professor Hovenkamp: “litigated patents are found 
to be invalid anywhere from one-third to one-half of the time” (Hovenkamp H.J., Consumer Welfare in 
Competition and Intellectual Property Law, 9 Competition Policy International, 2014, p. 11, citing 
W.M. Landes, R.A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, Belknap, 2003, p. 
338).  In a more recent study, Professors Hemphill and Lemley refer to RBC Capital Markets, 
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defined by Professor Shapiro, a patent cluster is “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property 
rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.”322 
The denser the cluster, the more difficult it is for generic manufacturers to determine 
if they could develop a generic version of the brand-name drug without infringing one of the 
originator‟s patents.  In this sense, this practice raises legal uncertainty as to whether generic 
manufacturers can enter the market, as they are not able to properly asses the scope of the 
originator‟s patent portfolio.  As explained by the European Commission, “where generic 
companies might manage to invalidate the base patent before its regular expiry they still cannot enter the 
market, if the originator company has succeeded in creating what some originator companies call ―a 
multilayered defence‖ by other patents for such aspects as different dosage forms, the production process or for 
particular pharmaceutical formulations.” 323 
Although the generic manufacturer knows that only a limited number of the myriad of 
patents allegedly covering the brand-name drug might be infringed by the generic version, 
and an even smaller number might be valid, it is extremely costly and time consuming to 
reach the necessary level of certainty prior to launch.324  In other words, although the main 
patent protecting the brand-name drug (i.e. the one on the basic compound) may have 
expired, generic entry might be delayed by uncertainty on whether the generic version 
infringes one of the multiple patents surrounding it.325 
                                                                                                                                                   
Pharmaceuticals: Analyzing Litigation Success Rates, 15 January 2010, concluding that generic 
manufacturers won only about half of the cases that reached judgment between 2000 and 2009.  They 
however note that “[t]he drop in the generic win rate is likely traceable to two changes we think occurred in challenge 
and settlement practice.  The first is an increase in settlements in weak-patent cases […]. The second is an increase in 
the filing of weak generic claims, motivated in part by the prospect of a future settlement payoff.”  As Professors S. 
Hemphill and Sampat reports “each drug has 2.7 patents on average (with a median of two patents), which yield an 
average nominal patent term of 15.9 years.  By comparison, average effective life is 12.2 years, a difference of nearly four 
years. […]  The key difference between effective life and nominal term is patent challenges by the generic firm.” (C.S. 
Hemphill, B.N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in 
Pharmaceuticals, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 399, 2012, p. 12) 
322  C. Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and 
Standard Setting, in A.B. Jaffe, J. Lerner, S. Stern, Innovation Policy and the Economy, MIT Press, 
2001, p. 119. 
323  European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009, par. 
476. 
324  “Despite their often dubious strength in eventual invalidity procedures, the mere existence of 
‗evergreening‘ patents will first discourage generic competitors from entering the market. At the very least, it will delay 
entry.” (M. Temmerman, The Legal Notion of Abuse of Patent Rights, Working Paper No 2011/23, 
nccr trade regulation, p. 24)  See also K.S. Gaudry, Evergreening: A Common Practice to Protect New 
Drugs, 29 Nature Biotechnology, 2011, p. 876 (“Under the practice of ―evergreening‖, a company may attempt 
to extend its total monopoly by securing a number of monopolies – each beginning and ending at different times.  For 
example, a company may file a first patent application claiming a new chemical compound.  Several years later, the 
company may file a second patent application claiming a use of the compound to treat a condition.  Later yet, the 
company may file a third patent application claiming a particular formulation of the compound.  […][A] patent arising 
from third patent application would likely expire years after [the first patent].  Though the latter part of the monopoly 
would likely cover a narrower concept, the protection may be sufficient to deter competitors from attempting to design-
around the patent.”) 
325  “This can occur either because patents cover all economically interesting or viable salt forms, 
enantiomers or formulations of the compound or all efficient ways of its manufacturing. In other words patent clusters and 
divisionals seem to be aimed at creating legal uncertainty for generic competitors” (European Commission, 
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009, par. 525).  See also J. Drexl, AstraZeneca 
and the EU Sector Inquiry: When Do Patent Filings Violate Competition Law?, in J. Drexl, L. Nari 
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The creation of a patent cluster is thus used to expand the scope of the exclusivity 
both objectively (protecting the drug from competing products that are not infringing the 
main patent) and temporally (extending the duration of the exclusivity on the drug beyond the 
20 years granted by the main patent),326 creating uncertainty for potential competitors (generic 
and not).327  Under certain circumstances, this strategy might be pursued to facilitate the 
switch to second generation products, which will be analyzed in more detail in the chapter 
dedicated to product hopping. 
Directly connected with the creation of patent clusters is their enforcement through 
litigation.  Indeed, patent clusters represent a valuable asset for originators to engage in patent 
litigation, whose simple threat may be sufficient to deter generic companies from entering the 
market.  Enforcement of worthless, invalid or non-infringed patents creates unjustified 
obstacles to generic entry (in terms of legal cost, risk of interim injunctions and damages).  
Only larger generic companies may have the financial resources to identify potentially 
infringed patents, determine their validity and undertake long and costly litigation.328 
                                                                                                                                                   
(eds.), Pharmaceutical Innovation, Competition and Patent Law: A Trilateral Perspective, Edward 
Elgar, 2013, p. 308 (“[P]harmaceutical companies […] apply […] for a number of secondary patents, such as for 
processes or re-formulations, in addition to the base patent in order to extend the exclusivity beyond the expiry of the 
protection period of the base patent.  If this happens towards the end of the term of protection of the base patent – a 
strategy that is generally termed ‗evergreening of patents‘ – this will cause the most delay to the market entry of generics.”) 
326  This is the case when originators submit, as innovative, inherent characteristics of the 
brand-name drug whose main patent is about to expire.  See, e.g., European Commission, AT.39226, 
Lundbeck, 19 June 2013, par. 627 (“the crystallisation patent, on which Lundbeck heavily relied to deter generic 
entry, […] was analysed by Lundbeck‘s ―enemies‖ as ―high school chemistry‖ and not novel, meaning that parties 
realised that this patent could very well be held partially or entirely invalid by a court, a national patent office or the 
EPO.”) and par. 1026 (“Alpharma shared this basic assessment of the vulnerability of Lundbeck‘s crystallisation 
patent. […] ―My personal opinion, regarding the patent in question [that is to say Lundbeck‘s crystallisation patent], is 
that we shall go ahead and market our product.  The patent is not likely to pass scrutiny on novelty and inventive step.  
I expect that they will end up, either with no patent or a very limited and narrow patent, which should not cause us 
problems.  We do however need the supportive opinions of [external lawyers].  If they coincide, then I would recommend a 
―go ahead‖.  We might loose and have to pay a limited damage fee, but not entering the market, could also lead to a 
significant loss.‖”) 
327  Generic manufacturers and other originators tend to respect the patents granted and, 
instead of challenging their validity, they may simply abstain from bringing generics to the market and 
redirect their investments.  Indeed, the creation of a patent cluster may prevent the creation of 
substitutable products (such as me-too products) by interfering with the R&D path of rival 
companies, thus impairing both price and dynamic competition.  As illustrated by Professor 
Hovenkamp, “[o]ne consequence of ineffectual opposition is that fields become very crowded with patents whose 
technological contributions are minimal or nonexistent.  Nevertheless, the cost of challenging or avoiding them is very 
high.  As a result, they can deter competitive entry and innovation even if they do little to promote long run technical 
progress. […]  In such cases there is no innovation–competition ―tradeoff‖ because there is no innovation to trade off.‖ 
(H.J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System. A Reexamination, 76(3) Ohio State Law Journal, 
2015, p. 483-484) 
328  “Litigation costs deter innovation because a firm looking to invest in innovation will consider the risk 
that the innovation will inadvertently expose it to a patent infringement lawsuit.  Recognizing these costs, firms […] will 
refrain from entering or continuing with a particular field of research that such patents appear to cover.  Such effects deter 
market entry and follow-on innovation by competitors and increase the potential for the holder of a questionable patent to 
suppress competition.  The anticompetitive effect is particularly strong for small innovative firms that lack the resources to 
challenge such patents. […]  The presence of any patent serves as a scarecrow that may keep competitors out of a 
particular field.  Patentees initiate and threaten litigation based on suspect patents.  Litigation costs associated with 
defending an infringement suit are high.  And that is just the litigation costs; the potential liability costs can be 
staggering.  Further, if the competitor knows about the patent and infringes anyway, the court may consider the 
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This first type of conduct, which has been the object of a number of antitrust cases, 
can be considered first and foremost an abuse of rights,329 as patent rights are used by 
originators to impede, rather than incentivize, innovation.  The excessive proliferation of 
patents raises transaction costs, constrains R&D, and exposes firms to ex-post holdup 
through patent litigation.330 
Issues connected to patent clusters should ideally be tackled by patent offices by 
                                                                                                                                                   
infringement willful and award treble damages and attorneys‘ fees.  Even if a competitor believes the patent is invalid, the 
costs of being wrong – or having the judge get it wrong – are too high.  Investigating patent validity takes time and 
money.” (C.R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation Policy, 34(4) The 
Journal of Corporation Law, 2009, pp. 1271-1273) 
329  “[I]nvalid patents upset the balance between encouraging innovation and suppressing competition 
because we pay the cost of reduced competition without receiving the benefit of increased innovation.” (C.R. Leslie, 
Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation Policy, 34(4) The Journal of Corporation 
Law, 2009, p. 1270)  “It is not appropriate to defend such a broad fence of defence by means of unused patents on the 
ground that in patent law there is no obligation to use the protected invention.  Firstly, such an obligation indeed exists, 
only that it is sanctioned merely by the imperfect instrument of the imposition of compulsory licences.” (H. Ullrich, 
Strategic patenting by the Pharmaceutical Industry: Towards a Concept of Abusive Practices of 
Protection, in J. Drexl, L. Nari (eds.), Pharmaceutical Innovation, Competition and Patent Law: A 
Trilateral Perspective, Edward Elgar, 2013, p. 244) 
330  To explain the issues potentially arising from defensive patenting and the creation of 
patent clusters from an IP perspective, we can refer to two compelling analogies, with blackmail and 
kidnapping, proposed by Professor Merges and Professor Abbot respectively.  What Professor Merges 
explains is that, “for an economist, the puzzling aspect of blackmail is that it involves a voluntary and seemingly 
Pareto-satisfying exchange.  The blackmailer has information the blackmailee wants; they agree to a price; and the deal 
is done.  From the point of view of libertarian theory, if not pure market exchange, what‘s not to like?  After some 
discussion of these issues, the answer came clear enough to Ronald Coase when he wrote about blackmail in 1984.  He 
emphasized the social wastefulness of blackmail transactions: ―Blackmail involves the expenditure of resources in the 
collection of information which, on payment of blackmail, will be suppressed.  It would be better if this information were 
not collected and the resources were used to produce something of value.‖ […]  Blackmail is part of a broader pattern in 
which the legal system sorts out which voluntary transactions ought to be enforced.  Where […] there is no social welfare 
gain possible […], and especially where enforcement encourages wasteful expenditures (again from the perspective of social 
welfare), there is good reason not to promote voluntary exchange.” (R.P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls 
Innovation Rent-Seeking and Patent Law, 24(4) Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 2009, pp. 1600-
1601).  It is difficult not to see a parallelism with patents unrelated to actual innovation, i.e. patents 
obtained and enforced with the sole purpose of blocking innovation from other originators, delaying 
generic entry or extracting undue and excessive benefits from a product whose patent is expired or 
would have a much more limited reach.  Patentees who employ patents not only not to benefit social 
welfare, but to its detriment, can be said to engage in a form of extortion. (R.P. Merges, The Trouble 
with Trolls Innovation Rent-Seeking and Patent Law, 24(4) Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 2009, 
p. 1603)  In the same vein, Professor Abbot offers a parallelism with kidnapping.  See F.M. Abbott, 
Excessive Pharmaceutical Prices and Competition Law: Doctrinal Development to Protect Public 
Health, 6(3) UC Irvine Law Review, forthcoming Spring 2017, p. 19, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2719095, accessed on 6 August 2016. (“The 
pharmaceutical industry prefers that discussions about price be based on the ―value‖ to healthcare systems in terms of 
alternatives.  For example, without treatment by a new drug a patient would develop symptoms, visit doctors, be subject 
to tests, be admitted to a hospital(s), become disabled and potentially die.  The cost of hospitalization can be quite high, 
and the price of hospitalization for an extended period can run into the millions of dollars.  Therefore, in ―value‖ terms 
based on alternatives, even a high-priced medicine may be a ―bargain‖.  This type of value assessment is essentially a 
―hostage‖ bargaining model.  The drug is under the control of the monopoly patent owner, and the price of ransoming the 
drug is whatever the party seeking to obtain it can pay.  If the ransom is not paid the consequences may be terrible, and 
in that regard the ransom can be characterized as a bargain.  But it is only a bargain because of the threat.  A similar 
―value proposition‖ could be worked out for virtually any essential product.”) 
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simply not granting unmeritorious patents.331  This would avoid at least the legal cost and 
uncertainty of litigation (where the decision is left to legally trained judges instead of 
scientifically trained patent examiners), and would limit the negative effects that the existence 
(and abstract enforceability) of invalid patents have on incentives to innovate.332 
In determining whether the originator‟s conduct (i.e. filing the patent application) is 
abusive, the key criterion is whether the originator has any interest in developing and bringing 
the patented invention to the market.333  To determine the originator‟s intent, which, while 
irrelevant for the grant of a patent, can be taken into account in the antitrust assessment, 
objective factor may provide some indication.  If the only justification for patenting around 
the main patent is to impede competition on innovation from originators334 and price 
competition from generic manufacturers335 (evidence of which can be the fact that this 
                                                 
331  “[P]atent offices are much better placed to detect weak patents.  Hence, the problem of unjustified 
secondary patents is a topic that should primarily be addressed in the context of patent law and policies.  Accordingly, the 
appropriate question to ask is not whether competition law should be applied to patent filings at all, but, from an 
institutional perspective, whether specific competition policy concerns can be better taken account of in the framework of 
patent or competition law.  It is hoped that the patent offices will defend the patent system at their best by maintaining a 
high level of patent quality and, thereby, convince the competition agencies that intervention is not needed.” (J. Drexl, 
AstraZeneca and the EU Sector Inquiry: When Do Patent Filings Violate Competition Law?, in J. 
Drexl, L. Nari (eds.), Pharmaceutical Innovation, Competition and Patent Law: A Trilateral 
Perspective, Edward Elgar, 2013, p. 319)  See also C.S. Hemphill, M.A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: 
Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 Antitrust Law Journal, 2011, pp. 967-968 
(“Patents are not carefully scrutinized by the Patent Office before they are issued.  That default could be altered for drug 
patents, for example, by providing for reexamination of every patent that receives a Paragraph IV certification, or even 
every patent in the Orange Book.  Reexamination has the advantage that, unlike a private suit, it cannot be settled once 
it has begun.  And this additional scrutiny would be consistent with proposals that the PTO focus more attention on the 
most important patents.  But it cannot solve the whole problem. The PTO is oriented towards granting, not denying, 
patents.”)  The number of hours spent on each application is limited, the application can be closed only 
if the patent is approved, the examiner is required to write an explanation for patent rejections, and 
bonuses are often based on productivity (in terms of patents examined or approved).  See M.A. 
Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Northwestern University Law Review, 2001, p. 
149, and R.P. Merges, As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for 
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 1999, p. 609. 
332  Litigation fears may induce generics and rival originators to “avoid market or research 
activities out of recognition of the vagaries of litigation results and the possibility of infringement liability”. (J.R. 
Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 
University of Illinois Law Review, 2001, p. 319)  Indeed, “[o]nly 1.5% of patents are ever litigated, and only 
.1% make it to trial.” (M.A. Lemley, C. Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 2005, p. 75) 
333  “[I]n some case both patent clusters and divisionals seemingly serve to prevent or delay generic entry.  
While this, during the period of exclusivity, is generally in line with the underlying objectives of patent systems, it may in 
certain cases only be aimed at excluding competition and not at safeguarding a viable commercial development of own 
innovation covered by the clusters. ([…] the description of the underlying intentions is relevant to understand how 
companies use existing legislative framework for their purposes.  The intention can also be taken into account in 
competition law assessments.)” (European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 
2009, par. 523. See also par. 1122) 
334  “Competitors will face a difficult choice: either they will have to litigate the validity of the patents, or 
they will have to accept a license and pay the fee, or finally they will have to design their products ―around the patent‖.  
All these practices will increase their costs, reduce their incentives to innovate and facilitate collusive practices as, in most 
cases, the dispute will lead to an anticompetitive patent settlement or a cross-licensing scheme.” (I. Lianos, R.C. 
Dreyfuss, New Challenges in the Intersection of Intellectual Property Rights with Competition Law, 
CLEAS Working Paper Series, 2013, pp. 43-44) 
335  As anticipated, the immediate consequence of patent clusters is the creation of 
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happened close to the main patent expiry),336 than there is strong case in favor of finding an 
abuse.  This is the case when the dominant originator knew, or should have known, that its 
application did not respect the patentability requirements, and the filing was thus aimed solely 
at obtaining an unmeritorious patent.  It is the complete lack of pro-innovation justification 
that leads to a finding of abuse, both under antitrust and patent law. 
This position is not shared by the U.S. Supreme Court.  In Continental Paper Bag,337 the 
circuit court found that “the complainant, so to speak, locked up its patent.  It has never attempted to 
make any practical use of it, either itself or through licenses, and apparently its proposed policy has been to 
avoid this.  […][C]omplainant stands in the common class of manufacturers who accumulate patents merely 
for the purpose of protecting their general industries and shutting out competitors.”  The Supreme Court 
however concluded “[a]s to the suggestion that competitors were excluded from the use of the new patent, 
we answer that such exclusion may be said to have been of the very essence of the right conferred by the patent, 
as it is the privilege of any owner of property to use or not use it, without question of motive. […]  In some 
foreign countries, the right granted to an inventor is affected by nonuse.  This policy, we must assume, Congress 
has not been ignorant of, nor of its effects.  It has nevertheless selected another policy; it has continued that 
policy through many years.  We may assume that experience has demonstrated its wisdom and beneficial effect 
upon the arts and sciences.”   
This is clearly in contrast with the position expressed by this work.  What the U.S. 
Supreme Court does is erroneously equating patent non-use in general to the abusive use of 
the patent system, aimed at preventing competition and deterring innovation through the 
creation of patent clusters.  Not only, the Supreme Court‟s opinion should be read in light of 
the eBay opinion discussed above.  Doing so would, in this author‟s view, lead to a similar 
position to that expressed by Justice Douglas in (his dissenting opinion in) Special Equipment:338 
                                                                                                                                                   
uncertainty as to the subject matter protected and thus the increase of the originator‟s rivals‟ costs and 
risks.  Even after the main patent expired, a generic manufacturer might stay out of the market fearing 
infringement of one of the multiple patents surrounding it. 
336  This is the case of “last-minute” or “just in time” inventions.  Even when the filing 
was not close to expiration of the main patent, the fact that it has been made much later than the 
conclusion of R&D is a strong indication of abusive intent. 
337  Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S., 1908, pp. 428-430. 
338  Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S., 1945, pp. 381-384 (“The right of suppression of a 
patent came into the law over a century after the first patent act was passed.  In 1886, Judge Blodgett had ruled that a 
patentee ―is bound either to use the patent himself or allow others to use it on reasonable or equitable terms.‖ Hoe v. 
Knap, 27 F. 204, 212.  In 1896, that rule was repudiated […][T]he court stated that a patentee‘s ―title is exclusive, 
and so clearly within the constitutional provisions in respect of private property that he is neither bound to use his 
discovery himself, no permit others to use it.‖  That theory was adopted by this Court in Continental Paper Bag Co. v. 
Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405, decided in 1908. […]  I think it is time to be rid of that rule.  It is 
inconsistent with the Constitution and the patent legislation which Congress has enacted. […]  ―The Congress is given 
no general power to issue letters patent or to reward inventors as it will. […]  The purpose ―to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts‖ accordingly provides the standards for the exercise of the power and sets the limits beyond which 
it may not go.  That purpose also provides the guide for the interpretation of patent laws enacted pursuant to that power. 
[…]  The patent is a privilege ―conditioned by a public purpose.‖ Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U. S. 
661, 320 U. S. 666.  The public purpose is ―to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.‖ The exclusive right 
of the inventor is but the means to that end.  That was early recognized by this Court. See Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 
1, 27 U. S. 19; Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, 62 U. S. 327-328; Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, 78 U. 
S. 533-534.  But the Paper Bag case marked a radical departure from that theory.  It treated the ―exclusive‖ right of 
the inventor as something akin to an ―absolute‖ right.  It subordinated the public purpose of the grant to the self-interest 
of the patentee.  The result is that suppression of patents has become commonplace.  Patents are multiplied to protect an 
economic barony or empire, not to put new discoveries to use for the common good.  ―It is common practice to make an 
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“the Court sits as a court of equity.  It should withhold its aid from a patentee who has employed or plans to 
employ the patent not to exploit the invention, but to suppress it in order to protect another patent or otherwise. 
[…]  If that purpose were clear, a patent should not issue in the first instance.  If it has been issued and not 
cancelled and the patent has been suppressed, anyone should be permitted to use it, at least on payment of 
reasonable royalties.  In that way, the constitutional objective will be more nearly realized -- the product of the 
inventive genius of the human mind will be put to work in the economy.” 
It is not necessary to file multiple applications to stockpile patents and create a patent 
cluster, originators can simply (and more easily) buy someonelse‟s patent (or even patent 
application) on a competing product or process, and suppress it.339  While this might seem 
counterintuitive to some, the reason why a (potential) competitor would sell its innovation to 
a competing originator is the fact that it might earn more with lower risk from splitting 
monopoly profits than from competing.  This is the economic theory behind the prohibition 
of cartels.  Selling at agreed upon monopoly prices (and thus acting as one single undertaking 
in a monopolistic position) enhances the undertakings‟ profits to the detriment of consumers.  
                                                                                                                                                   
invention and to secure a patent to block off a competitor‘s progress.  By studying his ware and developing an 
improvement upon it, a concern may ‗fence in‘ its rival; by a series of such moves, it may pin the trade enemy within a 
technology which rapidly becomes obsolete. As often as not, such maneuvers retard, rather than promote, the progress of 
the useful arts.  Invariably their effect is to enlarge and to prolong personal privilege within the public domain.‖ 
Hamilton, op. cit. supra, p. 161.  One patent is used merely to protect another.  The use of a new patent is suppressed 
so as to preclude experimentation which might result in further invention by competitors.  A whole technology is blocked 
off.  The result is a clog to our economic machine and a barrier to an economy of abundance.  It is difficult to see how 
that use of patents can be reconciled with the purpose of the Constitution ―to promote the Progress of Science and the 
useful Arts.‖  Can the suppression of patents which arrests the progress of technology be said to promote that progress?  
It is likewise difficult to see how suppression of patents can be reconciled with the provision of the statute which 
authorizes a grant of the ―exclusive right to make, use, and vend the invention or discovery.‖ Rev.Stat. § 4884, 35 
U.S.C. § 40.  How may the words ―to make, use, and vend‖ be read to mean ―not to make, not to use, and not to 
vend‖?  Take the case of an invention or discovery which unlocks the doors of science and reveals the secrets of a dread 
disease.  Is it possible that a patentee could be permitted to suppress that invention for […] the term of the letters patent 
[…] and withhold from humanity the benefits of the cure?  But there is no difference in principle between that case and 
any case where a patent is suppressed because of some immediate advantage to the patentee.  I think it is time to return to 
the earlier, and I think the true, philosophy of the patent system.  We should not pass on to Congress the duty to remove 
the private perquisites which we have engrafted on the patent laws.  This Court was responsible for their creation.  This 
Court should take the responsibility for their removal.”) 
339  “[S]uppose the patent monopolist of widgets pursues a course of buying up exclusive licenses to all 
patents pertaining to the production of widgets.  If the monopolist finds the patent useful to its own widget-production 
process, it employs the patent; if not, it simply ―inventories‖ the patent, refusing to license it to any other.  Thus the 
monopolist‘s strategy continuously denies to potential rivals the patents needed to engage in widget production.  Should 
this form of nonuse violate the antitrust laws? Condemnation of such nonuse is unnecessary if the courts are steadfast in 
enforcing a rule that a monopolist may not lawfully acquire exclusive rights in ―related‖ patents as a general matter.  In 
that case, the widget monopolist‘s mere acquisition of alternative widget patents developed by others constitutes the 
violation, and no additional showing of nonuse is necessary.  We would permit the monopolist to acquire a nonexclusive 
license, but such a license would not deny the technology to others, and thus the acquirer‘s refusal to license becomes 
unimportant.” (H.J. Hovenkamp, M.D. Janis, M.A. Lemley, C.R. Leslie, M.A. Carrier, IP and Antitrust: 
An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law, Aspen, 2014, p. 14-32)  See 
also p. 2-49 (“[S]uch a strategy may constitute an antitrust violation, possibly leading to the grant of a court- ordered 
license under the patents.  Suppose that the patent holder sues a third party would-be licensee for producing widgets in 
defiance of the patents, and the patent holder proves infringement.  At the remedy stage, the third party may well present 
its antitrust arguments as equitable arguments under the eBay test against a permanent injunction.  If the court declines 
a permanent injunction, the third party will have gained a compulsory license, quite possibly without ever actually 
litigating the antitrust claim.  Even where competition-related arguments may have failed under antitrust law, courts 
might well decide that those arguments contribute to an overall equitable showing under eBay that disfavors the grant of 
an injunction.”) 
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The same can be said here.  Acquiring patents on competing technologies, at an embryonic 
stage (when merger control may not apply),340 allows the incumbent originator to use its 
monopoly profit to “buy-off” its closest (potential) competitors to stay out of the market, by 
purchasing their innovative product or technology for a much higher price than it would be 
valued if the market was competitive.  To put it in economic terms, the incumbent originator 
pays with consumer welfare to suppress competition and innovation.  The incentive to sell is 
particularly strong, not only because of the amount offered (usually higher than what the 
market values the invention), but also for the costs involved in developing and marketing a 
competing drug and/or process (often prohibitive for small and medium enterprises), and the 
risk it will not be successful (due to doctors‟ inertia, marketing and distribution cost and 
effectiveness, infringement litigation from the originator, etc.).341 
This behavior runs counter to the patent‟s purpose (which is certainly not to be piled 
up to prevent competition by innovation, quite the contrary) and is detrimental to consumer 
welfare.  It should thus be prohibited, both under antitrust and patent law. 
11.1. Servier (EU) 
Due to the position taken by the Supreme Court, there have been no cases in the U.S. 
prohibiting patent clusters and the acquisition of competing patents under the rules of 
monopolization (and/or patent misuse).  We thus have to look at the EU, and at the 
individual EU Member States, to find precedents on patent clusters.  The two cases analyzed 
                                                 
340  It is noteworthy that the European Competition Commissioner recently stressed the 
importance of protecting competing innovations in the context of mergers.  In her words, "[o]ne of the 
simplest defences against innovation is to buy up rivals that create innovative products. […]  Last year, we looked at a 
merger between the drug company Pfizer and its rival, Hospira.  We only approved the deal after Pfizer agreed to sell the 
European rights to an arthritis drug it was developing.  One concern was that Hospira already had a competing drug on 
the market, and we thought Pfizer might stop work on its own drug if the deal went ahead as planned.  Which would 
have meant less of the innovation that we depend on as patients.  So protecting innovation is important in our merger 
policy.  So important, in fact, that we‘re considering whether to change our rules to do it more effectively.  Our rules decide 
which mergers need to be notified to us based on the turnover of the companies involved.  So when someone buys up an 
innovator, with a lot of good ideas but not yet much in the way of sales, we might not even have the chance to look at 
whether that merger will be bad for innovation.  That‘s why I announced last month that we're looking at whether to 
change the thresholds for notification, to make sure we get a look at this type of merger.” (M. Vestager, Competition: 
the mother of invention, 18 April 2016, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-
2019/vestager/announcements/competition-mother-invention_da, accessed on 6 August 2016).  The 
existence of a gap in merger control rules has been acknowledged by both national competition 
authorities and the European Commission.  Already in 2014, the German Monopolies Commission 
(GMC) recommended “additional notification requirements based on the transaction volume”.  The GMC noted 
that purchase price may be a more appropriate criterion to determine the economic impact of a 
transaction.  On 1 July 2016, the German Ministry for Economic Affairs published a draft of the ninth 
amendment to the German Act against Restraints of Competition, inter alia, to introduce an additional 
threshold for concentrations valued in excess of EUR 50 million.  At the EU level, on 7 October 2016 
the European Commission launched a public consultation on the evaluation of procedural and 
jurisdictional aspects of EU merger control.  The consultation is aimed, inter alia, at determining 
whether a reform is necessary to allow the Commission to capture all transactions that have the 
potential to affect competition in Europe.  Particularly, the Commission is considering whether the 
current turnover-based thresholds should be complemented by a value-based threshold. 
341  This whole analysis applies specifically to innovation aimed at competing with, and 
not replacing, the current drug or process to manufacture it.  The effects, value and incentives relating 
to an innovation that could replace the incumbent‟s would be much more uncertain and complicated 
to assess. 
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by this work, Servier at the EU level and Pfizer at the Member State level are two of the most 
controversial cases recently decided. 
In Servier,342 the European Commission found a combination of infringements of both 
Article 101 and Article 102 TFEU by the French originator Servier in relation to the blood 
pressure control drug Perindopril.  Under Article 102, the Commission found that Servier 
purchased the main viable competing delivery technology, not to improve its own production 
process (as there was evidence that Servier did not use the technology), but to foreclose 
competitors from having access to the market.  This acquisition was used by Servier to 
reinforce the patent thicket it had created around the compound.343  Faced with the expiry of 
the compound patent, Servier created a cluster of blocking patents around it.  These patents, 
however, did not afford absolute protection against generic entry as alternative processes to 
manufacture the drug could be developed.  Therefore, Servier put in place and rigorously 
pursued a comprehensive strategy to protect perindopril by amassing process patents.  As the 
Commission puts it, Servier “relied on the creation of a ―maze of patents‖, and influenc[ed] regulatory 
standards so that they would, for example, ―lead to the use of [Servier‟s] protected processes‖ and thus 
influenced the parameters for viable market entry by generic perindopril.  Within that broader context, Servier 
pursued a targeted exclusionary strategy […] to remove, before market entry, all close sources of competitive 
threats on the up- and down-stream markets for perindopril with the potential to overcome notably the patent 
and regulatory barriers.”344 
Two of Servier‟s strategies are discussed in this chapter.  The first one is the 
acquisition of the most advanced alternative technologies for the production of perindopril.  
Every time Servier learned that a producer of active pharmaceutical ingredients (“API”) had 
found an alternative (non-infringing and thus potentially competing) method, it acquired the 
technology and removed it as a competitive threat from the market.  This way, Servier 
strengthened the defense mechanism for its drug345 and prevented generic companies from 
being able to develop non-infringing perindopril formulations.346  “Through these acquisitions, 
Servier not only eliminated direct competition from the patent holders themselves but also removed them as a 
                                                 
342  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014. 
343  See T. Curzon Price, M. Walker, Incentives to Innovate v Short-term Price Effects in 
Antitrust Analysis, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2016, p. 6 (“there were valuable 
primary patents that had run out.  The EC argued that the firms involved attempted to extend the rents from those 
primary patents by protecting their market positions with secondary patents of dubious validity.  If the Commission's 
argument is correct, then these cases are examples of precisely the type of rent-seeking behaviour that competition 
authorities need to be aware of within a context of protecting dynamic efficiency.”) 
344  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2793. 
345  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2776 
(“Servier‘s interest in the acquisition of the Azad technology was not to improve its production processes (as stated ex 
post facto in the context of the present investigation), but to add the Azad patent application to its ―defense mechanism‖ 
which can only have been designed to defend against generic entry.  There is also evidence that Servier did not put to use 
the purchased technology […].  In addition, Servier‘s list of patents qualified as protective measures against generics later 
contained an explicit reference to the patent application for delta and epsilon polymorphs acquired from Azad.  This 
again confirmed that the Azad technology was effectively added to the ―blocking patents‖“) 
346  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 142 (“the 
generic companies perceived Servier as acquiring all alternative supply sources, which rendered market entry difficult.  
Generic companies also recommended to each other not to disclose their respective API sources to Servier.  Another 
internal Ivax/Teva email of 10 August 2005 states: ―In any conversations with Servier, it is important that they are 
not given the name of our APIs supplier.  The general Industry consensus is that Servier will attempt to take out API 
sources‖.”) 
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source of essential inputs (notably supplies of API, and licences) for other potential generic entrants.  The 
generic companies noted on this practice: ―once an API manufacturer has got around the process patents, 
Servier has bought the company, sourcing API has been very difficult‖.”347 
The second abusive conduct by Servier consisted in the application for, and 
obtainment, an array of patents on process to manufacture and synthetize the drug, as well as 
on its crystalline alpha form (the “947” patent), with the aim of creating a patent cluster (a 
“maze of patents”) protecting different aspects of the drug.  “[O]f the 33 process patents (mostly 
patents for synthesis routes), 21 were described by Servier internally as ―blocking‖ patents or ―paper patent‖.  
Three of these 21 process patents were in addition characterised as involving ―zero inventive step‖.  These 
patents were, however, granted by the EPO.” 348  The 947 patent was declared invalid by the UK 
High Court for lacking novelty.  In confirming the High Court‟s decision, the Court of 
Appeal, in the person of Lord Justice Jacob, explained: “as the Judge held and we confirm, it is 
invalid.  And very plainly so.  It is the sort of patent which can give the patent system a bad name. I am not 
sure that much could have been done about this at the examination stage.  There are other sorts of case where 
the Patent Office examination is seen to be too lenient.  But this is not one of them.  For simply comparing the 
cited prior art (‗341) with the patent would not reveal lack of novelty and probably not obviousness.  You need 
the technical input of experts […] and some experimental evidence in order to see just how specious the 
application for the patent was.  The only solution to this type of undesirable patent is a rapid and efficient 
method for obtaining its revocation.  Then it can be got rid of before it does too much harm to the public 
interest.  It is right to observe that nothing Servier did was unlawful.  It is the court‘s job to see that try-ons 
such as the present patent get nowhere.  The only sanction (apart, perhaps, from competition law which thus far 
has had nothing or virtually nothing to say about unmeritorious patents) lie in an award of costs on the higher 
(indemnity) scale if the patent is defended unreasonably”.349 
This passage of the judgment is very insightful.  It highlights the shortcomings of the 
patent office examination, noting how difficult it is to address them.  It explains how applying 
and obtaining unmeritorious patents harm the public interest and how the solution is to get 
rid of them.  It makes a parallelism between the lack of patentability requirements and a 
potential antitrust violation, (indirectly) underlining how the latter can be more effective in 
deterring these conducts (by imposing a fine rather than simply invalidating the patent and 
awarding costs). 
With respect to technology acquisitions, they are considered to deviate from 
competition on the merits, and be thus capable of producing foreclosure effects and infringe 
Article 102 TFEU, when: (i) the acquired technology was a source of competition to the 
originator and (ii) was effectively removed from the market (i.e. the transferor could not use it 
or license it to others and the transferee was not willing and/or able to license it to others), 
and (iii) the acquisition “was ―capable of making more difficult, or impossible the entry‖ and thus to 
                                                 
347  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 6. 
348  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 122.  See 
also par. 123 (“Furthermore, minutes of one of Servier‘s internal meetings held on 22 January 2003, show that 
Servier continued throughout the lifecycle of perindopril to develop and file patent applications which were themselves 
considered internally as ―blocking‖ patents.  The minutes categorise as such 31 synthesis process patent applications.  
For those patent applications Servier proposes filing with the EPO as a purely editorial task – i.e. without conducting 
any patentability studies or any laboratory trials.”). 
349  Judgment [2008] EWCA Civ 445, Case No A3/2007/1715, paragraphs 9 and 10, as 
cited by European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 187. 
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significantly delay generic competitors trying to enter the perindopril market”.350  The specificities of the 
pharmaceutical market have obviously to be taken into account in conducting this 
assessment.351  In the specific case of Servier, the Commission concluded that, “[u]nlike many 
other technology acquisitions, the Azad Technology Acquisition deviated from competition on the merits in that 
it consisted, as part of a broader strategy to eliminate competitive threats, in the acquisition by a dominant 
undertaking of scarce potentially viable technology liable to enable early entry by interested generic companies, 
which it acknowledged did not infringe its patents and with the stated purpose of strengthening the defence 
mechanism for these patents, and its branded product.”352  “Azad technology was not excluded from the 
market because Servier‘s technology was superior, but because Servier, seeking to strengthen its protection 
against generic entry, removed this independent source of competition by means of an acquisition.  This was 
capable of restricting competition not only because it made generic entry more remote, as a number of generic 
development projects needed to be discontinued, but because it was capable of delaying generic entry.”353  
Therefore the acquisition represented an “abusive behaviour, contributing to Servier‘s overall single and 
continuous exclusionary strategy which the Commission considers an infringement of Article 102”354 
                                                 
350  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2800.  At 
par. 2802, the Commission refers to previous case law (specifically 31.043, Tetra Pak, 26 July 1988, in 
which an exclusive license was acquired) on which its test is based.  In that case “acquisition of exclusive 
rights can, in specific circumstances where this acquisition strengthens the dominant position and prevents or considerably 
delays the entry of competitors on the market, constitute an abuse under Article 102 of the Treaty.”  At par. 2804, 
the European Commission summarizes its findings in Tetra Pak as follows: “Tetra Pak‘s acquisition of the 
exclusive license had two consequences. First, it ―strengthened Tetra‘s very considerable dominance‖ compared to its 
actual competitor in the relevant market, PKL, ―by reinforcing its technical advantages vis-à-vis the minimal competition 
that remains‖.  Second, the exclusive license ―had the effect of preventing, or at the very least considerably delaying, the 
entry of a new competitor into a market where very little if any competition is found‖. […]  The Commission thus 
concluded that the exclusive license had ―The effect of blocking or delaying the entry of a new competitor‖.”  As 
explained by the General Court in AstraZeneca (T-321/05, AstraZeneca, 1 July 2010, par. 365), in the 
appeal of the Commission decision in Tetra Pak, “the Court merely approved the Commission‘s assessment that, 
in the case before it, Article [102 TFEU] did not allow the undertaking in a dominant position, by acquiring an 
exclusive licence, to strengthen its ‗[already] very considerable‘ dominance and to prevent or considerably delay ‗the entry 
of a new competitor into a market where very little if any competition [was] found‘ (paragraph 23 of [T-51/89, Tetra 
Pak v Commission, 10 July 1990]).”  At par. 2854 of its decision, the Commission indicates the 
elements it will take into account in the assessment of the effects of the Azad acquisition: “(i) the 
anticompetitive effects the acquisition was capable of producing in view of the alternative potentially enabling sources of 
API technology able to constrain Servier in the absence of Azad (ex ante perspective), and (ii) the consequences of the 
acquisition on Servier‘s position on the API technology market and the final product market for perindopril 
formulations.” 
351  Particularly, “(a) API is an indispensable input into final formulation; (b) generic entry requires 
several years of multifaceted development work (vertically integrated, or in cooperation on one or more levels) on the API, 
the formulation, distribution, taking into account regulatory and patent law requirements; and any disruption of this 
process is liable to cause significant delays (for example because both the work on the API and the formulation may need 
to be restarted if a source of API is lost); (c) any delay in generic entry, from the end of the patent term, causes significant 
consumer harm both for patients and for social security systems; (d) the demand is fairly price-inelastic prior to generic 
entry; (e) the price difference between a monopolised market and a market with just two (or more) competitors is often 
very large – sometimes a factor of ten to one.” (European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 
July 2014, par. 2801) 
352  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2917. 
353  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2881. 
354  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2917.  The 
Commission cautions on extending the significance of the decision to other cases and explicitly state 
that “the finding in this case with regard to the technology acquisition is limited to the circumstances of this case and 
should not be construed as a general prohibition of technology acquisitions by dominant undertakings.” 
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The effects of the technology acquisition cannot thus be isolated from the other 
conducts (in this case, the reverse payment patent settlement, which is analyzed below) with 
which the originator pursued the same objective of delaying generic entry.  As the 
Commission explains: 
“[T]he acquisition of Azad‘s patent application and related know-how by Servier (―Azad 
Technology Acquisition‖) and the reverse payment patent settlements can be seen to form a single and 
continuous exclusionary strategy by Servier.  There are essentially two ways to viably launch a generic 
product where the market is still protected by patent barriers.  The first one is to invent around the 
remaining patents and develop a non-infringing product.  The second one is to challenge the relevant 
patent situation, either by directly seeking a finding of invalidity or non-infringement of the patents or 
by entering at risk.  Any strategy to successfully delay generic entry, would have to address both types 
of generic threats, as illustrated by the above-mentioned documents from Servier and generic 
companies, which advocate the use of both acquisition of novel, non-infringing, technology and 
settlements to end litigation on the relevant patents.  This is why the Azad Technology Acquisition, 
targeting an independent non-infringing technology to produce perindopril API, was a necessary 
complement to the patent settlement agreements with generic companies which threatened to invalidate 
the ‗947 patent in legal proceedings.”355 
11.2. Pfizer (Italy) 
One of the most recent and meaningful cases assessing the potential antitrust 
concerns arising from patent clusters has been decided at the national level.  Pfizer356 is one of 
the most controversial decisions on the intersection between IP and antitrust in the 
pharmaceutical sector and, as we delve into it, it will become evident how important it is for 
this work. 
The facts of the case are as follows.  In 1989, Pharmacia, a Swedish originator, filed a 
European patent application for latanoprost, a drug aimed at curing ocular glaucoma.  The 
brand-name given to the product was Xalatan.  The patent was granted in 1994 and was due 
to expire in September 2009 (20 years after the application).  In 1997, Pharmacia filed SPC 
applications in several European countries, but not in Italy.  The SPC was granted and 
extended the patent protection in selected countries up to 17 July 2011.  In Italy the 
expiration of the patent protection remained 2009 and the term to submit the SPC 
application expired. 
The conduct analyzed by the Italian Competition Authority (ICA) consisted in the 
attempt by Pfizer (that had acquired Pharmacia) to close the gap between the protection of 
Xalatan in Italy and in other European countries.  In 2002 – 7 years before the expiration of 
its patent in Italy – Pfizer filed a European voluntary sub-divisional application with the 
European Patent Office (EPO) to obtain a divisional patent on a specific dosage regime of 
Xalatan.  The divisional patent was granted at the beginning of 2009, six month before 
                                                 
355  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, paras. 2794-
2795. 
356  Italian Competition Authority (ICA), A431, Ratiopharm/Pfizer, prov. no. 23194, 11 
January 2012.  The decision was annulled by the first instance administrative tribunal and confirmed 
by the Council of State (Consiglio di Stato), in AGCM v. Pfizer Italia s.r.l., Pfizer Health Ab and 
Pfizer Inc., 12 February 2014, no. 693. 
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expiration of the main patent,357 and validated by Pfizer exclusively in Italy, Spain and 
Luxembourg.  No new product was introduced on the market.  Based on this divisional 
patent, Pfizer requested in April 2009 and obtained in June 2009, from the Italian Patent and 
Trademark Office (UIBM), an SPC covering Italy, moving the loss of exclusivity on Xalatan 
to July 2011, thus realigning the patent duration in Italy with that of the other European 
countries.358  Pfizer requested and was granted also a supplementary six months extension of 
the SPC, until January 2012, as part of an approved pediatric investigation plan.   
At this point, Pfizer started an aggressive campaign against the generic manufacturers 
to make them „cease and desist‟ from entering the market.359  Pfizer put pressure also on the 
Italian pharmaceutical regulatory body (AIFA) in an attempt to dissuade it from granting 
marketing authorizations to the generic versions of Xalatan.  When the AIFA granted the 
authorization to launch the generics, Pfizer immediately appealed the decision and was 
granted an interim injunction in the first instance in June 2010.  The Council of State (CoS) 
however repealed the judgment of the lower court in July 2010 and generics were able to 
effectively enter the market.  In addition to the appeal proceedings against the AIFA decision, 
Pfizer also sued generic manufacturers for patent infringement, asking for damages. 
In October 2010, the ICA, following a complaint from Ratiopharm (a generic 
manufacturer), opened a formal investigation into Pfizer‟s conduct, shortly after the General 
Court‟s ruling in AstraZeneca.  The ICA‟s investigation regarded in particular the belated 
divisional patent applications, filed at the EPO in 2002, and the SPC requested on the basis of 
that patent in 2009, which effectively delayed generic entry.  Pfizer‟s letters to Ratiopharm 
asking to confirm that it would respect Pfizer‟s exclusive right under the SPC was also taken 
into account. 
In the ICA‟s view, the purpose pursued with the divisional patent application was not 
the preservation of the unity of the patent or the protection of a new invention (the dosage 
regime), but the correction of Pfizer‟s past negligence and obtain an SPC in Italy, 
notwithstanding the abundant expiry of the time limit to request it on the basis of the main 
patent.360 
                                                 
357  During the seven years of examination by the EPO, Pfizer repeatedly amended its 
claims and the scope of the divisional patent as ultimately granted had very little in common with the 
application as originally filed. 
358  As said, Pfizer would have been too late to request an SPC based on the main patent 
and was able to do it only because it requested and obtained a divisional patent (on whose basis it 
requested the SPC). 
359  The situation described above had already led to a climate of “deep uncertainty among 
generic drug manufacturers – which had relied on the expiry of the main patent protection, in Italy, in September 2009 
– about whether or not the generic version of the original drug could be marketed.  As a result, [generic 
manufacturers] decided to postpone their entry into the market, discouraged also by the several warnings with which 
Pfizer threatened to take legal action.” (G. Ghidini, G. Cavani, P.F. Pisera‟, Italy – Abuse of Patent Rights 
and Abuse of Dominant Position: The Pfizer Case, in G. Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition 
and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  An International Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, p. 256) 
360  The ICA thus recognized a specific relevance to the exclusionary intent of the 
divisional application, namely the extension beyond its term of the patent protection.  This conclusion 
was based not only on the fact that Pfizer did not launch any new product, but also on the timing of 
the divisional application (thirteen years after the main patent application) and on the fact that the 
divisional was validated only in certain countries.  As noted by Stefano Grassani, “Competition on the 
merits holds that a dominant company cannot be allowed to indirectly and subtly seek for such additional patent 
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The ICA concluded that the use of a divisional application as a pretext to obtain an 
artificial extension of the exclusivity granted by the main patent (through the request of an 
SPC based on such divisional) constituted an abuse of dominance, as well as an abuse of 
rights.  While Pfizer was formally entitled to request and obtain a divisional patent, use the 
divisional patent to obtain the SPC, and request and obtain such SPC, these rights were 
granted with and for a specific purpose, foster innovation and consumer welfare, and using 
them in a specious way, not coherent with their purpose, runs counter the very reason they 
were granted and thus represents an abuse of rights, punishable under both patent and 
antitrust laws.   
“In other words, the abuse of rights does not suppose a formal infringement of laws, but the distorted 
exercise of the granted rights, for purposes different from those meant by the legislator.”361   
The immediate purpose of a patent is to protect a new product (broadly speaking) or 
process.  In this case, the patent was granted for the optimal dosage of the active ingredient 
covered by the main patent and Pfizer was thus requested to demonstrate that, following the 
grant of the patent, a new product was launched or any other activity was carried out under 
the protection of the new patent (i.e. the patent was commercially exploited in any way).  In 
these regards, the ICA (and on appeal the CoS) concluded that the evidence collected proved 
that no real and concrete use of such divisional patent was made, other than for the purpose 
of prolonging the duration of the exclusion of competitors by discouraging generic entry 
through the creation of legal uncertainty on the date of expiration of Xalatan‟s patent 
protection.  Pfizer‟s divisional patent was thus considered a case of defensive patenting,362 as 
no new product was covered, other the one already protected and produced under the main 
patent.  
In the ICA‟s view, the use of administrative procedures with the sole purpose of 
                                                                                                                                                   
protection by resorting to tactics which, ultimately, have a purely foreclosing object; regardless of whether such tactics are 
formally lawful under IP law.” (S. Grassani, Evolution or Revolution? The Italian Competition Authority 
and the Pfizer Decision: A Reply to Thomas Graf, 7 February 2012, available at 
http://kluwercompetitionlawblog.com/2012/02/07/evolution-or-revolution-the-italian-competition-
authority-and-the-pfizer-decision-a-reply-to-thomas-graf/, accessed on 6 August 2016) 
361  C. D‟Amore, The Administrative Supreme Court Confirms the ICA‟s Decision to 
Condemn Pfizer for Abuse of Dominant Position, Italian Antitrust Review, 2014, p. 80 (citing Council 
of State, III, decision No. 2857, dated 17 May 2012).  See also UNCTAD Secretariat (note by), The 
Role of Competition in the Pharmaceutical Sector and its Benefits for Consumers, UN Conference on 
Trade and Development, 27 April 2015, p. 13 (“Therefore, besides the legitimate nature of the right, the purpose 
to grant such legal right by the legislator shall be taken into account with more proportion when weighing the pros and 
cons in making a decision on the abuse of intellectual property rights.”) 
362  The EPO Board of Appeal denied the existence of double patenting and approved 
the divisional patent because the optimal dosage of the active ingredient in Xalatan had not been 
claimed by, nor could be inferred from the description of, the original patent application.  This 
however brings about another issue, the legitimacy of the divisional.  As explained by G. Ghidini, G. 
Cavani, P.F. Pisera‟, Italy – Abuse of Patent Rights and Abuse of Dominant Position: The Pfizer Case, 
in G. Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  An 
International Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, pp. 266-267, “by inserting in the divisional of such ‗further‘ claim with 
respect to the parent patent […], an extension of the inventive material covered by the main application was 
implemented, thus running counter to the principle that the divisional application may involve only ‗elements that do not 
extend beyond the content of the initial application‘, and that, after having been originally ‗packed‘ in the only parental 
patent, they were then removed from the latter and inserted in the divisional (only). […] In this perspective, it is all the 
more doubtful that the divisional application was filed strictly for the purpose of splitting what was reasonably considered  
compatible with the principle of ‗unity of invention‘ (Article 82 EPC).” 
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excluding competitors, with no benefit to innovation and consumer welfare other than those 
already achieved by the main patent, might constitute an abuse of rights as well as an abuse of 
a dominant position if it restrics competition.  In Pfizer, the ICA found that the originator 
purposefully adopted a complex strategy to create a climate of legal uncertainty in respect of 
the possibility to commercialize the generic version of Xalatan.  Pfizer‟s conduct with respect 
to the filing of a divisional patent application (without any new product or new version being 
introduced or even the patent being validated in more than just the countries in which Pfizer 
needed an SPC) and application for the related SPC and extension for pediatric trial, were 
further aggravated by the submission of numerous formal warning letters to generic 
manufacturers intimating them not to enter the market prior to the loss of exclusivity.  The 
cease-and-desist letters were followed by civil lawsuit against alleged infringers to prevent, 
discourage or raise costs of generic entry.  Finally, Pfizer tried to prevent AIFA from granting 
marketing authorization to generic manufacturers and include the generic versions of Xalatan 
in the list of generic medicines available on the market (so-called “transparency list”).  As a 
result of these actions, competition was significantly restricted as the first market entry was in 
May 2010.363   
On this basis, the ICA reached the conclusion that, even though Pfizer‟s conduct was 
in the abstract compliant with patent law, it integrated “a single and complex exclusionary 
strategy” in violation of Article 102 TFEU.364  Accordingly, the ICA imposed on Pfizer a fine 
for abuse of dominant position amounting to €10.6 million. 
The most interesting element of this case is the fact that the ICA (and on appeal the 
CoS) expressely identified the abuse of a dominant position as a species of the genus abuse of 
rights, which is what this work is premised upon.  In the case at stake, Pfizer abused two 
“distinct, although teleologically convergent rights.” 
“The first one is the right of – rectius: to – the patent, (Needless to say, ‗patent right‘ and ‗right to 
the patent‘ are not synonymous.  The former refers to the complex of exclusive rights that the law 
grants to the holder after the patent has been awarded, particularly: the right to put into effect, use 
and make a profit from the invention.  The latter refers to the right and corresponding conditions, to 
apply for and obtain a valid patent entitlement) where the abuse lies in the unlawful mode of 
                                                 
363  “According to industry data presented by Pfizer itself, the delayed entry of the manufacturers of 
generics gained the company a seven-month extension of its monopolistic profits, which amounted to approximately 17 
million euros (based on the market share gained by generic manufacturers during the first seven months of market entry).  
Thanks to its strategy, Pfizer managed to: 1) increase the effective market entry costs for the manufacturers of generic 
drugs; 2) delay the market entry of Xalatan-equivalent specialty drugs by at least 7 months; 3) maintain the de facto 
exclusive commercialization of medicines based on latanoprost even after patent coverage had expired; 4) cause an 
estimated 14 million euros in lost savings by the NHS.  These elements led the Authority to classify the sanctioned 
competitive violation as very serious.” (ICA, Press Release. Pfizer sanctioned with 10.6 million euro fine for 
abuse of dominant position, 17 January 2012, available at http://www.agcm.it/en/newsroom/press-
releases/1986-pfizer-sanctioned-with-106-million-euro-fine-for-abuse-of-dominant-position.html, 
accessed on 6 August 2016) 
364  In defining the relevant market, the ICA followed the method adopted by the 
European Commission and referred to the ATC4 level, limiting it to prostaglandin-analogous 
products (due to the different modes of action of prostaglandins and beta-blockers, and the different 
effectiveness to treat specific pathologies, the two types of products were not considered 
substitutable).  Pfizer was found dominant in light of (i) high market share (Xalatan was the de facto 
standard in the prostaglandin market), (ii) scarce competition by substitution and absence of 
competition by imitation (generics), (iii) high barriers to entry before and after patent expiry. 
96 
 
application: in Pfizer, for obtaining an extension of the exclusive right thanks to a SPC of a 
divisional patent (in fact, note: a divisional of a previous divisional, in turn obtained from the main 
patent), in contrast with the principle known as unity of invention (Articles 82 EPC, Rule 44 
EPC‘s Executive Regulation).  The aim and effect of the foregoing was to exclude others from gaining 
access to an active ingredient, adopted as the de facto standard, which the competitors legitimately 
expected as forthcoming off patent due to the imminent expiry of the ‗parental‘ patent. (The filing of 
divisional applications for exclusionary purposes was analysed by the European Commission which 
revealed how this practice – an example of strategic patenting – creates uncertainty as to the scope and 
duration of the patent right.  In fact, until such time as the European Patent Office finally rules on 
the grant of the right, the party filing the patent is entitled to the early protection recognized by Art. 
67, subs. 1, of the European Patent Convention.  This applies even if the parent patent has been 
invalidated (or where the application is still pending).  Therefore, the applicant of an original patent 
(until the original patent has not yet been granted) who subsequently files a series of divisional 
applications related to one or more ‗portions‘ of the original application, may benefit from 
‗consolidated‘ protection. […])  The second form of abuse is the right to appeal to the Courts, which 
consists – from an antitrust perspective of the sham litigation – in the launch, under the exclusive 
right artfully achieved, of a judicial and para-judicial intimidation campaign.  […][T]his aspect 
seems to be assessed not as an autonomous exclusionary conduct, but rather as an additional element 
of ‗circumstantial‘ evidence of the abusive form of strategic patenting committed by the dominant 
undertaking.”365 
In Pfizer, the finding of an abuse of rights (basis for the finding of an abuse of 
dominance) arose from the nature of Pfizer‟s conduct, aimed at delaying and preventing 
generic entry, to the detriment of consumers.  To assess the originator‟s behavior, the ICA 
and the CoS looked at: (i) the timing of the divisional application, more than 10 years after the 
parent patent application and just in time to obtain the SPC; (ii) the non-use of the divisional, 
which did not lead to the introduction of a new drug or a version of the already marketed 
drug and was validated only in Italy, Spain and Luxembourg, which were the only countries in 
which Pfizer did not apply for an SPC in time; (iii) the de facto extension of the exclusivity on 
the brand-name drug (and not merely on the “innovation” covered by the divisional) thanks 
to the SPC and pediatric extension application based on a divisional of a divisional of the 
patent on the main compound.  Based on the foregoing, the ICA‟s and CoS‟s conclusion can 
be summarized in the words of Professors Ghidini and Cavani: “the divisional patent […] was 
requested and obtained for a purpose other than the one assumed by the law.  This is not only because the 
divisional application had been filed thirteen years after the ‗grand-parent‘ patent application without any 
objective justification for such abnormal delay; but also and especially because such a late request appeared to 
be aimed strictly at enabling the period in which Pfizer could request and obtain that SPC that it had 
forgotten to timely request in Italy and Spain, as had instead been done in many other countries, ‗to start to 
run afresh‘.”366 
                                                 
365  G. Ghidini, G. Cavani, P.F. Pisera‟, Italy – Abuse of Patent Rights and Abuse of 
Dominant Position: The Pfizer Case, in G. Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition and Patent 
Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  An International Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, pp. 259-260. 
366  G. Ghidini, G. Cavani, P.F. Pisera‟, Italy – Abuse of Patent Rights and Abuse of 
Dominant Position: The Pfizer Case, in G. Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition and Patent 
Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  An International Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, p. 265 (at footnote 54, 
the authors note: “What was questioned, rather, was the abusive nature, in this case, of the procedure followed to 
obtain the result and the fact that, in doing so, the patent holder thwarted the legitimate expectations of the competitors to 
97 
 
In its analysis of Pfizer‟s conduct, the ICA took into account, not only the objective 
factors mentioned above, but also Pfizer‟s intention deemed “the binding agent of an 
anticompetitive strategy”.  Although the abuse of dominance is an objective concept, intent can 
still be relevant in determining the anticompetitive nature of the conduct.  For this reason, the 
ICA referred to several excerpts from internal communications that confirmed the fact that 
Pfizer was aware of the fact that its application was baseless and feared antitrust enforcement. 
Pfizer was thus sanctioned for its antitrust violation and appealed the ICA decision 
before the administrative court (of first instance) of Lazio, which overturned it in its 
judgment of 3 September 2012.  The court took the position, awfully similar to that of the 
dissenting opinion in the U.S. Actavis case (discussed below), that Pfizer‟s conduct could not 
be abusive as the originator simply pursued its legitimate interests, by lawfully exercising its 
rights under the (patent) law.  According to the administrative court, Pfizer‟s applications for 
the divisional patent, the SPC and the pediatric extension were perfectly legal and Pfizer‟s 
enforcement strategy was simply a legitimate way to protect its intellectual property rights 
from infringement.  The ICA lodged an appeal against the judgment of the administrative 
court of first instance before the CoS, which reinstated the ICA decision on 12 February 
2014.  This judgment is the most innovative part of the case as the Council of State expressly 
stated the position taken by this work: the abuse of dominance is a species of the wider genus of 
abuse of (patent) rights.367  In the words of the Court:368 
“the abuse of a dominant position, attributed to Pfizer, is nothing more than a specification of the 
broader category of abuse of right, of which a condition is precisely the existence of a right, excercised 
in a distorted way, inconsistent with the purpose for which it was provided for by the legal system: in 
this case, the exclusion of competitors from the market.” 
And again: 
“The considerations discussed above can be summarized in the sense that, while representing, and 
indeed precisely because, in theory, they represent, if taken individually, the exercise of rights conferred 
in the abstract by the legal system, […] the conduct and actions undertaken by Pfizer resulted in a 
complex and comprehensive behavior not wrongly defined by the Authority in terms of abuse of right 
and, particularly, anticompetitive.” 
The ICA and the CoS have thus taken the position (shared by this author) that an 
                                                                                                                                                   
enter the market on the twentieth year, nullifying, or at least compromising, their projects and investments.  In this sense, 
it must be said that the end (the obtaining of an extension of  the twenty-year term, in itself abstractly legitimate from the 
point of view of the patent system) did not justify the means, since through this distorted modus procedendi Pfizer had 
obtained a more advantageous and additional result compared to the standard exclusionary effect typical of patent 
protection: i.e., paralyzing, in a way not foreseen or foreseeable, the competitive activity of generic manufacturers already 
operating in the market.  Pfizer brought about an unexpected extension of the patent protection similar to that 
established in certain cases by patent law itself.”) 
367  In the words of the CoS, “the constituting elements of the abuse of rights are […] the existence 
of a right […]; the possibility that the right can be actually execised in a variety of non rigidly predetermined manners; 
the fact that the actual exercise of the right, although formally compliant with the law conferring it, is performed in a 
reprehensible manner […]; the fact that, due to the manner in which it was exercised, it resulted in an unjustified 
disproportion between the benefit to the right holder and the harm to the other party; therefore the abuse of rights, far 
from requiring a formal breach of the law, entails the distorted use of the legal framework, aimed at pursuing objectives 
which go both further and are different from those indicated by the legislator”. 
368  Council of State (Consiglio di Stato), AGCM v. Pfizer Italia s.r.l., Pfizer Health Ab 
and Pfizer Inc., 12 February 2014, no. 693. 
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antitrust violation (particularly an abuse of dominance) is an abuse of rights with a plus factor, 
the anticompetitiveness.  The abuse of dominance thus belongs to the broader category of 
abuse of rights which encompasses all the conducts formally permitted by the law but 
contrary to its purpose (as they create an unjustifiable disproportion between the benefit of 
the right-holder, in this case the patentee, and the harm caused to its counterparty, in this case 
society) and thus unlawful under the same law.  Therefore, the fact that a conduct is 
legitimate under the language of the law is irrelevant for the application of antitrust law, not 
only because the violation of antitrust does not require the formal violation of any other law 
(as the violation of another law is dealt directly by the provisions of that law), but also 
because formal compliance does not exclude the abuse of right, on which an antitrust 
infringement is premised.  While the abuse of rights conferred by a specific law could be 
addressed through the doctrine of abuse or misuse of rights by the law itself, the antitrust 
intervention (which is not coextensive with the abuse of right as it requires a plus factor) is 
sometimes necessary to correct the effects of the conduct and deter the patentee (and any 
other) from adopting the same abusive behavior. 
In this case, the CoS concluded that the ICA was right in holding that, although 
Pfizer‟s request for a divisional patent (and subsequent request for an SPC) was formally 
legitimate under patent law, Pfizer exercised its right not for the purposes for which it was 
provided (protecting a new invention), but with the sole aim of extending the exclusivity on 
the brand-name drug beyond its term, and thus delay generic entry. 
 
12. Sham litigation 
As we saw, the creation of a patent cluster (as well as most of the other abusive 
techniques discussed by this work) is often coupled with a lawsuit (or the threat of one).  
Indeed, for its conduct to be as effective as possible (and thus keep generic manufacturers 
and other competitors out of the market), the originator has to enforce its rights against 
potential infringers.  This is of course not unlawful per se, the enforcement of lawfully 
obtained rights is fundamental to the well-functioning of any legal system and has positive 
effects on the overall, as well as consumer, welfare.  Concerns however arise when the right 
of access to court is abused and litigation is used to reinforce the effects of another 
anticompetitive practice, e.g., of patent clusters and defensive patents (by increasing legal 
(un)certainty regarding the patent protection of the brand-name drug and discouraging 
generic entry), of fraudulently obtained patents, and as a way to reach a reverse payment 
patent settlement.  Litigation may also be abusive when it is an end in itself, i.e. the originator 
has no interest in the results of the litigation and promotes a lawsuit solely to harass the 
generic manufacturer or other (actual or potential) competitor and cause them damage, this 
way preventing, delaying or making less effective generic (or other competing product) 
entry.369  In short, sham litigation can be defined as “predatory or abusive litigation before 
administrative or judicial courts by firms that have no reasonable grounds for their claims, but anticipate that 
the costs of litigation will be lower in relation to the benefits to be obtained from the delay of the entrance of a 
                                                 
369  “[T]he plaintiff wants to hurt a competitor not by getting a judgment against him, which would be a 
proper objective, but just by the maintenance of the suit, regardless of its outcome.” (Professional Real Estate 
Investors, Inc., v. Columbia Pictures, 508 U.S., 1993) 
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competing product on the market during the period of litigation”.370 
The prospect of lengthy and costly litigation might deter smaller generic companies 
(as well as competing originators), without the necessary financial resources, from developing 
or launching their product in competition with that of the originator (particularly in cases 
where the originator may be granted a preliminary injunction and the generic would thus be 
unable to sell its products on the market, while the originator will continue to collect 
revenues).371  As the European Commission notes in the executive summary of its 
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry,  
“Enforcing patent rights in court is legitimate and a fundamental right guaranteed by the European 
Convention on Human Rights: it is an effective means of ensuring that patents are respected.  
[H]owever, […] litigation can also be an efficient means of creating obstacles for generic companies, 
in particular for smaller ones.  In certain instances originator companies may consider litigation not so 
much on its merits, but rather as a signal to deter generic entrants. […] The vast majority of disputes 
were initiated by the originator companies, which most often invoked their primary patents, e.g. by 
sending warning letters.”372 
What is most concerning is the fact that “[i]n contrast to the primary patents invoked in the 
pre-litigation phase, originator companies mainly invoked secondary patents during litigation”,373 which may 
indicate that the patents invoked in the warning letters were expired, invalid or unenforceable 
and/or that the originator have a significant amount of patents covering the same drug 
(patent cluster) used as means to start litigation against generic manufacturers and delay or 
block their entry.  Equally concerning is the fact that “[w]hilst the originator companies initiated the 
majority of the cases, generic companies won 62% of [them]” and “[t]he average duration of the court 
proceedings was 2.8 years, but varied considerably between Member States, from just over six months to 
sometimes more than six years.”374   
                                                 
370  V. Guimarães de Lima e Silva, Sham Litigation in the Pharmaceutical Sector, 7(3) 
European Competition Journal, 2011, p. 455. 
371  The European Commission goes into much more details in its Pharmaceutical Sector 
Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009, par. 583 (“Patent litigation can influence the commercial decisions of generic 
companies.  In particular, the threat of lengthy and costly patent litigation across EU Member States can dissuade 
smaller generic companies from launching a competing product, hence avoiding burdensome court procedures, before patent 
expiry, even if they consider the patent to be invalid or not to have been infringed.  Even if generic companies are not put 
off by patent litigation and are willing to go to court, litigation can have an impact on bringing to market a generic 
version of the originator product.  Most importantly, interim injunctions can oblige generic companies to withdraw their 
product from the market and refrain from further production and commercialisation until the main action is decided.  It 
goes without saying that interim injunctions can also be a necessary and legitimate tool allowing patent-holders to 
effectively enforce their patent rights.  However, the grant of interim injunctions can become particularly relevant when 
examined in the light of originator companies‘ overall patent and life cycle strategies which are aimed at maximising 
profit and shielding their products from competition.”)  
372  European Commission, Communication - Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical 
Sector Inquiry Report, SEC(2009) 952 COM(2009) 351 final, 8 July 2009, p. 12. 
373  European Commission, Communication - Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical 
Sector Inquiry Report, SEC(2009) 952 COM(2009) 351 final, 8 July 2009, p. 13. 
374  European Commission, Communication - Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical 
Sector Inquiry Report, SEC(2009) 952 COM(2009) 351 final, 8 July 2009, p. 12.  At p. 13, the 
Commission notes also that “[i]n 30% of the cases litigation was initiated between the same parties in more than 
one Member State with respect to the same medicine.  In 11% of the final judgments reported, two or more different 
courts in different EU Member States gave conflicting final judgments on the same issue of patent validity or 
infringement.”  See also European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 
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To recap, most lawsuits are brought by originators on the basis of secondary patents 
and the absolute majority of those that reach judgment are decided in favor of the generic 
manufacturer.  The generic manufacturer has however to spend serious amounts375 and wait 
from six month to six years (the proceedings last on average 2.8 years) to be able to have legal 
certainty that its product does not infringe the originator‟s patents (and thus that it does not 
risk liability for damages marketing it).  In the course of the proceedings, originators are 
granted injunctions lasting on average 18 months in half of the cases, but almost half of these 
cases end in a way favorable to the generic manufacturer.376 
As for the other abuses of dominance, also sham litigation is primarily an abuse of 
rights (to access to court)377 and becomes also an abuse of dominance when coupled with 
(potential) anticompetitive effects (and is undertaken by a company with significant market 
power).  The abuse of right is particularly evident when litigation is based on double 
patenting, defensive patenting or patent clusters (e.g. using divisional and divisional of 
divisional), where the originator attempts to keep generics “busy” with the litigation for as 
long as possible.378  To determine whether litigation can be qualified as abusive, the 
originator‟s intention to harm379 and knowledge of the harassing nature of its action (due to 
                                                                                                                                                   
2009, par. 501, and the other sources mentioned supra at footnote 320. 
375  The Commission reports that “[t]he total cost of patent litigation in the EU relating to the 68 
medicines on which litigation was reported for the period 2000 – 2007, is estimated to exceed € 420 million, of which a 
significant proportion could have been saved, if the cross-border duplication of cases linked to the absence of a Community 
patent and a specialised patent litigation system could have been avoided.‖ (European Commission, 
Communication - Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report, SEC(2009) 952 
COM(2009) 351 final, 8 July 2009, p. 13) 
376  Indeed, originators “asked for interim injunctions in 255 cases, and were granted such 
injunctions in 112 cases.  The average duration of the interim injunctions granted was 18 months.  In 46% of the cases 
in which injunctions were granted the subsequent court proceedings in the main case ended either with final judgments 
favourable to the generic company, or settlements which appear to be favourable to the generic company as they allowed 
early entry for the generic company and/or foresaw a value transfer to it.  In addition there were a number of further 
patent settlements, for which a final classification (i.e. favourable to the generic or the originator company) was not 
possible.” (European Commission, Communication - Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical Sector 
Inquiry Report, SEC(2009) 952 COM(2009) 351 final, 8 July 2009, p. 13) 
377  As noted by G. Ghidini, G. Cavani, P.F. Pisera‟, Italy – Abuse of Patent Rights and 
Abuse of Dominant Position: The Pfizer Case, in G. Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition and 
Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  An International Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, p. 269, “even in 
the absence of a dominant position in the strict sense, [sham litigation can] be qualified, as confirmed by the case law, 
as an act of unfair competition.  See, for example, Supreme Court of Cassation (Civil) Section I, 26 Nov.  1997, no. 
11859 and Milan Court, 29 Mar. 2007, in G.A.D.I., 2007, 304, according to which ‗the transmission of a letter 
demanding that a product not be brought to market could be considered in the context of Art. 2598, no. 3, of the Civil 
Code, given that the threat of legal proceedings made culpably or in bad faith – ignoring the obvious invalidity of the 
patent – constitutes an inappropriate market disturbance‘.  See also T. Ascarelli, Teoria della concorrenza e dei beni 
immateriali [Theory of Competition and Intangible Goods], Milan, 1960, p. 262”. 
378  See e.g. Rb. Brussel (kort geding) 26 Oct. 2004, Medinol Ltd. c. Janssen 
Pharmaceutica, Johnson & Johnson Medical, Cordis Holding Belgium (Johnson & Johnson Group) 
(04/607/C), as cited by A. Leonard, Abuse of Rights in Belgian and French Patent Law – A Case Law 
Analysis, Jipitec, 2016, pp. 44-45. 
379  See, e.g., with respect to Belgium and France, A. Leonard, Abuse of Rights in Belgian 
and French Patent Law – A Case Law Analysis, Jipitec, 2016, p. 35 (“It is worth noting that prior to 2003, 
the intention to harm criterion played a predominant role in the evaluation of AoR in the course of litigation.  However, 
in a landmark decision regarding procedural abuses, the Belgian Cour de cassation/Hof van cassatie clarified that this 
criterion was not unique, and that manifest excesses in the exercise of a right can turn a procedure into a vexatious 
litigation […]  Similarly […], the French Cour de cassation has also declared that procedural abuse does not require an 
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the invalidity of the patent or lack of infringement)380 are the key elements.381  These elements 
are common to both an abuse or misuse of rights and an antitrust violation.382  For instance, 
in the U.S., the Federal Circuit explained that “[t]he bringing of a lawsuit to enforce legal rights does 
not of itself constitute violation of the antitrust laws or patent misuse; there must be bad faith and improper 
purpose in bringing the suit, in implementation of an illegal restraint of trade. See American Tobacco Co. v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809, 66 S.Ct. 1125, 1138, 90 L.Ed. 1575 (1946) (otherwise lawful acts, 
when done to give effect to conspiracy to restrain trade, are forbidden); Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, 
Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir.1982) (even if a lawsuit has a colorable basis, it can violate the antitrust 
laws if filed for an improper purpose), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958, 103 S.Ct. 2430, 77 L.Ed.2d 1317 
(1983).  A purpose is improper if its goal is not to win a favorable judgment, but to harass a competitor and 
deter others from competition, by engaging the litigation process itself, regardless of the outcome.”383 
In the U.S., two are the most important cases when it comes to sham litigation, Noerr 
(which establishes an immunity from antitrust liability for “petitioning the government”, 
including filing a lawsuit)384 and PREI.385  On the basis of these precedents, a patentee is 
                                                                                                                                                   
intentional element.  Specifically, it was deemed sufficient to demonstrate that the right had been used for another purpose 
than its social goal [N. Cayrol (n.27). The plaintiff does not act to restore justice, but merely to pressure the defendant.] 
or that the right holder acted with frivolousness”)  See also p. 38 (“As with the difficulty to prove the knowledge of the 
patent holder, it is quite clear from the cases analysed that, for the argument of abuse to succeed, it is necessary to 
demonstrate a manifest intention to harm or to clearly objectify this intention by relying on the particular circumstances of 
the case.”) 
380  A. Leonard, Abuse of Rights in Belgian and French Patent Law – A Case Law 
Analysis, Jipitec, 2016, p. 41 (“This combination was at the heart of a 2003 French Supreme Court case.  […][I]t 
was manifestly abusive for a patent holder to enforce a patent for which he/she could not have misunderstood, in good 
faith, the extent of its scope (i.e. the knowledge of the patent holder).  Therefore, a patent holder could not have initiated 
an infringement action when he/she knew, or should have known, that its patent was actually not infringed upon.  To do 
so could only have been explained by the intention to intimidate a competitor and to drive them out of the market (i.e. 
unfair competition practices).”) 
381  A. Leonard, Abuse of Rights in Belgian and French Patent Law – A Case Law 
Analysis, Jipitec, 2016, p. 34 (“Therefore, when litigants institute legal procedures – or persevere in a legal action – 
with the sole purpose of harming the defendant (the intention to harm criterion), in a disproportionate manner (the 
proportionality criterion) or with a particular objective not intended by the legislator (the right-function criterion), it can 
become abusive.  An action is considered vexatious when a litigant uses the procedure to (intentionally/maliciously) 
hinder or harm third parties. In short, there will be an AoR in the course of litigation when the right holder exercises 
his/her rights with either, the intention to harm or when he/she is inexcusably negligent, frivolous or indifferent to the 
consequences of this exercise.‖) 
382  “Vexatious litigation under patent misuse is similar to sham litigation under the antitrust laws in 
that the theory of misconduct flows from patentees coercing and intimidating defendants into submission despite having 
weak or invalid patents by saddling defendants with litigation costs. (See Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A 
Legal And Economic Analysis 26, 135-73 (19JO) (arguing that imposing liability on the party best able to choose 
between accident and safety costs maximizes the efficiency in accident cost reduction).) One court has treated misuse based 
on vexatious litigation similarly to sham litigation. (Moore US.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 139 F. Supp.2d 
348, 362 (W.D.N.Y., 2001) (―it appears that SRC can state a patent misuse claim to the extent that it alleges that 
Moore NA, Toppan Printing and Moore Canada have engaged in sham litigation.  In other words, the same facts that 
could support a finding of sham litigation (and an antitrust violation) could also support a finding of patent misuse […].  
In light of the Federal Circuit‘s decision in Galverbel, SRC‘s ninth counterclaim survives this motion to dismiss for the 
same reasons that SRC‘s antitrust counterclaims survived‖).” (D. Lim, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Law: 
Empirical, Doctrinal and Policy Perspectives, Edward Elgar, 2013, p. 137) 
383  Glaverbel Societe Anonyme v. Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc., 45 F.3d, Fed. Cir., 
1995, p. 1558. 
384  E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S., 1961, p. 144 
385  Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 
49, 1993. 
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presumptively entitled to immunity for filing a lawsuit – a finding of misuse, as well as of an 
antitrust violation (if the underlying elements of an antitrust violation are present), requires 
two elements: objective and subjective baselessness.  First, the claim must be objectively 
baseless, i.e. no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits (because the 
patent is invalid or not infringed).  Second, if the objective element is established,386 it must be 
demonstrated that “the baseless lawsuit conceals an attempt to interfere directly with the business 
relationships of a competitor, through the use of the governmental process – as opposed to the outcome of that 
process – as an anticompetitive weapon.”387  This second prong protects litigants that filed an 
objectively baseless suit in good faith.  Indeed, negligence or recklessness are not sufficient to 
establish an antitrust violation, and a knowledge of the meritlessness of the suit or, more 
likely, the specific intention to harass a competitor is required.388  In Abbott v. Teva,389 the 
district court denied motion to dismiss because it recognized that Abbott‟s infringement 
lawsuits could constitute sham litigation.  The court‟s finding was based on the two prong-
test outlined above.  First, as to the objective baselessness, before bringing the lawsuit the 
patentee did not investigate (by obtaining the infringing product and conducting a good faith 
comparison) whether the generic actually infringed its patents.  Second, subjectively, the 
originator was perfectly aware of the fact that the allegedly infringed patents were 
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct before the Patent Office. 
At the EU level, as seen above, the European Commission expressly recognized as a 
fundamental right guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights the right to 
effective remedies and a fair trial to ensure the respect of patent rights.  The requirements for 
a finding of sham litigation are thus not very different from the U.S.  The leading case 
decided by European Commission (rejecting ITT Promedia‟s complaint) and General Court 
(confirming the Commission‟s decision) is ITT Promedia.390  In this case, while confirming that 
entering into litigation is expression of the fundamental right of access to justice and could 
not be considered abusive in itself,391 the Court conceded that an antitrust violation can be 
exceptionally envisaged when the action brought by the dominant firm fulfills two criteria: (i) 
is objectively manifestly unfounded (i.e. it “cannot reasonably be considered as an attempt to establish 
[the plaintiff‟s] rights and can therefore only serve to harass the opposite party”) and (ii) is “conceived in the 
framework of a plan whose goal is to eliminate competition”.392  Both criteria must be fulfilled to 
                                                 
386  Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 
U.S., 1993, p. 60 (“Only if the challenged litigation is objectively meritless may a court examine the litigant‘s subjective 
motivation.”) 
387  Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 
U.S., 1993, p. 62.  See, with specific reference to patent misuse, In re Indep. Serv. Org., 85 F. Supp. 
2d, D. Kan., 2000, p. 1169.  See also H.J. Hovenkamp, M.D. Janis, M.A. Lemley, C.R. Leslie, M.A. 
Carrier, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law, 
Aspen, 2014, p. 11-26 (“The Supreme Court relied extensively on the existence of ―probable cause‖ to bring the 
underlying lawsuit, as the standard established and defined in the context of the tort of malicious prosecution.  In the 
words of the Court, ―a proper probable cause determination irrefutably demonstrates that an antitrust plaintiff has not 
proved the objective prong of the sham exception and that the defendant is accordingly entitled to Noerr immunity.‖”) 
388  H.J. Hovenkamp, M.D. Janis, M.A. Lemley, C.R. Leslie, M.A. Carrier, IP and 
Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law, Aspen, 2014, p. 
11-30. 
389  Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, v. Abbott Laboratories, 580 F. Supp.2d, D. Del., 2008. 
390  General Court, T-111/96, ITT Promedia v Commission, 17 July 1998. 
391  General Court, T-111/96, ITT Promedia v Commission, 17 July 1998, par. 60. 
392  General Court, T-111/96, ITT Promedia v Commission, 17 July 1998, par. 55. 
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establish an abuse, 393 and the second (subjective criteria) may be considered only after the 
first has been satisfied.394   
 
13. Product Hopping 
Another abuse of market power involving patents is the so-called product hopping.  
This abuse has been dealt with by authorities and courts in the U.S., EU, and individual 
Member States.  
Product hopping (or product switching) is one of the most popular tactics used by 
originators to extend the period of exclusivity over a cure.395  It consists in modifying certain 
characteristics of the drug, e.g., dosage; means of administering the drug: such as tablet 
(extended release, orally dissolving, or chewable), capsule, injectable, solution, suspension, 
syrup; and addition, removal or combination of active compounds; to qualify for a new 
patent, or at least prevent generic substitution,396 shortly before the patent on the older 
version of the drug expires, and then withdrawing the older drug from the market.397 
                                                 
393  General Court, T-111/96, ITT Promedia v Commission, 17 July 1998, par. 56 (“The 
fact that unmeritorious litigation is instituted does not in itself constitute an infringement of Article 86 of the Treaty 
unless it has an anti-competitive object.  Equally, litigation which may reasonably be regarded as an attempt to assert 
rights vis-à-vis competitors is not abusive, irrespective of the fact that it may be part of a plan to eliminate competition.”) 
394  General Court, T-111/96, ITT Promedia v Commission, 17 July 1998, par. 59. 
395  The European Commission found that “originator companies [tried to switch patients of their 
medicine facing imminent loss of exclusivity to a so-called second generation, or follow-on, medicine] in relation to 40% of 
the medicines in the sample selected for in-depth investigation, which had lost exclusivity between 2000 and 2007.” 
(European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, Preliminary Report, Fact Sheet “Originator-
Generic competition”, p. 4) 
396  As noted by Professors S. Hemphill and Lemley, “Another tactic is to execute multiple 
switches, for example, from a capsule form to a tablet form, and then a second switch—as the generic firm again closes in 
on approval—to a third, slightly different tablet form.” (C.S. Hemphill, M.A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity 
Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 Antitrust Law Journal, 2011, p. 961) 
397  Timing is of the essence for a successful product switch.  As the Commission 
explains in its sector inquiry report, “[t]iming the launch of a follow-on product is crucial for originator companies.  
If cheaper, generic versions of the first product come on the market before or simultaneously with the switch to the follow-
on product, the originator company may incur considerable value losses both in terms of smaller volumes and reduced 
prices.  Therefore, it is of utmost importance for the originator company to bring the follow-on product on the market 
before the first product effectively loses exclusivity.  This means that very often accompanying measures are taken by the 
originator company to facilitate the switch.  Such measures typically aim at effective channeling of demand from the first 
product to the follow-on product, but may in certain cases also attempt to delay or prevent generic entry for the sensitive 
period of the product switch.” (European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 
2009, paras. 1010-1011)  In the fact sheet, the Commission notes that, “[o]n average, the launch took place 
one year and five months before loss of exclusivity of the first generation medicine.  In some cases, the first medicine was 
withdrawn from the market some months after the launch of the second generation medicine.  If originator companies 
succeed in switching patients by that point, the probability that generic companies will be able to gain a significant share 
of the market decreases significantly.  If, on the other hand, generic companies enter the market before the patients are 
switched, originator companies have difficulties in convincing doctors to prescribe their second generation medicine and/or 
obtain a high price for it.”  (European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, Preliminary Report, 
Fact Sheet “Originator-Generic competition”, pp. 4-5)  The same conclusion is reached in the U.S. by 
M.A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The Missing Dimension of 
Product Hopping, in 62 Florida Law Review, 2010, p. 1020 (“Several examples demonstrate the crucial role 
played by timing.  In the TriCor case, one document demonstrated the different projected sales based on timing.  The 
brand firm, Abbott, predicted that if it launched its reformulated version before generic entry, sales would rise from 161 
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This conduct is aimed at steering doctors and pharmacists to the new patent-
protected version of the brand-name drug and avoiding generic competition, thus prolonging 
exclusivity for another patent term.398  By withdrawing the previous product from the market 
and switching patients to the new drug, the originator hampers generic competition, as 
generic manufacturers cannot rely on substitution rules (that allow pharmacists to fulfill the 
prescription for a brand-name drug with its generic version) to make up for the significant 
entry barriers represented by the prolonged exclusivity granted by the patent (on the main 
active substance) and the originator‟s investment in marketing (over the life of the drug), 
particularly vis-à-vis doctors.399   
“When the brand name manufacturer kills demand for its old formulation, demand for rival generics 
dies with it”.400 
From launch of the reformulated drug, originators undertake intensive marketing 
efforts to convince doctors to migrate their patients to the new drug.  If the old drug is still 
on the market, doctors are presented with a choice between two brand-name drugs, one of 
which is presented as an improvement to the other, for a price that is often slightly lower.  In 
addition to the significant marketing efforts on the second-generation product, highlighting 
the advantages of the new product compared to the old, the originator often stops at the 
                                                                                                                                                   
million Euros in 2004 to 269 million Euros in 2008.  But if the reformulation did not reach the market before the 
generic, sales would only reach 35 million Euros in 2004 and 15 million Euros in 2008.  In other words, in 2008, 
sales would be more than 17 times greater if Abbott introduced the new version before generic entry”).  Indeed, as the 
European Commission highlights quoting statements from originators: “once generics are on the market, it 
becomes more difficult to switch patients to second generation products, […] ―If [generics] come together with or prior to 
[second generation product] the switch rate is dramatically reduced. […] Once [generics] come in it becomes more difficult 
to get switches from [old original product]‖”; and “Originator companies are aware of their competitive advantage if they 
manage to switch patients to the second generation product before loss of exclusivity for the first product: ―The launch of 
[our second generation product] is a challenge, not experienced until now, as generics firms, […] press onto the market 
with all force and as we have to fear the loss of our patent […].  This means each patient that is not switched quickly 
enough to [our second generation product] is forever lost to the generics.  Once the patient is switched to [our second 
generation product] the physician does not have to, cannot and will not switch him to a generic, and what is more 
important: the pharmacist cannot substitute!!‖” (European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final 
Report, 8 July 2009, paras. 1025 and 1028) 
398  As Professor Domeij explains: “The originator company has in the switching context clearly 
done some innovative work, because the follow-on product has been awarded a patent.  However, patentability 
requirements are low.  The technical and therapeutic results when reformulating a known pharmaceutical are 
unpredictable to a degree, even for a person skilled in the art, which may be enough to make the reformulation 
patentable.  With the patent, the follow-on product is shielded from direct copying.  The available generics will be 
identical with the first generation product but, crucially, not with the second generation product.  This will be enough to 
prevent generic substitution if physicians prescribe the follow-on product.” (B. Domeij, Anticompetitive marketing 
in the context of pharmaceutical switching in Europe, in J. Drexl, N. Lee (eds.), Pharmaceutical 
Innovation, Competition and Patent Law, Edward Elgar, 2013, p. 273) 
399  See State of New York v. Actavis, No. 14-4624, 2d Cir., 2015 (“Competition through state 
drug substitution laws is the only cost-efficient means of competing available to generic manufacturers. (The district court 
found that the regulatory context makes it impractical and uneconomical for generic manufacturers to market their 
products to doctors or pharmacists because, among other reasons, marketing costs severely impact generic manufacturers‘ 
ability to offer the lower prices upon which they compete.)”) 
400  J. Cheng, Note: An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 108 Columbia Law Review, 2008, p. 1488.  See also European Commission, Pharmaceutical 
Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009, par. 1028, quoting an originator‟s document (“Once the patient 
is switched to [our second generation product] the physician does not have to, cannot and will not switch him to a generic, 
and what is more important: the pharmacist cannot substitute!!”) 
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same time any promotional activity on the first generation drug, thus limiting the opportunity 
for doctors and patients to compare the two.401 
If doctors stop writing prescriptions for the older drug, either because it is not on the 
market anymore (although the patent is still enforceable) or convinced by the originator‟s 
marketing efforts, and prescribe instead the newly introduced drug; once the generic version 
is finally able to enter the market the patient base will be almost entirely gone.  Indeed, if 
switching is successful, after patent expiry the use of generics will be limited to the very 
narrow share of the market that has not switched.  Doctors and patients are unlikely to switch 
back after generic entry, both because of lack of marketing efforts on the first generation 
product and because of the doctors‟ inertia (and risk-aversion).402 
To be substitutable with the newly prescribed drug, generics have to be equivalent, 
including in terms of form and dosage.403  Limited reformulations, coupled with withdrawal 
of the first brand-name drug from the market, de-registration of the market authorization and 
                                                 
401  On the originators‟ marketing efforts, Professor Domeij notes: “it is too simplistic to 
assume that the ‗launch‘ of a new product merely entails passively making the product available for consumers.  In 
almost all cases marketing is necessary and competition law scrutiny could be focused on this, rather than on the 
originator‘s technical product development.  Even a small modicum of product improvement is beneficial for someone, but 
marketing is, from a competition and economic perspective, a more ambivalent practice and an easier target for scrutiny.  
[…][C]ertain specific and well-defined marketing efforts abuse a dominant position in the special context of the 
pharmaceutical field.  Marketing will prevent the up-take of generics and constitute deviations from competition on the 
merits.  For a host of reasons, it is evidently important with high standards concerning marketing of pharmaceuticals, but 
from a competition perspective this is especially true in the time-span between the launch of the follow-on product and the 
loss of exclusivity for the first generation medicine (typically a period of one year and five months).” (B. Domeij, 
Anticompetitive marketing in the context of pharmaceutical switching in Europe, in J. Drexl, N. Lee 
(eds.), Pharmaceutical Innovation, Competition and Patent Law, Edward Elgar, 2013, p. 285-286) 
402  Generic companies have no resources nor incentive to invest in marketing since the 
cost would be borne by one manufacturer and the resulting benefits would be shared by all generic 
manufacturers (i.e. the other manufacturers would free-ride on one‟s marketing efforts because 
pharmacist may substitute any generic for any other).  Generics‟ sole method of competition is price 
(and investments in marketing would make them much less competitive on price).  Indeed, “costs 
incurred to encourage a doctor to write a prescription for one‘s product would be squandered because the pharmacist could 
fill the prescription with a competitor‘s AB-rated product.  As Namenda concluded, ―additional expenditures by generics 
on marketing would be impractical and ineffective because a generic manufacturer promoting a product would have no 
way to ensure that a pharmacist would substitute its product, rather than one made by one of its generic competitors.‖ 
(787 F.3d at 656)  The inability of generics to profitably market to doctors is desirable.  If a generic could do so, this 
would reintroduce the price-disconnect failure.” (M.A. Carrier, Product Hopping: A New Framework, 91 
Notre Dame Law Review, forthcoming 2016, p. 33) This however leads to doctors having access (pre-
generic entry) only to the bias point of view of the originator on the relative merits of the drugs (both 
brand-name and generics).  Once generics enter, originators almost always stop promoting their drug. 
403  Even without new patent, originators may delay generic entry by reformulating the 
drug because, for their product to be substitutable for the reformulated drug, generic manufacturers 
must obtain a new market authorization, which faces the same lengthy review as the first one.  In the 
U.S., substitution in most States is possible only if the generic is „AB-rated‟ by the FDA.  “To receive an 
AB rating, a generic drug must be pharmaceutically equivalent (having the same active ingredient, form, dosage, strength, 
safety, and efficacy) and bioequivalent (absorbed in the body at roughly the same rate).  The concern when a brand 
reformulates its drug is that the generic version of the original product is not bioequivalent or pharmaceutically equivalent 
to the reformulated product.  And while the generic may eventually demonstrate equivalence, such a showing likely will 
not occur for years as the generic reformulates its product, seeks FDA approval, and awaits the expiration of the brand‘s 
thirty month stay of FDA approval.”  (M.A. Carrier, United States.  Pharmaceutical Antitrust Law in the 
United States, in G. Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical 
Sector.  An International Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, p. 480). 
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changes to the reference code of the first generation product to “obsolete” (or de-listing of 
the product from the prescribing software) may be sufficient to impair the functioning of the 
drug‟s substitutability mechanism and thus limit generic competition. 
The legality of product hopping (any version thereof) would have a negative impact 
also on the originators‟ incentive to invest in R&D.  Investments in incremental 
improvements of existing blockbuster drugs would be highly encouraged and originators 
would concentrate their efforts on switching demand to trivial or minor reformulations 
instead of developing innovative, more socially valuable, but costly and of uncertain success, 
new drugs. 
Obviously the introduction of a new formulation of a drug does not constitute an 
abuse in itself and can generate significant therapeutic benefits.  This is the case when the 
follow-on drug is a real improvement over the original version, and its introduction is not 
primarily aimed at delaying generic entry.  In these cases, however, there is no reason, other 
than to damage consumers and foreclose competitors, for the originator to wait until (close 
to) patent expiry of the first drug to release the new version, denigrate the first drug (and 
consequently its generic versions) as compared to the new, and/or withdraw the first drug 
from the market.  If the follow-on drug is a real improvement over the original, consumers 
will switch regardless of the presence of generics in the market.  This can be regarded as a 
good indicator of the level of improvement of the follow-on drug over the original, as 
consumers “vote with their feet” which drug is most beneficial to them.  The originator‟s 
conduct will thus have to be assessed in light of the innovative content of the new drug only 
as an indication of the anticompetitive intent (when the reformulation has no or negative 
impact on consumer welfare), which is not the end, but only an element, of the antitrust 
assessment. 
To get more into detail, the switch characterizing product hopping may take two 
different forms: hard and soft.  The soft switch consists in the differential promotion of the 
two drugs (favorable comparison of the new product to the old one, “denigration” of the old 
drug potentially highlighting risks to the patient‟s health and side effects, aggressive 
promotion of the new drug, including pressure on doctors, hospitals and insurance 
companies, and complete halt of any promotion of the previous version)404 and differential 
price (raising the price of the old drug and selling the new one at a sensibly lower price or 
with heavy discounts, increasing with the quantity purchased).  It is evident how doctors and 
patients, in a situation in which there are no generics on the market (and there will not be for 
some time as the patent on the old drug is not expired yet), the new drug is described as the 
“panacea” and the old as a seriously lacking cure (to which generic manufacturers cannot 
respond adequately), and the price differential between the two is in favor of the new drug, 
may be persuaded to switch.  By the time generic approval has been obtained, the market has 
already moved on to the new, patent-protected, drug.  As described above, switching back 
patients and doctors once generics enter the market is extremely difficult given the 
characteristics of the pharmaceutical market.405   
                                                 
404  This strategy, substantially addressed against the originator‟s own old drug has been 
defined “cannibalizing” (S.D. Shadowen, K.B Leffler, J.T. Lukens, Anticompetitive product changes in 
the pharmaceutical industry, 41 Rutgers Law Journal, 2009, p. 45). 
405  In certain cases, such as Namenda‟s discussed below, the specific characteristics of the 
drug or of the patients make switching back even less likely (in Namenda this was due to the high 
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The soft switch has not been considered in breach of antitrust (in the U.S.),406 
although denigration of generic drugs has been (in France, see below).  This author agrees 
with the finding that soft switch is not anticompetitive when it happens once the patent on 
the old drug has expired and generics could (and did) enter the market.407  If the conducts 
described above are undertaken before loss of exclusivity on the first drug, however, both 
patients and doctors can be easily misled and the originator‟s behavior cannot be qualified as 
competition on the merits.  It would thus depend on how serious the effort to mislead 
doctors and consumers is.  If it is significant and unjustified by the objective difference 
between old and new drug, it would not fit under competition on the merits and would thus 
constitute a breach of antitrust rules.408  As clearly explained by Professor Domeij: 
“A dominant firm‘s price or quality comparisons between its first and second generation 
pharmaceutical in a marketing context should be deemed abusive as long as the first generation 
product is still benefitting from exclusivity.  In effect, negative statements concerning the first generation 
product are in this period statements directed at soon to be launched generic products.  It is not 
obvious, but in the switching window any marketing messages formally directed at the first generation 
product are in practice concerned with competitors‘ future generic products.  This is a direct 
consequence of the rules on generic substitution.  Negative statements are likely to be misleading about 
the relative value of the soon to be launched generics, due to generic companies‘ inability to respond.  
During exclusivity generics may not legally be marketed due to the patent on the first generation 
product.  After patent expiry generics cannot realistically be market for economic consequences flowing 
from the rules on generic substitution.  Another rationale for not accepting negative statements 
concerning the first generation product as competition on the merits, is that resulting patient migration 
is not profit maximizing for the originator absent the competitive changes that will arise in the near 
future for the first and second generation products.  When the comparative advertisement is made the 
second generation product is normally no more profitable than the first generation product for the 
originator.  The marketing is only profit-maximizing because switched patients will after migration be 
mostly captured, that is not exposed to pending generic competition.  They are locked in due to a lack 
of marketing funds for generics and rigidities in physicians prescribing practices.  Negative messages in 
general about the first generation product and comparisons with the second generation product in 
                                                                                                                                                   
transaction costs associated with changing Alzheimer patients‟ prescriptions). 
406  In the U.S., the Second Circuit stated: “As long as Defendants sought to persuade patients 
and their doctors to switch from [Product A] to [Product B] while both were on the market (the soft switch) and with 
generic IR drugs on the horizon, patients and doctors could evaluate the products and their generics on the merits in 
furtherance of competitive objectives.” (New York v. Actavis plc, No. 14-4624, 2nd Cir., 22 May 2015).  See 
also Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharms., 534 F. Supp. 2d, D.D.C., 2008. 
407  The importance of timing for (a successfully anticompetitive) product hopping is 
underlined by M.A. Carrier, Product Hopping: A New Framework, 91 Notre Dame Law Review, 
forthcoming 2016, p. 10 (“Stated most simply, the brand firm will be much more successful in forestalling generic 
competition if it can switch the market to the reformulated drug before a generic of the original product enters the market.  
Without a generic on the market, the brand‘s heavy promotion and marketing artillery can convince doctors to prescribe 
the reformulated drug.  If the brand successfully switches the market to the reformulated product before the generic enters, 
the generic entry is of no practical significance: there are few or no prescriptions for the original product for which the 
generic can be substituted.”) 
408  See G. Ghidini, Profili Evolutivi del Diritto Industriale, Profili evolutivi del 
diritto industriale: innovazione, concorrenza, benessere dei consumatori, accesso alle 
informazioni, Giuffrè, 2015, Ch. V, par. 9, who would not condemn product hopping before having 
verified whether the new product represents a “cosmetic” bluff and nothing more or an actual 
(incremental) innovation. 
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particular, are not profit-maximizing for the originator in the short time frame, but will be when 
competition develops differently in the near future for the first and second generation products.”409 
The hard switch involves, often in addition to the practices qualified as soft switch, 
the discontinuation of the old drug.410  Contrary to the soft switch, the hard switch is not 
limited to trying to persuade (more or less aggressively) doctors and patients to switch, it 
actually forces them to do so (since they cannot, even if they wanted to, buy the old, and 
withdrawn, drug).  Discouraging or impeding generic competition without an objective and 
legitimate business justification is considered in violation of competition law.411 
In both cases of hard and soft switch, the test developed by courts in relation to 
anticompetitive product redesign should be applied.  First, it is for the authority/plaintiff to 
demonstrate that the switch has anticompetitive effects, i.e. it coerces consumers and impedes 
competition.412  Once this has been demonstrated, the originator must present a 
                                                 
409  B. Domeij, Anticompetitive marketing in the context of pharmaceutical switching in 
Europe, in J. Drexl, N. Lee (eds.), Pharmaceutical Innovation, Competition and Patent Law, Edward 
Elgar, 2013, pp. 286-287. 
410  “[T]he withdrawal of a product/registration, and/or its replacement with another that is functionally 
equivalent […] in order to preclude or obstruct generic competition, can be characterised as such conduct” (R. 
O‟Donoghue, J. Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 102, Hart, 2013, p. 669).  “Certainly, neither 
product withdrawal nor product improvement alone is anticompetitive.  But under Berkey Photo, when a monopolist 
combines product withdrawal with some other conduct, the overall effect of which is to coerce consumers rather than 
persuade them on the merits, id. at 287, and to impede competition, id. at 274-75, its actions are anticompetitive under 
the Sherman Act.  (Several other courts have held that product redesign violates § 2 when combined with other conduct 
and the combined effect is anticompetitive or exclusionary.  See Allied Orthopedic, 592 F.3d at 1000 (explaining that § 
2 is violated when ―some conduct of the monopolist associated with its introduction of a new and improved product design 
constitutes an anticompetitive abuse or leverage of monopoly power, or a predatory or exclusionary means of attempting to 
monopolize the relevant market‖ (internal quotation marks omitted))” (State of New York v. Actavis, No. 14-
4624, 2d Cir., 2015). 
411  See also H.J. Hovenkamp, M.D. Janis, M.A. Lemley, C.R. Leslie, M.A. Carrier, IP and 
Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law, Aspen, 2014, pp. 
15-78.3 - 15-79 (“From an antitrust perspective, product hopping to ward off generic competition is precisely the sort of 
behavior the Sherman Act condemns.  While monopolists have no general duty to help their competitors, they do have an 
obligation to refrain from acts that have no purpose or effect except to exclude competition.  And while distinguishing 
between the two can be tricky, courts have proven themselves up to the task, even in cases involving product design.  It 
makes no sense to immunize patently anticompetitive behavior because of the risk that some cases might prove tough to 
decide.  The proper standard requires deference to innovation, but not complete abdication.”) and P.R. Malone, J. 
Pearlman, M. Rietfors, Brief for Intellectual Property and Antitrust Professors as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Plaintiff-Appellee, State of New York v. Actavis, No. 14-4624, 2d Cir., 2015, pp. 3-4 
(“Because product hopping typically exploits the Hatch-Waxman framework to restrain generic competition and cause 
anticompetitive effects with no countervailing procompetitive justification, it can constitute illegal exclusionary conduct 
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  The type of product hopping at issue in this case – withdrawing drugs from the 
market and forced-switches to new versions – undermines the generic entry and competition intended and facilitated by the 
operation of Hatch-Waxman and state drug substitution laws. This exclusionary conduct can violate Section 2 by 
foreclosing competition and reducing consumer choice when it is undertaken without a purpose other than eliminating 
competition or when its anticompetitive effect outweighs any business purpose.‖) 
412  See also P.R. Malone, J. Pearlman, M. Rietfors, Brief for Intellectual Property and 
Antitrust Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee, 14-4624, in People of the 
State of New York v. Actavis, 2nd Circuit, 2015, pp. 28-29 (“The anticompetitive effects of product hopping can 
be particularly pronounced when the conduct includes, as in this case, changes timed to occur before generic entry, proferred 
justifications for the changes that are pretextual or lacking in evidentiary support, ―smoking gun‖ documents that 
demonstrate the actual intent and effect of the product switch are to protect monopoly revenue from generic competition, 
rather than a legitimate business purpose, or other evidence demonstrating an exclusionary objective and impact.‖) 
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procompetitive justification for its conduct, i.e. that its conduct is indeed a form of 
competition on the merits.  The burden of proof moves then back on the authority/plaintiff 
that has to rebut the procompetitive justification or demonstrate that it is outweighed by the 
anticompetitive effects of the originator‟s conduct.413 
This conduct as well has been considered to run against the very purpose of the 
patent system and thus represents an abuse of rights “[(i)] in view of the rationale of the patent right 
and the patent system (by re-claiming 20 years of protection without having innovated); and [(ii)] also against 
higher ends, because the society as whole would not benefit from that patent anymore.  We think in particular 
of access to medicines and the human right to health.  Both are reportedly favoured and hindered by the grant 
of patents, yet this balance may shift the wrong way if patent protection goes up to 40 years.‖414 
13.1. United States 
13.1.1. Namenda (U.S.) 
Product hopping has been the object of more than one decision, at the U.S., EU, and 
Member States level.  Starting with the U.S., the first case analyzed is the one involving the 
Alzheimer‟s treatment Namenda. 
The issue arose from the decision taken by Actavis, the originator manufacturing 
Namenda, to switch patients from an immediate release (IR) version of the drug onto a 
sustained release version (Namenda XR).  Namenda IR and Namenda XR had the same 
active ingredient and the same therapeutic effect, but they were not therapeutically equivalent.  
The main difference between the two drugs was in the dosage regimen, and thus in the 
strength, from the two tablets a day of the IR (immediately released into the bloodstream) to 
one of the XR (released gradually)(in addition, the IR was marketed in tablet form, the XR in 
capsule form).  Due to these differences, the generic version of the IR would not be AB-rated 
to the XR and pharmacist would not be permitted to substitute the generic IR for a Namenda 
XR prescription. 
Actavis planned to withdraw the IR version near the end of its patent term (the XR 
version was brought to market in 2013, three years after it was approved and two years before 
patent expiry of the IR), and migrate patients to the newly introduced XR, in order to force 
patients to switch before generic entry.  The patents on XR ensured exclusivity, and thus 
prevented generic competition, until 2029.  Actavis‟s conduct was described as “―product 
extension‖ strategies to convert patients from Namenda IR to Namenda XR and, thus, to avoid the patent 
cliff.  Initially, Defendants sold both Namenda IR and XR but stopped actively marketing IR.  During that 
time, they spent substantial sums of money promoting XR to doctors, caregivers, patients, and pharmacists.  
They also sold XR at a discounted rate, making it considerably less expensive than Namenda IR tablets, and 
issued rebates to health plans to ensure that patients did not have to pay higher co-payments for XR than for 
IR.  The parties have referred to Defendants‘ efforts to transition patients to XR while IR was still on the 
                                                 
413  See, inter alia, in the U.S., United States v Microsoft, 253 F.3d, D.C. Cir., 2001, pp. 
58-64 (where, the court held that, when an alleged monopolist introduces a new product, the question 
is whether it is “engaging in exclusionary conduct as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a 
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident” and that “[j]udicial deference to product innovation […] does 
not mean that a monopolist‘s product design decisions are per se lawful”; Trans Sport, Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, 
Inc., 964 F.2d, 2d Cir. 1992, pp. 188-89. 
414  M. Temmerman, The Legal Notion of Abuse of Patent Rights, Working Paper No 
2011/23, nccr trade regulation, p. 23. 
110 
 
market as the ―soft switch,‖ […].  In early 2014, Defendants decided on a more direct approach.  They were 
concerned that they would be unable to convert a significant percentage of Alzheimer‘s patients dependent upon 
memantine therapy from IR to XR prior to the entry of generic IR.  Defendants‘ internal projections estimated 
that only 30% of Namenda IR users would voluntarily switch prior to July 2015.  On February 14, 2014, 
Defendants publicly announced that they would discontinue Namenda IR on August 15, 2014, notified the 
FDA of their plans to discontinue Namenda IR, and published letters on their websites urging caregivers and 
healthcare providers to ―discuss switching to Namenda XR‖ with their patients.  Defendants also sought to 
convert Namenda IR‘s largest customer base, Medicare patients, to XR by sending a letter to the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services requesting that the agency remove IR from the formulary list, so that Medicare 
health plans would not cover it.”415 
Therefore, Actavis first tried a soft switch, keeping both IR and XR on the market.  
Failed this (i.e. only a small part of the patients switched to the new drug before loss of 
exclusivity, probably due to the transaction costs involved in changing the medications taken 
by Alzheimer patients); Actavis changed its strategy and announced (and prepared for) a hard 
switch (i.e. the withdrawal of Namenda IR from the market).  The hard switch was not put 
into effect because Actavis agreed to a standstill during the litigation proceedings and the 
Court ultimately decided not to allow Actavis to implement it, by granting a preliminary 
injunction barring Actavis from restricting access to Namenda IR prior to generic IR entry.  
However, as noted by the Second Circuit, “[b]ecause a manufacturer does not simply withdraw a drug 
at once, absent pressing safety concerns, announcing the imminent discontinuation of a drug is tantamount to 
withdrawal.”416  
A particularity of the case is the fact that Namenda is a drug for Alzheimer patients.  
Doctors‟ inertia was therefore multiplied in this case by the type of patients.  Indeed, it is very 
complicated to change drugs that treat long-term or chronic condition, above all in cases 
where the patient population is represented by Alzheimer‟s patients with moderate-to-severe 
dementia.  The friction was thus significant when trying to move doctors and patients from 
one drug to another (which is probably the reason why the soft switch was not successful), 
but once the switch is completed, it will be likely permanent.  While in theory doctors would 
be free to switch their patients back once the generics enter in the market, in practice they, 
the patients and their families would be reluctant to do so (due to routine and risk-aversion), 
notwithstanding the price difference.   
As to the effects, the district court found that “consumers would pay almost $300 million 
more and third-party payors would pay almost $1.4 billion more for memantine therapy if Defendants were 
permitted to switch patients to Namenda XR before generic IR entry.  And HHS reports that Defendants‘ 
withdrawal of Namenda IR prior to generic entry would cost Medicare and its beneficiaries a minimum of $6 
billion over the next ten years.”417 
In deciding that Actavis was liable of antitrust infringement, the Court noted that 
neither the introduction of a new, arguably superior, drug nor the withdrawal of an old one 
are anticompetitive per se.  They might however be when they are carried out in combination, 
with substantially coercive effects on doctors and patients.  The Court concluded: 
“In withdrawing Namenda IR from the market, Defendants‘ explicit purpose was to impede generic 
                                                 
415  State of New York v. Actavis, No. 14-4624, 2d Cir., 2015, pp. 18-20. 
416  State of New York v. Actavis, No. 14-4624, 2d Cir., 2015, p. 21. 
417  State of New York v. Actavis, No. 14-4624, 2d Cir., 2015, p. 56. 
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competition and to avoid the patent cliff―which occurs at the end of a drug‘s exclusivity period when 
generics gain market share through state substitution laws. […]  Defendants‘ hard switch crosses the 
line from persuasion to coercion and is anticompetitive. […]  By effectively withdrawing Namenda IR 
prior to generic entry, Defendants forced patients to switch from Namenda IR to XR―the only other 
memantine drug on the market. […]  Defendants argue that courts should not distinguish between 
hard and soft switches. But this argument ignores one of Berkey Photo‘s basic tenets: the market can 
determine whether one product is superior to another only ―so long as the free choice of consumers is 
preserved.‖ 603 F.2d at 287.  Had Defendants allowed Namenda IR to remain available until 
generic entry, doctors and Alzheimer‘s patients could have decided whether the benefits of switching to 
once-daily Namenda XR would outweigh the benefits of adhering to twice-daily therapy using less-
expensive generic IR (or perhaps lower-priced Namenda IR).  By removing Namenda IR from the 
market prior to generic IR entry, Defendants sought to deprive consumers of that choice.  In this way, 
Defendants could avoid competing against lower-cost generics based on the merits of their redesigned 
drug by forcing Alzheimer‘s patients to take XR, with the knowledge that transaction costs would 
make the reverse commute by patients from XR to generic IR highly unlikely. […]  While 
introducing Namenda XR may be procompetitive, that argument provides no procompetitive 
justification for withdrawing Namenda IR.  […][I]n deciding to take IR off the market, Defendants 
were willing to give up profits they would have made selling IR―Forest‘s bestselling drug.  This 
―willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end‖ is indicative of 
anticompetitive behavior. In re Adderall, 754 F.3d at 135 (internal quotation marks omitted).” 418 
13.1.2. TriCor (U.S.) 
In TriCor,419 another U.S. case, Abbot Labs changed multiple times the dosage 
strength of its brand-name drug and the dosage form, from a capsule to a tablet (the FDA 
considered all of the formulations bioequivalent: from a medical perspective they were thus 
substitutable, but they were not from a regulatory one).  Once obtained the NDA for the 
tablet formulation, Abbot stopped selling the old product in capsules, purchasing back 
existing supplies from pharmacies, and changed the code of the capsules in the database used 
by pharmacies for automatic substitution purposes (the National Drug Data File) to 
“obsolete” (which prevented pharmacies to fill prescriptions for the new formulation with a 
generic capsule formulation). 
Generic manufacturers then developed equivalents to the new tablet formulation and 
submitted ANDAs.  Abbot filed lawsuits against these manufacturers alleging infringements 
of its patents.  While the litigation was pending, Abbott submitted an NDA for a new dosage 
strength of its drug in the form of nanoparticulate tablets.  And, as before, the originator 
stopped selling the old version and removed the drug from the database to prevent generic 
substitution. 
Through the reformulations of TriCor (which could be considered very close to mere 
repackaging of the chemical compound), Abbot managed to hold off generics for over a 
decade (after they had successfully challenged the patents), and thus prevented consumer 
choice.  Abbot manipulated the pharmaceutical regulatory framework to block generic 
entry.420  By eliminating the most cost-efficient means of generic competition, i.e. 
                                                 
418  State of New York v. Actavis, No. 14-4624, 2d Cir., 2015, pp. 23, 37-38, 49. 
419  Abbott Labs v. Teva, 432 F. Supp. 2d, D. Del., 2006. 
420  “[W]hile a monopolist may compete and is not required to aid its competitors, see, e.g., 
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substitution,421 Abbot prevented consumers from being able to choose freely among 
competing products.  As the Court stated: “[t]he nature of the pharmaceutical drug market, as 
described in Plaintiffs‘ allegations, persuades me that the rule of reason approach should be applied here as 
well.  […][C]onsumers were not presented with a choice between fenofibrate formulations.  Instead, Defendants 
allegedly prevented such a choice by removing the old formulations from the market while introducing new 
formulations. Hence, an inquiry into the effect of Defendants‘ formulation changes, following the rule of reason 
approach, is justified. […]  Therefore, in this case, an antitrust inquiry into the benefits provided by 
Defendants‘ product changes is appropriate.  Contrary to Defendants‘ assertion, Plaintiffs are not required to 
prove that the new formulations were absolutely no better than the prior version or that the only purpose of the 
innovation was to eliminate the complementary product of a rival.  Rather, as in Microsoft, if Plaintiffs show 
anticompetitive harm from the formulation changes, that harm will be weighed against any benefits presented by 
Defendants.”422  On the basis of the above, the District Court denied the motion to dismiss.  
The case settled shortly before trial.  Two class action lawsuits were also brought against 
Abbot and were settled.  The lawsuit by the direct purchasers with a payment of $184 million, 
the one with the indirect purchasers with the payment of $65.7 million.  25 States and the 
District of Columbia sued Abbot as well complaining that it violated antitrust law by 
obtaining multiple patents through inequitable conduct, reformulating TriCor with only 
minor changes to its form and strength and creating artificial product differentiation to 
persuade doctors to switch to new formulations.  The case was settled in January 2010 with 
Abbott agreeing to pay $22.5 million.  As noted by Shannon Gibson, “[a]lthough the above 
settlement amounts are significant, […] Abbott unquestionably still came out ahead, especially considering 
that since 2006, TriCor has generated more than $1 billion in annual sales in the U.S. and is one of the top 
30 selling drugs in the country.”423 
13.1.3. Doryx (U.S.) 
                                                                                                                                                   
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58, ―a monopolist is not free to take certain actions that a company in a competitive (or even 
oligopolistic) market may take, because there is no market constraint on a monopolist‘s behavior.‖ LePage‘s Inc. v. 
3M, 324 F.3d 141, 151-52 (3d Cir.2003) (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 
585, 601-04, 105 S.Ct. 2847, 86 L.Ed.2d 467 (1985)).  Contrary to Defendants‘ assertion (D.I. 384 at 15), 
Plaintiffs allege harm to competition rather than simply harm to Teva and Impax.  By removing the old products from 
the market and changing the NDDF code, Defendants allegedly suppressed competition by blocking the introduction of 
generic fenofibrate.  The Court inBerkey Photo noted that such conduct, which results in consumer coercion, is potentially 
anticompetitive. See 603 F.2d at 287 & n. 39 (finding no liability but stating that ―the situation might be completely 
different‖ if the defendant stopped producing old products or removed them from the market).  Thus, the allegations of 
product removal and NDDF code changes, like the allegations related to the product changes themselves, support 
Plaintiffs‘ antitrust claims.” (Abbott Labs v. Teva, 432 F. Supp. 2d, D. Del., 2006, p. 424) 
421  “To show that conduct has an anticompetitive effect, ―it is not necessary that all competition be 
removed from the market. The test is not total foreclosure, but whether the challenged practices bar a substantial number 
of rivals or severely restrict the market‘s ambit.‖ United States v. Dentsply Int‘l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 191 (3d 
Cir.2005). Competitors need not be barred ―from all means of distribution,‖ if they are barred ―from the cost-efficient 
ones.‖ Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 64. Here, while Teva and Impax may be able to market their own branded versions of 
the old TriCor formulations, they cannot provide generic substitutes for the current TriCor formulation, which is alleged 
to be their cost-efficient means of competing in the pharmaceutical drug market. That opportunity has allegedly been 
prevented entirely by Defendants‘ allegedly manipulative and unjustifiable formulation changes. Such a restriction on 
competition, if proven, is sufficient to support an antitrust claim in this case.‖ (Abbott Labs v. Teva, 432 F. Supp. 
2d, D. Del., 2006, p. 423) 
422  Abbott Labs v. Teva, 432 F.Supp. 2d, D. Del., 2006, p. 422. 
423  S. Gibson, The Use and Abuse of Drug Reformulation in Pharmaceutical Life Cycle 
Management, 20 Health Law Journal, 2013, p. 118. 
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U.S. courts discussed again product hopping in a case involving Warner Chilcott and 
its drug Doryx.424  In July 2012, Warner Chilcott was sued by Mylan, a generic manufacturer, 
under the accusation of having engaged in product hopping to prevent or delay generic 
competition for its drug Doryx, used to treat acne.  This is the first product hopping case in 
which the FTC intervened filing an amicus brief. 
The conduct contested to Warner Chilcott consisted in at least three distinct changes 
to Doryx with little to no therapeutic benefit: (i) from capsule to tablet; (ii) from 75 mg and 
100 mg tablets to a single 150 mg; (iii) from a single-scored version of the 150 mg tablet to a 
dual-scored version.  Warner Chilcott ceased marketing of the old versions of Doryx and 
eventually discontinued its sales, asking major customers to return inventory. 
Warner Chilcott argued that originators do not have a duty to continue promoting 
outdated drugs to permit generic competitors to take advantage of automatic substitution 
laws.  This is most certainly the case, but it obviously does not cover drug withdrawal.  The 
public relies on the functioning of the system devised by the Hatch-Waxman Act and State 
substitution laws to expedite generic entry and the originator‟s regulatory gaming goes in the 
opposite direction.  What some companies qualified as generics‟ free-riding is what the 
Hatch-Waxman is premised on, i.e. allowing “the generic manufacturer [to] obtain approval while 
avoiding the ―costly and time-consuming studies‖ needed to obtain approval ―for a pioneer drug.‖ See Eli Lilly 
& Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U. S. 661,676 (1990). The Hatch-Waxman process, by allowing the generic 
to piggy-back on the pioneer‘s approval efforts, ―speed[s] the introduction of low-cost generic drugs to market,‖ 
[…] thereby furthering drug competition.”425  In its amicus brief, the FTC emphasized that 
“[w]hatever ‗free-riding‘ occurs is the intended result of the legislative framework of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
and the state substitution laws.”  In other words, patent protection, marketing authorization and 
piggy-backing go hand in hand.  The originator cannot get one without allowing the other.   
In the case at stake, however, Doryx capsules have been available without patent 
protection for almost 20 years before Sandoz and Mylan introduced the generic version.  
Mylan launched also its own generic 75 and 100 mg Doryx tablets after Warner Chilcott had 
introduced them and was thus already in the market when Warner Chilcott introduced a new 
dosage and discontinued the old drug.  Therefore, “doctors remained free to prescribe generic Doryx; 
pharmacists remained free to substitute generics when medically appropriate; and patients remained free to ask 
their doctors and pharmacists for generic versions of the drug.”426  Citing Microsoft, the Court thus 
concluded that Mylan “failed to produce initial evidence of anticompetitive conduct [and] thus need not 
proceed with the burden-shifting framework and determine whether Defendants have proffered nonpretextual, 
procompetitive justifications for their product changes, whether Mylan has rebutted those justifications, or 
whether the product changes were, on balance, procompetitive or anticompetitive.”  On 28 September 2016, 
the Third Circuit confirmed the Eastern District of Pennsylvania‟s holding that Warner 
Chilcott‟s conduct did not violate antitrust.  In its opinion, the Third Circuit indicated that, 
while in Namenda the originator‟s reformulation extended the period of patent exclusivity and 
served to “completely bar generics from entering the market”,  in Doryx “there were no patent cliffs on the 
horizon, and the evidence demonstrates that there were plenty of other competitors already in the oral 
                                                 
424  Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott PLC et al., No. Civ. 12-3824, 2015 WL 
1736957, E.D. Pa., 16 April 2015. 
425  FTC v. Actavis, Inc. 570 U.S., 2013, par. I.A. 
426  Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott PLC et al., No. Civ. 12-3824, 2015 WL 
1736957, E.D. Pa., 16 April 2015. 
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tetracycline market.”427 
13.1.4. Suboxone (U.S.) 
The last U.S. product hopping case analyzed by this work relates to Suboxone and is 
instructive of the importance of consumers‟ freedom of choice in determining the 
anticompetitiveness of product hopping.428  In this case, the Court denied motion to dismiss 
(concluding that the plaintiff had “plausibly pleaded exclusionary conduct, as required for an antitrust 
claim”) on grounds that the originator, after having developed a new, patent-protected, 
version of the drug (changing the administration form from tablets to film), launched a 
marketing campaign against its previous tablet version, warning doctors of allegedly fabricated 
safety concerns, and announced the withdrawal of the tablet version (soon to lose patent 
exclusivity).429 
The court noted that, “what is clear from the case law is that simply introducing a new product on 
the market, whether it is a superior product or not, does not, by itself, constitute exclusionary conduct. The key 
question is whether the defendant combined the introduction of a new product with some other wrongful conduct, 
such that the comprehensive effect is likely to stymie competition, prevent consumer choice and reduce the 
market‘s ambit. This analysis must be undertaken with the somewhat unique characteristics of the 
pharmaceutical market in mind” 430 The specific conduct undertaken by the originator (Reckitt 
Benckiser, now Indivior) was ultimately found potentially anticompetitive because “[t]he 
threatened removal of the tablets from the market in conjunction with the alleged fabricated safety concerns 
could plausibly coerce patients and doctors to switch from tablet to film.  A patient that preferred the tablets 
despite the safety concerns might be further persuaded to switch to the film, believing that their favored product 
would soon be removed from the market”431  On 4 October 2016, 35 States and the District of 
Columbia filed a federal lawsuit against the originator alleging that it engaged in an illegal 
scheme to block generic entry and cause purchasers to pay artificially high prices. 
13.2. European Union 
13.2.1. Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry 
Having concluded the analysis of the U.S. case law, it is now time to look at the 
                                                 
427  Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Co., No. 15-2236, 3rd Cir., 28 September 
2016, p. 38. 
428  In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., No. 13-
MD-2445, 2014 WL 6792663, E.D. Pa., 3 December 2014. 
429  In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., No. 13-
MD-2445, 2014 WL 6792663, E.D. Pa., 3 December 2014, p. 9 (“the facts presented sufficiently allege that 
the disparagement of Suboxone tablets took place alongside ‗coercive‘ measures. The threatened removal of the tablets 
from the market in conjunction with the alleged fabricated safety concerns could plausibly coerce patients and doctors to 
switch from tablet to film. A patient that preferred the tablets despite the safety concerns might be further persuaded to 
switch to the film, believing that their favored product would soon be removed from the market.”) 
430  In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., No. 13-
MD-2445, 2014 WL 6792663, E.D. Pa., 3 December 2014, p. 10. 
431  In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., No. 13-
MD-2445, 2014 WL 6792663, E.D. Pa., 3 December 2014, p. 12.  The Court stated that: “While Reckitt 
did not repurchase existing supplies held by pharmacies or change the NDDF code on the tablets to obsolete, the 
withdrawal of Suboxone tablets is alleged to have created a similar effect of reducing consumer choice.  While Plaintiffs 
acknowledge that the Generics have not been completely foreclosed from the market, neither were the generics in 
[Abbott]. […][C]omplete foreclosure is not the standard […] for establishing anticompetitive conduct”. 
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decisions adopted at the EU and Member States level.  As is in the U.S., product hopping is 
contrary to antitrust rules in the EU as well.  In its pharmaceutical sector inquiry, while 
recognizing the importance of incremental research “as it can lead to significant improvements of 
existing products, also from the perspective of the patients [the Commission emphasized the fact that] 
for 40% of the medicines in the sample selected for in depth investigation, which had lost exclusivity between 
2000 and 2007, originator companies launched second generation or follow-on medicines.  Nearly 60% of the 
patent related litigation cases between originator and generic companies examined in the context of the inquiry 
concern medicines that moved from first to second generation products.  The launch of a second generation 
product can be a scenario in which an originator company might want to make use of instruments that delay 
the market entry of generic products corresponding to the first generation product.  The companies have an 
incentive to do so in order to avoid generic exposure for the second generation product.  In this respect the 
inquiry indicates that in order to successfully launch a second generation medicine, originator companies 
undertake intensive marketing efforts with the aim of switching a substantial number of the patients to the new 
medicine prior to the market entry of a generic version of the first generation product.   If they succeed, the 
probability that generic companies will be able to gain a significant share of the market decreases significantly.  
If on the other hand generic companies enter the market before the patients are switched, originator companies 
may have difficulties in convincing doctors to prescribe their second generation product or in obtaining a high 
price for the second generation product.  On average the launch took place one year and five months before loss 
of exclusivity of the first generation product. In some cases the first medicine was withdrawn from the market 
some months after the launch of the second generation medicine.‖432 
13.2.2. AstraZeneca (EU) 
The first case in which product hopping was sanctioned by the European 
Commission is AstraZeneca.433  In this case, the first European patent application for 
omeprazole (brand-name Losec) was filed in 1979 (thus set to expire in 1999) and designated 
nine EPO Member States.  In 1998, AstraZeneca introduced a new version of Losec, which 
consisted in a repackaging of the original drug in a different pharmaceutical form, from 
capsules to tablets (only the means of delivery changed, while the active ingredient remained 
the same).434  The old version of Losec was withdrawn from the market and replaced by the 
new Losec MUPS (Multi-Unit Pellet System).  AstraZeneca also deregistered the marketing 
authorization for the capsule formulation in Denmark, Norway and Sweden.435  In 2000, 
                                                 
432  European Commission, Communication - Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical 
Sector Inquiry Report, SEC(2009) 952 COM(2009) 351 final, 8 July 2009, pp. 15-16. 
433  European Commission, COMP/A.37.507/F3, AstraZeneca, 15 June 2005. 
434  As in the U.S., “the preparation by an undertaking, even in a dominant position, of a strategy 
whose object it is to minimise erosion of its sales and to enable it to deal with competition from generic products is 
legitimate and is part of the normal competitive process, provided that the conduct envisaged does not depart from practices 
coming within the scope of competition on the merits, which is such as to benefit consumers. […][T]he fact that an 
undertaking in a dominant position is under no obligation to protect the interests of competitors does not make practices 
implemented solely to exclude competitors compatible with Article 82 EC.  The mere desire of an undertaking in a 
dominant position to protect its own commercial interests and to guard against competition from generic products and 
parallel imports does not justify recourse to practices falling outside the scope of competition on the merits.” (General 
Court, T-321/05, AstraZeneca, 1 July 2010, paras. 804, 816) 
435  The strategy relied on loopholes, now closed, in the marketing authorization system 
for generic products.  At the time, generic companies could not rely on the originator‟s clinical trials 
and necessary scientific literature if the marketing authorization was not in force on the date on which 
the generic abridged drug application was filed.  With the deregistration of the marketing 
authorisation, AstraZeneca prevented generic manufacturers from using the abridged procedure and 
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AstraZeneca launched a second-generation product, the esomeprazole (brand-name Nexium), 
a single isomer version of omeprazole and the successor of Losec capsules and Losec MUPS. 
Assessing the anticompetitiveness of AstraZeneca‟s conduct, the General Court 
expressly excluded that launching Losec MUPS or withdrawing Losec capsules from the 
market represented a breach of competition law, since those acts were not such as to raise 
legal barriers to entry, capable of delaying or preventing the introduction of generic products.  
The Court however confirmed the Commission‟s conclusion that the deregistration of Losec 
capsule‟s marketing authorization could not be considered competition on the merits, and as 
such constituted an abuse.436  The Court confirmed also the Commission‟s finding that the 
purpose of the deregistration was to create obstacles to the market entry of generic products 
in Denmark, Norway and Sweden.437  “[I]t is quite clear from the documents on which the Commission 
relied that AZ intended, by means of those deregistrations, to obstruct the introduction of generic products and 
parallel imports. […]  AZ was aware of the utility that the deregistration of the Losec capsule marketing 
authorisations might have for the purposes of raising barriers to entry of a regulatory nature, with regard both 
to the introduction on the market of generic products and to parallel imports.”438  The General Court thus 
concluded that, “in the absence of grounds connected with the legitimate interests of an undertaking engaged 
in competition on the merits and in the absence of objective justification, an undertaking in a dominant position 
cannot use regulatory procedures solely in such a way as to prevent or make more difficult the entry of 
competitors on the market.”439 
What the Court found abusive in this case is thus the fact that the conduct had no 
                                                                                                                                                   
thus delayed generic entry and increased the generic manufacturers‟ costs.  Council Directive 
65/65/EEC has been since repealed by Council Directive 2001/83/EEC, amended by Directive 
2004/27/EEC.  According to Art. 10, the deregistration of a marketing authorisation can no longer 
prevent generic applicant from relying on the originator‟s application. 
436  “[T]hat conduct was not based on the legitimate protection of an investment designed to contribute to 
competition on the merits, since AZ no longer had the exclusive right to make use of the results of the pharmacological 
and toxicological tests and clinical trials.  Furthermore, the applicants adduce no evidence to permit the inference that 
those deregistrations were necessary, or even useful, for the introduction on the market of Losec MUPS, or for the 
conversion of sales of Losec capsules to Losec MUPS.  Thus, […] the deregistration of the Losec capsule marketing 
authorisations was the sole aspect of the conduct identified by the Commission which would be capable of creating 
obstacles to the market entry of generic products and to parallel imports.” (General Court, T-321/05, 
AstraZeneca, 1 July 2010, par. 812). 
437  See also par. 901 (“With respect to the second abuse of a dominant position, it is also established 
that the purpose of the deregistrations of the marketing authorisations was to create obstacles to the market entry of 
generic products in Denmark, Norway and Sweden and to parallel imports in Sweden, thus resulting in partitioning of 
the common market.”)  The Court of Justice confirmed the General Court‟s findings in these regards 
(Court of Justice, C-457/10, AstraZeneca, 6 December 2012, paras. 130-131, “conduct like that impugned 
in the context of the second abuse – consisting in the deregistration, without objective justification and after the expiry of 
the exclusive right to make use of the results of the pharmacological and toxicological tests and clinical trials […], by 
which AZ intended […] to hinder the introduction of generic products and parallel imports – does not come within the 
scope of competition on the merits.  […][A]fter the expiry of the period of exclusivity […], conduct designed, inter alia, 
to prevent manufacturers of generic products from making use of their right to benefit from those results was not based in 
any way on the legitimate protection of an investment which came within the scope of competition on the merits”). 
438  General Court, T-321/05, AstraZeneca, 1 July 2010, par. 814. 
439  General Court, T-321/05, AstraZeneca, 1 July 2010, par. 817.  This statement was 
repeated almost verbatim by Court of Justice, C-457/12, AstraZeneca, 6 December 2012, par. 134 (“It 
is important to point out, in this context, that an undertaking which holds a dominant position has a special 
responsibility […][and] it cannot therefore use regulatory procedures in such a way as to prevent or make more difficult 
the entry of competitors on the market, in the absence of grounds relating to the defence of the legitimate interests of an 
undertaking engaged in competition on the merits or in the absence of objective justification.”). 
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reason to be undertaken other than to exclude rivals.  The subjective intention to harm rivals 
is objectivized by inferring it from the way in which the conduct was designed (i.e. from the 
fact that the conduct was designed to achieve an anticompetitive effect) and thus its objective 
justification (or lack thereof).440 
13.2.3. Servier (EU) 
The second case of product hopping decided at the EU level is Servier.441  This case 
has been already analyzed in the context of patent clusters and patent acquisition and will be 
discussed again in the chapter on pay for delay agreements.   
Servier had developed a second generation product, bioequivalent to the original, but 
based on a new salt (arginine instead of erbumine),442 for which it received a patent,443 and 
sold in different dosages (due to the different molecular weight of the new salt).  The second 
generation product was considered to have no therapeutic advantages for patients over the 
first generation product.444   
As in the cases discussed above, Servier‟s strategy was to withdraw the first generation 
product from the market before generic entry in order to switch patients to its second 
generation, patent-protected, drug.  In an internal document mentioned by the European 
Commission in its decision, Servier described the purpose of its strategy as threefold: (i) 
extend the duration of protection of Coversyl, (ii) replace Coversyl immediately, (iii) prevent 
substitution by generics.445  As the Commission explains, “Servier put significant effort and resources 
                                                 
440  See, e.g., C. Osti, What Is in a Name: The Concept of Abuse in Sui Generis Abuse, in 
G. Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  An 
International Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, p. 95. 
441  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014.  A similar case 
of product hopping (as well as patent cluster and pay-for-delay agreement) has been decided a year 
before by the European Commission.  The Commission however did not subject the originator‟s 
patenting activity and switching tactics to direct antitrust assessment and the decision will thus be 
discussed below in the chapter dedicated to pay for delay (see European Commission, AT.39226, 
Lundbeck, 19 June 2013). 
442  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 231 (“With 
regard to the [marketing authorization], the registration of perindopril arginine was based on bioequivalence studies 
with perindopril erbumine […] Servier relied on clinical and pre-clinical data from the perindopril erbumine marketing 
dossier.  The procedure started with an abridged submission in France […].  The fact that Servier used the abridged 
application route is evidence that Servier considers perindopril erbumine and arginine as bioequivalent.  In other words, 
perindopril arginine can be linked to a generic version of perindopril erbumine.”) 
443  “In France and in Poland, where Servier successfully shifted the existing patient base to the arginine 
salt, the relevant patents protecting that salt constituted an additional barrier to expansion for the generic producers 
offering the products based on the erbumine salt of perindopril. […]  The patents relating to the arginine salt must be 
viewed as barriers to expansion whenever Servier was successful in carrying out its switching strategy.” (European 
Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, paras. 2572, 2574) 
444  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 8.  At par. 
225, the European Commission states: “It is evident that Servier was aware of the lack of added therapeutic 
benefits of the new product and that it would not bring any cost savings to the state.  An undated internal Servier 
presentation refers to perindopril arginine as a ―New form without IMSP [Improvement in the Medical  Service  
Provided] (expected  saving  compared  with  the  existing  form)‖ which is, however, ―likely to impede or block generic 
entry (generic price applied on the outgoing patent of the existing form)‖“ 
445  “Servier explicitly lists as one advantage of the salt switch that ―Pharmacist‘s substitution of one salt 
by another one is currently not permitted in a certain number of countries‖.  More specifically, Servier explains that 
generic substitution at the pharmacy level is hindered due to the new dosages (rather than the salt switch in itself): ―[…] 
However we are not completely protected from generics.  The launch of Coversyl arginine will protect us against the 
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into the switch from erbumine to arginine.  The timing of the switch (between 2006 and 2008) and the 
withdrawal of perindopril erbumine were often described as crucial, complemented by aggressive detailing as 
described in internal documents.  From the beginning, the strategic goal of quickly replacing perindopril 
erbumine with arginine appears to have been an important element in the action plan to prolong the lifecycle of 
perindopril.”446 
The timing of the hop was carefully planned.  The first marketing authorization for 
the arginine salt was obtained much before it was actually commercialized.  
Commercialization was delayed until the time “generic entry of perindopril erbumine occurred (or was 
imminent) […][T]he development of perindopril arginine was pursued with the objective to find ―the 
immediate replacement (annuls and replaces) while retaining all the therapeutic indications‖.”447   
In light of all the above considerations, the Commission concluded that “the main 
objective of the introduction of perindopril arginine was to deny generic substitution due to the different dosages 
of the new product”448 and was therefore anticompetitive.  With regards to the effects, the 
Commission calculated that, “where generic perindopril was eventually launched, average price reductions 
for all perindopril products (i.e. also including Servier‘s perindopril) ranged from around 18% in Poland 
(where Servier successfully switched to perindopril arginine and limited generic penetration) to 90% in the 
United Kingdom (where, following the annulment of the ‗947 patent, there was considerable generic entry) 
compared to Servier‘s prevailing prices prior to generic entry.”449 
13.2.4. Gaviscon (UK) 
To conclude, also the UK OFT decided a case of product hopping.  In Gaviscon,450  
Reckitt Benckiser delisted its brand-name drug Gaviscon, before a generic name was created 
for it (which happens as soon as the drug comes off-patent), from the NHS software which 
enables doctors to search for originators‟ drugs and their generic equivalent.  As a result, 
doctors looking for Gaviscon could find neither it nor any generic equivalent.  They could 
however find the patent-protected second-generation drug named Gaviscon Advance Liquid, 
which obviously had no generic alternative.  Since a generic name for the first generation drug 
did not exist, doctors started writing prescriptions for the second-generation drug, Gaviscon 
Advance.  These prescriptions did not allow substitution by pharmacists. 
The UK OFT issued a Statement of Objections alleging Reckitt Benckiser abused its 
dominant position by deleting Gaviscon from the NHS prescription list and qualified such 
conduct as falling outside the scope of “normal competition” or “competition on the merits”.  
The OFT took the position that, while “an intention to convert sales of GL to GA may be consistent 
                                                                                                                                                   
potential generics of Coversyl because pharmacists cannot substitute medicines with different dosages‖.” (European 
Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 234)  See also par. 2971 (“Whether 
generic entry was eventually successful also depended on whether Servier had been able to switch prescriptions from 
perindopril erbumine to perindopril arginine.  In certain Member States, where substitution between perindopril 
erbumine and arginine was not automatically possible due to the difference in dosages (e.g. France, Belgium, Italy, 
Ireland), generic versions of perindopril erbumine could not be dispensed when Servier‘s perindopril arginine was 
prescribed. Thus, in France, the anticompetitive foreclosure was capable of having effects even after the patent and 
regulatory barriers had been overcome successfully by generic companies.”) 
446  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 235. 
447  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2156. 
448  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 242. 
449  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2912. 
450  OFT, CE/8931/08, Reckitt Benckiser, decision no. CA98/02/2011, 12 April 2011. 
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with a ‗normal lifecycle management strategy‘, achieving that strategy by the Withdrawal cannot itself be 
regarded as part of a ‗normal lifecycle management strategy‘.  While there is no accepted definition of a ‗normal 
lifecycle management strategy‘ in the pharmaceutical sector, the OFT considers that in this context a ‗normal 
lifecycle management strategy‘ would involve a pharmaceutical manufacturer choosing to replace an existing 
product with one that incorporates innovations that are valued by clinicians and patients alike, such that it can 
make commercial sense (irrespective of any gains from hindering the development of full generic competition) to 
withdraw the original product for which there may then be no (or only limited) residual demand‖451 
Central in the OFT‟s finding that the withdrawal did not form part of a normal 
lifecycle management strategy, was the fact that it “was motivated by a desire to hinder the 
development of full generic competition in the relevant market [and, given the significant demand for the 
first generation product at the time of withdrawal, it] would have been commercially irrational were it 
not for the anticipated benefits to RB of hindering the development of full generic competition.”452  As far as 
effects go, the OFT considered reasonable to expect that the delisting would restrict 
competition by hindering generic competition, or was at least capable of such effect.  
Ultimately, Reckitt Benckiser admitted having infringed UK and EU antitrust and was fined 
10.1 million pound. 
 
14. Denigration 
As seen in the chapter above, a soft switch may consist in the favorable comparison 
of the new product to the old one, potentially highlighting risks to the patient‟s health and 
side effects of the old drug, and putting pressure on doctors, hospitals and insurance 
companies to prefer the new.  This behavior may be used by the originator to migrate patients 
from the old drug (whose patent is expiring) to the newly introduced, patent-protected, drug.  
This same behavior, in the form of negative comparison of generics to the brand-name drug, 
used to prevent patients from switching once generics become available, has been addressed 
and sanctioned by the French Competition Authority (FCA) in two different cases, Sanofi and 
Schering.  As illustrated by the President of the FCA, Bruno Lasserre,  
“The Autorité refers to denigration as situations where an originator manufacturer communicates on 
a group of generics so as to discredit them, at a time when the rival medicine is about to enter the 
market, thereby seeking to bar or delay such entry […].  The aim for the originator laboratory is to 
put forward to the target audience false, unverified or/and misleading information that will instill or 
reinforce distrust on the part of health professionals vis-à-vis the group of generics concerned, a feeling 
that is then passed on to patients and in turn makes these professionals wary of prescribing or 
                                                 
451  OFT, CE/8931/08, Reckitt Benckiser, decision no. CA98/02/2011, 12 April 2011, 
pp. 277-278.  In an internal document, Reckitt Benckiser stated: “Our understanding is that removal from 
the NHS lists of an apparently effective market leading product which is trusted by GP‘s and patients alike is a very 
unusual, if not unique, course of action… Given that GA has been on the market since 1997 RB cannot claim that the 
switch is simply to a new improved version, and indeed if that were the case one assumes that the withdrawal of liquid 
would have been phased.”  The OFT thus took the view that “[t]he documents described above demonstrate that 
neither RB nor its advisors were of the view that the decision to carry out the Withdrawal was in any way ‗normal‘ or 
typical of the pharmaceutical industry. Rather, the decision to withdraw RB‘s leading product was described by RB as 
being ‗unique‘, ‗high risk‘ and as an ‗industry first‘.” (pp. 279-280) 
452  OFT, CE/8931/08, Reckitt Benckiser, decision no. CA98/02/2011, 12 April 2011, p. 
253. 
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delivering the generic drug.”453 
Both the Sanofi and Schering cases were opened following complaints from generic 
manufacturers (Teva in Sanofi and Arrow in Schering) that originators had denigrated quality, 
efficacy, and/or bioequivalence of their products with the aim of stopping doctors and 
pharmacists from substituting the brand-name drug for the generic. 
The originators‟ practices included warnings to pharmacists and doctors and in 
general alarming and negative messages, as well as baseless accusations, against generics, 
spread by medical visitors and pharmaceutical representatives.   
Several were the FCA‟s concerns in these cases: (i) the originator is often considered a 
credible and reliable source of information on drugs, particularly on its drug and relative 
generic version; (ii) doctors have relatively limited information on drugs and most of them 
comes (directly and indirectly) from the originator –  doctor‟s prescription practice is thus 
influenced by the originator‟s promotional efforts and information provided; (iii) doctors are 
reluctant to change their prescribing habits and are risk averse, they thus tend to favor 
products they know, especially between brand-name and generics;454 (iv) the warnings the 
originator spread about generics were considered by the FCA inaccurate, misleading and/or 
unsubstantiated. 
In Sanofi,455 the originator Sanofi-Aventis adopted a denigration strategy against 
generic version of its brand-name drug Plavix.  The strategy was aimed at doctors and 
pharmacists and had the objective of limiting the entry of competing generics in favor of 
Plavix and Sanofi‟s own generic Clopidogrel Winthrop.  Focus of the practice was a type of 
salt (hydrogen sulfate) on which Sanofi-Aventis had a patent still in effect at the time of loss 
of exclusivity on the main active substance.  Therefore, only Plavix and Sanofi‟s generic could 
use this salt while competing generics had to choose a different one to avoid patent 
infringement.456  The FCA, supported by the French pharmaceutical regulatory body 
                                                 
453  B. Lasserre, France – Raising Artificial Barriers against Generic Entry: The French 
Experience, in in G. Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition and Patent Law in the 
Pharmaceutical Sector.  An International Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, p. 193 (who continues “The 
denigration of generics can have powerful effects.  In the long term, it raises barriers to innovation, because the savings 
made on the greater use of generics are a means for the State Healthcare system to free up funding to allocate to truly 
innovative drugs. In the short run, the effect of denigration – as actually intended by the perpetrator – is a decrease in 
both the prescriptions by doctors of the generics concerned and a lower rate of substitution by dispensing chemists in favour 
of these. The IGAS report of 2012 identified denigration as one of the factors accounting for the slow growth of the 
proportion of generics in the general consumption of medicines in France and noted that, according to a survey conducted 
in early 2012, 89% of dispensing chemists but only a mere 43% of doctors believed that generics met the same 
requirements as originator drugs.” 
454  As noted by the FCA, “in general, healthcare professionals are weary of new medicinal products 
for which insufficient time was available for evaluation” and “there remains, moreover, among healthcare professionals, 
some reluctance towards generic medicines; it can be explained in particular by their ignorance of MA procedures, by 
their wrong appreciation of the regulatory framework on substitution and by their will to protect themselves from being 
held liable, in either civil or criminal terms.” (FCA, Press release of 14 May 2013: Medicinal products, The 
Autorité de la concurrence fines Sanofi-Aventis a total of €40.6 million for disparaging the generic 
versions of Plavix®, one of the world‟s best-selling medicines, available at 
http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.php?id_rub=483&id_article=2091, accessed 
on 6 August 2016) 
455  FCA, 13-D-11, Décision du 14 mai 2013 relative à des pratiques mises en oeuvre dans 
le secteur pharmaceutique. 
456  In addition, generics could not claim a specific therapeutic indication for the 
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(Afssaps), took the view that “[t]he variations in salts and therapeutic indications of Plavix®‘s generic 
competitors, only due to intellectual property issues rather than to specific chemical or medical characteristics, 
have no impact on the bioequivalence and substitutability of these medicines; this goes for all pathologies treated 
by Plavix®”.457  The different salt was considered as safe and effective as the one used by 
Sanofi, and the generics were thus perfectly substitutable for Sanofi‟s product. 
To avoid generic substitution, Sanofi put in place a communication strategy, at the 
exact time when specialty generic competitors were introduced in the market, aimed at 
influencing doctors and pharmacists.  Sanofi tried to convince doctors to use the indication 
“non substitutable” in their prescriptions and pharmacists to substitute Plavix only with 
Sanofi‟s generic.  Sanofi used its medical visitors and pharmaceutical representatives to 
systematically denigrate and discourage the use of competing generics by spreading inaccurate 
statements as to their efficacy and safety, and claiming doctors‟ and pharmacists‟ liability in 
case of medical issues arising from the prescription or substitution of Plavix for a competing 
generic using a different salt.458  The FCA received substantial feedback indicating that 
doctors and pharmacists were greatly influenced by Sanofi‟s strategy, which influenced both 
prescription and substitution practices.459  This is also due to the fact that Plavix was used to 
treat very serious cardio-vascular conditions (life-threatening illnesses) and the risks involved 
in the choice of treatment were substantial.  Sanofi‟s campaign was so extensive and 
persuasive that two pharmacists‟ associations had to distribute circulars to their members to 
                                                                                                                                                   
treatment of acute coronary syndrome, which involved the use of Plavix in combination with aspirin. 
457  FCA, Press release of 14 May 2013. 
458  Sanofi prepared and distributed to its representatives a set of Q&As to help them 
persuade doctors that it was safer to prescribe the brand-name drug and explicitly mention “not to be 
substituted” in the prescription. 
459  “In the Champagne-Ardenne area: ―antigeneric communication from MV [medical visitor] to 
pharmacies with an aim to prevent the substitution of Plavix®, unless the generic medicine should be Wintrop.  A 
communication that was sometimes aggressive: such substitution (except in the case of the Wintrop generic medicine 
marketed by the same brand) would be a « murderous » behaviour. Main argument: the salt difference.  Communication 
of the MV to doctors in order to encourage ―NS‖ [non-substitution].  Death cases linked to Plavix® substitution were 
mentioned by the MV […]‖ (paragraph 183 of the decision).  In the Nord-Pas-de-Calais area, the speeches identified 
mentioned in particular an ―endangerment of patients if plavix or its generic from the same brand is not prescribed‖, and 
a ―defamation of other generic medicines by insisting on the pharmacist‘s liability in a case a patient suffered 
complications following the substitution‖ (paragraph 186 of the decision).   In the Rhône-Alpes area, ―pharmacies notice 
numerous ―NS‖ indications on the medical prescriptions for clopidogrel (50% of medical prescriptions, because labs 
―terrorised‖ doctors with their speeches) and voice their discontent: ‗we must fight the disinformation spread by the labs 
every time a generic products enters the market‘― (paragraph 247 of the decision).  In the Centre area, cardiologists 
―systematically add on to their prescription the indication ―non substitutable‖.  In the Midi-Pyrénées area, ―both general 
practitioners and pharmacists do not wish to take any risks by prescribing or selling the generic product because there are 
doubts regarding the therapeutic efficiency of the generic products marketed (doubts on efficiency, concerns over medical 
consequences).  Doctors therefore add the indication ―non substitutable‖ on the prescriptions and chemists do not 
substitute or they reference the generic produced by Sanofi-Aventis, Winthrop‖. (paragraph 500 of the decision)  In the 
Picardie area, ―general practitioners and cardiologists do not wish to take any risks; consequently, more and more do the 
indications ―PLAVIX NS‖, even sometime ―CLOPIDOGREL WINTHROP NS‖, appear on prescriptions.‖ 
(paragraph 501 of the decision).  Likewise, numerous pharmacists reported that they chose to order the generic medicine 
marketed by Sanofi-Aventis, Clopidogrel Winthrop®, to avoid being held liable.  Among the many examples identified, 
here is a testimony of a retail pharmacist located in Pierrelatte: ―We sell the generic medicine of the Winthrop labs 
because it is made with the same salt as Plavix and we do not want to be held liable if we associated with the Kardegic. 
On this subject, the pharmacy‘s employees were very convinced by the SANOFI labs‘ discourse on the concept of liability 
upon delivery, in resulting cases of strokes and heart attacks (there are risks involved when mixing kardegic and a 
generic medicine other than winthrop)‖ (paragraph 494 of the decision).” (FCA, Press release of 14 May 2013) 
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counter the misinformation and restore scientific facts.460 
The campaign significantly slowed the expected rate of generic substitution.461  
Generics represented less than 65% of the market by the end of 2010 (Sanofi‟s own generic 
having 34%, about four times greater than the average),462 against the expected 75%.  
According to the FCA, this has cost the national health system (Assurance Maladie) €38 
million in expected savings between January 2010 and August 2011. 
Sanofi tried to justify its communications by arguing that the difference in salts raised 
issues regarding competing generics‟ efficacy and safety.  The FCA however noted that Sanofi 
had access to marketing authorizations confirming bioequivalence and substitutability of 
competing generics (despite the use of a different salt), against which Sanofi did not file any 
appeal.  Sanofi received also a letter from French public authorities confirming the inaccuracy 
of its insinuations.  The FCA indicated: “Sanofi-Aventis was free to submit to the healthcare authorities 
any information it had relating to the safety and efficiency of the Plavix® generics, not only within the 
framework of MA procedures, but also within that of pharmacovigilance.  But it did not bring to the attention 
of the healthcare authorities, after conclusion of the scientific debate before them, any argument that would allow 
for uncertainty about the quality and innocuousness of the Plavix® generics.”463 
The FCA defined the relevant market by looking at substitutability between drugs 
included in the relevant ATC4 category, and ultimately narrowed it down to Clopidogrel, for 
which it concluded there were no close substitutes (considering also the importance of the 
Plavix brand, which meant that doctors and patients would not take into consideration other 
drugs).  On this basis, the FCA found that Sanofi was dominant in the French market for 
Clopidogrel sold in pharmacies, in which it had a market share of about 60% between its 
brand-name drug Plavix and its own generic Winthrop.  As to the abuse of such dominance, 
the FCA found that Sanofi‟s communication plan created uncertainty about the quality and 
safety of generic substitutes, without any evidence to base it on.  Sanofi‟s statements were 
inaccurate and, as seen above, had the effect of maintaining or strengthening its dominant 
position by reducing the substitution rate.  The FCA thus concluded that Sanofi had abused 
its dominant position in the French market for Clopidogrel and imposed a fine of €40.6 
million. 
                                                 
460  The FCA referred to the following extracts: “―The salt used in the medicine is not critical 
element of its efficiency‖; ―The absence of a specific therapeutic indication (i.e. certain combinations with salicyclic acid) is 
not due to a possible lack of efficiency of generics, but to the fact that they were patented at a later date than the other 
therapeutic indications‖. (paragraph 195 of the decision)  ―Sanofi tried to do with the ―salts‖ what it had done with the 
―Excipients known to have a recognised action‖. Let‘s be objective: we understand Sanofi‘s motives (see above) when 
opposing generic medicines for its flagship product.  However, today, Afssaps did not hold the difference in salts to be a 
valid argument to prohibit Plavix‘s generic medicines, and it referenced the molecule in the generics directory.  The 
influence of the salts is becoming a non-argument, which chemists cannot be fooled by: no serious publication can justify 
Winthrop‘s position‖. (paragraph 197 of the decision)” (FCA, Press release of 14 May 2013) 
461  “Case documents show that the substitution rate for Plavix® follows a very atypical pattern.  
Indeed, despite great volumes and turnover, as well as numerous generic labs operating in the market, this rate, after it 
soared when generic were introduced, then experienced a steady decline for numerous months; no other similar molecule 
experienced such a pattern.”  (FCA, Press release of 14 May 2013) 
462  “The practice at stake also resulted in an exceptional penetration rate for Sanofi-Aventis‘ own 
generic medicine, Clopidogrel Winthrop® (now called Clopidogrel Zentiva®). This product enjoys a market share of 
over 34% in the clopidogrel generics segment; in other words its market share is four times greater than the one usually 
held by Sanofi-Aventis in the French generic medicine market.‖ (FCA, Press release of 14 May 2013) 
463  FCA, Press release of 14 May 2013. 
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The FCA decision was appealed by Sanofi that argued that it has, as an originator, a 
duty to provide complete and precise information on the characteristics of its product to 
doctors and pharmacists, and that its communication plan simply fulfilled this obligation.  
The Paris Court of Appeal464 rejected this argument, focusing on the way in which Sanofi 
communicated the information.  According to the Court, Sanofi highlighted differences 
between its products and the competing generics that had no impact on their efficacy or 
substitutability and simply resulted from Sanofi‟s patent portfolio.  With its communication 
plan, Sanofi implied that the difference in salts could affect efficacy or safety of competing 
generics, which in turn created uncertainty in doctors and pharmacists as to the 
substitutability of Plavix with its competing generics.  Sanofi‟s medical representatives 
encouraged doctors to indicate “non-substitutable” on their prescriptions and directed 
pharmacists to substitute Plavix only with Sanofi‟s generic.  The Court thus confirmed that 
spreading incomplete, ambiguous or misleading information on generics that creates 
unsubstantiated uncertainty about their quality and discourages doctors and pharmacists from 
generic substitution constitutes an abuse of dominance.  An appeal was lodged against the 
Court of Appeals decision and is now pending before the Cour de cassation. 
As anticipated, the FCA decided another case of denigration in the pharmaceutical 
industry, Schering.465  The case started with a complaint from a generic (Arrow) and ended with 
a fine imposed on Schering-Plough of €15.3 million for the disparagement of Arrow‟s generic 
and the granting of loyalty discounts to pharmacists to block generic entry.466  In this case, 
contrary to Sanofi, the FCA ordered Schering, by way of an injunction at the very beginning of 
the investigation, to publish a statement in the specialized press reminding doctors and 
pharmacists of the strict bioequivalence between its brand-name drug Subutex and its generic 
version, and of the absence of health risks from generic substitution. 
As in Sanofi, also in Schering the FCA found that the originator adopted a 
communication plan focusing on lack of bioequivalence and health risks of generic 
substitutes, aimed at delaying generic entry and discouraging substitution.  Referring to 
differences in appearance, dissolution and excipients, the originator‟s purpose was to create 
uncertainty in doctors and pharmacists about the risk of psychiatric instability of patients and 
misuse and trafficking of the generic versions of Subutex.467  To carry out its communication 
                                                 
464  Paris Court of Appeal, 2013/12370, 18 December 2014. 
465  FCA, 13-D-21, Décision du 18 décembre 2013 relative à des pratiques mises en 
œuvre sur le marché français de la buprénorphine haut dosage commercialisée en ville. 
466  See B. Lasserre, France – Raising Artificial Barriers against Generic Entry: The 
French Experience, in in G. Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition and Patent Law in the 
Pharmaceutical Sector.  An International Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, pp. 194-195 (the FCA 
“recommended that visits made to doctors by sales representatives on their behalf should come under tighter control and 
sanctions.  The […][FCA] negotiated and obtained from infringing pharmaceutical companies a commitment to avoid in 
the future such denigration practices within their ranks, by incorporating preventive measures within their corporate 
compliance programmes.  It would be advisable that all manufacturers take similar initiatives and train their staff, 
especially within the marketing department, in order to raise their awareness of competition, in anticipation of the patent 
expiry on the originator medicine and the entry of generics.) 
467  The content of the message changed before and after generic entry.  Before, the plan 
focused on the alleged greater risk of misuse by patients, due to the fact that the generic was easier to 
dissolve and it was thus claimed that more patients could inject the product.  After generic entry, the 
communication was based on the alleged negative consequences for patients of the difference in 
excipients, and the consequent risk of liability for doctors of a prescription that allowed substitution.  
None of the allegations were substantiated by studies. 
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plan, “Schering-Plough organised seminars and telephone meetings and prepared sales pitch templates for its 
medical and pharmaceutical representatives so that they could disseminate an alarmist message to doctors and 
pharmacists on the risks of prescribing or dispensing the Arrow generic, even though it did not have access to 
any specific medical study to justify such a position.”468 
The plan was complemented by the offer of considerable discounts to pharmacists on 
the Subutex purchased, to “saturate their aisles” before generic entry, and minimize generics 
market penetration.  The commercial policy was to favor large orders by setting increasing 
volume discounts (in the form of vouchers in exchange for additional services supposedly 
rendered by pharmacists) for the purchase of significant quantities of Subutex, and extended 
payment deadlines.  By using this strategy, Schering aimed at making pharmacists store up to 
three months of supply. 
Schering‟s plan was very effective.469  It significantly increased the number of “non-
substitutable” prescriptions (67% of the total) and pharmacists‟ reluctance in substituting 
Subutex when this reference was not included.  This affected the substitution rate and the 
generic version had a market share “twice as low as the average for molecules in the same therapeutic 
category one year after the entry of the first generic.”  The effects on the national health system were 
significant with several million euros per year of unrealized savings. 
While the FCA‟s decisions are certainly questionable, they highlight the fact that the 
pharmaceutical industry has characteristics (both in terms of structure and players) that make 
certain abusive conducts more effective (and concerning).  The wording and interpretation of 
Article 102 TFEU (and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, if not Section 5 of the FTC Act)470 are 
broad enough to address these practices when they fall outside of competition on the merits 
and a certain degree of market power is involved.471  The question here (as well as above with 
                                                 
468  FCA, Press release of 19 December 2013: Medicinal Products, The Autorité de la 
concurrence fines the Schering-Plough pharmaceutical laboratory a total of 15.3 million euro for 
hindering entry onto the market of the generic of its originator medicinal product Subutex®, available 
at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/user/standard.php?id_rub=483&id_article=2325, accessed 
on 6 August 2016.  As in Sanofi, the FCA indicated specific examples in its press release: “during a 
training seminar for medical representatives, they were asked to ―instil certain ―doubts‖ in the minds of pharmacists 
regarding change‖ (―2006 pharmacy strategy - Communicate information on the specificities of drug addicts, and the 
specific nature of care: instil certain ―doubts‖ regarding change (psyc. comorbidities, risk of misuse and 
trafficking)/paragraph 369 of the decision.  Schering-Plough‘s CEO reproduced the speech delivered by a medical 
representative to a pharmacist that he wished to be disseminated due to its effectiveness: ―1) The excipients are not the 
same (talc + silica) 2) no-one knows what would happen if injected 3) indeed, initial problems with generic products have 
arisen in Beziers‖/paragraph 375 of the decision”. 
469  The FCA referred to a regional manager of Schering prasing the job done by their 
“drug addition specialists.  It quoted “I believe that their actions have greatly curbed the establishment of the 
generic product. Every day I meet pharmacists in the field who tell me that had the drug addiction specialists not been 
there, they would have immediately ordered the generic product (the same is true for doctors‘ prescriptions). (…) I believe 
that given the penetration rate of the generic, they are performing exceptionally well” (FCA, Press release of 19 
December 2013). 
470  Section 5 of the FTC Act authorizes the FTC to intervene prosecute “unfair method 
of competition”, including deceptive acts or practices.  A conduct may be considered deceptive when 
it involves representation, omission, or practice likely to mislead customers affecting their conduct or 
decision-making (See, e.g., FTC Policy Statement on Deception, 14 October 1983, available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1983/10/ftc-policy-statement-deception, accessed on 6 
August 2016). 
471  As stated by the Court of Justice, “the preparation by an undertaking, even in a dominant 
position, of a strategy whose object it is to minimise the erosion of its sales and to enable it to deal with competition from 
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regards to the “soft switch” in product hopping cases) is: why authorities should not 
scrutinize (and, if found anticompetitive, sanction) conducts by dominant undertakings aimed 
at, and having the effect of, foreclosing competitors (and ultimately consumers) by means 
other than competition on the merits?  This type of conduct is not only premised on 
inaccurate and misleading statements, but takes also advantage of information asymmetries, 
regulatory framework (both patent- and health- related), market structure, price disconnect 
and doctor‟s inertia.  It is thus not simply the mendacity of the conduct to be of concern, but 
the (ab)use of a position in which the originator is not only for its commercial success, but 
also thanks to a regulatory framework aimed at protecting consumers and enhancing 
consumer welfare.  Misinformation by originators is thus particularly troubling in the 
pharmaceutical industry, especially if part of a plan to prevent or delay generic substitution.  
As recapped by David Tayar, “the FCA seems to impose a duty of candor in such a situation, leaving 
little room for ambiguity.  Thus, to be considered lawful, a promotional campaign would likely need to focus on 
differences that are therapeutically relevant and backed by scientific studies (alternatively, if the differences in 
question have no therapeutic relevance, the originator company would need to expressly say so, which would 
likely diminish the impact of its promotional campaign).  Also, merely questioning (even implicitly) the efficacy 
and safety of approved generics is likely to be found abusive.”472 
 
15. Provision of Misleading Information to the Patent Office 
We discussed how the number of patents keeps on increasing and how the grant of 
patents not respecting the patentability requirements may prevent competition and slow 
down innovation.  The malfunctioning of the patent system cannot be attributed solely to a 
somewhat lenient and precipitous473 review (and an incentive towards the granting of patents) 
by patent examiners.  Also the way in which the patent system is devised and the patent 
applicants‟ conducts play their part.  With regards to the patent system, the confidentiality 
that characterizes much of the application process, and the limited to no participation of third 
parties in the decision to grant a patent (which can be challenged only ex-post grant), exclude a 
significant help from interested third parties to the patent office in weeding out the 
applications that do not meet the patent requirements.  The patent system (and the patent 
office review) is heavily reliant on the applicants‟ honesty, candor, good faith and 
cooperation.  To ensure celerity of the review, examiners rely on the patent applicants being 
truthful in their statements and disclosing prior art and every other relevant information they 
are aware of that may exclude patentability.  This grants the patent applicant the ability to 
influence the outcome of such decisions, e.g., by withholding information that might prevent 
it from getting a patent.474   
                                                                                                                                                   
generic products is legitimate and is part of the normal competitive process, provided that the conduct envisaged does not 
depart from practices coming within the scope of competition on the merits, which is such as to benefit consumers.” 
(Court of Justice, C-457/10, AstraZeneca, 6 December 2012, par. 129) 
472  D. Tayar, Spreading Misleading Information on a Competitor‟s Product as an Abuse 
of a Dominant Position: a French Pharmaceutical Story?, 5(9) Journal of European Competition Law 
& Practice, 2014, p. 634. 
473  As noted by H.J. Hovenkamp, M.D. Janis, M.A. Lemley, C.R. Leslie, M.A. Carrier, IP 
and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law, Aspen, 2014, 
p. 11-5, “[p]atent examiners spend very little time with each application – only 18 hours per patent on average over the 
course of three years.” 
474  In Analytichem lnt‟l, Inc. v. Har-Len Assoc., Inc., 490 F. Supp., W.D. Pa., 1980, p. 
126 
 
Although the patent system includes remedies in case of improper conduct, these 
consist mainly in the declaration of invalidity or unenforceability of the patent.  As noted by 
the General Court, “the existence of specific remedies which make it possible to rectify, or even annul, 
patents and SPCs granted unlawfully [does not limit the] application of the competition rules […].  Where 
behaviour falls within the scope of the competition rules, those rules apply irrespective of whether that behaviour 
may also be caught by other rules, of national origin or otherwise, which pursue separate objectives.  Similarly, 
the existence of remedies specific to the patent system is not capable of altering the conditions of application of 
the prohibitions laid down in competition law and, in particular, of requiring, in cases of behaviour such as 
that at issue in the present case, proof of the anticompetitive effects produced by such behaviour.”475 
Professor Hovenkamp perfectly explained why the antitrust intervention is important 
even when the patent system has the means (directly or through inequitable conduct, patent 
misuse or abuse of rights) to address the applicant‟s conduct (but not to remedy nor to deter 
it): 
“a mere declaration of invalidity as punishment on a patent that was invalid to begin with is not 
really a punishment at all.  For example, if a patent would not be issued if the true facts were known, 
then an applicant has every incentive to hide an essential fact when the probability of detection is less 
than 100% and the only penalty is that the patent is unenforceable. […]  It is the rough equivalent 
                                                                                                                                                   
275, the Court qualified as “abuse of a patent […] seeking economic gain by persuading or coercing the purchasing 
public to believe that a patent right exists when in fact and in truth it does not.  The situation is akin to a private 
individual, like the legendary Captain from Kopenick, pretending to be a tax collector authorized by law to exact tribute 
when in fact he is an impostor without authority”.  It is the applicants‟ ability and incentive to withhold 
potentially deleterious information that led to the introduction of the concept of inequitable conduct 
in the U.S.  Under inequitable conduct, failure to disclose material information or provision of false 
information to the patent office, to mislead or deceive the examiner, determines unenforceability of 
the entire resulting patent (even in cases where the withheld information, while material, would not 
have prevented the grant of the patent if disclosed).  As explained by Professor Leslie, “[f]rom a 
patentee‘s perspective, the legal ramifications of inequitable conduct are sweeping: the entire patent is rendered 
unenforceable, even those patent claims that are not the root of the inequitable conduct.  This may seem punitive, or at 
least sufficiently far-reaching, to deter deception.  In some circumstances, however, this patent remedy may be inadequate 
to ensure candor. First, some inequitable conduct permeates the entire patent and not merely individual claims. […]  
Second, the claims that are not directly the target of the inequitable conduct may not be particularly valuable. […]  The 
fact that the applicant attaches the valid claims to the invalid claim, and thereby puts the valid claims at risk, suggests 
that the valid claims had a significantly lower expected value than the claim for which the applicant committed 
inequitable conduct.” (C. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation Policy, 
34(4) The Journal of Corporation Law, 2009, p. 1282)  The doctrine of inequitable conduct essentially 
operates as a defense in infringement lawsuits.  The defendants arguing that a patent is unenforceable 
must show by clear and convincing evidence that the patentee breached its duty of candor to the 
patent office.  If the inequitable conduct defense is successful, the defendant is not liable for 
infringement.  See D. Lim, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Law: Empirical, Doctrinal and Policy 
Perspectives, Edward Elgar, 2013, p. 130, citing Landers v. Sideways, LLC, No. 4: OOCV-35-M, 2004 
WL 5569335, W.D. Ky., 2004, p. 23 (“To successfully assert a breach of the duty of candor, otherwise known as 
inequitable conduct, based on a patent applicant‘s submission of untrue statements to the PTO, the person making the 
allegations must ‗demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the false information was material to the patent 
examiner‘s decision to issue the patent; and (2) the patentee intended to mislead the examiner‟”).  In Therasense, 
Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d, Fed. Cir., 2011, pp. 1290-92, the Federal Circuit raised the 
standard of proof for inequitable conduct requiring the demonstration of “but for” materiality and 
specific intent to deceive (except in cases of affirmative egregious conduct).  After Therasense, the 
Federal Circuit expressly stated in Transweb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Props. Co., 812 F.3d, Fed. Cir., 
2016, p. 1307, that “the showing required for proving inequitable conduct and the showing required for proving the 
fraud component of Walker Processliability may be nearly identical”. 
475  General Court, T-321/05, AstraZeneca v Commission, 1 July 2010, par. 366. 
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of a criminal rule for theft that required as its only penalty that the thief return the stolen good.”476 
The lack of a serious and in-depth evaluation of the merits of a patent application, as 
well as the lack of discretion by the patent office, has been considered an important element 
in determining the anticompetitiveness of a practice.  In particular, the intervention of the 
patent office or of any other regulatory agency does not protect the undertaking from 
responsibility when no (or a very superficial) analysis has been conducted and/or when the 
office had no discretion in deciding whether to grant the request. 
Antitrust is thus concerned as much as patent law about the grant of unmeritorious 
patents as a result of inaccurate or misleading representations to the patent office.  This 
conduct may constitute patent misuse/abuse of rights as well as abuse of a dominant position 
or illegal monopolization and trigger antitrust intervention.  In the U.S., the Supreme Court 
expressed this concept in Walker Process by stating that, “[t]o permit recovery of treble damages for the 
fraudulent procurement of the patent coupled with violations of § 2 […] would also promote the purposes so 
well expressed in Precision Instrument,[…]: ‗A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. * * 
* (It) is an exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to access to a free and open 
market.  The far-reaching social and economic consequences of a patent, therefore, give the public a paramount 
interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct 
and that such monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope.‘“477 
In the EU, the General Court expressly recognized the harm to the public interest of 
misleading representations to the patent office to obtain patents to which the undertaking is 
not entitled, or to which it is entitled for a shorter period.  This conduct is “contrary to the public 
                                                 
476  H.J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System. A Reexamination, 76(3) Ohio 
State Law Journal, 2015, p. 548.  See also C. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of 
Innovation Policy, 34(4) The Journal of Corporation Law, 2009, pp. 1280-1281.  Unenforceability or 
invalidity of the patent “is hardly sufficient to right the wrong that the patentee has committed.  The competitors 
should never have been sued for infringement in the first place – and should never have had to worry about an 
infringement suit when deciding to enter the market – because no patent should have issued.  The unenforceable patent 
necessarily complicated – and probably delayed – market entry.  Furthermore, the competitors had to endure the cost, 
diversion of resources, and distraction of defending themselves against a lawsuit that should have never been brought.  
[…][C]ompetitors who stayed out of the market for fear of drawing an infringement lawsuit could now safely enter the 
market.  But those competitors that had previously been excluded from the market did not have a cause of action for lost 
profits: Patent law creates no affirmative rights for non-patentees injured by invalid or unenforceable patents.  In addition 
to the competitors, consumers also suffer damages caused by applicant misdeeds.  For example, in Walker Process, even 
though its patent was invalid, FMC was able to use it to deter market entry for almost the entire life of the patent.  Yet 
once the patent expired, the market price fell from $150 per unit to $50.  Because of the patent fraud, the patentee was 
able to charge consumers three times the market price.  Consumers who paid supracompetitive prices – designed to reward 
inventors with valid patents – would not be able to recover for the overcharge because inequitable conduct does nothing to 
compensate victims of the patentee‘s deception.  In sum, if consumers and competitors can only look to the patent system 
for relief, they will not be compensated for their injuries caused by the patentee‘s misconduct. […][T]he reliance on patent 
law to the exclusion of antitrust remedies risks making applicant misconduct cost-beneficial.  The facts of Walker 
Process itself also show why antitrust law is a better vehicle to punish and deter patent fraud, and to remedy the 
anticompetitive and anti-innovative effects of patent fraud. […]  Although Walker Process did argue an inequitable 
conduct defense, this alone would have been inadequate to right FMC‘s wrong.  FMC had already charged the monopoly 
price for the life of the patent; rendering the patent unenforceable would have been meaningless because the patent expired 
before the litigation finished.  Patent law could not disgorge the ill-gotten gains, but antitrust law could.  Even if a patent 
is invalidated, it would not disgorge the ill-gotten gains from the patent‘s effective exclusion of competitors.  This failure to 
disgorge makes the misconduct profitable.‖ 
477  Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S., 
1965, p. 177. 
128 
 
interest, as weighed up and applied by the legislator.  As the Commission observes, such misuse of the patent 
system potentially reduces the incentive to engage in innovation, since it enables the company in a dominant 
position to maintain its exclusivity beyond the period envisaged by the legislator.”478 
In the U.S., in addition to the patentee‟s market power, for a finding of an antitrust 
violation it is required to demonstrate that the misrepresentation has been deliberately carried 
out (i.e. deceptive intent) and had, or may have had, anticompetitive effects.  Under Walker 
Process, a patentee might violate antitrust if (i) it made a material omission or misstatement to 
the Patent Office with a specific intent to deceive the examiner,479 (ii) the patent would not 
have been granted but for the misrepresentation or omission,480 (iii) it acquired or maintained 
a monopoly through patent fraud,481 and (iv) the plaintiff has suffered antitrust injury as a 
result.482   
As seen, antitrust intervention is not barred by the existence of rules concerning 
                                                 
478  General Court, T-321/05, AstraZeneca v Commission, 1 July 2010, par. 367. 
479  Fraud in the procurement of the patent, which has to be intentional, material (i.e. on 
facts), and can consist in misrepresentation or omission, is defined by the Court as “knowingly and 
willfully misrepresenting facts to the Patent Office” (see also Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d, 9th 
Cir., 1979, p. 996, “[t]he road to the Patent Office is so tortuous and patent litigation is usually so complex, that 
‗knowing and willful fraud‘ as the term is used in Walker can mean no less than clear, convincing proof of intentional 
fraud involving affirmative dishonesty, ‗a deliberately planned and carefully executed scheme to defraud the Patent Office.‘ 
[...] Patent fraud cases prior to Walker required a rigorous standard of deceit […]  Walker requires no less.”). 
480  “Fraud on the PTO cannot produce such an anticompetitive market effect unless the PTO would not 
have issued the patent but for the patentee‘s misrepresentation or omission.  The cases are unanimously in accord with 
this higher standard of causation.  As the Eight Circuit has explained, where the patent would have issued even absent 
the fraud, the patentee does not receive any legal right he would not have received anyway.  It makes little sense to hold 
him liable for enforcing the patent in such a circumstance” (H.J. Hovenkamp, M.D. Janis, M.A. Lemley, C.R. 
Leslie, M.A. Carrier, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual 
Property Law, Aspen, 2014, p. 11-17). 
481  The relation between the tort of fraud and antitrust violation is that from genus to 
species.  As explained by the Federal Circuit: “[t]he tort of fraud requires that there was a successful deception, 
and action taken by the person deceived that would not have otherwise been taken.  Applied to patent prosecution, fraud 
requires (1) a false representation or deliberate omission of a fact material to patentability, (2) made with the intent to 
deceive the patent examiner, (3) on which the examiner justifiably relied in granting the patent, and (4) but for which 
misrepresentation or deliberate omission the patent would not have been granted.  A finding of fraud can of itself render 
the patent unenforceable”.  To find an antitrust violation, the elements above have to be accompanied by 
market power, anticompetitive effects and “a greater showing of scienter and materiality‖ than when seeking 
unenforceability based on conduct before the Patent Office (C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d, 
Fed. Cir., 1998, p. 1364). 
482  It is required a minimum level of enforcement of the fraudulently procured patent to 
find antitrust liability.  Patent enforcement may take several forms, it is obviously satisfied in case the 
patentee starts an infringement lawsuit, but it is equally present when the patentee threatened to sue 
the antitrust plaintiff (Unitherm Food Systems v. Swift-Eckrich, 2004 WL 1543286, Fed. Cir., 
2004) or third parties, such as the plaintiff‟s customers (Hydril Co. LP v. Grant Prideco LP, 474 F.3d, 
2007).  “In the pharmaceutical context, the requirement that the patent be enforced is typically met by listing the patent 
in the FDA‘s Orange Book and filing an infringement lawsuit that triggers a 30-month stay.  However, the Federal 
Circuit has held that defending a patent in a declaratory judgment action is also sufficient to establish enforcement for 
purposes of a Walker Process claim.  Courts have not expressly addressed whether a mere Orange Book listing, without 
filing for a patent infringement suit, constitutes enforcement of a patent under Walker Process‖ (American Bar 
Association, Pharmaceutical Industry Antitrust Handbook, 2009, p. 314)  The Federal Circuit stated 
that: “antitrust liability under Section 2 of the Sherman Act may arise when a patent has been procured by knowing 
and willful fraud, the patentee has market power in the relevant market, and has used its fraudulently obtained patent to 
restrain competition.” (C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., 157 F.3d, Fed. Cir., 1998, p. 1364) 
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annulment of patents.  In case antitrust liability is raised, “[w]hile one of its elements is the 
fraudulent procurement of a patent, the action does not directly seek the patent‘s annulment.  […][The 
patentee] must answer […] in treble damages to those injured by any monopolistic action taken under the 
fraudulent patent claim.  Nor can the interest in protecting patentees from ―innumerable vexatious suits‖ be 
used to frustrate the assertion of rights conferred by the antitrust laws.  It must be remembered that we deal 
only with a special class of patents, i.e., those procured by intentional fraud.”483 
Both the European Commission and the EU Courts dealt with the provision of 
misleading information in the obtainment of a patent in the already mentioned AstraZeneca 
case.484  The General Court observed that:  
“the submission to the public authorities of misleading information liable to lead them into error and 
therefore to make possible the grant of an exclusive right to which an undertaking is not entitled, or to 
which it is entitled for a shorter period, constitutes a practice falling outside the scope of competition on 
the merits which may be particularly restrictive of competition.  Such conduct is not in keeping with 
the special responsibility of an undertaking in a dominant position not to impair, by conduct falling 
outside the scope of competition on the merits, genuine undistorted competition in the common 
market”.485 
To be in breach of antitrust, the misleading nature of the representations made to 
public authorities for the purposes of improperly obtaining exclusive rights must be assessed 
in concreto, on the basis of objective factors and circumstances of each case.  What needs to be 
determined is whether the conduct in question was such as to lead the authorities wrongly to 
grant exclusive rights to the dominant undertaking.486  There is no need to show proof of the 
                                                 
483  Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S., 
1965, p. 176. 
484  The case originated from the adoption by AstraZeneca of a favorable interpretation 
of the regulation governing the grant of an SPC.  AstraZeneca took the view that the date of the first 
marketing authorization, on which the duration of an SPC is based, was not the date of the grant of 
the marketing authorization but the date on which the authorization was effective, i.e. after other types 
of authorisations and decisions, such as those relating to pricing or reimbursement (this interpretation 
was definitely rejected by the Court of Justice only in December 2003, C-127/00, Hässle AB v 
Ratiopharm GmbH, thus after AstraZeneca‟s conduct).  It thus submitted its applications using this 
later date, without making it clear to the authorities (which relied on the applicant to supply all the 
necessary information, without verifying the submission independently) that that was not the date on 
which the authorization was granted (and concealing information about certain relatively early 
marketing authorizations).  The Commission excluded any relevance of AstraZeneca‟s alleged good 
faith interpretation of the law and sanctioned its misleading and opaque representations to the public 
authorities.  As the General Court summarized it, “AZ adopted a consistent and linear course of conduct, 
characterised by the communication to the patent offices of misleading representations for the purposes of obtaining the 
issue of SPCs to which it was not entitled (Germany, Finland, Denmark and Norway), or to which it was entitled for a 
shorter period (Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland and the Netherlands.” (General Court, T-321/05, 
AstraZeneca v Commission, 1 July 2010, par. 598)  Indeed, according to the transitional provisions 
under Art. 19(1) of Regulation 1786/92 (introducing the SPC), it was possible to apply for an SPC for 
products that obtained the first marketing authorisation after 1 January 1985, whereas for Germany 
and Denmark this date was 1 January 1988.  Since the first technical marketing authorisation for 
omeprazole was obtained in France on 15 April 1987, according to the transitional provisions 
AstraZeneca could not have applied for an SPC in Germany and Denmark.  AstraZeneca thus 
communicated to the patent offices March 1988, i.e. the date when the drug‟s prices were published in 
Luxemburg, as the date of the first marketing authorization. 
485  General Court, T-321/05, AstraZeneca v Commission, 1 July 2010, par. 355. 
486  As seen, “the limited discretion of public authorities or the absence of any obligation on their part to 
130 
 
deliberate nature of the patentee‟s deceiving conduct or bad faith487 to identify an abuse of 
dominance, “intention none the less also constitutes a relevant factor which may, should the case arise, be 
taken into consideration by the Commission.”488  There is also no need for the fraudulently procured 
patent to be enforced for a finding of an abuse.  “The mere possession by an undertaking of an 
exclusive right normally results in keeping competitors away, since public regulations require them to respect 
that exclusive right.”489  In synthesis, “the submission to the patent offices of objectively misleading 
representations by an undertaking in a dominant position which are of such a nature as to lead those offices to 
grant it [a patent] to which it is not entitled or to which it is entitled for a shorter period, thus resulting in a 
restriction or elimination of competition, constitute[s] an abuse of that position.”490 
As anticipated, there is no need to show either deliberate intent or actual enforcement 
of the wrongfully obtained patent, only that the exclusive right has been granted on the basis 
of false or inaccurate information.  The U.S. and the EU approaches thus diverge, with the 
U.S. much more oriented towards non-intervention.  While in the U.S. specific intent and 
enforcement of the fraudulently obtained exclusive right are required, this is not the case in 
the EU.  
In AstraZeneca, the Court of Justice confirmed the Commission decision and 
concluded: “AZ‘s consistent and linear conduct […] characterised by the notification to the patent offices of 
                                                                                                                                                   
verify the accuracy or veracity of the information provided may be relevant factors to be taken into consideration for the 
purposes of determining whether the practice in question is liable to raise regulatory obstacles to competition.” (General 
Court, T-321/05, AstraZeneca v Commission, 1 July 2010, par. 357)  In the case at stake, the 
transitional rules governing the grant of an SPC did not leave the patent office any scope for 
discretion.  At the following paragraph, the General Court specifies that: “in so far as an undertaking in a 
dominant position is granted an unlawful exclusive right as a result of an error by it in a communication with public 
authorities, its special responsibility not to impair, by methods falling outside the scope of competition on the merits, 
genuine undistorted competition in the common market requires it, at the very least, to inform the public authorities of 
this so as enable them to rectify those irregularities.”  In the case at stake, at par. 493, the Court found that, “in 
view of the context in which […] representations to the patent attorneys and patent offices were made, AZ could not 
reasonably be unaware that, in the absence of an express disclosure of the interpretation that it intended to adopt […] 
the patent offices would be prompted to construe those representations as indicating that the first technical marketing 
authorisation in the Community had been issued in Luxembourg in ‗March 1988‘. Thus, there was no need for the 
Commission to demonstrate AZ‘s bad faith or positively fraudulent intent on its part, it being sufficient to note that such 
conduct, characterised by a manifest lack of transparency, is contrary to the special responsibility of an undertaking in a 
dominant position”. 
487  General Court, T-321/05, AstraZeneca v Commission, 1 July 2010, par. 494 (“the 
applicants‘ multiple arguments based on the alleged absence of bad faith on the part of AZ, as regards both the 
interpretation that it chose to adopt of Regulation No 1768/92 and the manner in which the SPC applications were 
presented, or the significance that it attached to the Luxembourg list, cannot constitute objective justification for the 
absence of proactive disclosure of the nature of the dates mentioned in relation to the Luxembourg and French marketing 
authorisations, on the one hand, and of the interpretation of Regulation No 1768/92 which led to the choice of those 
dates, on the other.”) 
488  General Court, T-321/05, AstraZeneca v Commission, 1 July 2010, par. 359 
(“[I]ntention can […] be taken into account to support the conclusion that the undertaking concerned abused a 
dominant position, even if that conclusion should primarily be based on an objective finding that the abusive conduct 
actually took place.”). 
489  General Court, T-321/05, AstraZeneca v Commission, 1 July 2010, par. 362 (the 
Court continues: “Furthermore, to the extent that the applicants argue that an intellectual property right must have 
been exercised in legal proceedings, that argument would tend to make the application of Article [102 TFEU] 
conditional on the contravention by competitors of the public regulations by their infringing the exclusive right of an 
undertaking; that argument must be rejected. Moreover, third parties seldom have information enabling them to know 
whether an exclusive right has been unlawfully granted.‖). 
490  General Court, T-321/05, AstraZeneca v Commission, 1 July 2010, par. 361. 
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highly misleading representations and by a manifest lack of transparency […] by which AZ deliberately 
attempted to mislead the patent offices and judicial authorities in order to keep for as long as possible its 
monopoly on the PPI market, fell outside the scope of competition on the merits.”491 
The position taken by EU Courts has been recently criticized by Professor Podszun as 
potentially resulting in “far-reaching obligations.”492  This critic, however, fails to recognize the 
importance of an in concreto assessment.  What makes transparency relevant in AstraZeneca is 
not only nor mainly the patentees‟ dominant position; it is the limited discretion of public 
authorities and/or the absence of any obligation on their part to verify the accuracy of the 
information received (as well as the lack of a third party ex ante review of the application).  
One could thus answer to the critic by noting that, yes, a dominant undertaking has a duty of 
candor vis-à-vis public authorities but only when they heavily rely on the undertaking‟s 
information to make their assessment, because they have no discretion in their decision-
making, they do not review in depth the application and/or they cannot ask third parties for 
their views.  
 
16. Excessive Pricing 
Although not exclusive to drugs, excessive pricing has a relevant role to play in the 
pharmaceutical industry, at least in the countries that recognize it as a competition law 
violation.  As seen above, the creation of a new drug is lengthy, costly, and risky.  A limited 
number of new drugs reaches the market and an even smaller number has sufficient success 
to justify the continuing investments in their manufacturing, distribution and marketing.  
                                                 
491  Court of Justice, C-457/12, AstraZeneca, 6 December 2012, par. 93.  See also paras. 
95-96: “the onus was on AZ to disclose to the patent offices all the relevant information and in particular the existence 
of that French technical authorisation in order to allow them to decide, with full knowledge of the facts, which of those 
authorisations they wished to accept for the purposes of issuing the SPC.  Thus, by making misleading representations to 
those patent offices, by concealing the existence of that French technical authorisation and deliberately leading them to 
believe that the date of 21 March 1988 corresponded to the Luxembourg technical authorisation and that that latter 
was the first MA in the Community, AZ knowingly accepted that those offices granted it SPCs which they would not 
have issued had they known of the existence of the French technical authorisation and which would have been shown to 
be unlawful in the event that the alternative interpretation proposed by AZ was not followed by the national courts or the 
Court of Justice.”  To conclude, at par. 99 the Court of Justice clarified that “contrary to what the EFPIA 
submits, the General Court did not hold that undertakings in a dominant position had to be infallible in their dealings 
with regulatory authorities and that each objectively wrong representation made by such an undertaking constituted an 
abuse of that position, even where the error was made unintentionally and immediately rectified.  It is sufficient to note in 
this connection that, first, that example is radically different from AZ‘s conduct in the present case, and that, secondly, 
the General Court pointed out […] that the assessment of whether representations made to public authorities for the 
purposes of improperly obtaining exclusive rights are misleading must be made in concreto and may vary according to the 
specific circumstances of each case. It thus cannot be inferred from that judgment that any patent application made by 
such an undertaking which is rejected on the ground that it does not satisfy the patentability criteria automatically gives 
rise to liability under Article [102 TFEU].” 
492  “Imagine the case of a trademark to be registered with the Office for Harmonization in the Internal 
Market.  Does a dominant undertaking need to disclose concerns it has that the new trademark could interfere with the 
rights of other trademark-holders?  Does the undertaking need to disclose legal opinions of its in-house legal team, which 
may have seen difficulties with some requirements of the Trade Mark Regulation?  Or think of the notification of a 
merger to the European Commission: does a dominant undertaking act abusively if it omits certain facts that the 
Commission deems relevant for assessing the case, even if it is not clear law that these facts need to be presented?  Should 
the undertaking disclose unfavourable market definitions that had been contemplated before?”  (R. Podszun, Can 
competition law repair patent law and administrative procedures? AstraZeneca, 51(1) Common 
Market Law Review, 2014, p. 289) 
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Even those that are successfully marketed have to (potentially) face competition from other 
drugs curing the same disease.  There is however a limited number of drugs that makes it all 
worth it, the blockbusters.  These are usually leap forward in the cure of certain diseases and 
often enjoy very strong patent protection and limited to no competition.  Most if not all of 
the drugs discussed in this work are blockbusters as they grant their originator a monopoly 
(or quasi-monopoly) and thus the power to abuse it.493 
While profit maximization is a legitimate commercial objective, fundamental to 
recoup R&D costs across products (by charging more for the small number of successful 
drugs), indiscriminate freedom to set prices in a heavily patent-protected industry (where the 
patients‟ health, and the State‟s finances, are at stake) might lead to excess.  Since the ability to 
charge inflated prices is often connected with the grant of a patent (without a patent, a new 
drug would be easily and inexpensively copied and sold at a price close to its marginal cost), it 
is necessary to determine whether charging excessive prices can be considered to fall within 
the purpose of patent law or it constitutes an abuse. 
To encourage investments in innovation to the benefit of consumers, patent rights are 
intended to give their holder the ability to charge prices above marginal cost.  This ensures 
the originator that its investment will be repaid if the product is successful and thus 
incentivizes investments that would not be otherwise made due to the risk of free-riding by 
generic manufacturers.  The power to charge monopoly prices is thus one of the means 
devised by the patent system to reach its purpose.  Without the power to charge monopoly 
prices, certain life-saving drugs would not be developed.  It is thus better to pay higher prices 
in exchange for a new and improved drug, instead of not having it at all. 
While prices above marginal costs may be considered a key element in reaching the 
patent‟s purpose (and thus stimulate innovation and the introduction of new drugs), this does 
not mean that originators in a dominant position should be left free to charge any price they 
want for the entire duration of their public-granted monopoly.  In exchange for the creation 
of an innovative drug, society pays a consideration to the originator, the grant of a patent.  
This consideration, however, cannot be unlimited and should be proportioned to what is 
necessary to achieve the society‟s purpose. 
Exclusivity is not granted for the originator to maximize the return on its investment, 
it is granted to maximize society‟s interest in long-term consumer welfare.  If the originator 
uses the patent in a way contrary to the enhancement of consumer welfare, i.e. in a way that 
                                                 
493  As explained in details by Professor Abbot, “[a]s a consequence of exclusive marketing rights 
(whether through patent or regulatory exclusivity), the originator pharmaceutical product is not subject to competition 
from the ―same product‖ (from a juridical standpoint) during the term of protection.  In principle, this enables the 
originator to charge whatever price it decides upon without fear of competition.  In practice, there are potential constraints 
on pricing.  First, there may be pharmaceutical products that are reasonable substitutes (even if not ―the same‖), and this 
introduces the element of potential price competition.  Second, the price that the originator can charge will depend on 
demand for the product, which is influenced by the degree to which it is required by patient/consumers, and ultimately by 
the amount the patient/consumers can afford to pay.  The maximum pricing power for the originator is manifest when it 
owns exclusive marketing rights for a unique (or breakthrough) therapy for a life-saving pharmaceutical product.  If there 
is no reasonable substitute product, pricing power is effectively constrained only by the capacity of the patient/health 
provider to pay.” (F.M. Abbott, Excessive Pharmaceutical Prices and Competition Law: Doctrinal 
Development to Protect Public Health, 6(3) UC Irvine Law Review, forthcoming Spring 2017, p. 4, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2719095, accessed on 6 August 
2016) 
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make the consideration paid by society excessive, its behavior can be deemed abusive.  As 
Professor Cotter points out: 
“Even if patents are necessary to stimulate the invention of drugs and other health-related subject 
matter, this does not necessarily mean that the optimal policy is, always and everywhere, to permit 
patent owners to charge whatever the market will bear.  Public utility monopolies are regulated, after 
all; and in theory there is no obvious reason why monopolies based on patents could not be too, as they 
are in countries that regulate drug prices.”494 
The monopoly rests on a patent granted by the public and is limited by the public 
interest.  Social costs and social benefits of a patent should be kept aligned and this is what 
the prohibition of excessive pricing do.  Intervention is thus based on the idea that the self-
correcting capacity of excessive prices, i.e. stimulating entry of competing products, is neither 
sufficient nor optimal to enhance consumer welfare, in particular when patents and drugs are 
involved.   
As explained by economists, it is post-entry prices that attract entry, rather than pre-
entry prices.  Since competition would significantly lower prices (particularly in the 
pharmaceutical industry), originators have much higher incentives to concentrate the 
significant investments necessary to discover and bring a new drug to the market in the 
development of drugs for which a rival is not already on the market.495 
In the U.S., the non-interventionist school has gained the upper hand and excessive 
prices are not subject to antitrust intervention.496  The idea is that new entrants will challenge 
                                                 
494  T.F. Cotter, Patents, Antitrust, and the High Cost of Health Care, The Antitrust 
Source, April 2014, p. 3. 
495  M. Motta, A. de Streel, Exploitative and Exclusionary Excessive Prices in EU Law, in 
C.-D. Ehlermann, I. Atanasiu (eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2003: What Is an Abuse of a 
Dominant Position?, Hart, 2006, p. 49. 
496  In Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S., 
2004, p. 407, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant 
charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system.  The 
opportunity to charge monopoly prices - at least for a short period - is what attracts ―business acumen‖ in the first place; 
it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth.” (see also Berkey Photo, Inc. v Eastman 
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d, 2d Cir., 1979, p. 297, “[a] pristine monopolist […] may charge as high a rate as the 
market will bear”; and Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wisconsin v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d, 
7th Cir., 1995, p. 1413, “[a] natural monopolist that acquired and maintained its monopoly without excluding 
competitors by improper means is not guilty of ‗monopolizing‘ in violation of the Sherman Act […] and can therefore 
charge any price that it wants, […] for the antitrust laws are not a price-control statute or a public utility or common-
carrier rate-regulation statute.”)  B. Baer, Reflections on the Role of Competition Agencies When Patents 
Become Essential, Remarks at the 19th Annual International Bar Association Competition 
Conference, 11 September 2015, available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-
general-bill-baer-delivers-remarks-19th-annual-international-bar, accessed on 6 August 2016, explained 
that: “We don‘t use antitrust enforcement to regulate royalties.  That notion of price controls interferes with free market 
competition and blunts incentives to innovate.  For this reason, U.S. antitrust law does not bar ‗excessive pricing‘ in and 
of itself.  Rather, lawful monopolists are perfectly free to charge monopoly prices if they choose to do so.  This approach 
promotes innovation from rivals or new entrants drawn by the lure of large rewards.  In this regard, we make common 
cause with our European enforcement colleagues.  Even though Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) authorizes actions against excessive pricing, the European Commission has said that 
―addressing excessive prices is an area of antitrust where limited and very cautious intervention is warranted.‖”  See 
also D. Lim, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Law: Empirical, Doctrinal and Policy Perspectives, Edward 
Elgar, 2013, pp. 122-124 (“Even in the heyday of vigorous enforcement, case law made it clear that ―[a] patent 
empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with the leverage of that monopoly.‖ (Brulotte v. Thys 
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the incumbent and excessive prices will not be upheld on a long-term basis.  Intervention 
would lower prices and increase consumer welfare in the short-run, but new competitors 
would be less likely to enter the market, the incumbent would not be able to maximize its 
profits and investments in innovation would be disincentivized.497 
While the non-interventionist stance has compelling arguments,498 this works takes the 
view that, especially in the pharmaceutical sector, a careful intervention in cases of blatantly 
excessive prices has positive effects on consumer welfare (both in the short and in the long 
                                                                                                                                                   
Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964))  Indeed, royalty rates well of up to 30 percent have been upheld. (See, e.g., W. L. Gore 
& Assocs., Inc. v. Carlisle Co., 529 F.2d 614, 623 (3d Cir. 1976) (30% Royalty).) […] One reason for this 
approach is simply that parties should be free to decide what the value of the deal is worth to them. Thus under antitrust 
law, the position has been that prices are not subject to regulatory oversight. Another reason for the reluctance of courts to 
intervene is that it is too complicated and speculative a venture.”). 
497  The U.S. non-interventionist stance does not seem to reason well anymore with a 
long list of U.S. politicians.  On 22 August 2016, U.S. senator Amy Klobuchar wrote a letter to the 
FTC to urge it to investigate the almost 500% price increase over a less than 10-year period of 
EpiPen, the dominant drug-filled injectable device used to counter potentially deadly allergic reactions 
(with a market share close to 90%).  The Senator noted that “[a]lthough the antitrust laws do not prohibit 
price gouging, regardless of how unseemly it may be, they do prohibit the use of unreasonable restraints of trade to 
facilitate or protect a price increase."  What is interesting about this letter is that it specifically refers to the 
fact that “there does not appear to be any justification for the continual price increases of EpiPen.  Manufacturing costs 
for the product have been stable and Mylan does not need to recover the product‘s research and development costs” and 
qualify the lack of prohibition of excessive pricing as “unseemly”.  The Senator‟s letter refers to two 
other cases that have recently shaken the public opinion, 5,500% price increase of Daraprim by Turing 
Pharmaceuticals and the 525 and 212% increase in Nitropress and Isuprel‟s prices by Valeant 
Pharmaceuticals.  Not much different has been the response of the former Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton, who recently stated “I‘ve put forward a plan to address exorbitant drug price hikes like these.  As part of 
my plan, I‘ve made clear that pharmaceutical manufacturers should be required to explain significant price increases, and 
prove that any additional costs are linked to additional patient benefits and better value.  Since there is no apparent 
justification in this case, I am calling on Mylan to immediately reduce the price of EpiPens.” 
(https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/statements/2016/08/24/hillary-clinton-statement-on-
epipen-pricing/)  The EpiPen scandal is being addressed from different perspectives.  The New York 
Attorney General is investigating contracts between Mylan and schools, apparently providing for an 
exclusivity obligation (i.e. a requirement not to purchase competitors‟ epinephrine injectors for a year).  
If confirmed, Mylan may be found in breach of antitrust law as its conduct effectively excluded rivals 
from the market for the sale of epinephrine auto-injectors to schools, in which Mylan is dominant.  
The West Virginia Attorney General has taken a different approach, opening an investigation of 
Mylan‟s “pay-for-delay” patent settlement with Teva, which prevented the latter from introducing its 
generic version of EpiPen, as well as of rebates paid under West Virginia‟s Medicaid program.  Other 
actions have been brough alleging breach of consumer protection laws rather than antitrust.  The 
grounds on which some of these actions are based tend to coincide with those typical of excessive 
pricing.  Particularly, a class action filed in Ohio alleges that Mylan “has a legal duty and obligation to set a 
fair, affordable, and reasonable Price and not hold consumers hostage by forcing them to pay exorbitant prices for its 
medically necessary product.” (Linda Bates vs Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Court of Common Pleas 
Hamilton County Ohio, Civil Consumer Class Action Complaint, p. 5)  While the EpiPen case is likely 
to be ultimately closed on grounds other than excessive pricing, having Mylan apparently engaged also 
in exclusive dealing, sham litigation (including the filing of a sham citizen petition at the FDA) and 
other potentially exclusionary practices, the positions repeatedly taken by influential U.S. politicians 
against price gouging may be an indication that it is now time for U.S. antitrust to cautiously move 
towards a more interventionist approach. 
498  The non-interventionists often indicate the difficulty in determining when a price is 
excessive and the fact that courts are not price regulators as the main arguments in favor of their 
approach. 
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run).499  The desirability of this approach is confirmed by the case of Sovaldi, the 
revolutionary drug treating chronic hepatitis C introduced by Gilead, in respect of which 
neither the U.S. nor the EU agencies500 have opened any investigation.501 
Having taken an interventionist stance, the first (and biggest) issue is defining the limit 
                                                 
499  A similar position has been taken by Professor Abbot, who states: “[t]he arguments 
against application of excessive pricing doctrine are essentially arguments against government interference in the free 
market.  But, no market is ―less free‖ than the pharmaceutical market.  It is regulated every step of the way.  Except, in 
the United States, with respect to prices.  And it is somewhat odd to argue that patent owners protected by legislative 
monopolies are pricing in a freely competitive market.  It is obvious that they are not. […]  This is not an argument 
against patents.  It is an argument against using patents as a basis for charging of excessive prices.  It is an argument 
that even in the context of patent protected pharmaceuticals there is such thing as a ―reasonable price‖, and conversely an 
―excessive price‖.  It is an argument in favor of returning to the original objective of the Sherman Act: protection of the 
public.” (F.M. Abbott, Excessive Pharmaceutical Prices and Competition Law: Doctrinal Development 
to Protect Public Health, 6(3) UC Irvine Law Review, forthcoming Spring 2017, pp. 17-18, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2719095, accessed on 6 August 2016.) 
500  Notwithstanding the more interventionist approach, the European Commission 
expressly stated with regards to cure for hepatitis C that: “[r]egarding the proposal to open an investigation 
into the possible violation of EU rules on competition […] by the high prices of new drugs against hepatitis C, on the 
basis of the information currently available, the nature of the market appears to be dynamic with several new entrants 
and more products in advanced stages of development.  There is therefore a limited likelihood that the Commission may 
find an infringement of the EU competition rules, in particular Article 102 TFEU prohibiting the abuse of a dominant 
position.” (Commission reply of 8 February 2016 to Petition No 0058/2015, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=COMPARL&reference=PE-
576.836&format=PDF&language=EN&secondRef=01, accessed on 6 August 2016).  See also D.W. 
Hull, M.J. Clancy, The Application of EU Competition Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector, 7(2) Journal 
of European Competition Law & Practice, 2016, p. 156, “in December 2014, the European Commission 
declined to open an investigation into allegations of excessive prices for Hepatitis C drugs, despite pressure from members 
of the European Parliament. In response to two parliamentary questions, the Commission noted that Member States 
have both economic bargaining power and regulatory powers to control the prices of pharmaceutical products, and that 
such powers were being used to limit the prices of the Hepatitis C drugs. (European Commission, Response to 
Parliamentary Question P-008636/2014, 22 December 2014, and Response to Parliamentary Question E-000261-
15 (31 March 2015))”. 
501  The effects of this decision have been explained by Professor Abbot.  “When Sovaldi 
was introduced in late 2013, it was a unique therapy successful in the treatment of hepatitis C.  There was tremendous 
pent-up patient demand for the product.  Gilead, with the advice of a team of investment bankers and pharmaceutical 
market specialists, took advantage of the situation to set a price of $84,000 for a 12 week course of treatment, and 
earned over US$14 billion in the first year of sales.  Gilead did not develop Sovaldi.  The drug was initially developed 
by a smaller biotechnology company, Pharmasett, which was purchased by Gilead for $11 billion in 2011. […]  The 
process by which the price of Sovaldi was set by Gilead makes for chilling reading from a public health standpoint.  The 
executives at Gilead essentially set out to determine what would be the maximum price that would stress the limits of 
political and public opinion, but not quite break it.  This was with a clear understanding that the pricing of the drug 
would severely undermine state public health procurement budgets.  Gilead has refused to furnish Congress with direct 
information regarding its cost of bringing the product to market, despite being requested to do so.  When Gilead 
introduced Sovaldi it had strong reason to believe that reasonably comparable alternative treatments would be approved 
by the FDA and introduced by other originators within a year or two.  In other words, there would be a temporal limit 
to its unconstrained pricing power.  In fact, such products were introduced and, approximately 1.5 years following the 
introduction of Sovaldi, Gilead was forced to reduce the price significantly.  While it may be suggested that this 
demonstrates that market forces will act to constrain pricing power, it remains that Gilead charged an excessive price 
when it introduced the product and for more than one year, and that even with the introduction of competition, the price 
for hepatitis C treatments offered by originators is very high and continues to threaten public health budgets.” (F.M. 
Abbott, Excessive Pharmaceutical Prices and Competition Law: Doctrinal Development to Protect 
Public Health, 6(3) UC Irvine Law Review, forthcoming Spring 2017, pp. 4-5, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2719095, accessed on 6 August 2016) 
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over which a price is considered excessive.  Authorities are generally reluctant to investigate 
potential cases of excessive pricing due to the risk of setting the threshold too low, thus 
reducing incentives to innovate.502 
At the EU level, Article 102(a) TFEU expressly includes in the non-exhaustive list of 
abuses of dominance: “directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair 
trading conditions”.  The Court of Justice observed that this provision could be invoked where a 
dominant undertaking charged “a price which is excessive because it had no reasonable relation to the 
economic value of the product supplied.”503 
The demonstration that a price is excessive requires evidence that (i) the difference 
between the costs actually incurred to bring the product to the market504 and the price actually 
charged for it is excessive (the Court refers to cost of production,505 selling price and profit 
margin),506 and if it is, (ii) the price imposed is either unfair in itself or when compared to 
competing products.507  These two conditions are cumulative.  Neither an excessive profit 
margin nor an unfair price are sufficient by themselves to prove an abuse, both need to be 
present.  As summarized by the European Commission, “[t]he United Brands test implies in essence 
that prices are only excessive if the profit margin is excessive and this is not the result of superior efficiency but 
                                                 
502  This trade-off has been recently recognized by the European Commissioner for 
Competition Margrethe Vestager, who noted: “if we want businesses to invest in coming up with those new 
ideas, then of course we need to make sure that innovation brings rewards.  So when we do take action against excessive 
prices, we need to make sure we‘re not taking away the rewards that encourage businesses to innovate.  Because we need 
the innovation.” (M. Vestager, Protecting consumers from exploitation, 21 November 2016, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/protecting-consumers-
exploitation_en, accessed on 11 December 2016) 
503  Court of Justice, C-27/76, United Brands v Commission, 14 February 1978, par. 250. 
504  Which should include R&D and any fixed cost and take into account the cross-
subsidization between successful and unsuccessful projects. 
505  In the case of drugs, the cost includes R&D (taking into account failures) and clinical 
testing, as well as any other expense incurred to secure marketing approval and bring the new drug to 
the market.  “In other words, the cost of developing and approving a new product must include a risk factor.” (F.M. 
Abbott, Excessive Pharmaceutical Prices and Competition Law: Doctrinal Development to Protect 
Public Health, 6(3) UC Irvine Law Review, forthcoming Spring 2017, p. 18, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2719095, accessed on 6 August 2016) 
506  In United Brands, the Court of Justice concluded that a profit margin of 7% is not 
excessive. 
507  Court of Justice, C-27/76, United Brands v Commission, 14 February 1978, paras. 
249-252 (“It is advisable therefore to ascertain whether the dominant undertaking has made use of the opportunities 
arising out of its dominant position in such a way as to reap trading benefits which it would not have reaped if there had 
been normal and sufficiently effective competition.  In this case charging a price which is excessive because it has no 
reasonable relation to the economic value of the product supplied would be such an abuse.  This excess could, inter alia, 
be determined objectively if it were possible for it to be calculated by making a comparison between the selling price of the 
product in question and its cost of production, which would disclose the amount of the profit margin […].  The questions 
therefore to be determined are whether the difference between the costs actually incurred and the price actually charged is 
excessive, and, if the answer to this question is in the affirmative, whether a price has been imposed which is either unfair 
in itself or when compared to competing products.”)  The European Commission explained that “[i]n the case 
law the United Brands test has a central place, even though the Court has stressed that it is not the only way to assess 
excessive prices. In particular, the case law shows that, depending on the circumstances of the case, the assessment focuses 
more on the second limb of the test, especially where it is obvious that the dominant firm is not providing a superior 
product.” (OECD Roundtable on Excessive Prices, European Union, 17 October 2011, par. 62, 
available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/multilateral/2011_oct_excessive_prices.pdf, accessed 
on 6 August 2016) 
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of the exercise of durable market power.”508 
The European Commission is often more hesitant509 than national authorities when it 
comes to excessive pricing.  As indicated by David Hull and Michael Clancy, “Pricing is likely to 
continue to be a focus of enforcement activity.  While the European Commission does not seem inclined to 
intervene as it sees pricing in this sector as primarily a national issue, it would not be surprising to see 
continued activity at the national level in light of the increasing concern over the impact of high-priced drugs on 
national healthcare budgets.”510  While most certainly right on the enforcement at the national 
level, the two authors may be wrong on the approach that will be taken by the European 
Commission.  In a recent speech, the European Commissioner for Competition Margrethe 
Vestager opened the door to a more interventionist approach on excessive pricing.  She stated 
that the European Commission is “bound to come across cases where competition hasn‘t been enough to 
provide a real choice.  Where dominant businesses are exploiting their customers, by charging excessive prices or 
imposing unfair terms.  We have to be careful […] that we don‘t end up with competition authorities taking 
the place of the market.  The last thing we should be doing is to set ourselves up as a regulator, deciding on the 
right price.  But there can still be times when we need to intervene.”511  She then proceeded to mention 
                                                 
508  OECD Roundtable on Excessive Prices, European Union, 17 October 2011, par. 63, 
available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/multilateral/2011_oct_excessive_prices.pdf, accessed 
on 6 August 2016.  The Commission went on to say that “The case law described above seems sometimes to 
indicate that any appreciable deviation from competitive levels could be deemed excessive.  To the extent that cases are 
only pursued in markets where high prices and profits have lost their signalling function to attract entry, it could be 
argued that such a clear but strict comparator is not inappropriate.  The enforcement practice indicates that generally only 
cases concerning large deviations from competitive levels are pursued.  In view of the complexity of excessive pricing cases 
this is arguably a wise use of enforcement resources.” 
509  The European Commission explained its cautious and restrained approach as follows:  
“It seems that enforcement action against excessive prices has only been considered as a last resort, in markets where high 
prices and high profits do not have their usual signalling function to attract entry and expansion because of very high and 
long lasting barriers to entry and expansion.  This recognises that even though in many markets prices may be 
temporarily high, due to a mismatch of demand and supply or the exercise of market power, it is preferable to give 
market forces the time to play out and entry and expansion to take place, thereby bringing prices back to more normal 
levels.  We have not seen enforcement activity in such markets, recognising that it would be unwise to run the risk of 
taking a wrong decision and furthermore spend enforcement resources on solving a problem that would solve itself over 
time anyway.  This is so even in markets characterised by sufficient entry barriers where there can be dominant firms.  Of 
course, it may be that a dominant firm tries to prevent this process of entry and expansion taking place by artificially 
raising entry barriers.  However, in such a situation it is more efficient for the competition authority to tackle the raising 
of these entry barriers directly since this will likely amount to an exclusionary abuse. If, however, the market is 
characterized by such entry barriers that it is unlikely that market forces over time will bring prices down, enforcement 
actions aimed directly against excessive prices may indeed be appropriate.”  As the European Commission itself 
noted, “the relatively small number of cases that we have been able to deal with, may already indicate that addressing 
excessive prices is an area of antitrust where limited and very cautious intervention is warranted.  Indeed, the case law 
indicates that enforcement against excessive prices is generally only contemplated in markets with an entrenched dominant 
position where entry and expansion of competitors can not be expected to ensure effective competition in the foreseeable 
future, that is markets where high prices and high profits do not have their usual signalling function to attract entry and 
expansion.” (OECD Roundtable on Excessive Prices, European Union, 17 October 2011, paras. 42, 60-
61, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/multilateral/2011_oct_excessive_prices.pdf, accessed 
on 6 August 2016) 
510  D.W. Hull, M.J. Clancy, The Application of EU Competition Law in the 
Pharmaceutical Sector, 7(2) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2016, pp. 160-161 
511  M. Vestager, Protecting consumers from exploitation, 21 November 2016, available 
at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/protecting-consumers-
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three examples, one of which is the pharmaceutical industry. 
“Often people‘s health relies on drugs that are sold by just one company.  That can be because the 
company has a patent.  But it can also be that no one else is interested in coming in to the market, 
because there isn‘t enough demand for the drug to make it worth their while.  That isn't a problem in 
itself, if prices stay at a reasonable level.  But there can be times when prices get so high that they just 
can‘t be justified. After all, people rely on these medicines for their health, even their lives.  The best 
answer is often to adjust regulation, or to give the health systems that buy those medicines better 
bargaining power. But as the recent action by the British and Italian competition authorities shows, 
there can be times when competition rules need to do their bit to deal with excessive prices.” 
In conclusion,  
“we need to act carefully when we deal with excessive prices.  The best defence against exploitation 
remains the ability to walk away.  So we can often protect consumers just by stopping powerful 
companies from driving their rivals out of the market.  But we still have the option of acting directly 
against excessive prices.  Because we have a responsibility to the public. And we should be willing to 
use every means we have to fulfill that responsibility.”512 
At the Member States level, in November 2014 the Italian competition authority 
(ICA) launched an investigation into the prices charged by Aspen Pharma for its life-saving 
and irreplaceable drugs used in the treatment of certain forms of cancer.513  On 29 September 
2016, the ICA imposed a fine in excess of EUR 5 million on Aspen for unfair and excessive 
prices (in violation of Art. 102(a) of the TFEU).  After purchasing the marketing rights from 
GlaxoSmithKline – whose patent expired decades before – Aspen started negotiating with the 
Italian pharmaceutical regulatory body (AIFA) to obtain a significant price increase, in the 
absence of economic justifications.  To obtain such an increase, which ultimately ranged 
between 300% and 1500% of the initial prices, Aspen threatened to interrupt the direct (and 
indirect through parallel trade) supply of the drugs to the Italian market.  The ICA‟s 
investigation on the unfair practice was carried out through a two-phase test that measured 
the disproportion between prices and costs.  The unreasonableness of this disproportion was 
the basis for a finding of unfair prices also in the light of specific context and behavioral 
factors, such as: the absence of economic justifications for the increase, the absence of any 
extra-economic benefits for patients, and the damage caused to the National Health System 
(Sistema Sanitario Nazionale – SSN). 
In the UK, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) dealt with excessive 
pricing in a case involving Pfizer and Flynn Pharma.514  A Statement of Objections was issued 
                                                                                                                                                   
exploitation_en, accessed on 11 December 2016.  The fact that the Commission should not act as a 
price regulator does not imply it should not intervene.  Indeed, as national authorities did, the 
Commission will likely limit its intervention to the determination that the price charged is unlawful 
and order that the price be adjusted to a reasonable level.  Provide guidance on this point may be 
difficult, but should be a considered a priority. 
512  Ibid. 
513  ICA, A480, Price Increase of Aspen‟s Drugs 
(http://www.agcm.it/concorrenza/concorrenza-
delibere/open/41256297003874BD/5D5033789DE6406AC1258051003331BE.html, accessed on 11 
December 2016). 
514  CMA, CE/9742-13, Phenytoin sodium capsules: suspected unfair pricing, 1 May 2013 
(https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/investigation-into-the-supply-of-pharmaceutical-products, accessed 
on 11 December 2016). 
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on 6 August 2015 alleging that these companies abused their dominant positions in the 
markets for the manufacture and supply of phenytoin sodium capsules (an anti-epilepsy 
drug)515 respectively, by charging excessive and unfair prices in the UK.  On 7 December 
2016, the CMA concluded the investigation and imposed a record fine of GBP 84.2 million 
on Pfizer and GBP 5.2 million on Flynn Pharma.  The CMA also ordered the two companies 
to reduce their prices.  Prices can be profitable, but must not be excessive and unfair.  The 
CMA found that, prior to September 2012, Pfizer manufactured and sold phenytoin sodium 
capsules under the brand name Epanutin and the prices were regulated.  In September 2012, 
Pfizer sold the distribution rights for the UK to Flynn Pharma, which de-branded the drug, 
making it no longer subject to price regulation.  Pfizer kept on manufacturing the drug, but 
started supplying it to Flynn Pharma at prices significantly higher than those at which it 
previously sold Epanutin in the UK – between 780% and 1,600% higher.  Flynn Pharma then 
distributed the drug to UK wholesalers and pharmacies at prices between 2,300% and 2,600% 
higher than those previously charged by Pfizer.  The CMA found that the amount paid by the 
NHS for 100mg packs of the drug increased from GBP 2.83 to more than GBP 50.  As a 
result of the price increases, the CMA estimated that the NHS expenditure on phenytoin 
sodium capsules increased from GBP 2 million a year prior to September 2012 to 
approximately GBP 50 million in 2013.  Ann Pope, CMA Senior Director of Antitrust 
Enforcement, commented: 
“While businesses are generally free to set prices as they see fit, those that hold a dominant position 
have a special responsibility to ensure that their conduct does not impair genuine competition and that 
their prices are not excessive and unfair.  The prices that the CMA is concerned about in this case are 
very high compared to those prices previously charged and have led to a big increase in the total NHS 
drug bill for what is a very important drug for tens of thousands of patients.”516 
In the same vein, Philip Marsden, Chairman of the Case Decision Group for the 
CMA‟s investigation, emphasized that: 
“There is no justification for such rises when phenytoin sodium capsules are a very old drug for which 
there has been no recent innovation or significant investment.  This is the highest fine the CMA has 
imposed and it sends out a clear message to the sector that we are determined to crack down on such 
behaviour and to protect customers, including the NHS, and taxpayers from being exploited.”517 
An almost identical case of excessive pricing, in which the originator removed the 
drug from price regulation and significantly increased prices, has been opened by the CMA 
against Actavis.  On 16 December 2016, the CMA issued a statement of objections alleging 
that Actavis broke competition law by debranding its hydrocortisone tables (used to treat a 
life threatening condition) and increasing prices by between 9,500% and 12,000% compared 
                                                 
515  Noteworthy is the fact, mentioned by the CMA, that switching epilepsy patients 
already taking phenytoin sodium capsules to other products, including other versions of the same 
product, involved risk of loss of seizure control, with potentially serious health consequences.  This 
acted as a constraint on NHS, which had no alternative to paying the increased price. 
516  CMA issues statement of objections to Pfizer and Flynn Pharma in anti-epilepsy drug 
investigation, 6 August 2015, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-issues-
statement-of-objections-to-pfizer-and-flynn-pharma-in-anti-epilepsy-drug-investigation, accessed on 6 
August 2016. 
517  CMA fines Pfizer and Flynn £90 million for drug price hike to NHS, 7 December 
2016, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-fines-pfizer-and-flynn-90-million-for-
drug-price-hike-to-nhs, accessed on 11 December 2016. 
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to the branded version of the drug (prices deemed by the CMA excessive and unfair).  The 
CMA found that prior to April 2008 the NHS spent approximately GBP 522,000 a year on 
hydrocortisone tablets. Spend that had risen to GBP 70 million a year by 2015.518 
 
17. Pay for Delay 
The last type of antitrust breach analyzed by this work is also one of the most 
discussed at the U.S. and EU level,519 and the only one that does not consist in a purely 
unilateral conduct but involves an agreement between originator and generic manufacturers.  
As indicated in the introduction, consumers heavily benefit from competition between the 
brand-name drug and generics.  The reason is that generics enter the market at a price 
significantly lower than the brand-name drug and, thanks to the rules on generic substitution, 
they keep on increasing their market share and decreasing their prices.  Economically, generic 
entry means that the originator surplus and the deadweight loss decrease in favor of an 
increase of consumer surplus (and overall economic welfare).  Not only the originator‟s 
surplus decreases in favor of consumers, but the originator has to share its reduced surplus 
with generic manufacturers.  This means that, with the entry of generics, the overall 
producers‟ surplus decreases as well as the individual producers‟ share of it (given that 
products are homogeneous).  The profit that the generic manufacturer anticipates to make is 
thus much lower than the profit the originator will lose from the same sales.  This is because 
the generic manufacture sells at a significant discount.  The difference between the 
originator‟s loss and the generic manufacturers‟ gain is what consumers save.  If the originator 
could prevent the shrinking of its surplus while ensuring that generic manufacturers receive 
part of it, the result would be a win-win for originator and generic manufacturers as each of 
                                                 
518  Pharmaceutical company accused of overcharging NHS, 16 December 2016, available 
at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pharmaceutical-company-accused-of-overcharging-nhs, 
accessed on 18 December 2016. 
519  “For more than 15 years, one of the FTC‘s top priorities has been to put an end to anticompetitive 
reverse-payment settlements between brand-name drug makers and their potential generic rivals. […]  FTC economists 
estimate that these agreements cost consumers, insurers, and taxpayers billions of dollars each year in higher drug costs.  
Moreover, they undermine the regulatory framework of the Hatch-Waxman Act, which was intended to speed the entry 
of generic drugs and stimulate innovation by research-based pharmaceutical companies.” (J. Towey, Quo Vadis Post-
Actavis?, 30 Mar 2016, available at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-
matters/2016/03/quo-vadis-post-actavis, accessed on 6 August 2016)  “A top priority for the Commission 
for nearly 20 years has been stopping anticompetitive reverse-payment settlements of patent litigation in which the brand-
name drug firm pays its potential generic rival to abandon a patent challenge and delay entering the market with a lower 
cost, generic product.” (E. Ramirez, Oversight of the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, speech before 
the U.S. Senate, 9 March 2016, available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/934563/160309enforcementantitru
stlawstest.pdf, accessed on 6 August 2016.  At the EU level, the Commissioner for Competition 
repeated several times the importance of preserving competition in the pharmaceutical sector, 
identifying antitrust enforcement in this sector as a top priority.  Opening proceedings to assess 
whether a contractual arrangement between the originator Johnson & Johnson and the generic 
Novartis may have had the object or effect of hindering generic entry, the at-the-time Commissioner 
for Competition Joaquín Almunia said: “I regard this sector as a priority in terms of enforcement of competition 
rules given its importance for consumers and for governments' finances, […] Pharmaceutical companies are already 
rewarded for their innovation efforts by the patents they are granted. Paying a competitor to stay out of the market is a 
restriction of competition that the Commission will not tolerate.” (Antitrust: Commission opens proceedings 
against Johnson & Johnson and Novartis, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-
1228_en.htm, accessed on 6 August 2016) 
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their surplus would be either the same or bigger than in a competitive scenario.520  It is 
obviously not a win for consumers that keep on paying monopoly prices even after patent 
expiry (or notwithstanding patent invalidity).521  Pay-for-delay agreements are essentially 
agreements concluded at the expense of a third party, the consumer (as well as health 
insurance and national health systems), who is not a party to them.522  Their purpose is to 
keep the originator‟s surplus high (and consequently the consumers‟ surplus low) and share 
the resulting benefit with potential generic entrant (by paying them to stay out of the 
market).523  In return for a value transfer from the originator, the generic manufacturer agrees 
not to enter the market before a certain date.  The patent-holder spends less than the profits 
it would lose in case of generic entry and the generic manufacturer earns more by staying out 
of the market than entering it (as its entry would reduce the margins on the drug).  Thus, their 
incentives are aligned against consumers, as they share in the benefits from delaying 
                                                 
520  “The price and output determined by a well-functioning cartel is identical to the price and output that 
a monopolist would determine.” (H.J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination, 
76(3) Ohio State Law Journal, 2015, p. 492)  For a thoughtful economic analysis of pay for delay 
agreements, see W. Choi, B. Den Uyl, M. Hughes, Pay-For-Delay Practices in the Pharmaceutical 
Sector: Lundbeck, Actavis, and Others, 5(1) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2014, 
pp. 46-48, 50-51. 
521  “By eliminating the potential for competition, the parties can share the consumer savings that would 
result if they were to compete.  In other words, these settlements are harmful because the parties are resolving their dispute 
at the expense of consumers.  Although both the brand-name and generic firms are better off with such settlements, 
consumers lose the possibility of earlier generic entry […]  Instead, consumers pay higher prices because such early generic 
entry is delayed” (United States, 121st meeting of OECD Competition Committee, Generic 
Pharmaceuticals, DAF/COMP/WD(2014)51, 19 June 2014, par. 15).  See also M.A. Carrier, Payment 
After Actavis, 100(7) Iowa Law Review, 2014, p. 15 (“Because the brand makes more by keeping the generic 
out of the market than the brand and generic would receive in total by competing in the market, they have an incentive to 
cede the market to the brand and split the monopoly profits.  The brand then can use a portion of this additional profit 
from delayed competition to pay the generic to stay out of the market.  In an extreme case […] the brand could even pay 
more than the generic would have received by competing on the market after winning its patent challenge.  Consumers, on 
the other hand, suffer by paying higher prices and forgoing access to needed medicines from the quashing of challenges to 
patents that often are invalid or not infringed.”)  
522  “It is unacceptable that a company pays off its competitors to stay out of its market and delay the 
entry of cheaper medicines.  Agreements of this type directly harm patients and national health systems, which are already 
under tight budgetary constraints.  The Commission will not tolerate such anticompetitive practices.” (J. Almunia, 
Antitrust: Commission Fines Lundbeck and other Pharma Companies for Delaying Market Entry of 
Generic Medicines, Press Release IP/13/563, 19 June, 2013,  available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-563_en.htm, accessed on 6 August 2016)  “Consumer harm 
from pay for delay settlements is significant.  In 2010, the FTC estimated that under relatively conservative assumptions, 
the annual savings to purchasers of drugs that would result from a ban on such settlements would be approximately $3.5 
billion.” (United States, 121st meeting of OECD Competition Committee, Generic Pharmaceuticals, 
DAF/COMP/WD(2014)51, 19 June 2014, par. 16) 
523  The European Commission offered a clear analogy, later confirmed by the General 
Court, between pay for delay agreements and the market sharing agreement in the BIDS case.  As 
summarized by the General Court, “the undertakings active in the beef processing market in Ireland had created a 
mechanism by which some undertakings agreed to stay out of that market for two years in exchange for payments from 
the undertakings that stayed in the market.  A similar dynamic arose in the present case through the conclusion of [pay 
for delay] agreements […], pursuant to which [the originator], which was the principal, or even the only, 
undertaking on the market in the countries concerned by those agreements, paid the generic undertakings, which were 
potential competitors, so that they would stay out of the market for a certain period.  It follows that both the case that 
gave rise to the BIDS judgment […] and the present case concern agreements that limited the ability of competing 
economic operators to determine independently the policy that they intended to adopt on the market, by preventing the 
normal operation of the competitive process” (General Court, T-472/13, Lundbeck v Commission, 8 
September 2016, paras. 423-425). 
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competition.   
Having a patent on the brand-name drug is not what determines the exclusionary 
nature of these agreements.  Generic exclusion is caused by the value transfer rather than the 
existence of a patent.  “Would not that ‗pay-for-delay‘ practice violate antitrust rules even if the agreement 
took place between two producers of generics, or between two holders of patents for the same therapeutic 
purpose?”524  As Professor Carrier puts it: “agreements by which brands pay generics not to enter the 
market threaten dangers similar to territorial market allocation.  But instead of allocating geographic space, in 
which the parties reserve for themselves particular territories, they allocate time.  The brand and generic, in 
other words, agree that the brand will not be subject to competition for a period of time, thereby dividing the 
market and preventing competition.  Market division is particularly concerning because it restricts all 
competition between the parties on all grounds.”525  Patents however play an important role in 
complicating the antitrust intervention since these agreements are often concluded to settle a 
patent infringement lawsuit started by the originator against one or more generic 
manufacturers (this is the reason why they are often called pay-for-delay patent settlement 
agreements).526  The originator sues the generic manufacturer for infringement of a patent 
protecting the brand-name drug and the lawsuit is settled with a payment from the originator 
to the generic and the agreement that the generic will not enter the market before a certain 
date.527  The peculiarity of these settlements is the “wrong direction” of the payment (which is 
                                                 
524  G. Ghidini, The Bride and the Groom. On the Intersection between Intellectual 
Property and Antitrust Law, in G. Caggiano, G. Muscolo, M. Tavassi (eds.), Competition Law and 
Intellectual Property: a European Perspective, Kluwer, 2012, p. 27. 
525  M.A. Carrier, Payment after Actavis, 100(7) Iowa Law Review, 2014, p. 14. 
526  “Patent settlement agreements […] are commercial agreements to settle patent-related disputes, e.g. 
questions of patent infringement or patent validity.  They are concluded in the context of patent disputes, opposition 
procedures or litigation where no final adjudication has been handed down.  Although the content of individual 
settlements will vary according to the circumstances of the case, the common aim of a settlement is to end the 
disagreement.” (European Commission, 7th Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements, 13 
December 2016, par. 2, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/patent_settlements_report7_en.p
df, accessed on 14 December 2016)  As noted by the European Commission, “[p]atent settlements 
often benefit both the parties to the dispute and, more generally, society, by allowing for a more efficient allocation of 
resources than if litigation were to be pursued to judgement.  The vast majority of patent settlement agreements between 
competitors do not raise antitrust concerns.  There is no presumption that patent settlements between competitors are 
antitrust infringements.” (European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 1102).  
See also European Commission, 7th Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements, 13 December 
2016, par. 3 (“As in any other area of commercial disagreement, the parties concerned have a legitimate interest in 
finding a mutually acceptable compromise.  In particular the parties may prefer to discontinue the dispute or litigation 
because it is too costly, time-consuming and/or risky as regards its outcome.  Settlements are thus a generally accepted, 
legitimate way of ending private disagreements.  They can also save courts and/or competent administrative bodies such 
as patent offices time and effort.  Therefore, they can have some positive impact in the interest of society.”  However, 
there is also no presumption of validity of patent settlement agreements between actual or potential 
competitors.  “[S]uch agreements do not provide immunity from competition law because they concern a patent or the 
settlement of a dispute.” (European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 1122)  
The European Commission refers also to the fact that “The Court of Justice has also recognised that 
agreements to settle patent litigation can fall within the prohibition of Article 101(1) of the Treaty: ―In its prohibition of 
certain ‗agreements‘ between undertakings, Article [101](1) makes no distinction between agreements whose purpose is to 
put an end to litigation and those concluded with other aims in mind‖.”  Par. 1123 further confirms that “while 
undertakings who are actual or potential competitors may reach agreement on their patent disputes just as they may 
conclude other kinds of agreements, in doing so they must respect Union competition law.”) 
527  “[A] generic company's ability to enter the market can be limited in several ways. The most 
straightforward limitation occurs when the settlement agreement contains a clause explicitly stating that the generic 
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the reason why these agreements are sometimes called reverse-payment settlements).528  
Instead of the generic manufacturer paying damages and litigation cost to the originator, it is 
the latter that pays the generic.  Assuming the patent is valid, enforceable and infringed, a 
value transfer from the originator to the generic would not be necessary to keep it out of the 
market.  Nothing more than the enforcement of the patent would be needed to achieve the 
exclusion of the infringing undertaking.529  If the patent is not valid, not enforceable or not 
infringed, there is no possible justification for the generic to stay out of the market other than 
the payment.  The payment is thus unjustified if one were to assume the patent is valid and 
infringed, and anticompetitive (as its purpose and effect is to keep a potential competitor out 
of the market) if the patent is invalid or not infringed.530  This is the reason why authorities do 
                                                                                                                                                   
company will refrain from challenging the validity of the originator company's patent(s)("non-challenge clause") and/or 
refrains from entering the market until the patent(s) has(ve) expired ("non-compete clause").  […][A] licence granted by 
the originator company allowing market presence of the generic company is also categorised as limiting generic entry, if the 
generic company cannot enter the market with its own product or it cannot set the conditions for the commercialisation of 
its product freely. Accordingly, the generic company's entry is at least partly controlled by the originator company through 
the terms of the licence agreement. Note though, that an exception applies in case of royalty free licences that allow generic 
companies to immediately launch their own product without any further constraints, i.e. concerning quantities, 
composition, pricing or other marketing conditions of their product. Hence, such licence agreements are not viewed as 
limiting generic entry.  The same logic […] applies to patent settlement agreements in which the parties agree that the 
generic company will be a distributor of the originator product concerned or if the generic company will source its supplies 
of the active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) from the originator company.  Furthermore, agreements providing for an 
early entry of a generic medicine will be seen as limiting generic entry where entry is not immediate. It should be noted 
that the list of potential limitations is not exhaustive.” (European Commission, 7th Report on the Monitoring 
of Patent Settlements, 13 December 2016, paras. 9-11) 
528  M.A. Lemley, C. Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 2005, p. 92.  The Supreme Court observed that “where only one party owns a patent, it is 
virtually unheard of outside of pharmaceuticals for that party to pay an accused infringer to settle the lawsuit.” (FTC v. 
Actavis, 133 S. Ct., p. 2233) 
529  “[I]f a generic undertaking is paid by an originator undertaking to cease its independent efforts to 
enter the market with a potentially infringing product, the situation to be analysed under competition law is very different 
from that if the originator undertaking had succeeded in obtaining an infringement ruling from a court.  If infringement is 
established by a court, the means used to achieve exclusion are the right to oppose based on the objective strength of the 
patent. Such means fall within the specific subject matter of the patent.  If a settlement is agreed without any transfer of 
value, such an agreement is subject to the scrutiny of competition law, but is likely to be found in compliance therewith as 
long as the agreement has been reached based on each party‘s competing assessment of the patent situation.  But when the 
generic undertaking‘s incentives to seek market entry are reduced or eliminated because of a transfer of value by the 
originator undertaking, the generic undertaking may willingly accept market exclusion which it would not accept without 
the inducement, and the result of market exclusion is therefore not achieved by the strength of the patent, but by the 
amount of the value transfer.” (European Commission, AT.39226, Lundbeck, 19 June 2013, par. 604) 
530  “When in a patent dispute or patent litigation, a settlement is reached on the basis of each party‘s 
assessment of the patent case before them, such a patent settlement is unlikely to infringe competition law even though it 
may contain an obligation on the generic undertaking not to use the invention covered by the patent during the period of 
patent protection (e.g. a non-compete clause) and/or an obligation not to challenge the patent concerned in court (e.g. a 
non-challenge clause).   Although in such a case certain limitations on the commercial behaviour of the generic 
undertaking are agreed between the parties to the patent dispute, they directly and exclusively result from the strength of 
the patent litigation case, as perceived by each party and are not the result of an additional transfer of value from the 
originator to the generic.  The situation is very different when such a result is achieved where the generic parties‘ incentives 
to independently compete have been affected by elements extraneous to the dispute/litigation.  This is notably the case 
where the originator pays significant sums of money, or offers other compensation (for example, a market sharing 
arrangement), to the generic company as consideration for a significant restriction of the generic company‘s commercial 
behaviour, limiting its independent efforts to enter one or more EU markets with a generic product (a ―reverse payment‖ 
situation).  This is not foreseen by the patent system.  While a patent holder has the right to oppose possible infringement 
of its patent, patent law does not provide for a right to pay actual or potential competitors to stay out of the market or to 
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not need to determine the validity, enforceability or infringement of the patent to assess 
whether a reverse payment is anticompetitive.531  What is relevant is the effect of the 
agreement and the parties‟ ex ante expectations regarding the “strength” of the patent.  As the 
European Commission explicitly stated: 
“[E]ven if the limitations included in the patent settlement remain within the scope of the patent, a 
settlement agreement may, under certain circumstances, have to be considered as contrary to 
competition law. […]  With respect to in-scope limitations obtained through transfers of value, it is 
not because the patent holder might (or might not) have obtained the same result by seeking an 
infringement ruling from a court that it must necessarily be free at a time when the outcome of a court 
ruling is unknown to achieve that same potential result in any other manner conceivable. The means 
used matter.”532 
Patent settlements are of concern when they comprise a value transfer from the 
originator to the generic manufacturer, the effect of which is to keep in force potentially 
invalid and unenforceable patents533 and/or to keep out of the market potentially non-
infringing competitors for longer than, at least, the case in which the settlement did not 
include any transfer of value.534 
                                                                                                                                                   
refrain from challenging a patent prior to entering the market.  The means used by patent holders to defend their rights 
matter.  It is not because the patent, if valid and infringed, grants the patent holder certain rights to exclude that any 
means used to obtain the exclusionary result would necessarily be compatible with competition law.  In particular, 
payments made by patent holders to generic challengers aimed at persuading them to stop or delay their independent 
efforts to enter the market may well, in certain specific circumstances, fall afoul of Union competition law.  Indeed, even if 
the limitations in the agreement on the generic undertaking‘s commercial autonomy do not go beyond the material scope of 
the patent, they constitute a breach of Article 101 of the Treaty when those limitations cannot be justified and do not 
result from the parties‘ assessment of the merits of the exclusive right itself but in particular from a transfer of value 
overshadowing this assessment and inducing the generic undertaking not to pursue its independent efforts to enter the 
market.” (European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, paras. 1136-1137) 
531  “A later finding of patent invalidity should not create antitrust liability for a settlement that was 
reasonably deemed lawful when created; nor should a later finding of validity serve to ratify an agreement reasonably 
regarded as anticompetitive.  This is consistent with the general principle that economics takes an ex ante rather than ex 
post approach to decision making.  Further, requiring judicial inquiries into patent validity and infringement in order to 
evaluate a settlement agreement brings back in the very questions that the disputing parties were seeking to avoid at the 
time of their settlement.” (H.J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination, 76(3) 
Ohio State Law Journal, pp. 516-517) 
532  European Commission, AT.39226, Lundbeck, 19 June 2013, par. 603. 
533  “Preventing patent challenges, whether in the form of pre-litigation disputes, court litigation, or 
opposition procedures may […] seriously impact the competitive process as they are frequently the very expression of 
competition to enter the market with a cheaper, generic product.  In Windsurfing International, the Court of Justice 
confirmed that ―it is in the public interest to eliminate any obstacle to economic activity which may arise where a patent 
was granted in error‖.” (European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 1132)  
See also General Court, T-472/13, Lundbeck v Commission, 8 September 2016, par. 390 (“the specific 
subject matter of the patent cannot be interpreted as also affording protection against actions brought in order to challenge 
the patent‘s validity, in view of the fact that it is in the public interest to eliminate any obstacle to economic activity, which 
may arise where a patent was granted in error”) and European Commission, Guidelines on the application of 
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to technology transfer 
agreements, 2014/C 89/03, par. 235 (“it is in the general public interest to remove invalid intellectual property 
rights as an unmerited barrier to innovation and economic activity”).  
534  “[I]n the absence of the agreed inducement and hence based purely on its assessment of its chances to 
succeed in the patent dispute, i.e. on the merits of the patent case, the generic company as a reasonable economic operator 
would not accept the commercial limitations which are accepted in the settlement and instead act independently in keeping 
with its own specific competitive incentives and resort to more pro-competitive solutions (for example, continued litigation, 
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Essentially, a settlement is contrary to antitrust when it substitutes (potential) 
competition for collusion.  The European Commission explained that, “[b]y paying the generic 
undertaking to give up its competitive challenge, the originator undertaking obtains certainty that the generic 
undertaking will not enter the market for the period of the agreement […].  From the perspective of the 
originator undertaking, it is the uncertainty of possible generic market entry, including through patent 
litigation, which reflects potential competition.  This potential competition is eliminated through the transfer of 
value and transformed into the certainty of no competition.  This is in particular the case when the amount of 
the value transfer matches the profit that the generic producer would have made if it had entered the 
market.”535 
Through the value transfer to the generic manufacturer, the originator uses its 
monopoly profits to purchase protection from the risk of competition536 from products that 
may not infringe its patent (or the patent risks being invalidated or rendered 
unenforceable).537  A reverse payment patent settlement raises concerns if it distorts the 
incentives of the generic manufacturer who, no longer aims at an entry date as early possible 
                                                                                                                                                   
acceptance of an early entry settlement). […][W]ithout the payment, litigation between the parties may have continued, or 
the generic could have insisted on less restrictive settlement conditions.  In both cases, the degree of competition (actual or 
potential) would have been superior compared to the situation where the restrictions are leveraged by a reverse payment, or 
another value transfer to the generic company.” (European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 
July 2014, paras. 1138, 1142)  See also par. 1102 (“An infringement of Article 101 can be envisaged only where 
the transfer of value represents a significant inducement which substantially reduced the incentives of the generic 
undertaking to pursue its independent efforts to enter the market.  Any finding of an antitrust infringement by a patent 
settlement depends on the specific circumstances of the case.”) 
535  European Commission, AT.39226, Lundbeck, 19 June 2013, par. 604. 
536  Potential competition between the originator and the allegedly infringing (and settling 
upon payment) generic company is one of the main points of discussion in these cases.  As recently 
explained by the General Court, “the examination of conditions of competition on a given market must be based 
not only on existing competition between undertakings already present on the relevant market but also on potential 
competition, in order to ascertain whether, in the light of the structure of the market and the economic and legal context 
within which it functions, there are real concrete possibilities for the undertakings concerned to compete among themselves 
or for a new competitor to enter the relevant market and compete with established undertakings” (General Court, T-
472/13, Lundbeck v Commission, 8 September 2016, par. 99).  In case of pay for delay settlement 
agreements, what matters to determine potential competition is that the generic company “had real 
concrete possibilities of entering the market at the time the agreements at issue were concluded […], with the result that 
[it] exerted competitive pressure on the [originator].  That competitive pressure was eliminated for the term of the 
[settlement agreement], which constitutes, by itself, a restriction of competition by object, for the purpose of Article 
101(1) TFEU.” (Ibid., par. 474) 
537  “The D.C. Circuit in United States v. Microsoft Corp. made clear that ―the exclusion of nascent 
threats is the type of conduct that is reasonably capable of contributing significantly to a defendant‘s continued monopoly 
power.‖ (United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001))  In fact, ―it would be inimical to the 
purpose of the Sherman Act to allow monopolists free reign to squash nascent, albeit unproven, competitors at will.‖  
Similarly, the leading antitrust treatise makes clear that ―the law does not condone the purchase of protection from 
uncertain competition any more than it condones the elimination of actual competition.‖ (12 Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application 220 (3d ed. 2012))”  (M.A. Carrier, 
Payment After Actavis, 100(7) Iowa Law Review, 2014, p. 14)  As it has been explained by the 
General Court, “[w]hat matters […] is that there was uncertainty, at the time the agreements at issue were concluded, 
as to the possibility, for the generic undertakings, of entering the market without being subject to injunctions or 
infringement actions, or of successfully challenging the validity of the applicants‘ patents, and that those agreements had 
replaced that uncertainty, by means of significant reverse payments, with the certainty that the generic undertakings would 
not enter the market during the term of the agreements at issue” (General Court, T-472/13, Lundbeck v 
Commission, 8 September 2016, par. 369). 
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(i.e. what consumers, and the regulation, want),538 but prefers instead to share in the 
originator‟s monopoly profits.539   
A large and unexplained payment is of concerns not only due to its incentive-
changing effect on generic manufacturers (effect that is obviously known and relied upon by 
the originator), but also as an indication of patent invalidity (the larger the payment, the lower 
the probability, in the originator‟s opinion, that the patent would be found valid and/or 
infringed),540 market power (the larger the payment, the higher the monopoly profits that 
make it worthwhile),541 and competitive harm (the larger the payment, the larger the expected 
savings consumers would gain from generic entry).542 
A payment below the originator‟s expected litigation cost (avoided by the settlement) 
is often deemed legitimate (at least in the U.S., where each of plaintiff and defendant usually 
                                                 
538  “[P]rice cuts resulting from a regulatory intervention, in a context where the [product] patent has 
already expired, illustrate the balance which the Member States have struck between the protection afforded to the patent 
of the originator undertaking, on the one hand, and the savings for State budgets and for consumers achieved by the entry 
of generics to the market and the effects of competition, on the other.” (General Court, T-472/13, Lundbeck v 
Commission, 8 September 2016, par. 385) 
539  “[B]oth the brand and the generic companies have an important incentive to prevail in the patent 
infringement suit.  The brand can preserve its patent monopoly by proving the patent is valid, and the generic, if it proves 
the patent is invalid, can enter the market […].  Both parties, however, also have a compelling reason to settle the patent 
infringement suit, in addition to avoiding the cost of prolonged litigation.  By reaching a settlement agreement before the 
court might invalidate the patent, the patent continues to generate monopoly profits that the brand and the generic can 
divide between them.” (D. Geradin, D. Ginsburg, G. Safty, Reverse Payment Patent Settlements in the 
European Union and the United States, George Mason University Legal Studies Research Paper Series 
LS 15-22, 2015, p. 3)  See also General Court, T-472/13, Lundbeck v Commission, 8 September 2016, 
par. 429, that eloquently explains: “In the present case, the parties to the agreements at issue preferred to replace the 
risks inherent in the normal competitive process and the state of uncertainty surrounding the validity of Lundbeck‘s 
process patents and whether or not the products that the generic undertakings intended to market infringed those patents, 
with the certainty that those undertakings would not enter the market during the term of those agreements, in return for 
significant reverse payments which corresponded approximately to the profits that those undertakings would have made if 
they had entered the market.  It is therefore irrelevant whether the undertakings would undoubtedly have entered the 
market during the term of the agreements at issue, since those agreements eliminated that very possibility, replacing it 
with the certainty that those undertakings would not enter the market with their products during that period.  By doing 
so, the parties to the agreements at issue were able to share a part of the profits that Lundbeck continued to enjoy, to the 
detriment of consumers who continued to pay higher prices than those they would have paid if the generics had entered the 
market”. 
540  “In a word, the size of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for a 
patent‘s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed exploration of the validity of the patent itself.” (W. 
Choi, B. Den Uyl, M. Hughes, Pay-For-Delay Practices in the Pharmaceutical Sector: Lundbeck, 
Actavis, and Others, 5(1) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2014, p. 48) “The 
assumption implicit […] is that a generic would demand a ―large‖ payment if it had a strong case, but would settle for a 
small payment if it was unlikely to prove the patent is invalid.  A large payment therefore indicates a greater likelihood 
the generic would have prevailed and thereby made the market more competitive had it not settled the litigation.” (D. 
Geradin, D. Ginsburg, G. Safty, Reverse Payment Patent Settlements in the European Union and the 
United States, George Mason University Legal Studies Research Paper Series LS 15-22, 2015, p. 11) 
541  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S., 2013.  For instance, an originator‟s willingness to pay 
20% of its profits to keep a generic out of the market suggests that the originator‟s profit-maximizing 
price is at least 20% above its costs. 
542  As M. Todino, Antitrust Rules and Intellectual Property Rights in the EU and the 
U.S., 1(2) Italian Antitrust Review, 2014, p. 35, has argued, at its extreme consequences, this series of 
presumptions “is tantamount to say that, once there is evidence of a large and unexplained payment, anticompetitive 
effects are somehow inherent to the settlement as such – which in turn is very close to endorse an analysis by object only 
[…] – in order to reverse the burden of proof upon the parties to the agreement.” 
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pay their own legal fees).543  Patent litigation in the U.S. has been estimated to cost between 
$2.6 and $10 million.544  A transfer of less than $10 million would thus be abstractly 
attributable to covering the litigation costs.  A payment in excess of the expected cost of 
litigation, instead, arguably raises concerns as it indicates that the originator and generic 
manufacturer thought it was at least possible that the patent would be deemed invalid or not 
infringed, and the originator paid the generic manufacturer to avoid such risk (of invalidity or 
non-infringement, and thus of generic entry).545 
While a payment below saved litigation costs is often unproblematic, authorities and 
courts in the U.S. and EU indicated that a payment close to the amount the generic would 
                                                 
543  “If a brand‘s payment to a generic is no higher than its future litigation costs, it is more likely to 
represent an objective assessment of patent validity.  Once the brand sues the generic, each side must pay its litigation 
costs.  An exclusion payment that does not exceed the brand‘s future costs does not present significant concern since the 
brand would have been required to spend this money in any event.” (M.A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100(7) 
Iowa Law Review, 2014, p. 21) 
544  “For example, in its consent decree in In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., the FTC did not prohibit 
settlements in which the value received by the generic was ―the lesser of the [brand firm‘s] expected future litigation 
costs…or $2 million.‖  And in In re Schering-Plough Corp., the FTC created an exception to its prohibition on 
settlements ―for payments to the generic that are linked to litigation costs, up to $2 million.‖  More recently, the Court in 
Actavis found that defendants could show ―offsetting or redeeming virtues‖ justifying payment when the payment 
―amount[s] to no more than a rough approximation of the litigation expenses saved through the settlement.‖  In such a 
case, ―there is not the same concern that a patentee is using its monopoly profits to avoid the risk of patent invalidation 
or a finding of noninfringement.‖  Most generally, the concept of litigation costs encompasses expenditures incurred in 
conducting litigation.  The most frequently cited survey of costs in intellectual property litigation is assembled every two 
years by the American Intellectual Property Law Association (―AIPLA‖).  The AIPLA defines litigation costs to 
include ―outside legal and paralegal services, local counsel, associates, paralegals, travel and living expenses, fees and costs 
for court reporters, photocopies, courier services, exhibit preparation, analytical testing, expert witnesses, translators, 
surveys, jury advisors, and similar expenses.‖  The figures from the most recent AIPLA survey show that patent 
litigation in which there is more than $1 million at risk costs $2.6 to $5.5 million on average.  In Hatch–Waxman 
litigation in particular, the figures range from $2.65 million to $6 million.  One study found that generics spent an 
average of $10 million for each challenge to a brand‘s patent.” (M.A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100(7) 
Iowa Law Review, 2014, p. 20)  See also H.J. Hovenkamp, Institutional Advantage in Competition 
and Innovation Policy, University of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-43, 2013, p. 6: “Parties 
often pay settlements in order to avoid costly litigation. But anticipated litigation costs in infringements cases of this type 
typically run less than $10 million. Settlements in gross excess of that amount suggest that something else must be going 
on.” 
545  The General Court clearly explained the reasoning that is often behind a pay for delay 
patent settlement and the reason it can be anticompetitive: “It is true that the asymmetry of the risks faced by 
the generic undertakings and the originator undertaking can partly explain why the latter may decide to grant significant 
reverse payments in order to avoid any risk, even small, that the generics might enter the market. […]  It must be 
recalled, however, that the fact that the adoption of anticompetitive behaviour may be the most cost-effective or least risky 
course of action for an undertaking in no way excludes the application of Article 101 TFEU […], particularly if that 
behaviour consists in paying actual or potential competitors not to enter the market and sharing with those competitors 
the profits resulting from the absence of generic medicinal products on that market, to the detriment of consumers 
[…][T]here was significant uncertainty, at the time the [pay for delay] agreements […] were concluded, as regards the 
outcome of the potential patent litigation, and […] that uncertainty was eliminated and replaced by the certainty that the 
generic undertakings would not enter the market during the term of those agreements. […] Furthermore, the fact that a 
reverse payment may constitute the only means of reaching an agreement by ‗bridging the gap‘ between the parties to that 
agreement, does not mean that such a payment constitutes a legitimate means of reaching such an agreement or that that 
agreement is exempt from the application of competition law, in particular in circumstances where (i) the amount of that 
payment appears to be linked to the profits expected by those generic undertakings if they had entered the market, (ii) the 
agreement does not enable the resolution of the underlying patent dispute and (iii) the agreement contains restrictions going 
beyond the scope of the originator undertaking‘s patents” (General Court, T-472/13, Lundbeck v Commission, 
8 September 2016, paras. 379-383). 
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have earned if it had entered the market would raise antitrust concerns.546  The test is thus 
two-pronged: “a reverse payment is sufficiently large if it exceeds saved litigation costs and a reasonable jury 
could find that the payment was significant enough to induce a generic challenger to abandon its patent claim. 
[…]  A reasonable jury could find that a reverse payment to a generic manufacturer that comes close to or 
exceeds the expected profits to be earned by prevailing in the patent litigation could induce a generic 
manufacturer to forfeit its claim.”547 
In sum, a payment equal or below the originator‟s litigation costs is unlikely to raise 
antitrust concerns and a payment (close,) equal or above the generic manufacturer‟s expected 
profits is likely to raise concerns.  The area in between is grey and authors have taken 
different positions as to the anticompetitiveness of these payments to settle a patent 
litigation.548  
A payment for the purposes of determining the anticompetitiveness of reverse 
settlements can consist in a transfer other than monetary “and if, when viewed holistically, it effects 
a large and unexplained net transfer of value from the patent-holder to the alleged patent-infringer, it may 
fairly be called a reverse-payment settlement.”549  From an antitrust perspective the form of the value 
transfer from the originator to the generic manufacturer is irrelevant.  A value transfer may 
consist in “distribution agreements or a "side-deal" in which the originator company grants a commercial 
benefit to the generic company, for example by allowing it to enter the market before patent expiry in another 
geographical area or by allowing market entry with another product marketed by the originator company. A 
value transfer could furthermore consist in granting a licence to the generic company enabling it to enter the 
market.”550 
The European Commission included in the value transfer potentially relevant to 
determine the anticompetitiveness of an agreement also “a non-assert clause whereby – even without 
a licence – the originator binds itself not to invoke the patent against the generic company, thereby allowing the 
                                                 
546  In a comparison between the U.S. Actavis and the EU Lundbeck decisions, the at-
the-time Director General for Competition Alexander Italianer stated that “Supreme Court looked at the 
same factors [as the European Commission], in particular the size of the payment including as compared to the 
expected profits of the generic producer, and the lack of any other convincing justification.” (A. Italianer, Competitor 
Agreements under EU Competition Law, 26 September 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2013_07_en.pdf, accessed on 6 August 2016) 
547  King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v Cephalon, Inc., 88 F.Supp.3d, E.D. Pennsylvania, 
2015, p. 418 (“First, Actavis specifically instructs that an appropriate benchmark for the size of a reverse payment is 
―its scale in relation to the payor‘s anticipated future litigation costs[.]‖ Id. at 2237. […]  Regarding the ―inducement‖ 
prong, Actavis instructs that ―there are indications that patentees sometimes pay a generic challenger a sum even larger 
than what the generic would gain in profits if it won the paragraph IV litigation and entered the market[,]‖ which 
―cannot in every case be supported by traditional settlement considerations.‖ Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2234-35. […]  As 
Actavis explains, the relevant inquiry is what would induce the generic to stay off of the market. Id. at 2235. […]  See 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and the Supreme Court‘s Actavis Decision, 15 Minn. J.L. 
Sci. & Tech. 3, 12 (Winter 2014) (―Even if the generic believes there is a 100% likelihood that the patent will be 
found invalid, it may still be more valuable for the generic to share the monopoly returns‖).”) 
548  E.g., A. Edlin, C.S. Hemphill, H.J. Hovenkamp, C. Shapiro, Activating Actavis, 28 
Antitrust, 2013, p. 16, took the view that a payment exceeding the expected litigation cost can be 
considered “large and unjustified”, thus anticompetitive; while D. Geradin, D. Ginsburg, G. Safty, 
Reverse Payment Patent Settlements in the European Union and the United States, George Mason 
University Legal Studies Research Paper Series LS 15-22, pp. 11-12, took the opposite view. 
549  In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., 94 F.Supp.3d, D.Conn., 2015, p. 243. 
550  European Commission, 7th Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements, 13 
December 2016, par. 12. 
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generic medicine to come onto the market”.551  The Commission however notes that if the agreement 
concerns exclusively the determination of an early entry date, prior to the expiration of the 
patent, and the originator‟s undertaking not to challenge it, i.e. no other limitations to the 
generic manufacturer stem from it, it is unlikely “to attract the highest degree of antitrust scrutiny.”  
If the settlement concerns exclusively the determination of the entry date, originator‟s and 
generic manufacturer‟s interests are opposed and the generic manufacturer will push for the 
most consumer enhancing solution it is able to get, i.e. enter the market as early as possible.  
This means that the agreed upon entry date reflects the parties‟ view on the likely outcome of 
the litigation and validity or infringement of the patent.552 
A peculiarity of the U.S. system when it comes to pharmaceuticals is the above-
discussed 180-day exclusivity period (from the “first commercial marketing” of the generic) 
granted by the Hatch-Waxman Act to the first generic manufacturer to file an ANDA with a 
                                                 
551  European Commission, 7th Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements, 13 
December 2016, par. 12. 
552  “As a result, it is less likely that settlements involving only an entry date lead to a loss of consumer 
welfare.” (G. Gurkaynak, A. Guner, J. Filson, The Global Reach of FTC v. Actavis – Will Europe 
Differ from the US Approach to Pay-for-Delay Agreements?, 45(2) International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 2014, p. 132)  As thoroughly explained by Prof. Carrier 
(and by the cited authors, courts and agencies): “The FTC explained that ―[a] settlement agreement is not 
illegal simply because it delays generic entry until some date before expiration of the pioneer‘s patent.‖ (In re Schering-
Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. at 987)  Rather, ―[i]n light of the uncertainties facing parties at the time of settlement, it is 
reasonable to assume that an agreed-on entry date, without cash payments, reflects a compromise of differing litigation 
expectations.‖  Similarly, the Supreme Court in Actavis stated that settlement allowing entry before patent expiration 
could ―bring about competition . . . to the consumer‘s benefit.‖(FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234 (2013)) […]  
The parties‘ compromise on the entry date reflects the odds of the parties‘ success in patent litigation. (Herbert 
Hovenkamp et al., IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law § 
15.3 (2d ed. Supp. 2010); Robert D. Willig & John P. Bigelow, Antitrust Policy Toward Agreements that Settle 
Patent Litigation, 49 Antitrust Bull. 655, 660 (2004).)  The greater the likelihood that the patent is valid and 
infringed, the later in the period generic entry would be expected. The lower the likelihood, the earlier entry would be 
expected: ―By way of example, if there were ten years remaining in the patent term and the parties agreed there was a 60 
percent chance that a court would uphold the patent‘s validity [and find that it was infringed], the mean probable date of 
entry under litigation would occur in six years‖. ([Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A 
Framework for Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 2009, p.] 75−76; see also Marc G. 
Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71 Antitrust L.J. 1033, 1043−44 
(2004).)  In short, patent-term split agreements are based on the strength of the patent alone, (The strength of the patent 
includes the likelihood of infringement as certain patents may be valid but not infringed) not supplemented by payment 
from the brand to the generic.  If the brand were to win its patent case, the generic would not be able to enter until the 
patent expired.  But if the generic were successful in showing that the patent was invalid or not infringed, it could enter 
immediately.  The settling parties‘ selection of a date for generic entry that lies between immediate entry and patent 
expiration thus falls naturally within the potential range of litigation outcomes. […]  Where the generic has not entered 
at risk, the brand‘s best-case scenario from litigation is to exclude the generic from the market for the duration of the 
patent term.  And the best-case scenario for the generic is immediate entry.  Under legitimate settlements based on the 
strength of the patent, then, generic entry would be anticipated at some point between immediate entry and the expiration 
of the patent term.  As discussed above, the particular entry date within the allowable range would depend on the parties‘ 
assessments of patent strength, with stronger patents resulting in later generic entry and weaker patents leading to earlier 
entry.” (M.A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100(7) Iowa Law Review, 2014, pp. 17-18, 28.  The 
author continues: “In contrast, where a generic that has not entered at risk receives a type of consideration other than 
entry, it cannot trace its bounty to its victory in patent litigation.  For in this case, it receives a type of consideration that 
cannot be explained by patent litigation.  In other words, the generic obtains something that would not be available even 
upon a resounding decision that the patent is invalid or not infringed. (In cases in which a generic has filed a 
counterclaim against a brand, the test is satisfied if the brand pays the generic an amount greater than the sum of 
litigation costs and the generic counterclaim.)”) 
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paragraph IV certification, if the patent is not declared valid and infringed.553  This provision 
has a very important role to play in reverse payment settlements.  On one side, the originator 
is risking its monopoly profits, which it would lose if the court declares the patent invalid (or 
non-infringed).  A generic manufacturer is equally interested in not losing the patent suit as 
most of its profits come from the 180-day exclusivity period and it would lose it if the court 
finds in favor of the originator and decides that the patent is valid and infringed.554  The 
generic manufacturer is therefore willing to exchange a later entry for the possibility to enjoy 
the exclusivity period.555  Since both parties have to lose from an unfavorable decision and to 
gain from a settlement with retained exclusivity, they may agree for the generic manufacturer 
to delay triggering the 180-day exclusivity, and thus delay its entry and that of any other 
generic, while the originator pays it off (with cash or the transfer of other values, including an 
acceleration clause).556  An acceleration clause gives the settling generic manufacturer the 
                                                 
553  As noted by Professors Hemphill and Lemley, “[i]n the early years of the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, […] to win the bounty, a generic drug maker had to file a Paragraph IV certification, be sued by the brand-name 
firm, and win the subsequent suit.  If the generic drug maker settled the case in a manner that delayed entry, or was 
never sued, no exclusivity was awarded.  During this period, awards of exclusivity were rare. […]  In 1998, the courts 
rejected this limitation on generic exclusivity as an impermissible interpretation of the Act‘s text, and the FDA changed 
its interpretation accordingly.  Since 1998, a first-to-file generic drug maker has been eligible for the bounty provided that 
it does not lose the patent suit, even if it never actually wins the patent litigation.  Indeed, it may earn the exclusivity even 
if it was never sued, so long as it was the first to file an ANDA.” (C.S. Hemphill, M.A. Lemley, Earning 
Exclusivity Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 Antitrust Law Journal, 2011, pp. 
954-955) See also pp. 956-957 (“we collected every instance in which 180-day exclusivity was awarded by the FDA 
and triggered by the generic firm over a four-year period between 2005 and 2009. […]  Almost half of the awards (23) 
are no-suit awards, meaning that the generic firm didn‘t have to spend money on litigation or face uncertainty about the 
outcome of the suit. Indeed, in some cases the basis for the award was a patent that was arguably irrelevant to the 
product described in the ANDA, in which case little or no effort was needed to develop a legal or design-around strategy.  
Another nine are settlements.  None of these settlements did anything to open up the market to other generic entrants.  
Eight more were launches at risk.  Only nine included a win by the generic firm, all but one of which included an 
invalidation or unenforceability determination as to at least one brand-name patent. […]  For the 180-day awards on 
non-suit drugs, twelve blocked other generic approvals, with the effect of keeping prices high for longer than would 
otherwise be the case.  Moreover, in most cases the award blocked approval of a large number of other generics, the earlier 
entry of which would have reduced prices even more.  Five of the nine settlements also blocked subsequent approvals.  In 
other words, when the exclusivity associated with the settling generic firm expired, there were immediate approvals of at 
least one other generic firm.  Of the generic wins, five blocked subsequent generics.  These results confirm the expectation 
that the exclusivity period does indeed impede subsequent entry.‖) 
554  “Most of the profits are earned during the exclusivity period.  As a result, the generic firm cares more 
about protecting its 180-day duopoly entitlement, and less about when exactly that entry occurs.  It is therefore much 
more willing to accept a later entry date than it would be if settlement did not preserve exclusivity.” (C.S. Hemphill, 
M.A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 Antitrust 
Law Journal, 2011, p. 965) 
555  “Elimination of the risk of losing by the generic company is not just a payment in and of itself, but 
the primary form of payment in Hatch-Waxman settlements.”  (Statement of Bernard Sherman, CEO of the 
generic manufacturer Apotex, Inc., Protecting Consumer Access to Generic Drugs Act of 2009: 
Hearing on H.R. 1706 before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the 
H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong., 2009) 
556  “Both the brand-name drug maker and the generic firm gain by settling the pending patent litigation 
without resolving the status of either the patent or the generic exclusivity.  The brand-name firm is much better off because 
it has eliminated a near-term threat to its monopoly.  And because the FDA regulates entry without evaluating the scope 
or strength of the relevant patents, settling that suit will enable it to keep even a dubious patent intact for some period of 
time.  The generic drug maker is also much better off.  When it eventually enters the market, at a time set by mutual 
agreement of the drug makers, it will reap the 180-day bounty.  Thanks to the lack of a successful defense requirement, 
the generic firm need not win a patent suit to receive the bounty.  Consumers, however, suffer from the elimination of a 
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possibility to anticipate its entry, and still benefit from its 180-day period of exclusivity, in 
case another generic manufacturer is successful in challenging the originator‟s patent.557  The 
effect of the acceleration clause is thus to reduce, if not to eliminate, the other generic 
manufacturers‟ incentive to challenge the originator‟s patent, as it ensures that no other 
generic manufacturer can enter the market before the settling generic manufacturer.558  
Acceleration clauses thus “constitute exclusion payments”.559 
The combined effect of the 180-day exclusivity and the acceleration clause is to 
incentivize reverse payment settlements.  An originator that would be normally cautious in 
(over)paying to settle, as it risks encouraging other generic manufacturers to sue in the hope 
to be paid off, would not have this disincentive in the U.S. due to the first-to-file 180-day 
exclusivity period.  Without this reward available, generic manufacturers other than the first 
filer have limited incentive to challenge the validity of the originator‟s patent, even in cases 
where the first filer received a substantial payment from the originator to settle (and stay out 
of the market).560   
                                                                                                                                                   
chance at early generic entry, as explained below, and from higher prices during the 180 days of generic exclusivity.”  
(C.S. Hemphill, M.A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, 77 Antitrust Law Journal, 2011, p. 962) 
557  See, e.g., Brief of Apotex, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, FTC v. 
Watson Pharm., Inc., No. 12-416, 677 F.3d 1298, 11th Cir., 2012. 
558  On acceleration clauses (otherwise called “poison pills”), see M.A. Carrier, Payment 
After Actavis, 100(7) Iowa Law Review, 2014, pp. 37-41.  At p. 40, the author states:  “if the surrogate 
loses, the settling generic still can exploit its 180-day period, which is delayed under the settlement.  And if the surrogate 
wins, the settling generic can show up on the scene after the hard work has been done, claiming the 180-day period that 
the Hatch–Waxman Act reserves for first filers and that is triggered by the success of the litigating generic.  The poison 
pill thus offers the settling first filer more than it could have gained by litigating, giving it the exclusivity period it could 
attain by winning the patent case while protecting it from one of the principal risks of losing – the risk that a second filer 
would enter before it does.  Second, and relatedly, the settling generic increases its likelihood of enjoying the 180-day 
exclusivity period by reducing later-filing generics‘ incentives to pursue litigation challenging the brand‘s patent.  Later 
filers cannot themselves use the valuable 180-day period reserved for the first filing generic. […]  In short, poison-pill 
clauses provide a type of consideration that the generic could never obtain as a result of winning a district court ruling that 
the patent is invalid or not infringed.” 
559  M.A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 100(7) Iowa Law Review, 2014, p. 41. 
560  A solution to the concerns relating to the use of the 180-day exclusivity to further 
delay generic entry has been proposed by Professors Hemphill and Lemley.  Their proposal consists in 
awarding the 180 days of exclusivity only if the generic manufacturer wins the lawsuit and invalidates 
the originator‟s patent or proves its drug does not infringe it; settle with immediate entry; or obtains 
FDA approval having never been sued.  Their solution (to an antitrust concern) is, as this work deems 
opportune, based on the society-welfare-enhancing purpose of the regulation establishing the 180-day 
exclusivity, i.e. it encourages “challenges to patents because the invalidation of bad patents benefits society as a 
whole.  Society doesn‘t benefit from a private deal to drop a challenge that has the effect of limiting competition. 
[…][L]itigating more cases to judgment is desirable.  As noted above, both the Supreme Court and commentators have 
observed that the invalidation of patents is a public good: one party bears the costs of invalidation, but lots of others share 
in the benefits.  And like most public goods, the invalidation of patents is likely to be undersupplied.  Generic 
manufacturers that have evidence invalidating a patent are using that evidence to obtain a private sweetheart deal, rather 
than to benefit the world at large by invalidating the patent.  Under earned exclusivity, some – though not all – of those 
patents will be invalidated.  That invalidation provides a substantial social benefit. (While we discuss invalidity here, the 
same logic applies to a finding of noninfringement.  A generic that succeeds in designing around a patent while making a 
bioequivalent drug has provided a public benefit, too.)”  (C.S. Hemphill, M.A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity 
Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 Antitrust Law Journal, 2011, p. 949, 978).  
The proposal “could be implemented without any legislative action, for example, by the FDA in interpreting the 
Hatch-Waxman Act. The FDA took a similar view in the 1990s, under different statutory language, but the D.C. 
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Directly related to the 180-day exclusivity period is the value transfer consisting in the 
originator‟s commitment not to launch its own authorized generic in return for delayed 
generic entry.  An authorized generic is a generic version of the brand-name drug marketed 
by the originator (or, more commonly, by a licensed generic manufacturer) under its own 
patent(s) and FDA approval.  The authorized generic is often identical to the brand-name 
drug both in active and inactive ingredients, the main difference being in the name and 
packaging.  U.S. courts have consistently held that authorized generics can be marketed even 
during the 180-day exclusivity period,561  which substantially lowers the first filer‟s sales and 
profit.  According to the FTC‟s Authorized Generic Study, the generic manufacturer loses, on 
average, 25% of its market share.  Retail generic prices are 4 to 8% lower and wholesale 
generic prices are 7 to 14% lower.  Competition from an authorized generic reduces also the 
first-filer‟s revenues by 40 to 52% on average during the 180 days.562  The “no authorized 
generic” commitment is thus very valuable to a prospective generic entrant and can be used 
instead of a cash payment to convince the generic manufacturer to delay its entry.563 
After a period of uncertainty, U.S. Courts seem to have recognized the potential 
competitive concerns arising from patent litigation settlements involving the originator‟s 
commitment not to launch an authorized generic.564 
                                                                                                                                                   
Circuit held that the statute did not support it.  It also could be implemented by the Federal Trade Commission using its 
enforcement powers under Section 5 of the FTC Act.” (Ibid., p. 950)  The proposed solution would encourage 
generics to file only if and when they have a strong case, given that what counts is not to be the first 
to file, but the first to win.  This would reduce litigation, thus litigation cost and uncertainty for 
originators, and increase the number of weak patents invalidated or invented around, with a clear 
benefit to consumers and generic manufacturers able to bring a strong challenge against the 
originator‟s patent.  “A generic that rushes to file an ANDA without doing its research may actually have a weaker 
case than one that waits.  For example, an early generic entrant may rush onto the market by copying the patentee‘s 
product exactly, relying only on the possibility of invalidating the patent or on long-shot claims like inequitable conduct.  
By contrast, a generic firm that spends the time to design around the patentee‘s drug, coming up with a bioequivalent drug 
that may not infringe the patent, may take longer to do so, but may also bring a stronger challenge.  If earned exclusivity 
discourages the long-shot challenge because the challenger was simply hoping for a settlement, the result may be to give the 
second challenger – the one with a stronger case – more incentive to bring its challenge.” (C.S. Hemphill, M.A. 
Lemley, Earning Exclusivity Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 Antitrust Law 
Journal, 2011, pp. 983-984) 
561  See, e.g., Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 454 F.3d, 4th Cir., 2006, p. 271; Teva Pharm. 
Indus. v. FDA, 410 F.3d, D.C. Cir., 2005, p. 52. 
562  FTC, Authorized Generic Drugs: Short-Term Effects and Long-Term Impact, 2011, 
pp. 57-62, available at https://www.ftc.gov/reports/authorized-generic-drugs-short-term-effects-
long-term-impact-report-federal-trade-commission, accessed on 6 August 2016. 
563  Professor Hovenkamp illustrates why so-called “no-AG” agreements should be 
scrutinized and, if anticompetitive, sanctioned. “The patentee‘s promise not to enter with an authorized generic 
is very valuable […] for the same reason that any cartel agreement can be valuable to participants: one cartel member 
promises to restrain its own output in order to get market prices up.  A ―no authorized generic‖ provision is actually 
more anticompetitive and harmful to consumers than a payment for delay.  The payment for delay is merely a wealth 
transfer between the patentee and generic.  By contrast, the ―no authorized generic‖ agreement is not merely a wealth 
transfer, it is also a cartel agreement that serves to reduce market output and keep prices higher than they would 
otherwise be.  As a result, agreements restraining authorized generic entry should be treated more harshly than pay-for-
delay settlements.” (H.J. Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination, 76(3) Ohio 
State Law Journal, pp. 498-499) 
564  King Drug Co. of Florence Inc. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d, 3d Cir., 
2015, pp. 32-35 (“no-AG agreements are likely to present the same types of problems as reverse payments of cash.  
[…]  In Actavis, the Supreme Court recognized generally that the 180-day exclusivity period is ―possibly ‗worth several 
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The absence of the 180-day exclusivity period in the EU limits the risk and 
effectiveness of pay-for-delay settlements.    Since paying off one generic manufacturer has 
the effect of “putting blood in water where sharks are always near‟‟.565 Indeed, for a pay for delay to 
be effective in the EU, the originator has to settle with multiple generic manufacturers to 
prevent entry, not only with the first filer.  As we will see in further details below, this has 
been the case in the settlements sanctioned by the European Commission.  
The U.S. agencies and the European Commission have not only enforced antitrust 
and fined originators and generic manufacturers that had concluded pay for delay settlement 
agreements; they are also actively monitoring them. 
In the U.S., since 2004, originators and generic manufacturers are required to file 
certain agreements with the FTC and DOJ by the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement 
and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA).  The FTC reviews these filings and issues an annual 
report summarizing the number of agreements filed and the incidence of certain potentially 
anticompetitive terms.  In its latest report, the FTC noticed that, since the Actavis decision 
(discussed below), while the number of overall patent settlements filed increased, the 
percentage of settlements containing reverse payments appears to be declining.566  In the 
                                                                                                                                                   
hundred million dollars,‘‖ and may be where the bulk of the first-filer‘s profits lie. […]  At the same time, a brand‘s 
commitment not to produce an authorized generic means that it must give up the valuable right to capture profits in the 
new two-tiered market.  The no-AG agreement transfers the profits the patentee would have made from its authorized 
generic to the settling generic—plus potentially more, in the form of higher prices, because there will now be a generic 
monopoly instead of a generic duopoly.  Thus, ―the source of the benefit to the claimed infringer is something costly to the 
patentee.‖ Aaron Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, Antitrust, Fall 2013, at 16, n.22.  Absent a no-AG promise, 
launching an authorized generic would seem to be economically rational for the brand. For this reason, the fact that the 
brand promises not to launch an authorized generic (thereby giving up considerable value to the settling generic) makes 
the settlement something more than just an agreed-upon early entry: it ―may instead provide strong evidence that the 
patentee seeks to induce the generic challenger to abandon its claim with a share of its monopoly profits that would 
otherwise be lost in the competitive market.‖ Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235.  The anticompetitive consequences of this 
pay-for- delay may be as harmful as those resulting from reverse payments of cash.  If the brand uses a no-AG agreement 
to induce the generic to abandon the patent fight, the chance of dissolving a questionable patent vanishes (and along with 
it, the prospects of a more competitive market).  As with a reverse payment of cash, a brand agreeing not to produce an 
authorized generic may thereby have ―avoid[ed] the risk of patent invalidation or a finding of noninfringement.‖ Id. at 
2236. In addition, when the parties‘ settlement includes a no-AG agreement, the generic also presumably agrees to an 
early entry date that is later than it would have otherwise accepted.  And during this time, the brand‘s monopoly remains 
in force.  Once the generic enters, moreover, it faces no competition with other generics at all.‖).  See also In re 
Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., --- F. 3d. --- , 2016 WL 698077, 1st Cir., 2016; and In re Nexium 
(Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, D. Mass., 2013.  “The Use of No-AG Commitments 
Appears to Be Declining—In FY 2012, almost half of the reverse-payment agreements filed with the FTC included a 
commitment by a brand company that it would not sell an authorized generic (AG) for some period of time, allowing the 
settling generic company to increase its sales volume, likely at prices greater than if the brand company sold an AG. […]  
Starting in FY 2013, the number of no-AG commitments in pharmaceutical patents settlements has declined 
substantially, from nineteen in FY 2012 to four in FY 2013 and five in FY 2014.” (J. Towey, B. Albert, Is FTC 
v. Actavis Causing Pharma Companies to Change Their Behavior?, 13 January 2016, available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2016/01/ftc-v-actavis-causing-
pharma-companies-change-their, accessed on 6 August 2016) 
565  This language comes curiously from J. Robert‟s dissenting opinion in FTC v. Actavis, 
Inc., 570 U.S., 2013. 
566  “From FY 2005 to FY 2012, potential pay-for-delay agreements […] increased steadily, from three 
in FY 2005 to 40 in FY 2012.  But since early 2013, this trend seems to have reversed.  For example, in FY 2014, 
21 such reverse-payment agreements were filed with the Commission – a nearly 50% decline from the FY 2012 peak of 
40 – while the number of final patent settlements went up.  Also, almost half of the FY 2014 reverse-payment 
settlements involved cash payments to the generic company amounting to $5 million or less.  Such small cash payments 
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FTC‟s words: “[t]hese statistics confirm what the Supreme Court said in Actavis: ―parties may well find 
ways to settle patent disputes without the use of reverse payments.‖ The recent decline in settlements with reverse 
payments may signal that the Commission‘s commitment to combat anticompetitive agreements is finally paying 
off.”567 
In the EU as well, the European Commission monitors patent settlements in the 
pharmaceutical sector.  Each year, originator and generic companies are required to submit 
copies of all the patent settlement agreements covering the EU/EEA.  As in the previous 
reports, the Seventh Monitoring Report568 discusses the main categories of settlements and 
provides statistics relating to the agreements concluded during the previous year.  The 
categories identified by the Commission are 3: A, B.I and B.II.  Settlements within the first 
two categories (A, allowing immediate generic entry, and B.I, involving no value transfer from 
originator to generic company) are considered unproblematic.  These agreements represented 
26% and 64% respectively of the settlements filed in 2015.569  Category B.II contains the 
potentially problematic agreements, i.e. those that do not allow immediate generic entry and 
involve a value transfer from the originator to the generic company.  They represented 10% 
of the settlements in 2015.570  Only one of the B.II agreements in 2015 included a payment to 
the generic company and the percentage of agreements falling within this category has 
stabilized at a much lower level than in the period covered by the pharmaceutical sector 
inquiry.571  As noted by David Hull and Michael Clancy, however, “[t]he problem with this category 
is that it includes almost every form of settlement that would seem to fall within the normal definition of the 
term and, thus, risks discouraging companies from entering into meaningful settlements at all, including those 
that would allow early entry.  For example, this category includes a common form of settlement that would 
                                                                                                                                                   
might represent saved litigation costs, one of the few justifications the Supreme Court specifically identified in Actavis. 
[…][M]ore final patent settlements were filed with the Commission in FY 2014 than in any previous year (160 final 
settlements, compared to the previous high of 156 in FY 2011), but in the vast majority—more than 80%—pharma 
companies settled without any compensation to the generic company.‖ (J. Towey, B. Albert, Is FTC v. Actavis 
Causing Pharma Companies to Change Their Behavior?, 13 January 2016, available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2016/01/ftc-v-actavis-causing-
pharma-companies-change-their, accessed on 6 August 2016) 
567  J. Towey, Quo Vadis Post-Actavis?, 30 March 2016, available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-matters/2016/03/quo-vadis-post-actavis, 
accessed on 6 August 2016.  In a recent hearing held by the U.S. Congress to address pay for delay 
agreements, the FTC Chairwoman E. Ramirez indicated that despite the Supreme Court ruling, she 
continued to support legislation making pay for delay agreements presumptively illegal.  The main 
reason given is that it would enhance clarity, create a stronger deterrent effect, and help the FTC 
intervene more quickly (United States, 121st meeting of OECD Competition Committee, Generic 
Pharmaceuticals, DAF/COMP/WD(2014)51, 19 June 2014, par. 40). 
568  European Commission, 7th Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements, 13 
December 2016, par. 2, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/patent_settlements_report7_en.p
df, accessed on 14 December 2016. 
569  “[M]ost of the settlements (90% in 2015) fall into categories that prima facie raise no need for 
competition law scrutiny. Companies, in most cases, are able to solve their disputes in a manner that is typically 
considered unproblematic from a competition law perspective.” (European Commission, 7th Report on the 
Monitoring of Patent Settlements, 13 December 2016, par. 50) 
570  European Commission, 7th Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements, 13 
December 2016, par. 30. 
571  European Commission, 7th Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements, 13 
December 2016, Table 2 and paras. 46, 49. 
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seem to be benign in most circumstances: early entry by the generic.”572  The total number of patent 
settlements increased through the years with a peak in 2012.  After 2012, the number 
decreased in 2013 and 2014, but increased significantly in 2015.573  Noteworthy is the 
percentage of originators and generic manufacturers that concluded a settlement agreement in 
2015, 40% and 30% respectively.  Both percentages are at their second to highest levels (only 
in 2011 the percentage of originators has been higher, at 44%, while the percentage of generic 
manufacturers has exceeded 30% only in 2013, reaching 35%).574 
17.1. United States 
17.1.1. Actavis (U.S.) 
The first case that will be analyzed is also one of the, if not the, most important on 
pay-for-delay patent settlements.  Across this work, three are the crucial cases that 
revolutionized the way in which the interface between IP and antitrust in the pharmaceutical 
industry is conceived: AstraZeneca in the EU, Pfizer in Italy and Actavis in the U.S. 
The most important finding in Actavis is the definite rejection of the “scope of the 
patent” test to determine whether a conduct may fall within the reach of antitrust (this test 
provided that, if the effect of the agreement fell within the exclusionary effect of the patent, 
the agreement is immune from antitrust).  This however should not lead to think that patent 
law and antitrust law are two different and completely independent disciplines, whose 
infringement should be assessed notwithstanding the other.  As we saw, the two disciplines 
have overlapping goals and complementary means to achieve them.  Their application should 
always go in parallel to avoid the risk of one undermining the other and reaching conflicting 
                                                 
572  D.W. Hull, M.J. Clancy, The Application of EU Competition Law in the 
Pharmaceutical Sector, 7(2) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2016, p. 153.  “Of the 
13 B.II agreements for the 2015 period, 5 (38%) enabled early entry without a licence or a distribution agreement, 6 
(46%) combined early entry with a licence to the generic company, 1 (8%) only included a licence, and 1 (8%) included a 
payment to the generic company to compensate for damages.” (European Commission, 7th Report on the 
Monitoring of Patent Settlements, 13 December 2016, par. 46)  See also M.A. Carrier, Payment After 
Actavis, 100(7) Iowa Law Review, 2014, p. 26 (“the most expansive definition of an exclusion payment would 
encompass every settlement that involves the transfer of any consideration between the parties.  Under this definition, an 
exclusion payment would be present when a brand conveys anything of value to a generic.  This standard would be too 
broad.  It is hornbook contract law that parties would not settle a case if they did not receive some consideration.  The 
most frequently cited source for this proposition is Judge Richard Posner, sitting by designation in the Northern District 
of Illinois, in Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc.  In granting defendants‘ motion to dismiss, Judge 
Posner explained that ―any settlement agreement can be characterized as involving ‗compensation‘ to the defendant, who 
would not settle unless he had something to show for the settlement.‖  Judge Posner appropriately observed that 
settlements tend to give each of the settling parties something of benefit.  For that reason, the standard for exclusion 
payments that violate the antitrust laws should not encompass the broadest conception of value transferred to the generic.  
Of particular concern, such a standard would ensnare settlements in which the brand and generic reach agreement solely 
on the date for generic entry.  For these settlements allow the generic to obtain something of value: the right to enter before 
the end of the patent term.”) 
573  The Commission thus notes that “[a]s with the former six exercises, the results of the seventh 
monitoring exercise show that the Commission's announcement that it would continue scrutinizing B.II category 
settlements in the future has not hindered companies from concluding settlements in general.” (European 
Commission, 7th Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements, 13 December 2016, par. 48) 
574  European Commission, 7th Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements, 13 
December 2016, par. 24. 
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results.575  The correct test is thus to determine whether a conduct falls within the purpose of 
the patent, not its scope.  If it is within the purpose to pursue which the right has been 
granted, the conduct is “shielded” from antitrust intervention, as it can be considered falling 
within the meaning of competition on the merits and is presumptively beneficial to consumer 
welfare.  If the conduct falls outside of the purpose of the patent, i.e. it is neither aimed nor 
useful to achieve the purpose of patent law, or runs counter to it, it should be scrutinized and 
potentially prohibited and sanctioned.  This way patent and antitrust works in tandem to 
define each other‟s reach and better achieve their common purpose. 
In Actavis, Solvay Pharmaceutical had filed an NDA for a brand-name drug called 
AndroGel in 1999, in 2000 the application was approved by the FDA, and in 2003 Solvay 
obtained the only patent protecting AndroGel (due to expire in August 2020).  Later that 
same year, Actavis (at the time, Watson Pharmaceuticals) and, subsequently, Paddock 
Laboratories filed ANDAs with paragraph IV certifications (invalidity or non-infringement) 
for the generic version of AndroGel.  Par Pharmaceutical did not file an application but 
joined forces with Paddock, sharing patent litigation costs and profits if Paddock obtained 
approval for its generic.  Solvay sued Actavis and Paddock for patent infringement and the 
30-month stay started running.  Thirty months later, in early 2006, the FDA authorized the 
marketing of Actavis‟ first-to-file generic.  In 2006, however, the two patent litigations were 
settled.  The settlement agreement with Actavis provided for: (i) a commitment by Actavis 
not to enter the market before 31 August 2015, 65 month before Solvay‟s patent expiry (with 
an acceleration clause, i.e. the possibility to enter sooner in case some other generic was to 
enter the market), (ii) an obligation of Actavis to promote AndroGel to urologist, (iii) a 
payment by Solvay to Actavis.  The settlement agreement with the other generic 
manufacturers had similar provisions.  The payments by the originator Solvay to the generic 
manufacturers were as follows: $12 million in total to Paddock; $60 million in total to Par; 
and an estimated $19 to $30 million annually, for the time it agreed to stay out of the market 
(nine years), to Actavis.576  Originator and generic manufacturers described these payments as 
compensation for the services provided by the generic manufacturers, whose value according 
to the FTC was very limited. 
On 29 January 2009, the FTC filed a complaint against Solvay, Actavis, Paddock, and 
Par alleging that they violated Section 5 of the FTC Act577 by agreeing to abandon their 
                                                 
575  “[I]t would be incongruous to determine antitrust legality by measuring the settlement‘s 
anticompetitive effects solely against patent law policy, rather than by measuring them against procompetitive antitrust 
policies as well.  And indeed, contrary to the Circuit‘s view that the only pertinent question is whether ―the settlement 
agreement . . . fall[s] within‖ the legitimate ―scope‖ of the patent‘s ―exclusionary potential,‖ 677 F. 3d, at 1309, 
1312, this Court has indicated that patent and antitrust policies are both relevant in determining the ―scope of the 
patent monopoly‖—and consequently antitrust law immunity—that is conferred by a patent.  Thus, the Court in Line 
Material explained that ―the improper use of [a patent] monopoly,‖ is ―invalid‖ under the antitrust laws and resolved 
the antitrust question in that case by seeking an accommodation ―between the lawful restraint on trade of the patent 
monopoly and the illegal restraint prohibited broadly by the Sherman Act.‖ 333 U. S., at 310. […]  It would be 
difficult to reconcile the proposed right [to pay a competitor to respect its patent and quit its patent invalidity 
or noninfringement suit] with the patent-related policy of eliminating unwarranted patent grants so the public will 
not ―continually be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or justification.‖ Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 
395 U. S. 653, 670 (1969).” (FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S., 2013, par. II.A) 
576  AndroGel was Solvay‟s best-selling drug.  In 2007 sales went beyond $400 million, 
accounting for one-third of Solvay‟s U.S. revenues. 
577  “The Actavis case was brought by the Federal Trade Commission under Section 5 of the FTC Act.  
However, the FTC often applies Sherman Act standards in such cases, and nothing in the Supreme Court‘s opinion 
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lawsuits and delay their market entry in exchange for Solvay‟s payment.  The District Court 
concluded that these allegations did not represent an antitrust violation and dismissed the 
FTC‟s complaint.  The FTC appealed and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed the District Court‟s opinion, confirming the “scope of the patent” test (“absent sham 
litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent, a reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack so 
long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent.”)578 
The Supreme Court‟s opinion, as anticipated, rejected the scope of the patent test, 
reversed the District Court decision, and remanded the case to the district court for trial.579  
The Supreme Court, while recognizing the value of settlements, concluded that this patent-
related factor should not affect the FTC‟s opportunity to prove its antitrust claim.  The Court 
listed five sets of considerations leading to this conclusion. 
First, the Court recognized that pay for delay settlements have the potential for 
genuine adverse effects on competition (as requested for the application of Section 5 of the 
FTC Act).  In particular, with the payment the patentee purchases “the exclusive right to sell its 
product, a right it already claims but would lose if the patent litigation were to continue and the patent were 
held invalid or not infringed by the generic product.”580  While generic entry before patent expiry 
benefits consumers, the payment to delay generic entry keeps prices at monopoly levels while 
dividing that return between originator and generic manufacturers.  In Actavis, generic 
manufacturers received a sum larger than what they would have gained if they won the 
litigation and entered the market.  According to the Supreme Court, a payment this size 
cannot be explained by traditional settlement considerations and “may instead provide strong 
evidence that the patentee seeks to induce the generic challenger to abandon its claim with a share of its 
monopoly profits that would otherwise be lost in the competitive market.”  The Court discussed also the 
fact that a high reverse payment may “signal to other potential challengers that the patentee lacks 
confidence in its patent, thereby provoking additional challenges, perhaps too many for the patentee to buy off”.  
As we saw, this argument is weakened by two features of the U.S. system: the 180-day 
exclusivity granted to the first filer581 and the 30-month stay before the FDA may approve the 
                                                                                                                                                   
suggests that the Court was applying a broader liability rule available only to the FTC under Section 5 of the FTC Act.  
This was, for all intents and purposes, a Sherman Act case.  Thus, the inference and procedure […] are also available 
to private plaintiffs.” (A. Edlin, C.S. Hemphill, H.J. Hovenkamp, C. Shapiro, Activating Actavis, 28 
Antitrust, 2013, p. 20) 
578  FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals (now Actavis), 677 F. 3d, 2012, p. 1312.  As the 
Supreme Court summarized it: “The court recognized that ―antitrust laws typically prohibit agreements where one 
company pays a potential competitor not to enter the market.‖ […]  But, the court found that ―reverse payment 
settlements of patent litigation presen[t] atypical cases because one of the parties owns a patent.‖ 677 F. 3d, at 1307 
(internal quotation marks and second alteration omitted). Patent holders have a ―lawful right to exclude others from the 
market,‖ ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted); thus a patent ―conveys the right to cripple competition.‖ Id., at 1310 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court recognized that, if the parties to this sort of case do not settle, a court 
might declare the patent invalid. Id., at 1305. But, in light of the public policy favoring settlement of disputes (among 
other considerations) it held that the courts could not require the parties to continue to litigate in order to avoid antitrust 
liability. Id., at 1313–1314.” (FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S., 2013, par. I.B.2) 
579  “Discovery in that case will close soon, and summary judgment motions are due early [2017]” (J. 
Towey, Quo Vadis Post-Actavis?, 30 March 2016). 
580  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S., 2013, par. II.B. 
581  “Subsequent challengers cannot secure that exclusivity period, and thus stand to win significantly less 
than the first if they bring a successful paragraph IV challenge.  That is, if subsequent litigation results in invalidation of 
the patent, or a ruling that the patent is not infringed, that litigation victory will free not just the challenger to compete, 
but all other potential competitors too (once they obtain FDA approval).  The potential reward available to a subsequent 
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second generic manufacturer‟s application.  The Court thus concluded that: “a reverse payment 
settlement with the first filer (or, as in this case, all of the initial filers) ―removes from consideration the most 
motivated challenger, and the one closest to introducing competition.‖“582 
Second, the mentioned adverse effects on competition may prove unjustified.  When 
confronted with a potentially anticompetitive settlement, courts will have to determine 
whether the virtues offset the vices.  One of the virtues recognized by the Supreme Court is 
ending the litigation, and saving litigation costs.  This may be the case when the payment is “a 
rough approximation of the litigation expenses saved through the settlement”.  Another potential 
justification for the payment is that it corresponds to the fair value of the services that the 
generic has promised to perform (mostly supply of raw material, distribution, marketing/co-
promotion or backup manufacturing services).583  If it is not to save on litigation costs or to 
buy legitimate services from the generic manufacturer, the payment has no other purpose 
than to delay generic entry relative to what originator and generic manufacturer would have 
expected absent the value transfer. 
Third, the patentee must possess the market power to bring about the unjustified 
anticompetitive harm in practice; market power that may be inferred from the size of the 
payment.  If the patentee were active in a competitive market, it would not pay (or be able to 
pay) to keep a rival out, as this would have a very limited impact on the drug prices, already 
close to marginal cost.  The exact opposite is true for a firm with market power, which often 
enjoys high margins and has any interest in protecting them by excluding rivals.  According to 
the Court, the “―size of the payment from a branded drug manufacturer to a prospective generic is itself a 
strong indicator of power‖—namely, the power to charge prices higher than the competitive level. […]  An 
important patent itself helps to assure such power.  [A] firm without that power [is un]likely to pay ―large 
                                                                                                                                                   
challenger being significantly less, the patentee‘s payment to the initial challenger (in return for not pressing the patent 
challenge) will not necessarily provoke subsequent challenges.” (FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S., 2013, par. II) 
582  The Court continues by noting that “scholars in the field tell us that ―where only one party 
owns a patent, it is virtually unheard of outside of pharmaceuticals for that party to pay an accused infringer to settle the 
lawsuit.‖ H.J. Hovenkamp, M. Janis, M. Lemley, & C. Leslie, IP and Antitrust §15.3, p. 15–45, n. 161 (2d ed. 
Supp. 2011). It may well be that Hatch-Waxman‘s unique regulatory framework, including the special advantage that 
the 180-day exclusivity period gives to first filers, does much to explain why in this context, but not others, the patentee‘s 
ordinary incentives to resist paying off challengers (i.e., the fear of provoking myriad other challengers) appear to be more 
frequently overcome. See 12 Areeda ¶2046, at 341 (3d ed. 2010) (noting that these provisions, no doubt 
unintentionally, have created special incentives for collusion).” 
583  Critic of the genuinity of these “side deals” is M.A. Carrier, Payment After Actavis, 
100(7) Iowa Law Review, 2014, p. 23 (“In most cases, brands are not interested in generic services outside the 
settlement context.  Based on a review of settlements between 1993 and 2000, as well as settlements filed under the 
Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, former FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz testified that ―side deals‖ between brands 
and generics were ―observed in settlements that restrained generic entry, but virtually never in settlements that did not.‖  
Leibowitz observed that there had been only two exceptions to this pattern, one of which was then under investigation.  
And he concluded that the side deals ―may be serving as a vehicle to compensate a generic challenger for its agreement to a 
later entry date than the generic firm would otherwise accept.‖  Similarly, based on a review of the securities filings of 
brands and generics that have entered into settlements, Scott Hemphill has concluded that ―[o]utside of settlement, brand-
name firms seldom contract with generic firms for help with the activities that form the basis of side deals.‖  In particular, 
Hemphill found that the 25 total combinations among five major brand firms and five major generic firms yielded only 
two minor business arrangements.  While the facts of individual settlements call for review, common sense calls for 
rigorous scrutiny.  Do brands really need promotion by generics? As evidenced by armies of pharmaceutical sales 
representatives and commercials with wind-swept actors walking along the beach, brands tend not to be at a loss in 
marketing their drugs.  And while brands sometimes rely on other brands for promotion, they do not use generics for this 
task outside the context of settlement.”) 
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sums‖ to induce ―others to stay out of its market.‖ […][R]everse payment agreements are associated with the 
presence of higher-than-competitive profits—a strong indication of market power.” 
Fourth, there is no need to litigate neither the patent‟s validity nor patent infringement 
to answer to the antitrust question.584  The Supreme Court insightfully explained that: “[a]n 
unexplained large reverse payment itself would normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about the 
patent‘s survival.  And that fact, in turn, suggests that the payment‘s objective is to maintain supracompetitive 
prices to be shared among the patentee and the challenger rather than face what might have been a competitive 
market—the very anticompetitive consequence that underlies the claim of antitrust unlawfulness.”585  The 
Court rejects also a risk-aversion defense by saying that payments to avoid even a small risk 
of competition are antitrust violations.  “The owner of a particularly valuable patent might contend, of 
course, that even a small risk of invalidity justifies a large payment.  But, be that as it may, the payment (if 
otherwise unexplained) likely seeks to prevent the risk of competition.  And, as we have said, that consequence 
constitutes the relevant anticompetitive harm.  In a word, the size of the unexplained reverse payment can 
provide a workable surrogate for a patent‘s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed 
exploration of the validity of the patent itself.” 
Fifth, the potential antitrust liability presumed in case of a large and unjustified 
reverse payment does not prevent litigating parties from settling their lawsuit in other ways, 
such as, by allowing the generic to enter prior to patent‟s expiration, “without the patentee paying 
the challenger to stay out prior to that point”.  As the Supreme Court concluded: “[a]lthough the parties 
may have reasons to prefer settlements that include reverse payments, the relevant antitrust question is: What 
are those reasons? If the basic reason is a desire to maintain and to share patent-generated monopoly profits, 
then, in the absence of some other justification, the antitrust laws are likely to forbid the arrangement.” 
17.2. European Union 
While the most internationally well-known case of reverse payment is probably 
Actavis, the European Commission has studied and tackled pay-for-delay agreements as 
well.586  As did the FTC and the U.S. Supreme Court, the Commission rejected the scope of 
                                                 
584  As the Supreme Court notes: “litigate the validity of the patent in order to demonstrate what 
would have happened to competition in the absence of the settlement […][would] prove time consuming, complex, and 
expensive.  The antitrust game, the Circuit may believe, would not be worth that litigation candle.” (FTC v. Actavis, 
Inc., 570 U.S., 2013, par. II.B) 
585  “[A] very large payment is strong evidence that the parties themselves think the patent is very weak 
or invalid. […] That, incidentally, is a market based assessment of the patent‘s strength, and as such it is very likely 
more reliable than a court‘s determination.  If the parties have calculated a, say, 70% likelihood that the patent will be 
invalid, given what they know about similar situations, that statistical assessment is more valid than the ultimate 
decision of the court, which could be wrong about half the time.  Given the high likelihood of invalidity, the high payment 
then indicates that this generic is delaying or foregoing entry in order to maintain the high prices currently being charged.‖ 
(H.J. Hovenkamp, Institutional Advantage in Competition and Innovation Policy, University of Iowa 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-43, 2013, p. 8) 
586  The European Commission‟s reasoning as to why these agreements are concluded 
and why they are detrimental to consumer welfare is perfectly in line with the analysis conducted in 
the U.S.: “it may be in the interest of the originator undertaking to induce, with a significant value transfer, the generic 
undertaking to stay out of the market for a period of time and in the interest of the generic undertaking to agree to stay 
out of the market in exchange for that payment.  In fact, both parties may do better with such an agreement than if they 
had continued their own independent commercial course and rivalry.  The reason why both (potential) competitors can be 
better off at the same time is that the profits the generic undertaking could make from entering the market will be lower 
than the loss in profits that would likely result for the originator undertaking from generic entry. Therefore the originator 
can easily afford to pay-off one or several generics to prevent their entry. […][O]riginator‘s losses from generic entry 
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the patent test587 and ruled that reverse payment agreements should be considered restrictions 
“by object” (thus excluding the need to demonstrate their effects).588  In the most recent case 
it decided, Servier, the Commission confirmed its previous finding that it is not necessary to 
show effects for a pay-for-delay agreement to be anticompetitive, but nevertheless assessed 
the effects of the agreement.  This is not the only interesting element of Servier.  In this case, 
the Commission introduced also another innovative element in the scrutiny of reverse 
payments, the unilateral perspective.  Indeed, the agreement may be seen as part of the 
originator‟s unilateral conduct aimed at inducing generic manufacturer to refrain from 
entering the market, rather than a common decision by originator and generic 
manufacturer(s).  This perspective will be discussed in detail in the context of the Servier case.   
                                                                                                                                                   
exceed generic company‘s expected gains from competing.  The difference would accrue to the consumer.  Therefore, if also 
consumers‘ interest in lower, off-patent prices is taken into account, the originator‘s interest in preserved product 
exclusivity is counterbalanced by both generics‘ and consumers‘ interest in generic competition.  It can certainly make 
commercial sense for an originator company to simply pay the generic undertaking the money that it could hope to gain by 
entering the market, or more, on condition that the generic undertaking stays out of the market.  The incentive to do so is 
even higher if the originator perceives an appreciable risk that its patent(s) will be held invalid and/or not infringed by a 
court.  This does not imply that it is legitimate to avoid risks of competition by practical cooperation between the 
companies. (Judgment in Beef Industry Development and Barry Brother, C-209/07, EU:C:2008:643, paragraphs 33 
to 35)”  (European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, paras. 1146-1149). 
587  As the European Commission notes in AT.39226, Lundbeck, 19 June 2013, par. 698, 
“[p]aying potential competitors not to try to enter the market at all is not based on any rights granted by patent law, nor 
is it based on the strength of the patent, nor is it one of the legitimate means society has provided for the defence of patent 
rights.  In this sense, one could say that the agreements covered by this Decision fall outside of the ―specific subject 
matter‖ of the patent, which includes the right to oppose, but not the right to buy off competition.”  This position has 
been confirmed by the General Court, which affirmed that the European Commission rightly noted 
that the “scope of the patent test” is problematic from a competition law perspective as “it leads to a 
presumption that a generic medicinal product infringes the originator undertaking‘s patent and thus allows the generic 
medicinal product to be excluded on that basis, when the question whether it infringes any patents is an unresolved issue.  
Secondly, it is based on the premiss that any patent invoked in the context of a settlement agreement will be held valid if 
its validity is challenged, although there is no basis in law or in practice for that outcome […].  The ‗scope of the patent‘ 
test is therefore based on a subjective assessment, by the applicants, of the scope of their patents and of their validity, 
whereas a national court or competent authority may have taken a different view.  Moreover, the Supreme Court of the 
United States, concluding an intense debate on that issue, adopted the same approach by rejecting the ‗scope of the patent‘ 
test […] Whether or not a restriction falls within the scope of a patent is a conclusion that follows from an examination 
of the scope and validity of that patent and not, as the applicants suggest, the starting point of such an examination […] 
Moreover, the fact that some restrictions contained in the [pay for delay] agreements […] were considered by the 
Commission as potentially falling within the scope of [the originator‟s] patents means only that the applicants could 
have obtained comparable restrictions through court rulings enforcing their patents, assuming that they succeeded in 
actions brought before the competent national courts.  In that respect, even if the agreements at issue also contained 
restrictions potentially falling within the scope of the applicants‘ patents, those agreements went beyond the specific subject 
matter of their intellectual property rights, which indeed included the right to oppose infringements, but not the right to 
conclude agreements by which actual or potential competitors were paid not to enter the market” (General Court, T-
472/13, Lundbeck v Commission, 8 September 2016, paras. 491-495). 
588  The European Commission‟s position has been later confirmed by the General 
Court, which stated that: “the very existence of reverse payments and the disproportionate nature of those payments 
[are] relevant factors in establishing whether [pay for delay settlement] agreements [constitute] restrictions of 
competition ‗by object‘ for the purpose of Article 101 TFEU in that, by those payments, the originator undertaking 
[provides] an incentive to the generic undertakings not to continue their independent efforts to enter the market. 
[…][Pay for delay agreements are] comparable to market exclusion agreements, which are among the most serious 
restrictions of competition.  The exclusion of competitors from the market constitutes an extreme form of market sharing 
and of limitation of production.” (General Court, T-472/13, Lundbeck v Commission, 8 September 2016, 
paras. 355 and 435) 
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As to the infringement of Article 101 TFEU, based on the Commission‟s practice so 
far, three are the basic criteria applied to determine whether an agreement is anticompetitive: 
(i) it has been concluded between (at least potential) competitors; (ii) it involves an unjustified 
transfer of value from the originator to the generic manufacturer; (iii) as a result of the 
agreement, the generic manufacturer‟s ability and incentives to independently compete with 
the originator are somehow limited (i.e. delayed entry, no-challenge or non-compete clauses, 
and/or market entry under license or distribution agreement with the originator).   
Therefore, if (i) an originator and a generic manufacturer settle a patent litigation with 
the agreement that (ii) the originator gives something of value to the generic manufacturer 
with no other justification than to induce (iii) the generic manufacturer to delay its entry (or 
otherwise limit its efforts to compete), the patent is assumed to be “weak” (i.e. there is a high 
probability it is invalid or not infringed) and the agreement is considered a restriction by 
object contrary to Article 101 TFEU, with no need to prove effects.589  As the Commission 
noted in Servier, “[t]he protection of rivalry, including through patent law challenges, relates to an important 
general principle underlying Article 101 of the Treaty, which is that each economic operator must determine 
independently the policy which it intends to adopt on the market.”590  Obviously a reverse payment 
                                                 
589  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 1144 (“If the 
generic company was an actual or potential competitor as it had a real concrete possibility to enter, or viably remain on, 
the market absent the settlement, the immediate and direct consequence of the reverse payment patent settlements as 
assessed in this Decision is to remove the possibility that the generic undertaking will enter or remain on the market.  
[F]or the purposes of competitive assessment (of restrictions by object) [w]hat matters is if a reverse payment patent 
settlement collusively removes a potential competitor and affects the structure of the market. […][I]n this case, it is not 
only inappropriate, but also unnecessary for the Commission to rely on posterior patent court decisions or perform an own 
assessment of the likely outcome of the patent dispute/litigation.  A reverse payment settlement may remove a potential 
competitor and distort the market structure, resulting in reduced risks from competition and the resulting market 
uncertainty, thus easing competitive pressure to the benefit of the originator.”)  See also European Commission, 
AT.39226, Lundbeck, 19 June 2013, paras. 638-640 (“When in a patent dispute a settlement is reached without 
inducement on the basis of each party‘s assessment of the probability of a patent being held valid and infringed by a court, 
such a patent settlement will normally not infringe Article 101(1) of the Treaty if the agreed limitations on the behaviour 
of the generic undertaking do not go beyond the rights granted by patent law. […][By contrast,] ―when an agreement is 
concluded in which the generic undertaking accepts to exit or not to enter the market for a certain period of time […] but 
instead the originator undertaking pays a considerable sum of money to the generic undertaking, then such an agreement, 
whether referred to as a patent settlement or not, merits the full scrutiny of competition law.”) 
590  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 1139.  The 
Commission continues with a pertinent parallelism with the Irish Beef case (Court of Justice, C-
209/07, Beef Industry Development and Barry Brothers, 20 November 2008, paras. 33-34): “Irish Beef 
is of particular interest to the facts examined in this Decision.  This case dealt with a mechanism, the so-called BIDS 
arrangements, to reduce perceived overcapacity in the Irish beef sector.  As part of the BIDS arrangements, the 
undertakings that stayed in the market paid financial compensation to those who agreed to leave the market.  The Court 
of Justice found that: ―That type of arrangement conflicts patently with the concept inherent in the EC Treaty provisions 
relating to competition, according to which each economic operator must determine independently the policy which it 
intends to adopt on the common market.  Article 81(1) EC [now 101(1) of the Treaty] is intended to prohibit any 
form of coordination which deliberately substitutes practical cooperation between undertakings for the risks of competition.  
In the context of competition, the undertakings which signed the BIDS arrangements would have, without such 
arrangements, no means of improving their profitability other than by intensifying their commercial rivalry or resorting to 
concentrations.  With the BIDS arrangements it would be possible for them to avoid such a process and to share a large 
part of the costs involved in increasing the degree of market concentration…‖.  The European Court of Justice in Irish 
Beef concluded that the arrangements in question, premised on exclusionary payments, were a restriction by object. 
Advocate General Trstenjak characterised the arrangement as ―the ‗buying off‘ of competition‖.  This is close to how one 
of the settlements had been described internally, as well as by a third party, as the generic company ―taking the money in 
exchange for being bought out‖ by Servier.” (paras. 1139-1140) 
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agreement can still be exempted under Article 101(3) TFEU if the parties are able to rebut the 
illegality presumption and demonstrate that the efficiencies counterbalance the adverse 
impact on competition. 
The European Commission‟s on pay-for-delay agreements have been taken one year 
apart, in 2013 and 2014, and concern brand-name drugs manufactured by Lundbeck and 
Servier.  In Lundbeck, the Commission found that the agreements restricted competition by 
object and infringed Article 101 TFEU.  In Servier, the Commission‟s analysis went further 
and found that the agreements restricted competition both by object and by effect and 
Servier‟s conduct violated both Article 101 and 102 TFEU. 
17.2.1. Lundbeck (EU) 
The 2013 Lundbeck decision is the first intervention by the European Commission 
on pay for delay agreements.  The case concerned agreements between an originator 
(Lundbeck) and four generic manufacturers, involving a value transfer from the former to the 
latters.  These agreements were not patent settlements as the most relevant patents on the 
brand-name drug (the antidepressant Citalopram) had already expired and the agreements 
were not concluded to resolve a patent dispute.591  However, since several secondary process 
patents, e.g., on the means of delivery, were still in place, the Commission took the view that 
the agreements were “concluded in the context of at least a potential patent dispute”.592 
In 2002, Lundbeck‟s best-selling drug Citalopram was near the end of its lifecycle.  
The product and process patents had been granted between 1977 and 1985 and were thus due 
to expire between the late nineties and the beginning of the year 2000.  As the Commission‟s 
decision reports, “[b]etween 1997 and 1999, with the expiry of patent protection for the citalopram 
compound in many European countries looming, Lundbeck launched an avalanche of patent applications for 
all processes for manufacturing citalopram Lundbeck was able to identify.”593  Lundbeck thus created a 
cluster of process patents at the time of the agreements to further delay generic entry and 
create a window of opportunity to switch patients to its second generation product 
Escitalopram.594  However, due to the expiration of the main patents covering the original 
compound and some manufacturing processes, not all possible production methods were 
covered and generic manufacturers could enter the market with their drugs.  Indeed, one of 
them started selling a generic version of Citalopram while others were preparing to launch 
theirs. 
To avoid competition from generics, Lundbeck concluded pay-for-delay agreements 
with four generic manufacturers (Alpharma, Merck, Arrow and Ranbaxy) – Lundbeck would 
pay generic manufacturers tens of millions of euros (substantially the equivalent of what they 
                                                 
591  “The agreements in question did not resolve any patent dispute; they rather postponed the issues 
raised by potential generic market entry. It was also established that the agreements contained no commitment from 
Lundbeck to refrain from infringement proceedings if the generic undertaking entered the market with generic citalopram 
after expiry of the agreement.  Finally, the agreements concerned obtained results for Lundbeck that Lundbeck could not 
have achieved by enforcing its process patents before the national courts.  Each of the agreements in question prevented the 
generic company concerned from selling generic citalopram, irrespective of whether such citalopram would be produced in 
infringement of Lundbeck‘s process patents.” (European Commission, AT.39226, Lundbeck, 19 June 2013, 
par. 6) 
592  European Commission, AT.39226, Lundbeck, 19 June 2013, par. 4. 
593  European Commission, AT.39226, Lundbeck, 19 June 2013, par. 144. 
594  European Commission, AT.39226, Lundbeck, 19 June 2013, par. 133. 
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would have earned if they had entered the market) and the generic manufacturers would keep 
their generic version of Citalopram out of the market for the duration of the agreements.  
Lundbeck paid significant lump sums, purchased existing stocks of generics with the sole 
purpose of destroying them, and offered guaranteed profits via distribution agreements.  
What was peculiar about this case is that the agreement to delay generic entry was used by 
Lundbeck not only to keep Citalopram prices up,595 but also to adopt a concurrent product 
switching strategy.  While the agreements were in force, Lundbeck‟s strategy was to migrate 
patients to its second-generation patented drug, Escitalopram, whose success would have left 
no market for generic manufacturers to sell their generic product when they were finally able 
to enter.596 
Based on the above, the Commission concluded that the pay-for-delay agreements 
between Lundbeck and the four generic manufacturers, violated Article 101 TFEU, and 
imposed fines amounting to €93.8 million on Lundbeck and €52.2 million in total on the 
generic manufacturers.  In its decision, the Commission referred to the economic and legal 
context leading to each agreement, their content and objectives, and each party‟s subjective 
intention in concluding the agreement (to verify it matched the assessment based on objective 
elements).  The anticompetitiveness of each agreement was based on the following findings: 
(i) Lundbeck and the four generic manufacturers were potential competitors; (ii) Lundbeck 
paid the generic manufacturers millions of euros, in different forms, to induce them not to 
independently pursue their efforts to enter the market; (iii) as a result, and for the duration of 
the agreement, the generic manufacturers‟ ability and incentives to compete were limited.  In 
its press release, the European Commission expressly stated: 
“Paying competitors to stay out of the market at the expense of European citizens has nothing to do 
with the legitimate protection of intellectual property: it is an illegal practice and the Commission will 
fight against it.”597 
Lundbeck and the generic manufacturers have presented appeals to the General 
Court, which were recently rejected.  Particularly, on 8 September 2016 the General Court 
upheld the European Commission‟s decision in its entirety, confirming the finding that 
                                                 
595  Patients were thus deprived of access to cheaper versions of Citalopram and public 
health systems had to bear the cost of the brand-name drug, one of the most widely prescribed 
antidepressants, for a much longer period than it would have been otherwise the case.  The harm has 
been significant considering that, after generic entry in the UK, prices of generic citalopram “dropped 
31% in just three months‘ time.  After seven months, prices of generic citalopram had dropped 69% and after 13 
months they had dropped 90%.” (European Commission, AT.39226, Lundbeck, 19 June 2013, par. 726) 
596  In an internal document, Lundbeck described its strategy in the following way: “It is 
like a poker game[.] We have been dealt a mediocre hand – no aces, a couple of queens and some small uneven cards[.] 
But we have a large pile of $$$at our side[.] We call it – ―the art of playing a loosing hand slowly‖[.] Our strategy[.] 
Our objective : To create a window of opportunity for the Cipralex switch[.] Focus on EU and particularly the northern 
European markets – the generic markets[.] Three main tactics: – Influencing the authorities[,] – Patent defence, mainly 
process patents[,] – Deal making‖.  Lundbeck defined ―window of opportunity‖ as ―time difference from Cipralex 
launch to generic entry [on citalopram].‖ The same ―Generic citalopram update 22 11 2002‖ also stated: ―Value of 
delayed generic entry[.] Besides the value of ―sales not lost to generics‖[.] Additional value from impact on – Cipralex 
price[,] – Cipralex penetration![,] – Staff morale.‖“ (European Commission, AT.39226, Lundbeck, 19 June 
2013, paras. 131-132) 
597  J. Almunia, Commission fines Lundbeck and other pharma companies for delaying 
market entry of generic medicines, 19 June 2013, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-13-553_en.htm, accessed on 6 August 2016. 
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Lundbeck‟s pay for delay settlement agreements are restrictions by object.598 
17.2.2. Servier (EU) 
The second European case analyzed by this chapter involved the originator Servier.  
This case has been discussed more than once in the chapters above, in relation to patent 
clusters and product hopping, and will be examined once more from the perspective of the 
pay-for-delay agreement concluded by Servier with a number of generic manufacturers. 
As in Lundbeck, Servier‟s patent on the perindopril molecule had expired but several 
secondary patents were still in force, protecting the manufacturing processes and different 
forms of the drug.  This protection was limited and generic manufacturers were thus 
preparing to enter the market.  The technologies for the production of perindopril not 
covered by Servier‟s patents were however limited and Servier acquired the most advanced 
one, blocking several generic projects and delaying their market entry.  Each time a generic 
company was about to enter the market (e.g., it applied for a marketing authorization), Servier 
sent warning letters making reference to its patent cluster and started litigation to obtain 
injunctions.  At the same time, generic producers challenged Servier‟s secondary patents. 599  It 
is in this context that Servier concluded five reverse payment settlement agreements with 
generic manufacturers, namely Niche/Unichem, Matrix, Teva, Krka and Lupin.  The 
agreements imposed contractual limitations on the generic companies with regards to 
challenging Servier‟s patents and entering the market (typically in the form of non-challenge 
and non-compete obligations), and in exchange provided for a “reverse payment” from 
Servier in the form of actual monetary transfers or other inducements.  The settlement with 
Krka and Lupin included also the transfer of certain of their patents to Servier.  In total, 
Servier‟s payments to the generic companies exceeded €120 million. 
The Commission‟s findings were that each of the five reverse payment patent 
settlements that Servier concluded with its generic competitors violated Article 101 TFEU.  
First, the Commission applied the analytical framework applied in Lundbeck and 
concluded that the agreements restricted competition by object.  In particular, (i) Servier and 
the generic manufacturers were at least potential competitors, (ii) the agreements involved a 
value transfer from Servier to the generic manufacturers as an inducement to reduce their 
ability and incentive to compete (the sum paid was based on the generic companies‟ expected 
profit in case of market entry),600 and (iii) generic companies committed to delay their entry 
                                                 
598  General Court, T-472/13, Lundbeck v Commission, 8 September 2016. 
599  “During the period concerned, Servier sent warning letters to practically all generic challengers and 
entered into litigation in certain Member States with a number of generic companies that were preparing to launch generic 
versions of perindopril.  In addition, Servier defended itself against several generic companies that had initiated opposition 
procedures before the EPO.  The main subject matter of the litigation as well as the opposition procedure was the ‗947 
patent. Litigation with Niche and Krka also related to Servier‘s process patents, ‗339, ‗340 and ‗341.” (European 
Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 152) 
600  “Niche noted on the transfer: ―Settlement was equivalent to over 10 year planned sales and 20 years 
planned gross profit‖.” (European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 7)  As 
the Commission explained: “Servier had considerable financial resources at its disposal because of the profits it had 
made as a result of the sales of perindopril. Servier used a portion of these rents to induce its competitors to enter into the 
successive reverse payment patent settlement agreements.” (European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril 
(Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2929) 
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for the duration of the agreements.601  In addition, the agreements did not restrict Servier‟s 
ability to sue the generic manufacturers for patent infringement (once they were able to enter 
the market) and the obligations imposed on some generic manufacturers were more 
restrictive than what Servier could have obtained successfully enforcing its patents. 
Second, the European Commission went further than in Lundbeck and, although it 
deemed “unnecessary to analyse whether the effects of the said agreements were also restrictive of competition, 
[…] for the sake of completeness, the Commission [analyzed also] the likely restrictive effects of the 
agreements on competition.”602  The Commission concluded that each of the agreements 
“appreciably restrict[ed] potential competition among Servier and generic companies and barred ―real concrete 
possibilities‖ […] to compete among themselves or ―for a new competitor to penetrate the relevant market and 
compete with the undertakings already established‖. [Furthermore, the] Settlement Agreement appreciably 
increased the likelihood that Servier‘s significant market power would remain uncontested for a longer period of 
time, thereby avoiding the significant reduction of prices that would have ensued from timely and effective generic 
entry.”603 
It is interesting to note that the Commission, not only rejected the parties‟ claimed 
efficiencies, as they did not (i) substantiate the alleged savings from avoided litigation, nor (ii) 
demonstrate the restrictions were indispensable to obtain them (and cash payment exceeded 
litigation costs), but it also noted that the parties should have demonstrated that “such cost 
reductions produce any pro-competitive effect on the market instead of just increasing the companies‘ profits”.  
In particular, “litigation forms a key part of competition between originator and generic companies.  Avoided 
litigation costs are basically savings achieved due to a reduction of output into (litigation) activity needed to 
possibly successfully challenge the patent and thus enable a viable generic entry into the market.  The parties 
failed to show how such savings would lead to pro-competitive effects on the market.”604  The Commission 
thus rejected the automatic procompetitiveness of savings on litigation costs, envisioning the 
possibility that even simply ending the litigation might have negative effects on competition. 
                                                 
601  “Servier used its financial resources to ―pay off‖ the generic companies in question so they would not 
challenge Servier‘s patents and would not enter the market and therefore compete.  [Servier paid] an amount which was 
equivalent to […] years of profit expected by the generic compan[ies].  In exchange [the generic companies] needed 
to commit not to challenge Servier‘s patents concerning perindopril […] and to restrict their ability to compete. […]  The 
generic companies cashed the expected profit without running the risk of competition. This clearly changed their incentives 
to enter the market.  The amounts paid were self-financing since they enabled Servier to keep its rents for a longer time 
period.” (European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, paras. 2937-2938) 
602  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 1213.  “This 
new approach is not entirely surprising considering that one of the main criticisms made against the Lundbeck decision 
was that the ―by object‖ restriction approach pursued by the Commission was inappropriate considering the complex 
nature of reverse-payment patent settlements.  Unlike price-fixing cartels – whose negative effects on competition are clear 
and cannot be redeemed by efficiencies – the effects of reverse-payment patent settlements, which can vary a lot in scope 
and nature, are unlikely to be so clear cut and thus should be proven.  In addition, in its Cartes Bancaires judgment 
adopted in September 2014, the Court of Justice of the EU ruled that the concept of restriction of competition ―by 
object‖ (the equivalent of per se illegality under Article 101 TFEU) must be interpreted ―restrictively‖ and ―can be 
applied only to certain types of coordination between undertakings which reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition 
that it may be found that there is no need to examine their effects, otherwise the Commission would be exempted from the 
obligation to prove the actual effects on the market of agreements which are in no way established to be, by their very 
nature, harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition.‖  Thus, by showing the effects of reverse-payment patent 
settlements the Commission placed itself on safer grounds.” (D. Geradin, D. Ginsburg, G. Safty, Reverse 
Payment Patent Settlements in the European Union and the United States, George Mason University 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series LS 15-22, 2015, p. 23) 
603  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 1659. 
604  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2075. 
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The Commission ultimately imposed fines totaling €427.7 million on Servier, for its 
strategy aimed at excluding competitors and delaying generic entry, and on Servier and the 
five generic manufacturers for concluding a series of anticompetitive pay for delay settlement 
agreements. 
Peculiar to this decision is the analysis on whether concluding reverse payment patent 
settlements can be considered a unilateral conduct in violation of Article 102 TFEU.605  In 
particular, the Commission examined whether the five agreements concluded by Servier 
“constitued behaviour falling outside the scope of competition on the merits and was capable of contributing to 
the foreclosure effects of Servier‘s single and continuous exclusionary strategy, that is to say rendering generic 
entry more difficult and/or delayed.”606  Referring to Continental Can607 and TeliaSonera,608 the 
Commission pointed out that an “[a]buse may occur if any undertaking in a dominant position 
strengthens such a position in such a way that the degree of dominance reached substantially fetters competition 
[…] regardless of the means and procedure by which it is achieved.”609  It then referred to Hoffman-La 
Roche to specify that the fact that the other parties to the agreement were powerful 
undertaking did not preclude the existence of an abuse.  An undertaking may abuse its 
dominant position if it interferes with the structure of competition in a market in which the 
degree of competition has already been weakened by the very presence of the dominant 
undertaking.610 
The unilateral behavior contested to Servier as part of its exclusionary strategy is the 
use of its market power to induce generic manufacturers to withdraw from competition, by 
offering to pay them a significant sum of money, or provide other commercial advantages.611  
The Commission concluded that “[t]he five agreements formed part of a continuous course of conduct by 
Servier whereby it used its market power in order to hinder effective competition on the market for perindopril.  
This behaviour by a dominant company falls outside the scope of competition on the merits.”612  The reasons 
why Servier‟s conduct cannot be qualified as competition on the merits are clearly articulated 
by the Commission.  “Servier‘s strategy deviated from its special responsibility as a dominant company 
―not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market‖ and constituted 
―recourse to methods different from those which condition normal competition in products or services on the 
basis of the transactions of commercial operators‖.  Servier did not exclude the operators representing a close 
competitive threat on the technology market or the final product market by outperforming them with the 
                                                 
605  The European Commission refers to several cases in which the Court of Justice and 
General Court concluded that both Article 101 and 102 TFEU were applicable concurrently, provided 
that there is an additional and distinct unilateral aspect (Court of Justice, C-85/76, Hoffman-La 
Roche, 13 February 1979, par. 116; C-66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen, 11 April 1989, par. 37; T-
83/91, Tetra Pak, T-83/91, 6 October 1994, paras. 21, 25 and 30; C-395/96 P, Compagnie maritime 
belge transports, 16 March 2000, par. 33.  The parallel application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU is 
foreseen also by the Commission‟s Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal 
cooperation agreements of 17 January 2011, par. 16. 
606  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2920. 
607  Court of Justice, C-6/72, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can 
Company v Commission, 21 February 1973. 
608  Court of Justice, C-52/09, TeliaSonera Sverige, 17 February 2011, paras. 26-27. 
609  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2921. 
610  Court of Justice, C-85/76, Hoffman-La Roche v Commission, 13 February 1979, par. 
120. 
611  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2927. 
612  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2920.  See 
also par. 2960. 
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strength of its patent portfolio, quality of its products, or superior manufacturing efficiency, but by a series of 
direct transactions with these operators to effectively buy them out of the market by purchasing their technology 
or by providing inducements for them to accept restrictions of competition.  Servier‘s conduct was capable of 
leading to ―the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the 
growth of that competition‖.”613 
On the basis of this analysis, it is difficult to imagine a situation in which a pay-for-
delay patent settlements violating Article 101 TFEU is not violating Article 102 TFEU as well 
(provided the originator is in a dominant position).614  If the pay-for-delay violates Article 101 
TFEU, it would be quite odd to qualify it as “competition on the merits”.  While it can be 
often expected to be part of a “single and continuous exclusionary strategy”, as the creation 
of a patent cluster is a sensible antecedent and product hopping is a profit-maximizing 
subsequent, even by itself this conduct could be considered abusive.615 
The question that is left to answer is, while in case of reverse payment settlements 
there is no 101 without 102, can there be 102 without 101?  There could be situations in 
which the agreement is the outcome of pressure brought to bear by the originator on the 
generic manufacturer.  Indeed, the context in which these agreements are concluded is most 
certainly not one in which the parties are free from pressure.  While under certain 
circumstances it is the originator to be under pressure, due to the weakness of its patent and 
the concrete threat of generic entry, in other cases it is the generic manufacturer to enter into 
the agreement because the pressure exercised by the originator forced it.  This may be the 
                                                 
613  European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2996. 
614  As for the dominant position, however, as explained above there cannot be a reverse 
payment patent settlement without the originator having significant market power.  The Commission 
itself pointed out that, “[i]f the market for [the brand-name drug] was contested by generic entry or another 
significant competitive constraint, [the originator]‘s ability to provide such significant inducements would have been 
undermined.  In addition, in a competitive market, [the originator] would, as a reasonable economic operator, not have 
the incentive to hand out such inducements, as the restrictions imposed on a single generic company would be offset by 
remaining competition.” (European Commission, AT.39612, Perindopril (Servier), 9 July 2014, par. 2938)  
See also par. 2933 (“Servier had a strategy of using all possible means to protect Coversyl from the threat of generic 
entry, which included using part of the substantial profits that it was reaping from its sales of perindopril to fend off 
generic challengers.  As the holder of the key patents protecting perindopril, only Servier could devise a strategy of different 
settlement agreements with the different generic challengers.  Thus Servier was the counterparty in each of the agreements 
and could, through this situation, use its market power to induce generic companies to enter into reverse payment patent 
settlement agreements by paying in total more than EUR [80 - 95]* million to the generic companies to keep them off 
the market.  The chain of agreements was likely to have a cumulative and self-reinforcing effect, which was stronger than 
that of each agreement taken individually and sought to maximise the potential of perpetuating Servier‘s monopoly on the 
perindopril market.”) 
615  Of the same opinion is S. Gallasch, A new dimension to EU pharma antitrust 
product hopping and unilateral pay for delay, 12 (1) European Competition Journal, 2016, p. 157 (“pay 
for delay settlements could be used as a means to an end for the brand company to succeed with a broader unilateral 
strategy, which would justify an investigation under Art. 102 TFEU.  A pay for delay settlement could turn the general 
legitimate attempt of the brand company to switch consumers to a new follow-on drug into an anticompetitive conduct.”  
At pp. 143-144, the author insightfully notes that: “Scrutinizing such unilateral conduct under Art. 102 
TFEU would also have a further strategic advantage.  In an investigation against a brand company regarding the 
alleged abuse of its dominant position, the European Commission is more likely to receive cooperation from the generic 
company that entered into the pay for delay settlement, as only the brand company is subject of the investigation.  In fact, 
the European Commission could initiate proceedings under Art. 101 TFEU as well as under Art. 102 TFEU and 
could use its discretion to drop the Art. 101 TFEU proceedings against the generic company in return for their 
cooperation.  This is also not likely to be an undue prioritization of the enforcement, as the investigated conduct is based 
on a unilateral strategy that has been facilitated by the agreement between the brand company and the generic company.”) 
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case when the originator is much more economically powerful than the generic manufacturer 
and undertakes (or threatens to undertake) an exclusionary strategy including the creation of a 
patent cluster and vexatious litigation.616  If this is the case, the generic manufacturer has two 
alternatives, either it accepts the (economically advantageous) offer to be bought off by the 
originator, or it starts an endless and economically extenuating fight only to get, in the best 
case scenario, the exact same (or worse) result than accepting the offer.  Even in the best case 
scenario, a judge may award legal fees and damages to the originator as the generic 
manufacturer did not settle the litigation when offered to and brought it forward only to get 
the exact same (or worse) result in the end.  Under procedural rules, this may qualify as 
harassment of the other party (i.e. vexatious litigation) and a waste of the court‟s time and 
resources, leading to the generic manufacturer‟s responsibility. 
Generic manufacturers are profit-oriented companies, competing on price.  They have 
neither aim nor prospect of inventing a disruptive new product that grants them monopoly 
profits, and can predict their likely revenues from market entry.  If rational, they will thus 
accept the originator‟s offer both if induced617 as well as forced.  The difference between the 
two is however that in the second case it would be much more difficult to demonstrate the 
necessary meeting of the minds and the fact that the generic manufacturer had a concrete 
possibility to take an unfettered decision as to its market entry and conclusion of the 
settlement agreement. 
 
18. Conclusion 
The analysis of patent-related abusive conducts in the pharmaceutical industry 
confirmed that conducts sanctioned under antitrust law and conducts contrary to the purpose 
of patent law tend to coincide.  Patent-related abuse of dominance is nothing more than a 
specification of the broader category of abuse of (patent) rights.  When patents are involved, 
and directly relevant for the conduct, also concerted actions may fall within the definition of 
abuse of patent rights.  As seen, the European Commission itself found that patent 
settlements may form part of a unilateral conduct falling outside the scope of competition on 
the merits and, as did the U.S. Supreme Court, excluded that paying generics to stay out of 
the market falls within the specific subject matter of the patent.  This also means that, if the 
anticompetitive settlement is reached mainly thanks to the undue leverage of the market 
power conferred by the patent, an abuse of the patent right (often in the form of sham 
litigation) can be found. 
If, as this work contends and doctrine and case law upheld, antitrust and patent law 
have the same ultimate purpose, why would we need both patent law and antitrust to address 
the same conduct, and what is their respective role?  As said, antitrust and patent law are 
interdependent and complement each other.  Both are needed to maximize consumer welfare 
as they focus on different aspects and use different means to reach their common purpose.  
                                                 
616  And here we can go back to the insightful parallelism discussed in the chapter 
dedicated to patent clusters that Professor Merger proposed with blackmail (see R.P. Merges, The 
Trouble with Trolls Innovation Rent-Seeking and Patent Law, 24(4) Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal, 2009, pp. 1600-1601). 
617  See General Court, T-472/13, Lundbeck v Commission, 8 September 2016, par. 391 
(“the reverse payments had induced the generic undertakings to accept the limitations on their autonomy laid down in the 
agreements at issue”). 
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The limitations to unrestricted static competition coming from patent law incentivize 
innovation and dynamic competition.  Innovation is an objective of antitrust as well, but 
patent law is undeniably better placed to achieve it.  In the same way that lack of protection 
for new inventions is unlikely to lead firms to invest in research that could be easily copied, 
excessively pervasive patents and misconducts by patentees can stifle innovation (as well as 
price competition). 
The two disciplines thus work together to strengthen and balance each other out, in 
the pursuit of the same overarching goal: “maximize wealth by producing what consumers want at the 
lowest cost”618 and “encourage[e] innovation, industry and competition”.619  Each controls the excess of 
the other and punishes its abuse.  It is thanks to their teamwork that they can keep up with 
the constantly evolving industries and worldwide markets, as well as consumers‟ needs and 
undertakings‟ misconducts, with no need for the legislator to intervene.620 
It is not only their focus (on price and innovation respectively, while not neglecting 
the other) that justifies the need for both to maximize consumer welfare, it is also their 
divergence in means.  The patent system is not designed to truly punish, even less to deter, 
the abuse of patent rights.  Antitrust fines, on the other hand, are calculated and imposed 
with the specific aim to punish and deter abusive conducts.  Patent law focuses on relations 
between individuals and is designed to remedy wrongs committed against (or by, in the case 
of abuse) patent owners vis-à-vis alleged patent infringers.  From this it follows that, while 
patent law is pursuing and protecting the public interest, its enforcement (also in the negative, 
when the patent right is abused or misused) is aimed at righting private wrongs.  There is no 
public authority (as the FTC or the European Commission) that intervenes on its own 
motion once the patents have been granted, to ensure they are exercised (and protected) in 
compliance with the public interest.  The abuse of patents may thus go unpunished and even 
when it does not (because consumers or other innovators invoke the abuse of patent rights or 
patent misuse doctrines), the solution provided by the patent system is often limited to the 
case at stake or inadequate to deter future misconducts by the same or other patentees.  The 
means provided by the patent system alone are thus ineffective and insufficient to address all 
the patent-related conducts that may have a negative impact on consumer welfare.621  To 
                                                 
618  W.S. Bowman, Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal, 
University of Chicago Press, 1973. 
619  Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 897 F.2d, Fed. Cir., 1990, p. 1576. 
620  “[I]ntellectual property laws and antitrust laws share the same fundamental goals of enhancing 
consumer welfare and promoting innovation. […][I]ntellectual property and antitrust laws work in tandem to bring new 
and better technologies, products, and services to consumers at lower prices.  Intellectual property laws create exclusive 
rights that provide incentives for innovation by ―establishing enforceable property rights for the creators of new and useful 
products, more efficient processes, and original works of expression.‖ […]  Antitrust laws, in turn, ensure that new 
proprietary technologies, products, and services are bought, sold, traded, and licensed in a competitive environment.” 
(U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual 
Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition, April 2007, pp. 1-2)  See also U.S. 
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property, 6 April 1995, par. 1. 
621  Both the abuse of rights and the abuse of dominance usually intervene once the 
patent has been granted.  At this stage antitrust is undoubtedly more effective in punishing the 
patentee and deterring future abuses.  Patent law has however a much bigger role to play at the stage 
of patent application.  Indeed, a strict interpretation of the non-obviousness/inventiveness criteria 
would go a long way in preventing the issuance and validation of questionable patent, whose 
proliferation is one of the elements on which the abusive conducts are premised. 
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maximize innovation (as well as competition), the legal system needs to respond to abusive 
conducts by patentees that stifle innovation.  In this sense, while the doctrines of abuse of 
rights and patent misuse may be sufficient (and most of the times even more effective than 
antitrust) to stop the misconduct (by making the patent unenforceable), antitrust intervention 
(which is not coextensive as it requires a quid pluris) is sometimes necessary to correct the 
deficiencies of these doctrines in terms of disgorging ill-gotten gains, deter future abuses and 
compensate the victim(s).622-623 
Antitrust intervention strengthens the means provided for by patent law.  Though 
requiring a showing of market power and anticompetitive effects (and often of 
anticompetitive intent, at least to confirm the objective evidence of abuse), antitrust remedies 
help the patents system to achieve its purpose (common to antitrust).624  An interesting 
analogy to better understand the relative role of the two disciplines has been proposed by the 
U.S. Federal Circuit.  The court likened the inequitable conduct doctrine (but the same can be 
said about the abuse of patent rights or patent misuse) to a shield, and antitrust to a sword.  
As explained by Professor Leslie, while the court “seemed to think that applying these labels showed, 
ipso facto, that antitrust remedies were unnecessary […] the court misconstrued the significance of its own 
analogy.  A shield can stop an attack, but it cannot disgorge ill-gotten gains, deter future attacks, or 
compensate the victims of earlier attacks.  Only a sword—an offensive weapon—can achieve these additional 
goals.  In employing its analogy, the Federal Circuit failed to recognize that shields and swords are 
complements, not substitutes.  Every well-prepared knight has both.  So it is with innovation policy: patent 
                                                 
622  “In most instances, patent law stops misconduct more easily than an antitrust approach can, because 
an antitrust claim requires the plaintiff to prove the components of the patent defenses as well as the elements of the 
antitrust cause of action, such as monopoly power for section 2 monopolization claims or specific intent to monopolize for 
attempted monopolization claims.  The patent system, however, does not succeed in achieving the remaining three goals. It 
is not designed to disgorge, deter, and compensate.” (C. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts 
of Innovation Policy, 34(4) The Journal of Corporation Law, 2009, p. 1286).  See also H.J. 
Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System. A Reexamination, 76(3) Ohio State Law Journal, 2015, 
p. 548. 
623  When the patentee is not in a dominant position, however, patent misuse (and abuse 
of patent rights) is the only remedy available to impede the distorted use of patent rights to the 
detriment of competition and innovation.  This doctrine does not require a demonstration of market 
power but simply refers to the responsibility of each patentee “not to distort, to the detriment of third parties 
(i.e., to the detriment of freedom of competition) rights granted in the abstract, trying to obtain them in ways and/or for 
purposes other than those for which the law conferred them.” (G. Ghidini, G. Cavani, P.F. Pisera‟, Italy – Abuse 
of Patent Rights and Abuse of Dominant Position: The Pfizer Case, in G. Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, 
(eds.) Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  An International Perspective, 
Kluwer, 2016, pp. 268-269).  The authors continue: “[i]n our opinion, therefore, patent misuse can be enforced 
even in cases where it is not possible to establish a market power, that is, a ‗dominant position‘ in the strict sense, so as 
to warrant the need for antitrust intervention.”  The same authors refer also to the possibility to address these 
conducts under the rules of unfair competition: “when the illegally obtained exclusive right is exercised to 
restrict the freedom of competition of one or more individual competitors‘ the conduct of the owner may qualify as an act 
contrary to ‗honest business practices‘, hence of unfair competition (Article 10bis of Paris Union Convention, PUC), 
and ensuing national legislations.”  While antitrust is more concerned about risks for competition and 
consumer welfare as such, trying to preserve an actually pluralistic market structure and the existence 
of alternative choices for consumers, unfair competition focus on the individual competitors and the 
conflicts between them. 
624  “The inadequacy of [patent law] remedies leads one to expect that the amount of deadweight loss 
caused by improper enforcement actions is significant, particularly where the probability of detection is low.  This is the 
reason that antitrust law has a damages multiplier—designed to offset the fact that violations are difficult to detect and 
prove.” (Herbert Hovenkamp Antitrust and the Patent System A Reexamination, p. 550) 
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and antitrust provide complementary responses to patent misconduct that threatens innovation. Those who take 
on perpetrators of patent misconduct need both the shield (patent law) and the sword (antitrust law).”625 
The two disciplines should thus work together, which means that both judges and 
antitrust agencies should always keep in mind both disciplines when deciding or bringing a 
case.626  As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Actavis, “patent and antitrust policies are both 
relevant in determining the ―scope of the patent monopoly‖ – and consequently antitrust law immunity – that 
is conferred by a patent.”   
Including both a patent and antitrust approach in deciding a case involving patent-
related conducts increases the effectiveness of the response.627  Patent law and antitrust law 
are not enemies but partners in the maximization of consumer welfare.628  “Antitrust and patent 
should be working together against their common enemies: invalidity, fraud, and tying.”629 
In conclusion, one cannot but hope for a rethinking of the intersection between 
patent and antitrust laws by some courts and practitioners, in line with the case law and 
doctrine mentioned in this work, to do justice to the profoundly connected and 
interdependent nature of these two disciplines.  On one hand, the reach of antitrust should be 
limited by the need to achieve the purpose of patent law.  Therefore, a conduct falling within 
the purpose (not the scope) for which the patent was granted could not be considered in 
breach of antitrust.  On the other hand, a conduct contrary to the purpose of patent law 
cannot be considered competition on the merits and will be caught by patent law (as an abuse 
of rights) as well as antitrust (when the patentee is dominant and the conduct is 
anticompetitive).  This joint intervention and reciprocal limitation is of particular importance 
in the pharmaceutical sector, where the need for incentives to innovate (due to significant 
R&D costs and ease of copying) and the risk of consumer harm (given the direct impact of 
abusive conducts on the fundamental right to health), are at the highest levels.  
                                                 
625  C. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation Policy, 34(4) 
The Journal of Corporation Law, 2009, p. 1286. 
626  “Judges, however, sometimes go one step too far by conflating patents and innovation as if they are one 
and the same, instead of appreciating that patents are but one aspect of innovation policy.  Judges should recognize that 
their goal should be to maximize innovation, not just patent rights, and that innovation cannot be maximized without 
taking antitrust principles into account.  A strong antitrust system is an important component of a larger innovation 
policy because it provides a check on those forms of patent misconduct that also injure competition.  Much of the conduct 
that antitrust law condemns in the context of patents – such as fraud and tying – is conduct that patent law itself often 
seeks to stop.” (C. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation Policy, 34(4) The 
Journal of Corporation Law, 2009, p. 1288) 
627  “In sum, to the extent that invalid and improperly procured patents stifle innovation, the exclusive 
use of patent law to address applicant misconduct constitutes inefficient innovation policy.  Supplementing patent law with 
antitrust remedies provides a more effective legal response to the problem of invalid patents.” (C. Leslie, Antitrust and 
Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation Policy, 34(4) The Journal of Corporation Law, 2009, p. 
1283) 
628  “[C]ompetition law enforcement should not be perceived as a threat to IPR: intervention is limited to 
those specific cases in which pathological IPR-driven LCM strategies hamper the otherwise healthy relationship that 
exists between innovation and competition.” (G. Pitruzzella, Life-Cycle Management Strategies in the 
Pharmaceutical Patent Sector, in G. Muscolo, G. Pitruzzella, (eds.) Competition and Patent Law in the 
Pharmaceutical Sector.  An International Perspective, Kluwer, 2016, p. 84) 
629  C. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation Policy, 34(4) 
The Journal of Corporation Law, 2009, p. 1286. 
172 
 
Bibliography 
Abbott F.M., Excessive Pharmaceutical Prices and Competition Law: Doctrinal Development 
to Protect Public Health, 6(3) UC Irvine Law Review, forthcoming Spring 2017 
Adams C.P., van Brantner V., Estimating The Cost Of New Drug Development: Is It Really 
$802 Million?, 25 Health Affairs, 2006 
Adams C.P., van Brantner V., Spending on new drug development, 19 Health Economics, 
2010 
Adams M.O., Drugs Company Profits In The United States: Are They Excessive? Evidence 
from Public Administration Perspectives, 4(2) Journal of Business & Economics Research, 
2006 
Aitken M., Berndt E.R., Cutler D.M., Prescription Drug Spending Trends in the United 
States: Looking Beyond the Turning Point, Health Affairs, 2009 
Almunia J., Antitrust enforcement: Challenges old and new, 8 June 2012 
Almunia J., Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Motorola Mobility on 
potential misuse of mobile phone standard-essential patents, 6 May 2013 
Almunia J., Competition Policy in Times of Restructuring, 22 June 2012 
Almunia J., Property and Competition Policy, 9 December 2013  
Anderman S. (ed.), The Interface between Intellectual Property Rights and Competition 
Policy, Cambridge University Press, 2007 
Anderman S., Ezrachi A. (eds.), Intellectual Property and Competition Law: New Frontiers, 
Oxford University Press, 2011 
Anderman S., Schmidt H., EU Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: the 
Regulation of Innovation, Oxford University Press, 2011 
Anderman S., The “Accommodation” of EU Competition Law with Intellectual Property 
Law 
Areeda P.E., Hovenkamp H.J., Antitrust Law: an Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their 
Application, Aspen, 2004 
Arena A., Bergmann B. and Himes J.L., Two Bodies of Law Separated by a Common 
Mission: Unilateral Conduct by Dominant Firms at the IP/Antitrust Intersection in the EU 
and the U.S., 9(3) European Competition Journal, December 2013 
Arezzo E., Competition Policy and IPRs: An Open Debate Over an Ever-Green Issue, Il 
Diritto D‟Autore, 2004 
Arezzo E., Intellectual Property Rights at the Crossroad between Monopolization and Abuse 
of Dominant Position: American and European Approaches Compared, 24(3) John Marshall 
Journal of Computer and Information Law, 2006 
Arezzo E., Strategic Patenting e Diritto della Concorrenza: riflessioni a margine della vicenda 
Ratiopharm/Pfizer, Giurisprudenza Commerciale, 2014 
173 
 
Baer B., Reflections on the Role of Competition Agencies When Patents Become Essential, 
Remarks at the 19th Annual International Bar Association Competition Conference, 11 
September 2015 
Baer B., Workshop on Examining Health Care Competition Opening Remarks, 25 February 
2015 
Bailey D., Rose V. (eds.), Bellamy & Child European Union law of competition, Oxford 
University Press, 2013 
Balto D.A., Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust Risks, 55 Food and Drug Law 
Journal, 2000 
Battaglia L.E., Drug Reformulation Regulatory Gaming: Enforcement and Innovation 
Implications, 7 European Competition Journal, 2011 
Battaglia L.E., Larouche P., Negrinotti M., Does Europe have an Innovation Policy? The 
Case of EU Economic Law, Discussion Paper No. 8481, Centre for Economic Policy 
Research, July 2011 
Bellia M., Italy: case note on "Pfizer", 45(7)International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law, 2014 
Bernard K., Is Full Transatlantic Competition Law Convegence Realistic, or Even Desirable?, 
CPI Antitrust Chronicle, December 2015 
Bohannan C., Hovenkamp H.J., Creation without Restraint: Promoting Liberty and Rivalry in 
Innovation, Oxford University Press, 2012 
Bohannan C., Hovenkamp H.J., IP and Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, 51 Boston College 
Law Review, 2010 
Bohannan C., IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 Iowa Law Review, 2011 
Boldrin M., Levine D.K., Against Intellectual Monopoly, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 
Bouchard R., Hawkins R., Clark R., Hagtvedt R., Sawani J., Empirical Analysis of Drug 
Approval-Drug Patenting Linkage for High Value Pharmaceuticals, 8(2) Northwestern 
Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, 2010 
Bowman W.S., Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economic Appraisal, University of 
Chicago Press, 1973 
Brewer D.J., The Patent System, 3 Yale Law Journal, 1894 
Burk D.L., Lemley M.A., Biotechnology‟s Uncertainty Principle, 54 Case Western Reserve 
Law Review, 2004 
Caggiano G., Muscolo G., Tavassi M. (eds.), Competition Law and Intellectual Property: a 
European Perspective, Kluwer, 2012 
Carrier M.A., A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The Missing Dimension 
of Product Hopping, 62 Florida Law Review, 2010 
Carrier M.A., Levidow N.L., Kesselheim A.S., Using Antitrust Law to Challenge Turing‟s 
Daraprim Price Increase, 31 Berkeley Technology Law Journal, forthcoming 2016 
174 
 
Carrier M.A., Payment After Actavis, 100(7) Iowa Law Review, 2014 
Carrier M.A., Product Hopping: A New Framework, 91 Notre Dame Law Review, 
forthcoming 2016 
Cheng J., Note: An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
108 Columbia Law Review, 2008 
Cheng T., Putting Innovation Incentives Back in the Patent-Antitrust Interface, 11(5) 
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, 2013 
Choi W., Den Uyl B., Hughes M., Pay-For-Delay Practices in the Pharmaceutical Sector: 
Lundbeck, Actavis, and Others, 5(1) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2014 
Clancy M., Geradin D., Lazerow A., Reverse-Payment Patent Settlements in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: An Analysis of U.S. Antitrust Law and EU Competition Law, 59(1) 
The Antitrust Bullettin, 2014 
Correa C.M., Efforts to Raise the Bar in Patent Examination Need to Be Supported, 43(7) 
International Review of Intellectual Property, 2012 
Correa C.M., Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries: The TRIPS 
Agreement and Policy Options, Zed Books, 2002 
Correa C.M., Ownership of knowledge. The role of patents in pharmaceutical R&D, 82 
Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 2004 
Cotter T.F., Misuse, 44 Houston Law Review, 2007 
Cotter T.F., Patents, Antitrust, and the High Cost of Health Care, The Antitrust Source, April 
2014 
Curzon Price T., Walker M., Incentives to Innovate v Short-term Price Effects in Antitrust 
Analysis, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2016 
D‟Amore C., The Administrative Supreme Court Confirms the ICA‟s Decision to Condemn 
Pfizer for Abuse of Dominant Position, Italian Antitrust Review, 2014 
Danzon P.M., Competition and Antitrust Issues in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
Denozza F., Consumer Transaction Costs at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual 
Property, Siena Memos and Papers on Law and Economics, 2003 
DiMasi J.A. and others, Trends in Risks Associated with New Drug Development: Success 
Rates for Investigational Drugs, 87 Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics, 2010 
DiMasi J.A., Hansen R.W., Grabowski H.G., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of 
Drug Development Costs, 22 J. Health Econ., 2003 
Dogan S., Lemley M.A., Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87(4) Texas Law Review, 
2009 
Domeij B., Patent Claim Scope: Initial and Follow-on Pharmaceutical Inventions in Europe, 
23(7) European Intellectual Property Review, 2001 
Domeij B., Pharmaceutical Patents in Europe, Kluwer, 2000 
175 
 
Drahos P., A Philosophy of Intellectual Property, Dartmouth, 1996 
Drahos P., Ghidini G., Ullrich H. (eds.), Kritika: Essays on Intellectual Property, 2015 
Drexl J. (ed.), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Edward 
Elgar, 2008 
Drexl J., Nari L. (eds.), Pharmaceutical Innovation, Competition and Patent Law: A Trilateral 
Perspective, Edward Elgar, 2013 
Economides N., Hebert W.N., Patents and Antitrust: Application to Adjacent Markets, 6 
Journal on Telecommunication & High Technology Law, 2008 
Edlin A., Hemphill C.S., Hovenkamp H.J., Shapiro C., Activating Actavis, 28 Antitrust, 2013 
Ehlermann C.-D., Atanasiu I. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2005: The 
Interaction between Competition Law and Intellectual Property Law, Hart, 2007 
Ehlermann C.-D., Atanasiu I. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2003: What Is an 
Abuse of a Dominant Position?, Hart, 2006 
European Commission, 7th Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements, 13 December 
2016 
European Commission, Communication - Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical Sector 
Inquiry Report, SEC(2009) 952 COM(2009) 351 final, 8 July 2009 
European Commission, Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry: Final Report, 8 July 2009 
European Commission, Staff Working Document, Pharmaceutical Industry: A Strategic 
Sector For The European Economy, SWD(2014) 216 final/2, 1 July 2014 
Falce V., Sulle Fondazioni Filosofiche delle Moderne Dottrine Economiche dell‟innovazione, 
Rivista di Diritto Industriale, 2004 
Farrell J., Katz M.L., The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust, 2(2) Competition 
Policy International 
Faull J., Nikpay A., The EC Law of Competition, Oxford University Press, 2014 
Feldman R., Rethinking Patent Law, Harvard University Press, 2012 
Fox E.M., Monopolization and Abuse of Dominance: Why Europe is Different, 59(1) The 
Antitrust Bulletin, Spring 2014 
FTC, Authorized Generic Drugs: Short-Term Effects and Long-Term Impacts, 2011 
FTC, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Drug Product Selection, January 1979, 
FTC, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study, July 2002 
FTC, Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions, 2010 
Galgano F., Qui suo iure abutitur neminem laedit?, Contratto e impresa, 2011 
Gallasch S., A new dimension to EU pharma antitrust product hopping and unilateral pay for 
delay, 12 (1) European Competition Journal, 2016 
176 
 
Gaudry K.S., Evergreening: A Common Practice to Protect New Drugs, 29 Nature 
Biotechnology, 2011 
Geradin D., The Uncertainties Created by Relying on the Vague “Competition on the Merits” 
Standard in the Pharmaceutical Sector: The Italian Pfizer/Pharmacia case, 5(6) Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice, 2014 
Geradin D., Ginsburg D., Safty G., Reverse Payment Patent Settlements in the European 
Union and the United States, George Mason University Legal Studies Research Paper Series 
LS 15-22, 2015 
Ghidini G., Innovation, Competition and Consumer Welfare in Intellectual Property Law, 
Edward Elgar, 2010 
Ghidini G., Intellectual Property and Competition Law. The innovation nexus, Edward Elgar, 
2006 
Ghidini G., Profili Evolutivi del Diritto Industriale, Profili evolutivi del diritto 
industriale: innovazione, concorrenza, benessere dei consumatori, accesso alle 
informazioni, Giuffrè, 2015 
Gibson S., The Use and Abuse of Drug Reformulation in Pharmaceutical Life Cycle 
Management, 20 Health Law Journal, 2013 
Gilfillan S.C., The Root of Patents, or Squaring Patents by their Roots, 31 Journal of the 
Patent Office Society, 1949 
Giudici S. (ed.), Studi in memoria di Paola A.E. Frassi, Giuffrè, 2010 
Glover G., Prepared Witness Testimony before the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, Recent Developments Which May Impact Consumer Access to, and Demand 
for, Pharmaceuticals, 13 June 2001 
Gordon W., A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural 
Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Yale Law Journal, 1993 
Govaere I., Ullrich H. (eds.), Intellectual Property, Market Power and the Public Interest, 
P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2008 
Grabowski H., Patents, innovation and access to new pharmaceuticals, 5 Journal of 
International Economic Law, 2002 
Grassani S., Evolution or Revolution? The Italian Competition Authority and the Pfizer 
Decision: A Reply to Thomas Graf, 7 February 2012 
Guimarães de Lima e Silva V., Sham Litigation in the Pharmaceutical Sector, 7(3) European 
Competition Journal, 2011 
Gurkaynak G., Guner A., Filson J., The Global Reach of FTC v. Actavis – Will Europe 
Differ from the US Approach to Pay-for-Delay Agreements?, 45(2) International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 2014 
Hemphill C.S., Lemley M.A., Earning Exclusivity Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-
Waxman Act, 77 Antitrust Law Journal, 2011 
177 
 
Hemphill C.S., Sampat B.N., Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in 
Pharmaceuticals, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 399, 2012 
Hemphill C.S., Sampat B.N., When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies, 2011 
Herman S., Classical social theories and the doctrine of „abuse of rights‟, 37 Louisiana Law 
Review, 1977 
Hershey K., Scheiber v. Dolby Laboratories, Inc., 18 Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 2003 
Hilty R.M., Liu K.-C. (eds.), Compulsory Licensing, Springer, 2015 
Hovenkamp H.J., Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination, 76(3) Ohio State Law 
Journal, 2015 
Hovenkamp H.J., Consumer Welfare in Competition and Intellectual Property Law, 9 
Competition Policy International, 2014 
Hovenkamp H.J., Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice, West, 
2016, 
Hovenkamp H.J., Innovation and the Domain of Competition Policy, 60 Alabama Law 
Review, 2008 
Hovenkamp H.J., Institutional Advantage in Competition and Innovation Policy, University 
of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-43, 2013 
Hovenkamp H.J., Janis M.D., Lemley M.A., Leslie C.R., Carrier M.A., IP and Antitrust: An 
Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law, Aspen, 2014 
Hovenkamp H.J., The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 Florida Law 
Review, 2010 
Hull D.W., Clancy M.J., The Application of EU Competition Law in the Pharmaceutical 
Sector, 7(2) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2016 
Italianer A., Competitor Agreements under EU Competition Law, 26 September 2013 
Jacob R. (Rt. Hon. Sir), Patents and Pharmaceuticals, paper given on 29th November at the 
Presentation of the Directorate-General of Competition‟s Preliminary Report of the Pharma-
Sector Inquiry, 27 September 2011 
Jaffe A.B., Lerner J., Stern S., Innovation Policy and the Economy, MIT Press, 2001 
Jenny F., Anticompetitive Abuses of Patent Systems and the Role of Competition 
Authorities, Concurrences, 2013 
Jones A., Sufrin B., EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, Oxford University 
Press, 2014 
Käseberg T., Intellectual Property, Antitrust and Cumulative Innovation in the EU and the 
US, Hart, 2012 
Katz A., Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and the Rule of Law: Between Private Power and 
State Power, 17 Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 2016 
178 
 
Korah V., Merck v. Primecrown – The Exhaustion of Patents by Sale in a Member State 
where a Monopoly Profit Could not be Earned, 4 ECLR, 1997 
Kovacic W.E., Winerman M., Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 Antitrust Law Journal, 2010 
Kroes N., Commission launches sector inquiry into pharmaceuticals, 16 January 2008 
Kur. A., Dreier T., European Intellectual Property Law: Text, Cases and Materials, Edward 
Elgar, 2013 
Ladas S.P., Patents, Trademarks, and Related Rights. National and International Protection, 
Harvard University Press, 1975 
Landes W.M., Posner R.A., The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, Belknap, 
2003 
Larouche P., Schinkel M.P., Continental Drift in the Treatment of Dominant Firms: Article 
102 TFEU in contrast to Section 2 Sherman Act, TILEC Discussion Paper DP 2013-020, 
May 2013. 
Leaffer M., Patent Misuse and Innovation, 10 Journal High Tech. Law, 2010 
Lemley M.A., Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA Law Review, 2015 
Lemley M.A., Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Northwestern University Law 
Review, 2001 
Lemley M.A., Shapiro C., Probabilistic Patents, 19 Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2005 
Lenaerts A., The relationship between the principles of fraus omnia corrumpit and of the 
prohibition of abuse of rights in the case law of the European Court of Justice, 25 Common 
Market Law Review, 2011 
Leonard A., Abuse of Rights in Belgian and French Patent Law – A Case Law Analysis, 
Jipitec, 2016 
Leslie C.R., Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation Policy, 34(4) The 
Journal of Corporation Law, 2009 
Lianos I., Competition law, intellectual property rights and dynamic analysis: towards a new 
institutional “equilibrium?, Concurrences, 2013 
Lianos I., Dreyfuss R.C., New Challenges in the Intersection of Intellectual Property Rights 
with Competition Law, 4 CLES Working Paper Series, 2013 
Lim D., Patent Misuse and Antitrust Law: Empirical, Doctrinal and Policy Perspectives, 
Edward Elgar, 2013 
Lim D., Patent Misuse and Antitrust: Rebirth or False Dawn?, 20(2) Michigan 
Telecommunication and Technology Law Review, 2014 
Lorenz M., Chrocziel P., et al. (eds.), Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Kluwer, 
2016 
179 
 
Lundin D.A., Moral Hazard in Physician Prescription Behavior, 19(5) Journal of Health 
Economics, 2000 
Magazinni L., Pammolli F., Riccaboni M., Rossi M.A., Patent Disclosure and R&D 
Competition in Pharmaceuticals, 18 Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 2009 
Maggiolino M., Intellectual Property and Antitrust: a Comparative Economic Analysis of US 
and EU Law, Edward Elgar, 2011 
Maggiolino M., Lilla‟ Montagnani M., Astrazeneca‟s Abuse of IPR-Related Proce- dures: A 
Hypothesis of Anti-Trust Offence, Abuse of Rights, and IPR Misuse, World Competition, II, 
2011, p. 245 
Mahn G., Keeping Trolls out of Courts and out of Pocket: Expanding the Inequitable 
Conduct Doctrine, 45 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, 2014 
Martin S., The Goals of Antitrust and Competition Policy, CIBER Working Papers, July 2007 
Merges R.P., As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for 
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 1999 
Merges R.P., Commercial Success and Patent Standards Economic Perspectives, 76(4) 
California Law Review, 1988 
Merges R.P., Justifying Intellectual Property, Harvard University Press, 2011, 
Merges R.P., Kuhn J.M., An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented Standards, 97 California Law 
Review, 2009 
Merges R.P., Menell P.S., Lemley M.A., Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age, 
Aspen Publishers, 2012 
Merges R.P., Nelson R.R., On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 Columbia Law 
Review, 1990 
Merges R.P., Reflections on Current Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse, 70 Journal of the 
Patent & Trademark Office Society, 1988 
Merges R.P., The Trouble with Trolls Innovation Rent-Seeking and Patent Law, 24(4) 
Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 2009 
Merges R.P., Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 Berkeley Technology Law 
Journal, 1992 
Monti M., Competition and Information Technologies, Brussels, 18 September 2000 
Monti M., The New EU Policy on Technology Transfer Agreements, Paris, 16 January 2004 
Muscolo G., Pitruzzella G. (eds.) Competition and Patent Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector.  
An International Perspective, Kluwer, 2016 
Musso A., Del Diritto di Brevetto per Invenzioni Industriali, in Commentario del Codice 
Civile Scialoja-Branca, Zanichelli, 2012 
NBER, The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity, Princeton University Press, 1962 
180 
 
O‟Donoghue R., Padilla J., The Law and Economics of Article 102, Hart, 2013 
OECD, Policy Roundtable on Competition, Patents and Innovation, DAF/COMP(2007)40, 
8 January 2008 
Pammolli F., Baio G., Rungi A., Il prezzo delle specialità medicinali alla luce di alcune recenti 
tendenze, XVI(2) Mercato Concorrenza Regole, 2014 
Peritz R., The Competition Question Unasked in Actavis: What Is the Scope of the Patent 
Right to Exclude?, 28 Antitrust, 2013 
Petit N., "Stealth Licensing" - Or Antitrust Law and Trade Regulation Squeezing Patent 
Rights, Revue du Droit des Industries de Réseau, 2014 
Podszun R., Can competition law repair patent law and administrative procedures? 
AstraZeneca, 51(1) Common Market Law Review, 2014 
Posner R.A., The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, 72 Antitrust Law Journal, 
2005 
Raffaelli E. A. (ed.), Antitrust Between EU law and National Law, XI Conference, Bruylant – 
Giuffrè, 2015 
Ramirez E., Oversight of the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, speech before the U.S. 
Senate, 9 March 2016 
Shadowen S.D., Leffler K.B., Lukens J.T., Anticompetiitive product changes in the 
pharmaceutical industry, 41 Rutgers Law Journal, 2009 
Shapiro C., Antitrust, Innovation, and Intellectual Property. Testimony Before the Antitrust 
Modernization Commission, 8 November 2005 
Sichelman T., Commercializing Patents, 62 Stanford Law Review, 2010 
Stazi A., Intellectual Property Rights and Market Power in the European Union: The Fil 
Rouge of Consumer Welfare, Comparazione e diritto civile, June 2011 
Tayar D., Spreading Misleading Information on a Competitor‟s Product as an Abuse of a 
Dominant Position: a French Pharmaceutical Story?, 5(9) Journal of European Competition 
Law & Practice, 2014 
Temmerman M., The Legal Notion of Abuse of Patent Rights, Working Paper No 2011/23, 
nccr trade regulation 
Thomas J.R., Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent 
Bounties, University of Illinois Law Review, 2001 
Todino M., Antitrust Rules and Intellectual Property Rights in the EU and the US, 1(2) Italian 
Antitrust Review, 2014 
Tokic S., The Role of Consumers in Deterring Settlement Agreements Based on Invalid 
Patents: The Case of Non-Practicing Entities, Stanford Tech. Law Review, 2012 
Tom W.K., Newberg J.A., Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres to 
Unified Field, 66 Antitrust Law Journal, 1997 
181 
 
Towey J., Albert B., Is FTC v. Actavis Causing Pharma Companies to Change Their 
Behavior?, 13 January 2016 
Towey J., Quo Vadis Post-Actavis?, 30 March 2016 
Tuominen N., Patenting Strategies of the EU Pharmaceutical Industry – Crossroad between 
Patent Law and Competition Policy, College of Europe Research Paper in Law, 2011 
Tyler N.S., Patent Nonuse And Technology Suppression The Use Of Compulsory Licensing 
To Promote Progress, 162 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2014 
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement and 
Intellectual Property Rights. Promoting Innovation and Competition, April 2007 
UNCTAD Secretariat (note by), The Role of Competition in the Pharmaceutical Sector and 
its Benefits for Consumers, UN Conference on Trade and Development, 27 April 2015 
United States, 121st meeting of OECD Competition Committee, Generic Pharmaceuticals, 
DAF/COMP/WD(2014)51, 19 June 2014 
Van Ommeslaghe P., Abus de droit, fraude aux droits des tiers et fraude à la loi note sous 
Cass., 10 sept. 1971, R.C.J.B., 1976 
Vestager M., Competition: the mother of invention, 18 April 2016 
Vestager M., Intellectual Property and Competition, 11 September 2015 
Vestager M., Protecting consumers from exploitation, 21 November 2016 
Vezzoso S., Towards an EU Doctrine of Anticompetitive IP-Related Litigation,  3(6) Journal 
of European Competition Law & Practice, 2012 
Whish R., Bailey D., Competition Law, Oxford University Press, 2015. 
Wu T., Taking Innovation Seriously: Antitrust Enforcement If Innovation Mattered Most, 78 
Antitrust Law Journal, 2012 
